Memorandum by Italian Embassy (Informal
Translation)
1(a) The aim outlined in art 17 of the Amsterdam
Treaty (integration of the WEU in the European Union) has in fact
been modified by the Conclusions of the Cologne European Council,
which foresee only "the inclusion of those WEU functions
necessary to the European Union to discharge its new responsibilities
in the field of the Petersberg tasks".
This means that, though in a much reduced role,
in the foreseeable future the WEU will survive as depositor of
the collective defence guarantee (art V). As a reflection of this
the Ten Members WEU Council should survive in the medium term.
As for the network of relations with non-EU countries, the European
Union will not be able to "import" the WEU model sic
et simpliciter, a specific one shall be worked out in order
to safeguard its members' exclusive prerogatives. A "residual"
WEU might retain the WEAG and WEAO activities, whereas the Satellites
Centre and the Institute of Defence Studies could become subsidiary
agencies of the European Union.
1(b) As indicated also in the Communique«
of the NATO Ministerial Meeting of 15 December 1999, the new development
vis-a«-vis the decisions taken at the June 1996 Berlin
Summit is the need to develop the relations between NATO and the
European Union and no longer those between NATO and the WEU. It
will be the European Union in fact that will manage possible future
military operations under European leadership.
1(c) All EU members are willing to agree
by the end of this year the scheme of new organisms needed for
crisis management. We could therefore proceed without further
delay to formalise arrangements for consultation and cooperation
with NATO and with non-EU European countries.
Whether this time schedule is realistic will
be verified when the provisional settings of the new organisms
will start working (from 1 March).
1(d) All EU members deem it necessary to
establish links of information, consultation and possible operational
cooperation with the other NATO countries and with the countries
candidate to join the European Union.
In cases of military operations under EU leadership,
with the use of NATO resources, it will be necessary to ensure
the full involvement of the EU countries which are not members
of NATO.
2(a) There is no formal division of responsibilities
between the EU and NATO preventing the latter from leading Petersberg
type actions. It is true, however, that, in compliance with the
Conclusions of the Cologne and Helsinki European summits, the
development of the EU military dimension is finalised to fulfil
conflict prevention and crisis management tasks.
In general terms the direct involvement of the
European Union is to be foreseen in those circumstances in which
NATO decides not to act directly.
2(b) Italy believes that the laying down
of headline goals for military capabilities should swiftly bring
about the setting of national targets and common criteria to ensure
convergence of member states' operational capacities. The national
targets and "operational standards" should help define
the financial resources that each partner should commit.
It will be of the utmost importance to carry
out a periodical assessment of the progress made toward achieving
the headline goals also to help member states to verify the adequacy
of the national effort undertaken.
2(c) The development of a European industrial
capacity in the field of defence is essential for the credibility
of the EU military dimension. Convergence of procurement policies
and operational standards is just as essential.
However, the industrial set up in the various
EU countries is not homogenous thus making difficult the development
of a swift plan involving all the 15 members. This is a typical
situation in which it would instead be preferable to foster enhanced
co-operation among certain member states, similar to the project
currently being pursued with the "Letter of Intent".
2(d) The security and defence dimension
of the European Union is developing in the frame of the second
pillar with an intergovernmental brand. This ensures that national
parliaments can discourse with their respective governments and
make their orientations known.
3(a) Having agreed to the need to avoid
any unnecessary duplications with what already exists within NATO,
it is nevertheless important to equip the European Union with
a modicum of autonomous intelligence capacity on which to base
its own political judgement. The development of transport, intelligence
and other capacities in the context of the EU military dimension,
would take place basically thanks to a co-ordinated development
of national resources, which would naturally be utilised also
for NATO purposes.
3(b) Italy has already passed legislation
which foresees the change over from conscription to an armed force
of volunteers specifically to pursue the restructuring necessary
to face up to the new tasks.
3(c) The objective of a 60,000 strong armed
force has been determined taking into account recent experiences
of international intervention. It appears to be both suitably
ambitious and realistic. However, it concerns the assembling of
national forces: as clearly stated in the Conclusions of the Helsinki
European Council, this process will not imply the creation of
a European army.
4(a) The so called EU defence dimension
is part of CFSP. The related military capability is, in the first
place, an instrument of which the Union will be able to avail
itself in pursuing its external relations aims. By equipping itself
with the capacity to carry out military operations the Union has
provided an additional mean—together with its economic power,
cultural influence and diplomatic action—with which to enhance
its capacity to influence the external world and make it more
akin to its fundamental interests and the values on which it is
based. The acquisition of this new instrument will enable the
EU to better contribute to extinguish hotbeds of crises liable
to lead to humanitarian catastrophes and affect our security and
stability.
4(b) We believe that the model can work
if—by means of appropriate amendments to the Treaties, to
be discussed at the ongoing Intergovernmental Conference—a
mechanism will be introduced to allow the decisional powers of
the EU Council to be temporarily delegated to a subordinated body
(Political and Security Committee). The delegation of powers would
be temporary and limited to the needs of the day-to-day management
of a military operation, in the framework of the political instructions
provided by the Council.
4(c) The Member States are willing to set
up a channel of constant information, maximum transparency and
close cooperation with the United States and Europe's "near
abroad" countries (especially those candidates to join the
Union and the other members of NATO). Appropriate attention shall
also be paid to Russia and Ukraine. This should considerably benefit
the quality of the relations between the Union and all these countries.
4(d) The introduction of a military dimension
in the European Union will mark a significant breakthrough which
in our opinion should be politically reflected in the Treaties.
28 February 2000
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