Memorandum by Catriona Gourlay, Executive
Director, International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe,
Brussels
1. PROCEDURE
FOR INTEGRATING
DEFENCE INTO
THE EU
(a) How will the WEU be integrated into the
EU?
1. In the Cologne Declaration of the European
Council (3 June 1999) it was agreed that the EU would include
those functions of the WEU which are necessary to fulfilling its
new responsibilities in the area of Petersberg tasks (a range
of tasks from rescue evacuation, through other humanitarian actions,
to traditional peacekeeping and as far as peace-making). The stated
aim was to take the necessary decisions by the end of 2000, after
which the WEU "as an organisation" would have completed
its purpose. More specifically, the Cologne Declaration stated
that the EU would seek to acquire the following functions (previously
provided by the WEU):
— 2. "An EU Military Staff,
including a Situation Centre"
The new EU decision-making structures for European
Security and Defence (the Political and Security Committee and
the Military Committee) will require the incorporation of military
expertise within EU structures. Initially, a small military staff
(approximately eight) will be based in the European Council's
General Secretariat to assist an interim military body in, inter
alia, drafting a working programme by 1 April for the EU's
developing military staff. These military experts will later form
the core of the European Military Staff, which will be comprised
of up to 150 military experts seconded from Member States by the
end of 2001. In this way the function of the WEU's Situation Centre
will be taken on board by the EU. The Military Committee and Military
Staff will be located in a secure building near the Council Secretariat,
but its exact location has not yet been decided.
— 3. "A Satellite Centre"
The WEU's Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain
is a small facility with a staff of 20. While its independent
capacity to provide military intelligence is limited, it has been
especially useful in the surveillance of refugee movements and
camps and for de-mining tasks. It is likely that the EU will incorporate
its functions with little modification.
— 4. "An Institute for Security
Studies"
The WEU Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris
will probably be incorporated into the EU with little modification.
It is likely that it will remain in Paris and may perform an outreach/educational
function, for which there is no existing capacity in the EU.
5. A residual WEU structure will probably
remain as a repository of a European mutual defence agreement
(Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty). This might resemble the structure
of the WEU in the 1950's—a dormant organisation with a small
administrative staff.
Outstanding difficulties include:
— 6. Are Treaty changes required?
The Portuguese Presidency has been tasked with
answering the question of whether the new decision-making structures
for CESDP, notably a Political and Security Committee and a Military
Committee, will acquire competencies that require Treaty modification.
It is likely that the interim answer will be "no" since
many Member States are eager to avoid the "delay" incurred
by seeking parliamentary approval or conducting a referendum on
the issue (Denmark). Nevertheless, if the committees are to be
able to make swift decisions, mandated by the Council, they are
likely to be given "enhanced powers" in crisis situations
and many believe this to require Treaty amendment.
So far, the Portuguese Presidency has proposed
a number of multi-level consultations, co-operation and information-sharing
initiatives tailored to routine (non-crisis) and crisis situations.
These include the establishment of a Security Task Force to consider
the necessary EU-NATO security and communications arrangements;
cross-representation and participation in relevant Council, Committee
and working group meetings; and a detailed outline of the decision-making
procedure for launching and conducting EU-led operations using
NATO assets. Other provisions include a link between the Political
and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
during the phases in which options for action are considered and
implemented.
— 8. While the principle of institutional
autonomy in decision-making is established and uncontroversial,
some non-aligned EU members have indicated their resistance to
such close institutional co-operation. Likewise, NATO non-EU members
will demand significant participation in the EU decision-making
process if their assets are to be used in resulting actions. It
will also be difficult to agree information-sharing arrangements
between institutions with asymmetrical memberships.
— Asymmetrical memberships of NATO
and the EU (see1.(d) below).
— Involving non-EU Member States (see
1.(d) below).
(b) Difference between current proposals and
the June 1996 NATO Berlin Summit
9. In short, Berlin discussed the addition
of a European defence dimension in the context of strengthening
the European pillar of NATO whereas Cologne agreed the need to
develop an independent EU military capacity. While both summits
agreed that the EU might use NATO assets for EU-led operations,
the Cologne/Helsinki agreements have also included agreements
that the EU develop an "autonomous capacity to take decisions
and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct
EU-led military operations in response to international crises"
(Helsinki Summit 10 December 1999).
(c) Is the timetable realistic?
10. So far the timetable established in
Cologne and Helsinki has been adhered to. The Portuguese Presidency
has overseen decisions to establish, by 1 March 2000, the interim
bodies foreseen in the Helsinki Declaration of the European Council
(an interim Political and Security Committee, an interim body
of military representatives of Member States' Chiefs of Defence,
and a strengthened Council Secretariat, including military staff
seconded from Member States). These bodies are (realistically)
tasked with preparing for the establishment of permanent decision-making
bodies. Given the pace and output of negotiations to date, it
is likely that all decisions relating to the new institutional
structures for CESDP will be taken by the end of 2000, as foreseen
in Cologne.
11. With regards to achieving the Headline
Goal of creating a 50,000-60,000 strong rapid reaction force by
2003, the Portuguese presidency has proposed a programme to convene,
by the end of the year, a "Force Generation Conference"
to determine Member States' voluntary contributions to the proposed
force. A British initiative to elaborate the Headline Goals also
foresees a systematic approach aimed at identifying what the national
contributions should be and the capability gaps which would need
to be filled. While the proposed decision-making timetable appears
realistic, the realisation of resulting decisions may be delayed
if they imply significant increases in national defence spending.
12. Commissioner Patten is also in the process
of establishing a timetable for achieving headline goals in projecting
non-military capacity for crisis management (including policing,
mine-clearance, mediation, border controls) and intends to have
identified these goals by April 2000. In addition, a proposal
to establish a Rapid Reaction Facility for civilian crisis management
will be presented at the Lisbon European Council in March. Developments
in the field of civilian crisis management are not, however, bound
by a strict timetable and significant decisions in this area may
still be made during the Swedish Presidency in 2001.
(d) Memberships—non-NATO EU states?
Turkey? Non-EU NATO states?
13. The Helsinki European Council Declarations
tasked the Portuguese Presidency with producing "proposals
on appropriate arrangements (...) on modalities of consultation
and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned
to contribute to "EU military crisis management". To
this end, the Presidency has proposed that the EU develop special
dialogue and consultation mechanisms with Non-EU European NATO
members while still providing accession candidates with the ability
to participate in dialogue, consultation and co-operation structures.
This might take the form of a "European Security and Defence
Framework" consisting of ad hoc structures, parallel but
distinct from corresponding EU decision-making structures. At
each level of decision-making (Council, Political and Security
Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff), there would
be two parallel meetings, each with different memberships: firstly,
the EU Member States plus Non-EU European NATO Members, and secondly,
with all Non-EU NATO Members and those states which are candidates
for accession to the EU. Thus current discussions are focussing
on a three-tiered approach to involvement in decision-making.
14. The Portuguese Presidency proposals
do not differentiate between members of both the EU and NATO and
the four non-aligned EU members. While the four non-aligned EU
members are likely to want to minimise formal EU-NATO co-operation,
it is unlikely that they would block developments so long as they
are limited to the discussion of Petersberg tasks and respect
the ultimate autonomy of EU decision-making.
15. The Portuguese Presidency's proposals
do not differentiate in levels of involvement between different
non-EU European NATO members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Turkey). They clearly fall short of Turkey's demands to be
directly included in the Political and Security Committee, European
Military Committee and Military Staff and to be granted full and
equal participation in decision-making on all EU-led operations
drawing on NATO assets. Nevertheless non-EU European NATO members
may be satisfied with formula proposed by the Presidency in so
far as it provides for regular consultation and a significant
level of participation in the decision-shaping and subsequent
preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations, including
those which do not draw on NATO assets.
16. Turkey has already indicated that it
will contribute to the Headline Goal of a rapid reaction force
of 60,000 by 2003 with a brigade size unit supported by sufficient
air and naval components. According to current proposals, such
contributions would enable Turkey to participate in the second
tier of EU ESDP decision-making and to appoint a Military Liaison
officer to work with the EU Military Staff, in a "Standing
Military Liaison Cell".
2. SUBSTANCE
OF EUROPEAN
DEFENCE
(a) NATO and EU division of responsibility
17. It is undisputed that NATO will remain the
sole organisation responsible for European collective defence.
With regards to peacekeeping, however, the division of responsibilities
is less clear. NATO will continue to be responsible for peacekeeping
and peace enforcement tasks while the EU is preparing to be able
to conduct Petersberg tasks in its near abroad. Thus the EU may
take on a larger share of the peacekeeping burden only when NATO
does not want to be involved in specific European operations.
18. This is desirable in so far as it promises
the EU a greater political role in its near abroad and the US
the advantages of burden-sharing. Indeed, the EU is condemned
to succeed in realising the proposals of Cologne/Helsinki in so
far that failure is likely to erode EU political influence and
alienate the US without offering the benefits of burden sharing.
See 2. (b) below with regards its practicability.
(b) Adequate provision for funding of new
defence arrangements?
19. There is no guarantee that adequate
funding will be provided for the new defence arrangements, other
than the high political price of reneging on commitments. Current
proposals aim to identify: various "force packages"
corresponding to possible interventions scenarios; how national
contributions will meet their requirements and which additional
capabilities will be required. More specifically, the idea of
performance criteria aimed at providing sufficient forces to achieve
the Headline Goal has been suggested as a mechanism to help bring
sufficient leverage to bear on EU Member States. The Portuguese
Presidency recently stated that the EU "must now begin to
define convergence criteria to increase our effort together and
harmoniously". In addition, the French minister has proposed
that each Member State devote 0.7 per cent of its GDP to spending
on military investments.
(c) Implications for armaments policy
20. The creation of a European defence capability
will be greatly facilitated by the concurrent rationalisation
of the European Defence industrial base. This process, in turn,
would be facilitated by the development of a common procurement
policy and common procedures and methods. Such developments would
ultimately lead to greater interoperability, more cost-efficient
procurement and, potentially, to increased national specialisation.
21. While national defence specialisation
would allow large savings and enhance efficiency, it would also
end the fiction that each nation has an all-round defensive ability.
The real challenge to creating a strong industrial base for the
developing European Defence capability is the political acceptance
of such a change; it demands that decisions over national defence
industries and force structures be shaped by wider European interests
rather than purely national ones. While the European defence industry
is consolidating to create European "champions", these
developments are still generally seen in the context of providing
for all-round national defence rather than as a move towards national
specialisation.
(d) How is parliamentary accountability best
assured in this sector?
22. The Common European Security and Defence
Policy will remain strictly inter-governmental, governed ultimately
by unanimous decision-making in the Council of Ministers (although
during a crisis, the Council of Ministers may mandate the Political
and Security Committee to operate with enhanced decision-making
powers). As such, it will continue to be principally accountable
to national parliaments.
23. Nevertheless, it will become increasingly
difficult for national parliaments to scrutinise such complex
inter-governmental decision-making processes or to assess their
impact on the EU as a whole. At the intergovernmental level, there
is still the challenge of building the formal procedures of accountability,
both in overcoming the new problems of EU-led multilateral military
operations, and in responding to the perceptions of democratic
deficit.
24. In addressing the perceived democratic
deficit, national lines of accountability should be augmented
with transnational lines of accountability. To this end, the role
of the European Parliament (EP) should be enhanced. New powers
could include: co-decision in funding civilian aspects of the
CESDP (funding for military operations should remain with the
governments); EP consultation on (or even approval of) Council
decisions establishing principles for the threshold for use of
force; and EP consultation/approval for decisions on the mobilisation
of forces for specific operations.
25. The remaining aspect which needs thought
is the question of the wider democratic community comprised of
NATO members and Central Europeans who should have regular association
with the EU's defence work. The prospect of closer EU-NATO co-operation
has already resulted in closer co-operation (including cross participation)
between the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The future role of the WEU Assembly
has yet to be decided, but as a wider consultative body it could
still provide useful feedback, input and legitimacy for European
decision-makers. Should the Assembly be maintained, it too will
need to co-operate more closely with the EP in the oversight of
CESDP, perhaps by holding joint hearings and producing joint reports
on matters of defence.
3. FORCE STRUCTURE
(a) How can an EU capability be developed
in practical terms?
26. The practical arrangements for achieving
the new EU capability will be the subject of negotiations between
EU defence ministers over the next two years at least. Initially
the EU is likely to focus on co-ordinating available national
assets. It remains, unclear however, whether the new capabilities
it aims to develop will be national ones held "on call"
for EU operations of multinational capabilities.
27. If the EU is to develop joint capabilities
such as a joint Global Positioning System or joint space-based
intelligence assets, it will also need to develop policies governing
the use of these capabilities. The experience of developing jointly
funded capabilities within NATO has been far from positive and
it remains to be seen whether the degree of political will required
to fund common assets exists within the EU. Another cheaper, but
no less complex alternative is for the EU to forge appropriate
arrangements for access, on a regular basis, to US satellite information.
28. With regards to intelligence, a more
immediate need is for EU Member States to enhance their intelligence
co-operation. They should extend the intelligence-sharing arrangements
currently employed in the fields of non-proliferation and anti-terrorism
to a wider range of common interests. National intelligence services
need to receive clear orders on what can and must be shared on
a routine basis for the use of European Council and the High representative
of CFSP.
29. It is not clear how the need for large
transport aircraft will be met although it is possible that a
central military air transport command be established with the
power to requisition commercial transport aircraft from Member
States.
(b) The effect of conscription in most European
armed forces
30. EU Member States which rely on conscription
are already in the process of professionalising and restructuring
their armies to provide highly mobile, air-transportable, multi-purpose
units, trained in the different aspects of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.
Even where member states such as Germany are not planning to phase
out conscription altogether, they are nevertheless introducing
such professional units for rapid reaction operations. Therefore,
on present trends, the continued existence of conscript armies
will not preclude the EU from achieving a 50,000-60,000 Rapid
Reaction Force by 2003. It might, however, limit future initiatives
to exceed this level of readiness and/or deployment.
(c) Rapid-response force of 60,000—is
this the right approach?
31. According to a British document entitled
"Elaboration for the Headline Goals—Food for Thought",
the most demanding type of mission that the European Rapid Reaction
Force will be called upon to carry out will be a complex peace
enforcement task in or around Europe with the possibility (with
reservations) of conducting, in parallel, a more limited operation
elsewhere in the world. The WEU has also produced a series of
illustrative profiles of European-led Petersberg mission up to
corps size.
32. It is likely that a European Rapid Reaction
Force designed to carry out, at most, one peace enforcement operation
for up to one year, is adequate for European future "needs"
for EU-led operations, without US involvement. Beyond this it
is likely that European forces would contribute to UN or NATO-led
operations as at present.
33. There is no need for a standing "EU"
army as such, since it ultimately requires unified political leadership,
but some internationally provided staff will be required to service
the framework for EU actions. Multinational units such as the
Eurocorps and its headquarter facilities could be developed to
perform such functions.
4. GENERAL
(a) Implications for sovereignty and the development
of the EU
34. The new machinery that EU members have agreed
to establish for managing defence and for CFSP in general, aims
to increase the EU's collective strength in a non-collectivist
way. It remains a strictly intergovernmental process while offering
many points of contact for wider consultation at different levels.
Thus rather than contributing to the construction of supranational
institutions of the Union, some fear or argue that it will lead
to their deconstruction. In any case, the development of CESDP
demonstrates the diversity of methods of decision-making consistent
with the EU project.
35. The successful addition of a defence
capability should bring disproportionate benefits to the whole
enterprise of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in
so far as promises multi-functional synergy and greater institutional
authority. The experience of concerted action within this context
may also advance the identification of common interests and shared
principles, yet it need not necessarily "spill over"
into the institutional domain and result in greater political
integration.
(b) The inter-governmental model: national
interest, efficiency and durability?
36. The current and proposed model for dealing
with CESDP is strictly intergovernmental and as such requires
that all decisions are unanimous. While guaranteeing national
interest with a veto power, efficient decision-making will, as
at present, rely on shared interests. Just as the failure of CFSP
to deliver concerted action during the war in Bosnia reflected
divergent national interests, the current historic convergence
of French, German and British national interests may herald a
new era in "efficient" decision-making in accordance
with commonly established values, principles, strategies, and
approaches to humanitarian intervention.
37. The durability of the intergovernmental
model will ultimately depend on the long-term convergence of underlying
norms and interests. In this policy sector the intergovernmental
model will be strengthened by a shared normative framework based
on a universal respect for human rights, high and transparent
standards in areas such as the legal basis for intervention, laws
of war, threshold for the use of force, democratic accountability
and openness.
(c) Implications for relations with the US,
Russia, and Europe's "near abroad"
38. (a) Relations with the US have already
become more complicated as the US fears that the CESDP will not
result in real benefits of burden sharing while it will reduce
US influence of European Security. Within the NATO context, the
US position towards CESDP is usually summarised by the three No-D's:
"No De-coupling", meaning that development of a CESDP
should not weaken the Atlantic Alliance; "No Discrimination",
implying that EU-led crisis management operations should be open
to equal participation by all NATO members; and "No Duplication",
meaning that EU capabilities should not replicate those already
in existence within NATO.
39. Of these concerns, it will be particularly
difficult to satisfactorily resolve the tension between the European
desire for autonomous capabilities and the American demand for
avoidance of duplication. Some necessary duplication seems likely
in a number of core military capabilities.
40. US concerns that a strong CESDP would
weaken the Alliance are only valid if they refer to the weakening
of US influence within the Alliance. In this sense they are well
founded in so far as the EU will probably reject any developments
which might lead to either US predominance over European decision-making
processes or an unbalanced need to procure defence equipment in
the US. In every other sense, a strong CESDP should strengthen
the Alliance and the Trans-Atlantic relationship by making Europeans
better and more dependable allies. Conversely, the development
of CESDP is only likely to significantly strain Trans-Atlantic
relations if it fails and does not lead to real military and civilian
capacity-building.
41(b) Relations with Russia are especially
important to the EU in view of its upcoming eastward expansion.
The EU has pledged in its Common Strategy on Russia, "to
work with Russia to develop joint foreign policy initiatives with
regard to third countries and regions, to conflict prevention
and to crisis management." Indeed, EU-Russia relations would
be strengthened if the EU succeeds in engaging Russia in the development
and implementation of a number of practical civilian conflict
prevention measures and potentially Petersberg crisis-management
tasks.
42(c) A strengthened CESDP will be perceived
to add gravitas to the EU institutions and thereby enhance its
political influence generally. This would certainly be useful
in the context of the EU's engagement in the Middle East peace
process. Moreover, by developing additional civilian conflict
prevention instruments the EU will be in a better position to
implement its soon-to be-announced Common Strategy on the Mediterranean,
and the Stability Pact for South East Europe. Similarly the development
of CESDP should benefit its relations with Central and Eastern
European countries provided that they are still able to participate
in the new structures as they were able to through the WEU.
(d) Do current proposals make a qualitative
difference?
43. Yes, they should. The current proposals
provide the framework for a more efficient comprehensive and coherent
CESFP. They aim to provide an early warning and policy planning
capability, a professional situation analysis centre and military
expertise for the new decision-making forum, an improved range
and strengthened capability of civilian conflict prevention and
crisis management tools as well as an autonomous capability for
crisis management. Should these ambitious aspirations be realised,
there is no doubt that the quality of the EU's CFSP will be greatly
enhanced. Yet these are still early stages and it remains too
early to tell whether the EU will be successful in designing more
effective conflict prevention instruments or collectively providing
for the military capability they aspire to.
9 March 2000
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