Memorandum by NATO
Question:
It is proposed that the WEU will be integrated
into the EU. How can this be done? What are the main obstacles?
Answer:
Since the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks
into the Amsterdam Treaty ("humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace-making"), the European Union, at its European
Council Summit meetings in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999, has been
taking steps to underpin its common foreign and security policy
by developing a common policy on security and defence based on
real military (and non-military) crisis management capabilities.
With respect to the future of the WEU, the European
Union decided at Cologne that the ground should be prepared for
the transfer into the EU of the WEU functions necessary for the
EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg
tasks by the end of the year 2000. The Cologne Declaration states
that in that event the WEU as an organisation would have completed
its purpose.
This process is currently under way. At their
Luxembourg Ministerial meeting in mid-November last year, WEU
Ministers agreed that the bodies of the EU Council would have
direct access, as required, to the expertise of the WEU's operational
structures, including the WEU Secretariat; the Military Staff,
the Satellite Centre in Torrejon; and the Institute for Security
Studies in Paris. Shortly thereafter, the EU High Representative
took up his additional responsibilities as WEU Secretary General.
Helsinki, last but not least, empowered the EU HR/SG cum WEU Secretary
General to make full use of WEU assets for advising the EU Council
during the period of transition.
NATO is following these developments very closely,
since the WEU has been the Alliance's main interlocutor over the
past years with respect to European-led non-Article V crisis response
operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities. By the
time of the Washington Summit last year, we had put in place the
key elements of our 1996 Berlin decisions on setting up arrangements
and mechanisms for NATO support to WEU-led operations, such as
adjustments to defence planning and PARP; flexible options for
selection of European NATO Commander and NATO HQs; revised TORs
for DSACEUR; making use of the DJTF concept; operational planning;
exercises; consultation arrangements; and a framework for release
and return of Alliance assets and capabilities. These arrangements
were exercised and tested in a joint crisis management exercise
called CMX/CRISEX 2000 in February 2000 and are currently in the
process of being reviewed and adjusted.
Today, NATO is in a position to respond to a
request by the WEU (or the EU through the WEU) to make use of
Alliance assets and capabilities in a European-led operation under
the political control and strategic direction of the WEU, should
the NAC decide to do so. This means that until the EU is ready
to become our direct interlocutor, we could work through the WEU.
The existing NATO-WEU link is also of relevance
in implementing the Washington and Helsinki decisions on European
security and defence. Over the past years, we have put together
an impressive set of arrangements which constitute a toolbox from
which to choose in establishing similar links with the European
Union. While there are certainly differences between the EU and
the WEU, institutionally, legally and in terms of corporate culture,
the further development of ESDI has to build on Berlin and to
the extent possible on existing NATO-WEU mechanisms.
Question:
How does the current proposal for integrating
defence into the EU differ from the agreement at the June 1996
NATO Ministerial that operations could take place under WEU political
control and strategic direction?
Answer:
With the decisions taken by NATO and the EU
at Washington, Cologne and Helsinki, the European Union is becoming
the Alliance's main interlocutor for questions of European-led
military crisis management. This is adding further response options
to the Euro-Atlantic crisis management menu. In future, European-led
operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities under the
political control and strategic direction of the EU will be possible.
At the Washington Summit, the Alliance has acknowledged this situation
and expressed its preparedness to define and adopt arrangements
for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in
which NATO as a whole would not be engaged. The Alliance is working
on the implementation of the Washington agenda taking into account
relevant developments in the EU. In this context, it should be
noted that the EU is attempting to develop its capabilities for
military and non-military crisis management. It is not taking
on a role in defence. In fact, the Helsinki Declaration states
very clearly that NATO remains the foundation of the collective
defence of its members and that the development of a common European
policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice
to the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (and
Article V of the Brussels Treaty).
Question:
Is the timetable for the proposed new arrangements
realistic?
Answer:
During the last 18 months, we have made more
progress on ESDI/CESDP than in the 18 years before. There is a
sense of direction and there is a lot of momentum in all the institutions
involved in building ESDI-EU, WEU and NATO. This momentum must
be maintained and we must stay the course. This is first and foremost
a question of political will—and this political will has
been expressed very clearly by our Heads of State and Government
in Washington, Cologne and Helsinki.
Question:
How will the different memberships of NATO and
the EU affect the new security arrangements? At present four EU
member states (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden) are outside
NATO. What effect will their status have? How will the position
of Turkey and the other non-EU European Allies be handled?
Answer:
One of the key questions in making the European
Security and Defence Identity work over the next years, both in
the European Union and the Alliance, is to ensure that the mechanisms
and structures created are inclusive and allow for the necessary
involvement of all the countries concerned. It cannot be in our
interest to relegate to the sidelines countries that are making
a valuable contribution to European security and stability, for
instance in the Balkans. The EU has decided to set up structures
for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the six non-EU
European Allies on issues related to European security and defence
and crisis management. The Alliance has on various occasions expressed
its hope that solutions can be found which are satisfactory to
all Allies.
The key point for our non-EU European Allies
is that they should have the right to participate, if they so
wish, in EU-led operations involving the use of NATO assets and
capabilities, and that they should be invited to take part in
other EU-led operations. They also want to be fully involved in
consultations and decision-shaping leading up to EU operations.
In my view, such arrangements—mirroring what is the case
in the WEU—would not only enhance the effectiveness of EU-led
military crisis management operations but would also contribute
to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO.
We also need to address the question of how
to involve the non-Allied EU members on our side. I am confident
that arrangements can be worked out and that the interests of
the four countries can be met. The recent CMX/CRISEX 2000 exercise,
the first joint NATO-WEU exercise, was a good opportunity to develop
this aspect, with Partner military representatives being actively
involved in planning at SHAPE.
Finally, the Alliance has been working very
hard to create the interfaces for our co-operation with Partner
countries, in particular in crisis management. Our experience
in the Balkans with IFOR/SFOR and now KFOR involving 14 Partners
shows very clearly the need for and advantages of such an approach.
Future crisis management, whether it will be European or NATO-led,
will have the same requirements, for which we should all be prepared.
Question:
Under the new proposals, NATO is to guarantee
European security while the EU may conduct the Petersberg tasks
of crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Is
this a practicable and desirable division of responsibility?
Answer:
The European Union aspires to develop its military
and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened
common European policy on security and defence. Its Helsinki Declaration
of December 1999 acknowledges that NATO will continue to play
an important role in crisis management, which it is demonstrating
so clearly in the Balkans. A rigid division of responsibility
between the two organisations would in my view be artificial and
could even be counterproductive—politically and militarily.
Each crisis has its own challenges and thus requires a specific
response. In some cases, such a response might be given in the
transatlantic framework, involving the US and Canada, and therefore
NATO-led. Other crises might be managed by the Europeans under
EU-led arrangements, depending on the circumstances. What counts
is to have a spectrum of effective response options available,
rather than attempting to define in advance a theoretical hierarchy
that would not stand the test of times.
Question:
Is adequate provision being made for the funding
of the new defence arrangements? Is there any reason to believe
declarations on defence will translate into actions and expenditure?
How will national commitments be scrutinised to ensure all governments
are meeting their obligations? Is there a review mechanism and
an agreed timetable?
Answer:
Clearly, ESDI and CESDP would be meaningless
if the right capabilities were not delivered. In fact, capabilities
remain the ultimate litmus test, which is why there is a strong
link between ESDI and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative which
is the main vehicle for improving the defence capabilities of
all the Allies. As NATO Secretary General, I will keep on pressing
Allied Governments to remind them of their commitments on capabilities
and to make sure they deliver.
So far as mechanisms for implementing the headline
goal are concerned, this is a matter for the EU and not something
for NATO to render judgements about. However, the Alliance has
a strong interest in ensuring that force undertakings given by
Allies and Partners in the context of ESDI do not cut across NATO's
force planning processes. We also want to make force planning
mechanisms available to the EU in order to minimise duplication,
always respecting however that the EU must take its own decisions
on headline goal implementation.
Question:
Now that the EU is committed to creating a European
defence capability, does this require the creation of a European
armaments industry, a common procurement policy and standard military
operating procedures and methods? If so, is this technically feasible?
Answer:
The text of a Communication of the European
Commission to the EU Council, entitled "Implementing European
Union Strategy on Defence Related Industries", states that
"there can be no European defence policy or identity without
a healthy and competitive European technological and industrial
base". Europe is now witnessing major defence industrial
consolidation, most notably with the recent establishment of the
European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company (EADS), resulting
from the merger of Aerospatiale Matra and DASA. As in North America,
Europe is moving to an industrial landscape dominated by a few
large constellations of industries—in Europe's case EADS
and British Aerospace and Marconi Electronics Systems (BAE Systems).
However, the economics of defence industry remain very pernicious,
and even continental scale markets are appearing to become smaller
and smaller, certainly to the major defence contractors.
It may well be that the next stage of industrial
consolidation will see linkages between European and North American
companies—in other words, the present process of "Europeanisation"
will be but a step towards a transatlantic defence industry capability,
and then towards a more global defence industry.
There is a strong case for common procurement
and acquisition policies in Europe. The typical regulation that
we have seen in Europe leading up to and into the single European
market has not been evident in the procurement sector—a
fact partly explained by the desire of nations to protect their
sovereignty in armaments matters. However, the need to control
procurement costs is bound to push countries towards an ever closer
alignment in procurement policies and practices.
Clearly, standard military operating procedures
will be facilitated by forces possessing equipment that is interoperable.
The dilemma here—which DCI is trying to correct—is
that whereas within the Alliance we have a strategy requiring
high levels of interoperability, we also have great asymmetries
in technological sophistication between member countries which
make joint operations even harder to mount. Technology ought to
bring us closer together, not drive us apart. This will be a great
challenge for NATO in the years ahead, which will require both
greater intra-European and greater transatlantic defence co-operation.
Question:
How is parliamentary accountability best assured
in this policy sector?
Answer:
As a former MP and Defence Secretary and now
as General of NATO, I take this very seriously. Since we are talking
about national commitments and contributions to ESDI and CESDP,
I think that national parliaments ought to be involved in this
process as much as they are involved in any other issue of national
defence and security. At the same time, the European Parliament
will need to play its role. The same goes for the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, which is fulfilling an important function in this area
and which is already establishing ties with the European Parliament.
Question:
How can a European Union capability be developed
in practical terms? How will the required satellite, transport
and intelligence capacity be developed?
Answer:
The European Union is taking significant steps
to improve its military capability. It has set itself a clear
and defined target, the Headline Goal, for the kind of military
capability it wishes to have. The Goal requires that the EU be
able, by 2003, to deploy a corps-sized force (50-60,000 troops),
within 60 days of the order being given, and to keep those forces
in theatre for at least one year. This will require an additional
pool of deployable units and supporting elements at lower readiness
to provide replacements for the initial forces. Consultation mechanisms
are to be developed within the EU through which each Member State
will define its contribution to the level of capability required
by the Headline Goal and through which progress can be reviewed.
The audit of the military assets and capabilities currently at
Europe's disposal completed by the Western European Union will
assist in identifying the shortfalls that will need to be rectified
including those affecting the achievement of the Headline Goal.
The development of satellite, transport, intelligence
capabilities will be pursued through collective "capability
goals". It is important to bear in mind, however, that such
special capabilities are in many cases already available within
the force structure of the Alliance, and could be provided to
the EU. Within NATO, new efforts to improve European and other
Allied military capabilities, including ones of this kind, are
being made through the Defence Capability Initiative (DCI).
The EU also intends to have the political and
political-military mechanisms necessary to take security decisions
and to conduct operations. It has established an interim Political
and Security Committee to provide advice to EU leaders on security
issues, and potentially to provide day-to-day political leadership
of EU-led operations. A Military Committee and a military staff
are also being set up to provide military advice to political
authorities and to carry out their directions during operations.
These also represent practical steps in creating the ability to
carry out Petersberg missions.
Question:
At present, most European armed forces rely heavily
on conscription. How will this affect their ability to perform
their new obligations?
Answer:
Many European nations now have either all volunteer
forces or a combination of a significant proportion of professionals
alongside conscripts in their forces. Within the Alliance, several
Allies are either forming new structures organised specifically
for operations outside their national territory or are enhancing
the readiness of forces already declared as reaction forces. While
almost all nations that utilise conscripts have constraints on
the employment of conscripts outside national territory for crisis
management operations, several are increasing the numbers of regulars
and short-term volunteers in their forces or to man their reaction
force units exclusively with regulars and short-term volunteers
to overcome these problems.
Question:
Steps are being taken to provide for a European
rapid-reaction force of 60,000. Is this the right approach and
will this be adequate for future needs? Should there be a provision
for a standing European army?
Answer:
The Alliance has acknowledged the resolve of
the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action.
It has also noted that the process of creating such a capacity
will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation
of a "European Army". While there are already many multinational
forces with European elements, both within and outside NATO—and
many of these have a specifically European connotation (Eurofor,
Eurocorps, etc)—there is no proposal under consideration
to move away from the fundamental principle that armed forces
are recruited, organised, trained and controlled by national governments.
Question:
Defence is part of the core sovereignty of a nation
state. What does the addition of a defence capability imply for
the broader development of the European Union as an international
organisation?
Answer:
The Cologne and Helsinki decisions do not change
this fact. This process does not imply the creation of a European
army. It should also be noted that the EU is attempting to develop
its capabilities for military and non-military crisis management.
It is not taking on a role in defence. In fact, the Helsinki Declaration
states very clearly that NATO remains the foundation of the collective
defence of its members and that the development of a common European
policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice
to the commitments under Article V of the Washington Treaty (and
Article V of the Brussels Treaty). Obviously, in the longer term
we will need to address the question of what the addition of a
defence capability would imply for the broader development of
the European Union—and for NATO. At this stage, however,
we should focus our minds on the task at hand, namely to ensure
that the Europeans are capable—politically and militarily—of
making a more effective contribution to European security and
stability. Let's cross that other bridge when we get to it.
Question:
Can the current intergovernmental model preserve
for national interest and at the same time deliver an efficient
decision-making? Is the intergovernmental model durable?
Answer:
Yes, I believe it can, and yes, I believe it
is. The Atlantic Alliance is proof of that. NATO is an alliance
of sovereign nations with their respective interests, which has
been going about its business as effectively as any international
organisation for over 50 years now-and went through various enlargements
on its way. There is no reason why the EU should not be able to
do the same.
Question:
How will the new arrangements affect relations
with the United States, Russia and Europe's "near abroad"?
Answer:
For many years, the US has encouraged the Europeans
to make a more effective contribution to security and stability
on their continent. They envision the transatlantic relationship
as a true and balanced partnership in which Europe takes on greater
responsibility. It is thus ultimately in the interest of our North
American Allies that the Europeans are developing the capacity
for acting militarily in response to international crises.
Russia is a major player in European security.
NATO and the EU are both working very hard on forging a true and
enduring partnership with this country. NATO and Russia are cooperating
in Bosnia and Kosovo in a joint endeavour to bring about a lasting
peace in this war-torn region of Europe. In future crises, it
will be important for the EU to have Russia on board as much as
it is now for the Alliance.
What is the near abroad? I always have difficulties
with such terms. Clearly, Europe is already a significant (f)actor
on the international scene—whether it is the near abroad
or further afield. A real CESDP will certainly strengthen the
Union's common foreign and security policy and thereby its overall
standing. But it is an instrument. The European interests "abroad"
as set out by the European Union in numerous documents will not
change because of that. Rather, it will help the Europeans to
pursue them.
Question:
The likely timetable for further developments?
Answer:
We expect tangible results from the European
Council meeting in Feira, in particular with regard to NATO-EU
relations (joint ad hoc working groups on security; Headline
Goal implementation; EU access to NATO assets and capabilities;
and permanent consultation arrangements) and the participation
issue (15+6 meetings). Under the French Presidency during the
second half of the year, there will be further milestones, such
as the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November or the Nice
European Council in December (permanent arrangements, transfer
of WEU functions to EU).
From an Alliance perspective, the most pressing
need is to prepare the ground for NATO-EU security arrangements
that would allow the exchange of information—and eventually
the conclusion of a NATO-EU Security Agreement. Another priority
is the elaboration of the EU Headline and Capability Goals. We
stand ready to provide to the EU military planning expertise to
this end, and we are working hard to adapt further NATO's defence
planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability
of forces for EU-led operations. Clearly, the EU's Headline and
Capability Goals and the objectives arising from our Defence Capabilities
Initiative are mutually reinforcing.
Question:
The development of relationships between the EU
and NATO since Helsinki?
Answer:
Thus far, interaction between NATO and the EU
was limited to contacts between the two Secretaries General and
briefings by the EU Presidency. Clearly, this is not enough. If
we want to implement the Washington and Helsinki decisions, we
need to establish a close and confident relationship between the
two organisations (covering inter alia cooperation in defence
planning; EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities;
a coordinated exercise policy; consultation procedures between
the two organisations for the period preceding, and during, a
crisis; arrangements for the exchange of classified information,
including intelligence; arrangements for the release, use and
return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities). We expect the
European Union to propose NATO-EU consultative arrangements (joint
ad hoc working groups on security; Headline Goal implementation;
EU access to NATO assets and capabilities; and permanent consultation
arrangements) after Feira. The Alliance is certainly ready to
discuss the way ahead.
June 2000
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