Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence


Memorandum by NATO

Question:

It is proposed that the WEU will be integrated into the EU. How can this be done? What are the main obstacles?

Answer:

  Since the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty ("humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making"), the European Union, at its European Council Summit meetings in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999, has been taking steps to underpin its common foreign and security policy by developing a common policy on security and defence based on real military (and non-military) crisis management capabilities.

  With respect to the future of the WEU, the European Union decided at Cologne that the ground should be prepared for the transfer into the EU of the WEU functions necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks by the end of the year 2000. The Cologne Declaration states that in that event the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose.

  This process is currently under way. At their Luxembourg Ministerial meeting in mid-November last year, WEU Ministers agreed that the bodies of the EU Council would have direct access, as required, to the expertise of the WEU's operational structures, including the WEU Secretariat; the Military Staff, the Satellite Centre in Torrejon; and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Shortly thereafter, the EU High Representative took up his additional responsibilities as WEU Secretary General. Helsinki, last but not least, empowered the EU HR/SG cum WEU Secretary General to make full use of WEU assets for advising the EU Council during the period of transition.

  NATO is following these developments very closely, since the WEU has been the Alliance's main interlocutor over the past years with respect to European-led non-Article V crisis response operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities. By the time of the Washington Summit last year, we had put in place the key elements of our 1996 Berlin decisions on setting up arrangements and mechanisms for NATO support to WEU-led operations, such as adjustments to defence planning and PARP; flexible options for selection of European NATO Commander and NATO HQs; revised TORs for DSACEUR; making use of the DJTF concept; operational planning; exercises; consultation arrangements; and a framework for release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities. These arrangements were exercised and tested in a joint crisis management exercise called CMX/CRISEX 2000 in February 2000 and are currently in the process of being reviewed and adjusted.

  Today, NATO is in a position to respond to a request by the WEU (or the EU through the WEU) to make use of Alliance assets and capabilities in a European-led operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU, should the NAC decide to do so. This means that until the EU is ready to become our direct interlocutor, we could work through the WEU.

  The existing NATO-WEU link is also of relevance in implementing the Washington and Helsinki decisions on European security and defence. Over the past years, we have put together an impressive set of arrangements which constitute a toolbox from which to choose in establishing similar links with the European Union. While there are certainly differences between the EU and the WEU, institutionally, legally and in terms of corporate culture, the further development of ESDI has to build on Berlin and to the extent possible on existing NATO-WEU mechanisms.

Question:

How does the current proposal for integrating defence into the EU differ from the agreement at the June 1996 NATO Ministerial that operations could take place under WEU political control and strategic direction?

Answer:

  With the decisions taken by NATO and the EU at Washington, Cologne and Helsinki, the European Union is becoming the Alliance's main interlocutor for questions of European-led military crisis management. This is adding further response options to the Euro-Atlantic crisis management menu. In future, European-led operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of the EU will be possible. At the Washington Summit, the Alliance has acknowledged this situation and expressed its preparedness to define and adopt arrangements for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which NATO as a whole would not be engaged. The Alliance is working on the implementation of the Washington agenda taking into account relevant developments in the EU. In this context, it should be noted that the EU is attempting to develop its capabilities for military and non-military crisis management. It is not taking on a role in defence. In fact, the Helsinki Declaration states very clearly that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members and that the development of a common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (and Article V of the Brussels Treaty).

Question:

Is the timetable for the proposed new arrangements realistic?

Answer:

  During the last 18 months, we have made more progress on ESDI/CESDP than in the 18 years before. There is a sense of direction and there is a lot of momentum in all the institutions involved in building ESDI-EU, WEU and NATO. This momentum must be maintained and we must stay the course. This is first and foremost a question of political will—and this political will has been expressed very clearly by our Heads of State and Government in Washington, Cologne and Helsinki.

Question:

How will the different memberships of NATO and the EU affect the new security arrangements? At present four EU member states (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden) are outside NATO. What effect will their status have? How will the position of Turkey and the other non-EU European Allies be handled?

Answer:

  One of the key questions in making the European Security and Defence Identity work over the next years, both in the European Union and the Alliance, is to ensure that the mechanisms and structures created are inclusive and allow for the necessary involvement of all the countries concerned. It cannot be in our interest to relegate to the sidelines countries that are making a valuable contribution to European security and stability, for instance in the Balkans. The EU has decided to set up structures for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the six non-EU European Allies on issues related to European security and defence and crisis management. The Alliance has on various occasions expressed its hope that solutions can be found which are satisfactory to all Allies.

  The key point for our non-EU European Allies is that they should have the right to participate, if they so wish, in EU-led operations involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities, and that they should be invited to take part in other EU-led operations. They also want to be fully involved in consultations and decision-shaping leading up to EU operations. In my view, such arrangements—mirroring what is the case in the WEU—would not only enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military crisis management operations but would also contribute to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO.

  We also need to address the question of how to involve the non-Allied EU members on our side. I am confident that arrangements can be worked out and that the interests of the four countries can be met. The recent CMX/CRISEX 2000 exercise, the first joint NATO-WEU exercise, was a good opportunity to develop this aspect, with Partner military representatives being actively involved in planning at SHAPE.

  Finally, the Alliance has been working very hard to create the interfaces for our co-operation with Partner countries, in particular in crisis management. Our experience in the Balkans with IFOR/SFOR and now KFOR involving 14 Partners shows very clearly the need for and advantages of such an approach. Future crisis management, whether it will be European or NATO-led, will have the same requirements, for which we should all be prepared.

Question:

Under the new proposals, NATO is to guarantee European security while the EU may conduct the Petersberg tasks of crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Is this a practicable and desirable division of responsibility?

Answer:

  The European Union aspires to develop its military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence. Its Helsinki Declaration of December 1999 acknowledges that NATO will continue to play an important role in crisis management, which it is demonstrating so clearly in the Balkans. A rigid division of responsibility between the two organisations would in my view be artificial and could even be counterproductive—politically and militarily. Each crisis has its own challenges and thus requires a specific response. In some cases, such a response might be given in the transatlantic framework, involving the US and Canada, and therefore NATO-led. Other crises might be managed by the Europeans under EU-led arrangements, depending on the circumstances. What counts is to have a spectrum of effective response options available, rather than attempting to define in advance a theoretical hierarchy that would not stand the test of times.

Question:

Is adequate provision being made for the funding of the new defence arrangements? Is there any reason to believe declarations on defence will translate into actions and expenditure? How will national commitments be scrutinised to ensure all governments are meeting their obligations? Is there a review mechanism and an agreed timetable?

Answer:

  Clearly, ESDI and CESDP would be meaningless if the right capabilities were not delivered. In fact, capabilities remain the ultimate litmus test, which is why there is a strong link between ESDI and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative which is the main vehicle for improving the defence capabilities of all the Allies. As NATO Secretary General, I will keep on pressing Allied Governments to remind them of their commitments on capabilities and to make sure they deliver.

  So far as mechanisms for implementing the headline goal are concerned, this is a matter for the EU and not something for NATO to render judgements about. However, the Alliance has a strong interest in ensuring that force undertakings given by Allies and Partners in the context of ESDI do not cut across NATO's force planning processes. We also want to make force planning mechanisms available to the EU in order to minimise duplication, always respecting however that the EU must take its own decisions on headline goal implementation.

Question:

Now that the EU is committed to creating a European defence capability, does this require the creation of a European armaments industry, a common procurement policy and standard military operating procedures and methods? If so, is this technically feasible?

Answer:

  The text of a Communication of the European Commission to the EU Council, entitled "Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence Related Industries", states that "there can be no European defence policy or identity without a healthy and competitive European technological and industrial base". Europe is now witnessing major defence industrial consolidation, most notably with the recent establishment of the European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company (EADS), resulting from the merger of Aerospatiale Matra and DASA. As in North America, Europe is moving to an industrial landscape dominated by a few large constellations of industries—in Europe's case EADS and British Aerospace and Marconi Electronics Systems (BAE Systems). However, the economics of defence industry remain very pernicious, and even continental scale markets are appearing to become smaller and smaller, certainly to the major defence contractors.

  It may well be that the next stage of industrial consolidation will see linkages between European and North American companies—in other words, the present process of "Europeanisation" will be but a step towards a transatlantic defence industry capability, and then towards a more global defence industry.

  There is a strong case for common procurement and acquisition policies in Europe. The typical regulation that we have seen in Europe leading up to and into the single European market has not been evident in the procurement sector—a fact partly explained by the desire of nations to protect their sovereignty in armaments matters. However, the need to control procurement costs is bound to push countries towards an ever closer alignment in procurement policies and practices.

  Clearly, standard military operating procedures will be facilitated by forces possessing equipment that is interoperable. The dilemma here—which DCI is trying to correct—is that whereas within the Alliance we have a strategy requiring high levels of interoperability, we also have great asymmetries in technological sophistication between member countries which make joint operations even harder to mount. Technology ought to bring us closer together, not drive us apart. This will be a great challenge for NATO in the years ahead, which will require both greater intra-European and greater transatlantic defence co-operation.

Question:

How is parliamentary accountability best assured in this policy sector?

Answer:

  As a former MP and Defence Secretary and now as General of NATO, I take this very seriously. Since we are talking about national commitments and contributions to ESDI and CESDP, I think that national parliaments ought to be involved in this process as much as they are involved in any other issue of national defence and security. At the same time, the European Parliament will need to play its role. The same goes for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which is fulfilling an important function in this area and which is already establishing ties with the European Parliament.

Question:

How can a European Union capability be developed in practical terms? How will the required satellite, transport and intelligence capacity be developed?

Answer:

  The European Union is taking significant steps to improve its military capability. It has set itself a clear and defined target, the Headline Goal, for the kind of military capability it wishes to have. The Goal requires that the EU be able, by 2003, to deploy a corps-sized force (50-60,000 troops), within 60 days of the order being given, and to keep those forces in theatre for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units and supporting elements at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces. Consultation mechanisms are to be developed within the EU through which each Member State will define its contribution to the level of capability required by the Headline Goal and through which progress can be reviewed. The audit of the military assets and capabilities currently at Europe's disposal completed by the Western European Union will assist in identifying the shortfalls that will need to be rectified including those affecting the achievement of the Headline Goal.

  The development of satellite, transport, intelligence capabilities will be pursued through collective "capability goals". It is important to bear in mind, however, that such special capabilities are in many cases already available within the force structure of the Alliance, and could be provided to the EU. Within NATO, new efforts to improve European and other Allied military capabilities, including ones of this kind, are being made through the Defence Capability Initiative (DCI).

  The EU also intends to have the political and political-military mechanisms necessary to take security decisions and to conduct operations. It has established an interim Political and Security Committee to provide advice to EU leaders on security issues, and potentially to provide day-to-day political leadership of EU-led operations. A Military Committee and a military staff are also being set up to provide military advice to political authorities and to carry out their directions during operations. These also represent practical steps in creating the ability to carry out Petersberg missions.

Question:

At present, most European armed forces rely heavily on conscription. How will this affect their ability to perform their new obligations?

Answer:

  Many European nations now have either all volunteer forces or a combination of a significant proportion of professionals alongside conscripts in their forces. Within the Alliance, several Allies are either forming new structures organised specifically for operations outside their national territory or are enhancing the readiness of forces already declared as reaction forces. While almost all nations that utilise conscripts have constraints on the employment of conscripts outside national territory for crisis management operations, several are increasing the numbers of regulars and short-term volunteers in their forces or to man their reaction force units exclusively with regulars and short-term volunteers to overcome these problems.

Question:

Steps are being taken to provide for a European rapid-reaction force of 60,000. Is this the right approach and will this be adequate for future needs? Should there be a provision for a standing European army?

Answer:

  The Alliance has acknowledged the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action. It has also noted that the process of creating such a capacity will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a "European Army". While there are already many multinational forces with European elements, both within and outside NATO—and many of these have a specifically European connotation (Eurofor, Eurocorps, etc)—there is no proposal under consideration to move away from the fundamental principle that armed forces are recruited, organised, trained and controlled by national governments.

Question:

Defence is part of the core sovereignty of a nation state. What does the addition of a defence capability imply for the broader development of the European Union as an international organisation?

Answer:

  The Cologne and Helsinki decisions do not change this fact. This process does not imply the creation of a European army. It should also be noted that the EU is attempting to develop its capabilities for military and non-military crisis management. It is not taking on a role in defence. In fact, the Helsinki Declaration states very clearly that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members and that the development of a common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article V of the Washington Treaty (and Article V of the Brussels Treaty). Obviously, in the longer term we will need to address the question of what the addition of a defence capability would imply for the broader development of the European Union—and for NATO. At this stage, however, we should focus our minds on the task at hand, namely to ensure that the Europeans are capable—politically and militarily—of making a more effective contribution to European security and stability. Let's cross that other bridge when we get to it.

Question:

Can the current intergovernmental model preserve for national interest and at the same time deliver an efficient decision-making? Is the intergovernmental model durable?

Answer:

  Yes, I believe it can, and yes, I believe it is. The Atlantic Alliance is proof of that. NATO is an alliance of sovereign nations with their respective interests, which has been going about its business as effectively as any international organisation for over 50 years now-and went through various enlargements on its way. There is no reason why the EU should not be able to do the same.

Question:

How will the new arrangements affect relations with the United States, Russia and Europe's "near abroad"?

Answer:

  For many years, the US has encouraged the Europeans to make a more effective contribution to security and stability on their continent. They envision the transatlantic relationship as a true and balanced partnership in which Europe takes on greater responsibility. It is thus ultimately in the interest of our North American Allies that the Europeans are developing the capacity for acting militarily in response to international crises.

  Russia is a major player in European security. NATO and the EU are both working very hard on forging a true and enduring partnership with this country. NATO and Russia are cooperating in Bosnia and Kosovo in a joint endeavour to bring about a lasting peace in this war-torn region of Europe. In future crises, it will be important for the EU to have Russia on board as much as it is now for the Alliance.

  What is the near abroad? I always have difficulties with such terms. Clearly, Europe is already a significant (f)actor on the international scene—whether it is the near abroad or further afield. A real CESDP will certainly strengthen the Union's common foreign and security policy and thereby its overall standing. But it is an instrument. The European interests "abroad" as set out by the European Union in numerous documents will not change because of that. Rather, it will help the Europeans to pursue them.

Question:

The likely timetable for further developments?

Answer:

  We expect tangible results from the European Council meeting in Feira, in particular with regard to NATO-EU relations (joint ad hoc working groups on security; Headline Goal implementation; EU access to NATO assets and capabilities; and permanent consultation arrangements) and the participation issue (15+6 meetings). Under the French Presidency during the second half of the year, there will be further milestones, such as the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November or the Nice European Council in December (permanent arrangements, transfer of WEU functions to EU).

  From an Alliance perspective, the most pressing need is to prepare the ground for NATO-EU security arrangements that would allow the exchange of information—and eventually the conclusion of a NATO-EU Security Agreement. Another priority is the elaboration of the EU Headline and Capability Goals. We stand ready to provide to the EU military planning expertise to this end, and we are working hard to adapt further NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. Clearly, the EU's Headline and Capability Goals and the objectives arising from our Defence Capabilities Initiative are mutually reinforcing.

Question:

The development of relationships between the EU and NATO since Helsinki?

Answer:

  Thus far, interaction between NATO and the EU was limited to contacts between the two Secretaries General and briefings by the EU Presidency. Clearly, this is not enough. If we want to implement the Washington and Helsinki decisions, we need to establish a close and confident relationship between the two organisations (covering inter alia cooperation in defence planning; EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities; a coordinated exercise policy; consultation procedures between the two organisations for the period preceding, and during, a crisis; arrangements for the exchange of classified information, including intelligence; arrangements for the release, use and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities). We expect the European Union to propose NATO-EU consultative arrangements (joint ad hoc working groups on security; Headline Goal implementation; EU access to NATO assets and capabilities; and permanent consultation arrangements) after Feira. The Alliance is certainly ready to discuss the way ahead.

June 2000


 
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