Memorandum by Embassy of the Republic
of Hungary
GENERAL
1. Hungary supports the development of the Common
European Security and Defence Policy. She welcomes the fact that
the process launched upon an initiative by the United Kingdom,
has led, through St Malo, Cologne and Helsinki, to a real perspective
for the establishment of an independent European security and
defence system. Hungary considers the main goals of the Common
European Policy on Security and Defence to be the maintenance
of a secure environment—necessary for the development of
Europe—and the establishment of political and defence capabilities
to that end through an optimal use of the resources available.
Hungary's interests are best served in parallel to the evolution
of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence; particular
attention is being paid to the stability of the transatlantic
relationship.
2. Hungary considers defence a part of national
sovereignty. She is of the view that the evolution of the European
Union has reached the stage of developing an effective and credible
foreign and security policy which the Common European Policy on
Security and Defence will have to serve. The latter therefore
derives from the organic development of the process of European
integration and will, in our view, have a catalysing effect on
other fields of European Union activity. Hungary believes that
the developing Common European Policy on Security and Defence
does not counter national interests, but rather does the opposite:
through the improvement of the European security environment,
it provides more advantageous conditions for those participating
in it. It will provide a wider range of possibilities to assert
European interests than that available today.
3. Hungary believes that European security
and defence issues will remain in an intergovernmental framework
in the longer term. The application of the principle of constructive
abstention may ensure efficient decision-making in the intergovernmental
framework.
4. Hungary believes that the process of
the development of a Common European Policy on Security and Defence
will have a significant impact on the external relations of the
European Union. Such impacts and changes can in part already be
observed today:
— The Common European Policy on Security
and Defence is to become an institution interacting with its "environment".
CESDP will be able to achieve the desired level of effectiveness
if embedded in a system of wide-ranging co-operation.
— Hungary's interests are best served
if the European Union looks at NATO and its member states—including
the United States—as its strategic allies. We commend the
United Kingdom's role in ensuring that the reinforcement of the
transatlantic relationship has also received careful attention
simultaneously with the development of a Common European Policy
on Security and Defence.
— Hungary believes that maintaining
a strategic partnership with Russia and the Ukraine is an indispensable
factor to strengthening the security in Europe.
— The states of Europe's "near
abroad" can be involved at the level of co-operative partnership.
The "partnership" to be developed with these countries
may significantly increase security on the periphery of Europe
and promote the effectiveness of future crisis management.
PROCEDURE FOR
INCORPORATING DEFENCE
INTO THE
EU
5. The most important question arising in
the context of defence policy is: what is the set of objectives
and what are the means to achieve them. The most important goal
is to increase the effectiveness of European conflict- and crisis
management and the further deepening of integration among the
member states of the Union. The incorporation of certain functions
of the Western European Union will contribute to enabling the
European Union to perform Petersberg-type conflict and crisis-management
missions.
6. The broader perception of security requires
a complex set of means to handle security-related problems. The
European Union will have to have available a wide range of such
means that include also military and non-military types of crisis-management
capabilities. There is a natural demand for equipping the Common
European Policy on Security and Defence with adequate defence
capabilities. The incorporation of certain components of the WEU
is a result of, rather than a reason for the development of the
Common European Policy on Security and Defence. The development
of capabilities as well as institutions and decision-making procedures
has become a necessity, irrespective of the future of the Western
European Union.
7. Hungary considers that the following
obstacles and problems to be solved may emerge in the course of
the adaptation of WEU-functions by the European Union:
— Divergence of goals among EU-members
in relation to the Common European Policy on Security and Defence.
The latter is not yet a finalised set of ideas.
— The adaptation of different member
status established within the Western European Union to this new
type of co-operation.
— The adaptation of certain elements
of the NATO-WEU relationship and their accommodation in the different
environment of the European Union.
— The stage of development of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy will at all times limit the development
of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence.
8. The ESDI-process launched in Berlin in
June 1996 and the Common European Policy on Security and Defence
differ in a number of respects:
— Different organisations: ESDI was
not about the EU (and not really about the WEU, either) but rather
about the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance.
— Different sets of countries: The
proper ways for involvement of non-EU member European allies in
the Common European Policy on Security and Defence must be ironed
out.
— Different interests and mechanisms:
ESDI and the Common European Policy on Security and Defence have
different mechanisms for decision-making and conflict-management.
In addition, the two processes are being managed in different
ways.
9. It is in the interests of Hungary that
ESDI should not lose substance as a result of the evolution of
a Common European Policy on Security and Defence. The effective
and credible operation of the latter will be better served by
a close co-operation between NATO and the European Union. Hungary
supports the proposals of the Portuguese presidency of the European
Union with regard to relations between EU and NATO. At the same
time, we are of the view that the development of the EU-NATO relationship
is dependent on the decisions and internal processes of both organisations.
It is important for Hungary that work related to the development
of a Common European Policy on Security and Defence is pursued
in both EU and NATO in a simultaneous and co-ordinated manner.
This process will have to be transparent from the perspective
both of its final goals and decision-making mechanisms. Non-EU
member allies will have a significant role in establishing a harmonious
NATO-EU relationship.
10. As a future member of the European Union,
Hungary has an interest in seeing the Common European Policy on
Security and Defence becoming effective as soon as possible. Advancement
of the process, however, requires a gradual and pragmatic approach—goals
should be set only in a sequence that will ensure their implementation.
Excessive speed may result in false solutions characterised by
the same low level of efficiency as in the Western European Union,
albeit in a new framework. In addition to accelerated institutional
transformation, priority will also have to be ensured for the
development of capabilities.
11. There is a certain disproportion between
the involvement of the non EU-member European allies into the
Common European Policy on Security and Defence and the rights
ensured by NATO to EU-members which are not members of the Alliance.
Hungary hopes that in the course of practical co-operation, the
EU will be inclusive in its approach to co-operation, in the same
way as the Alliance in the context of involving non allied European
countries.
12. Hungary, other non-EU member allies,
as well as EU member states share a single security environment
and have common security interests. In order to enable the EU
to react effectively and, whenever possible, in a preventive manner
to challenges originating from its periphery, it is advisable
to establish wide-ranging co-operation with neighbouring states.
The special understanding with these six countries is justified
by the fact that those countries are members of the organisation
that ensures the highest level of security guarantee for the entire
region.
13. Hungary is situated near a permanent
crisis spot and therefore has a particular interest in the development
of an efficient European defence policy. Its geographical location
is one of the reasons Hungary attributes great importance to playing
a role in CESDP's decision shaping, to see its opinion being taken
into account, while respecting the EU's decision-making autonomy.
An inclusive approach and an appropriate place for non-EU member
European allies will also reinforce the Common European Policy
on Security and Defence itself.
14. Once a member of the European Union,
Hungary will also become a participant in the Common European
Policy on Security and Defence. The earliest and fullest possible
involvement of Hungary in the CESDP would help better preparation.
The shaping of the structures of co-operation is a delicate issue;
Hungary therefore attributes particular importance to the substance
and depth of that co-operation.
15. Hungary greatly appreciates the consistent
efforts of the United Kingdom to involve the three Central European
members of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Common European
Policy on Security and Defence.
SUBSTANCE OF
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
16. Co-operation with other countries and
international organisations is an organic part of NATO's philosophy.
Hungary favours healthy, carefully designed co-operation between
EU and NATO which would provide sufficient manoeuvring space for
the future evolution of both organisations.
17. Hungary believes that the financing
of capabilities made available for common objectives will remain
a competency of national budgets for the foreseeable future. The
ratio of Hungarian defence expenditure to GDP is being increased
annually by 0.1 per cent. The capability-oriented restructuring
of the Hungarian Defence Forces has become a timely issue anyway.
The planned defence reform will be in full harmony with the goals
of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence.
18. Hungary agrees with the concept of rationalising
and harmonising European defence industries and of the improvement
of efficient co-operation in this field. Lessons learned from
the Kosovo operation have also shed light on the technology gap
persisting between the United States and its European allies.
Increased harmonisation of defence industries would result in
a number of advantages, inter alia, in a favourable impact
on the development of a Common European Policy on Defence and
Security. With our limited means and capabilities available, Hungary
would like to be involved in certain forms of European defence
industrial co-operation. This intention is being manifested by
the Hungarian application for membership in the WEAG.
19. Hungary agrees that the supervision
of security and defence policies remains a competency of national
parliaments.
FORCE STRUCTURE
20. Owing to the composition of the two
organisations, the development-related goals of EU and NATO would
be better to coincide and occasionally supplement each other.
The European adaptation of NATO's planning system would effectively
assist the development of the European crisis management capabilities.
21. In order to identify the necessary capabilities
to be developed for a successful EU-led crisis management, Hungary
hopes that NATO's DCI, as well as the results of WEU's audit will
be given the greatest possible consideration.
22. The structure of national defence forces
continues to reflect the requirements of the Cold War and corresponds
less to the challenges we are currently facing. The use of resources
is also inefficient. However, the main problem is not the continuing
existence of conscription, but rather how to ensure that highly
qualified, well-equipped and well-trained and motivated non-conscript
personnel will fulfil the tasks of originating partially from
the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. If these goals
are attained, the question of the ratio between conscript and
career personnel will become an issue of secondary importance,
one that falls into the competence of national authorities. Trends
nevertheless show the concept of an all-volunteer army coming
increasingly popular.
23. Hungary is of the view that there is
no need to establish a standing European army at present. There
are no plans in the allied countries to establish separate military
capabilities for exclusively European or NATO purposes. In the
light of the current and foreseeable security challenges and goals
to be attained, the system of pooled capabilities identified in
the Headline Goals seems appropriate. In the case of NATO-members,
the establishment of a standing European army would result in
an unnecessary duplication of forces.
25 February 2000
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