Memorandum by the Embassy of the Republic
of Poland
Over the last decade, the priority of Poland's
foreign and security policy has been not only to regain our place
in the Euro-Atlantic community but also to consolidate and promote
its values as well as to contribute our best to strengthening
its ability to respond to crises and threats. This is why today
Poland as a NATO member, WEU associate member, and prospective
member of the EU, actively participates in the development of
European capabilities and mechanisms for crisis prevention and
resolution.
Poland participated in the framing of the decisions
of NATO's Washington Summit concerning the European Security and
Defence Identity and future NATO-EU co-operation. Our understanding
of the process of developing the ESDP within the EU stems directly
from these decisions as well as from the Helsinki European Council's
decisions, which we have recognised.
PRINCIPLES
The developments of ESDI within NATO as well
as a new EU policy on security and defence (ESDP) are to lead
to the overall enhancement of the ability of a whole Euro-Atlantic
community to respond to crisis situations. This assumption constitutes
the main principle that Polish policy concerning those developments
is based on.
We believe the Final Communique« from NATO
Washington Summit was a clear indication that we had reached a
common understanding as to this aim among all Allies of which
EU countries constitute a significant part.
We have acknowledged the EU's resolve to strengthen
its ability to react to crisis in the situation when the Alliance
as a whole will not be engaged militarily as an Alliance. In this
context it is extremely important to remember that, on the suggestion
of some European countries, we have also agreed in Washington
to include "non-Art 5 missions" (crisis response operations)
in the main functions of the Alliance. This was based on our deep
conviction that NATO is the only one organisation, which has so
far proved effective in the field of defence of the North Atlantic
area as set out in a revised NATO New Strategic Concept. Therefore
there are no basis for distinction between NATO conducting collective
defence missions and the EU responsible for other operations.
EU countries have also agreed in Helsinki that NATO will still
play an important role in crisis management operations.
According to Berlin 1996 decisions European
Security and Defence Identity was supposed to be based on the
NATO—WEU co-operation as well as the principle of separable
but not separate NATO assets over which WEU was envisaged to take
political control and strategic direction in case of European
operation. In April 1999 at Washington Summit we have agreed that
key practical elements of ESDI are being put in place. Since EU
was preparing itself to take over basic functions of the WEU we
have decided, also in Washington, to consider new guidance providing
for continuous development of ESDI within NATO.
There were three main presumptions which allowed
the Alliance to state its readiness to adopt necessary arrangements
for ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities
of the Alliance, once it will have former WEU functions assumed.
One of them was that these arrangements would respect the requirements
of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structures
(Art 10—Final Communique«). Two others went as follows:
— building on the mechanisms of NATO
and WEU co-operation, NATO and EU will ensure the development
of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency;
— non-EU European Allies should be,
to the fullest extent possible, involved in potential EU-led crisis
management operations (Art 9—Final Communique«).
Despite some misperceptions emerged after Cologne
decisions, eventually the EU Helsinki Summit has brought decisions
consistent, to the great extent, with the Washington principles
mentioned above. Strengthening of the European operational capabilities
as well as the EU's ability to conduct autonomous crisis management
operations with or without recourse of NATO assets was decided
to be based on the assumption that it will serve strengthening
the Alliance.
MEMBERSHIP IN
ESPD
Since 1992 WEU has developed a unique culture
and legacy of work within its broad family. Depending on their
different statuses towards NATO and EU all of them have had their
appropriate rights to participate in WEU activities. A group of
21 members, observers and associate members have actually had
equal rights as to the discussions and decision-shaping process.
Restricted formula of 10 full members have not been used in practice
any more, apart from some budgetary and institutional questions.
Obviously the right to use veto has constituted a privilege limited
to full members only. The WEU police operation in Albania as well
as WEU Exercise Policy constitutes but only a few examples of
co-operation in the broadest 28 formula, including also associate
partners.
The decision of EU to assume functions of WEU
has given light to the problem of different membership status
of 28 WEU countries. A problem which has to be managed.
From the Polish point of view it is of vital
importance that creating new arrangements concerning ESDP this
specific WEU acquis, constituting a unique example of indivisibility
of our security, is not being forgotten. The EU should avoid creating
an "exclusive club of safe countries" thus losing one
of the best tools of co-operation with new democracies. The forms
of participation, which have proved their worth in the WEU discussions
and decision-shaping process, should be incorporated and developed
in the functioning of the ESDP structures within the EU.
Full participation by the non-EU European Allies
in the day-to-day work in the new structures and in the preparation
and implementation of decisions in the ESDP framework is essential,
including in any decision to undertake an operation, whether with
or without recourse to NATO assets.
The full involvement of non-EU European Allies,
who have traditionally been among active participants in peacekeeping
operations and possess substantial capabilities in this regard,
could contribute to a better evaluation of the assets available
to the Europeans for a particular operation and thus to choosing
of the best option. Moreover a whole legal acquis concerning
WEU-NATO co-operation in the framework of ESDI was developed within
the 21 formula. The WEU Audit of force was being pursued also
in this format.
With a view to co-ordinating basic guidelines
and ensuring the coherence of security policy meetings of the
European Council and the General Affairs Council (GAC) with the
participation, if necessary, of Defence Ministers, devoted to
these topics should be held in 15 +6 format.
Deliberations of the Political and Security
Committee should also, from the very start, be held in 21 participants
format.
Once a decision, consulted with the Atlantic
Alliance and agreed within the group of 21 states, has been taken
by the EU to undertake an operation, and after individual states
have expressed their willingness to commit forces and assets to
its conduct, all subsequent decisions should be taken on the basis
of equal rights of all states taking part in the operation.
Without prejudice to the shape and nature of
any future military structures, participation in these structures
should reflect the rules in force in the present WEU Military
Staff and Military Committee, where the associate members, as
NATO members, enjoy rights similar to those of full Members. Since
all military bodies have by their nature only advisory functions,
it is clear that their broader form would not impair the European
Council's decisive role.
It is of equal importance however to ensure
also full involvement of all neutral EU countries in all EU operations
also those with recourse to the Alliance's assets. Since EU envisages
potential operations using NATO assets, it is of great importance
to find appropriate arrangements, which would allow those countries
to be fully involved in those operations as it was envisaged in
Helsinki documents. Since all of these countries currently participate
in Partnership for Peace programme, widely shared understanding
exists that the PfP Planning and Review Process within the programme
would serve as appropriate basis allowing these countries to participate
already in NATO's force planning process. During the first joint
NATO-WEU crisis management exercise CMX/CRISEX 2000, these countries
found PARP an adequate mechanism to meet this demand while still
not diminishing their status of neutrality. A question of potential
further amendments needed does not cause any controversy among
all countries involved.
EUROPEAN OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITIES
It is an extremely difficult task to elaborate
on the question of European operational capabilities as they were
planned in Helsinki, since the European Headline Goal still represents
a political commitment and it does not include sufficient detail
enabling one to plan it militarily. A clear strategic context
has not been outlined so far. Basic planning assumptions are therefore
also lacking, which make it impossible to evaluate whether EHG
assumptions meet future security demands. As to the composition
of force, the document discussed at the first meeting of EU Defence
Ministers on 28 February states that there is going to be defined
the pool of force of which an appropriate package of force would
be constructed, depending of the emerging crisis demands up to
50,000-60,000 troops. Air and naval-element of EHG also have not
been defined even though those components constitute a core in
both crisis management operations presently conducted in Europe.
It means that actually the pool is going to consist of more than
60,000 troops. This is even clearer when one takes into consideration
rotation demands.
It is also difficult to estimate whether the
political will of participating countries will prove strong enough
as well as whether financial limitations will not finally constrain
EHG, since the task agreed is extremely ambitious and a long term
one. It is even more difficult to answer these questions while
not being among decision-makers.
There are however, some basic assumptions, which
allow us to elaborate on this topic and they also arise directly
from our understanding of the Washington Summit decisions and
Helsinki Communique« as well as from the NATO New Strategic
Concept.
First of all among other principles of the development
of European Policy on Security and Defence there was the principle
of avoiding duplication. Its crucial importance stems from the
fact that it concerns directly operational capabilities and as
such final efficiency of a new project. This combined with a principle
of "respecting the requirements of NATO operations and the
coherence of its command structures" gives clear guidance
for future decisions.
Based on this guidance, we have already agreed
among all Allies and those members of the EU who do not belong
to NATO that the enhancement of European operational capabilities
will simultaneously improve the Alliance's capabilities. Thus
it must be pursued in full co-ordination with our efforts already
undertaken within NATO. In other words, for those countries concerned
it must constitute their input into the NATO's initiatives in
this field. If we are to enhance our ability to manage crisis
we cannot waste our resources on creating new parallel structures,
especially when not having enough resources, which is actually
the case. Countries do not wish and cannot afford also creating
two separate kinds of force of which one would be dedicated to
the European Headline Goal whereas the other one would be created
to meet the Alliance requirements. It has also been assumed that
potential core-size operation pursued by EU will not be an additional
one to those foreseen in Ministerial Guidance 98 within the NATO
Defence Planning Process.
Providing that all mentioned above principles
are not violated it becomes clear that forces potentially dedicated
to fulfil the European Headline Goal will have to be composed
of those dedicated already to NATO operations. Thus the idea of
"double-hatting" will have to be applied.
There are also other reasons for preserving
full coherence of our efforts in EU and NATO. Since the NATO Washington
Summit the Alliance has been implementing its Defence Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) aiming at the enhancement of the Alliance's capability
to conduct a whole spectrum of its missions as they are defined
in New Strategic Concept, including those of crisis management.
To this five basic areas for necessary improvement have been defined;
mobility and deployability of force, sustainability and logistics,
command and control, survivability and effective engagement. Moreover
the DCI have already been included into the NATO integrated planning
process. It means Force Goals 2000 defined during this process
already include, DCI related decisions, appropriate for single
Allies' capabilities.
As it appeared a few months later, during the
WEU Audit of European force shortages were identified in the same
fields. It indicates that capabilities needed for crisis management
operations, to which EU missions are going to be limited, are
not so much different than those for collective defence missions
and in some areas no less demanding. Thus there is no discrepancy
between two initiatives. However EHG is to some extent, more narrow
than DCI. We believe in Poland that the first one pursued separately,
with no care for DCI, may well lead to the limitation of our overall
goals as it was agreed when setting up the Defence Capabilities
Initiative.
Therefore there are in place all circumstances
to look for further similarity and compatibility between DCI and
EHG rather than defining differences and creating separate procedures.
Even though appropriate decisions concerning
the NATO-EU relations as well as participation of non-EU European
Allies in the ESDP have not been defined so far and the ESDP itself
is still based on temporary institutions, in depth discussions
have already been pursued within NATO with the aim to assure EU
access to Alliance's defence planning capabilities able to contribute
to military planning for EU-led operations as it was envisaged
in Washington. Among all countries participating in the integrated
military structure of the Alliance full agreement exists that
there is no possibility to create in a few years time similar
separate procedure which would be appropriate to serve EU as a
sufficient mechanism to rich the EHG. On the other hand so far
NATO staff's proposal have provided that allied Defence Planning
Procedures are flexible enough to appropriately include the EU's
input. Building on the NATO-WEU arrangements existing within the
ESDI framework (as it was agreed in Washington) we are able to
construct a procedure assuring not only an inclusion of already
agreed EU goals and planning scenarios but also providing EU with
great possibility to fully participate in the process and not
taking the role of a pure "demander" towards NATO.
A single procedure will assure for each country
willing to participate in potential NATO or EU operations a unified
guidance for the development of its set of forces. In addition,
proceeding on such basis would allow optimal co-ordination and
harmonisation of the plans of the countries concerned and would
ensure both that the closest possible account was taken of available
NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, and that NATO
operational planners would have as much information as possible
about the capabilities likely to be available for use in crisis.
It is necessary to remember that a first and
foremost function of the Alliance is the collective defence function,
which should not be diminished to any extent by new arrangements.
It is also clear that in order to fulfil EHG requirements countries
will most probably have to double-hat forces dedicated to the
Alliance as Immediate and Rapid Reaction Force. We need therefore
to find a proper balance between the availability of forces to
EU and our readiness to fulfil duties stemming from collective
defence responsibility.
This concerns for example the exact time which
will be given to EU for the return of forces released to it by
the Alliance in case an Art 5 threat emerges simultaneously to
the crisis response European operation. But one must also admit
that the worst development of "non-Art 5 scenario" may
well be the "Art 5 scenario" per se, which means
we cannot exclude the situation that a crisis management operation
evolves into a collective defence threat to one of our Allies.
The single construction should also apply to
autonomous EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets.
Taking into account different tasks of the NATO and EU, the risk
connected with the development of separate defence planning systems
in NATO and EU apart from requiring additional resources and potential
diminishing of the Alliance readiness to fulfil its basic functions
would lead also to conflicting guidance from NATO and EU on how
best to develop individual countries' forces. The effect might
well be to create divisions between different groups of countries
associated with one or the other of the systems, which would be
damaging to NATO as well as the whole idea of ESDI.
GENERAL QUESTIONS
It is a widely shared conviction among all Allies
that the transatlantic link constitutes a cornerstone of security
arrangements, which have proved so effective for the last 50 years.
Europe cannot afford to deal with its own security without the
support of USA. We believe it is therefore our role to preserve
this link as long as it proves valuable instead of preparing ourselves
for the potential withdrawal of American involvement in Europe.
There are still many more similarities among the interests of
USA and Europe than there are differences.
The question of effects that new European construction
will have on our relations is one of the most important. One has
to remember however that the US government has strongly supported
the ESDI as agreed in Berlin and Washington. It was understood
as the way to rebalance a burden sharing, which means more equal
sharing of responsibilities for European security, specifically
in the field of capabilities. Possible implications for these
relations will therefore have to be perceived in direct dependence
on principles the EU will follow shaping its European Security
and Defence Policy.
One of our common interests is co-operation
with Russia. Poland perceives the NATO-Russia Founding Act the
best example of the success of common efforts. From the Polish
perspective the presence of the US in this arrangement has had
a great impact on its final shape.
Since the creation of the institutional dimension
of European Security and Defence Policy within the second pillar
of the EU has created more questions so far than answers, it is
also difficult to foresee its possible implication for our relations
with the Russian Federation. We do not know whether Europe is
willing and ready to pursue this kind of relationship. We are
also not sure whether EU is going to include its "Common
Strategy towards Russia" a new chapter concerning a security
area and what would then be its role in relation to the NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council. It is also not clear how Russia perceives
the new European construction.
We are deeply convinced though that in this
area the principles of no-decoupling as well and no-duplication
play equally important roles as the field of capabilities. We
all agree that the involvement of Russia in new security arrangements
concerning Euro-Atlantic area provides best conditions for its
democratisation internally as well as in its external relations.
Since the task is difficult and a long term one, first of all
we have to assure a maximum possible continuity and we should
definitely avoid giving any signals of discrepancy among Allies.
To this end it will also depend on principles we chose to follow
building new structures for security policy.
April 2000
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