Memorandum by Sir Michael Quinlan GCB,
KCB, CB
I offer the following general reflections as
a private individual with some past experience in related matters
but no current official or institutional responsibilities. The
reflections are moreover framed in advance of a planned period,
later this year, of deeper and more systematic study of the issues.
1. There is a substantial history of attempts
at closer European co-operation in the defence field, reaching
back to the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the plans for a European
Defence Community in the mid-1950s. The list includes a range
of efforts under Western European Union both before and after
its re-invigoration in the 1980s; the work of the Eurogroup and
its subordinate bodies during the 1970s and early 1980s; numerous
projects for collaboration in the development and production of
military equipment, and joint forces like the Franco-German Brigade/Corps
and the United Kingdom-Netherlands Marine Corps. It is to be hoped
that the new endeavour will both carefully exploit the positive
acquis from this history and learn from its various disappointments.
2. Some of the rhetoric surrounding the
endeavour has stressed European independence (by implication,
mostly from the United States). The realism and wisdom of this
is open to debate, for several reasons. Firstly, both the worldwide
range of US interests and the nature of the US political structure
and indeed society mean that in practice there is unlikely to
be any international situation—or one of substantial interest
nevertheless to Europeans—about which the United States
has truly no opinion and no preference; and the probability that
European governments would collectively agree to act militarily
in ways running counter to US opinion and preference is and ought
to be remote. Moreover, as phases of the Bosnia experience warn,
there are potential dangers in situations where the US polity
has strong views yet in the pursuit of them is not constrained
by on-the-ground involvement. Secondly, the credibility of any
large military enterprise by Europeans alone will be questionable
(at least unless and until both political cohesion and collective
military capability are proven far beyond current levels) in the
eyes not only of the countries presumably expected to commit forces
but also of potential adversaries. Thirdly, as again the Bosnia
experience warns, it is hazardous to embark on large peace-keeping
commitments without assurance of extensive all-round military
back-up—not being aimed at the current enterprise, and very
hard, at the least, to guarantee without the US—if things
go wrong and serious combat has to be envisaged. Real-life scenarios
will not necessarily come neatly labelled in the "Petersberg"
categories; even if they start so they may not remain so. And
any idea of calling on "NATO assets" in the face of
significant transatlantic misgiving would surely be fantasy.
3. For reasons such as these, political
aspirations for the new endeavour ought to be expressed in modest
terms. It should not be looked to as the basis of any shift of
kind, as compared with the present, in the common foreign and
security policy, which the European Union seeks to build.
4. All this said, it is undoubtedly the
case that the aggregate of European military contribution in recent
Western peace-keeping and peace-making efforts has too often been
inadequate in volume, quality and timeliness. A drive to do considerably
better is plainly needed; and "Petersberg" and comparable
tasks are a good initial focus for that—relevant and not
too ambitious. The drive, endorsed now by all EU heads of government,
could be made a salutary collective stimulus to individual countries
to improve, or at least not reduce further, their defence resource
inputs (this being, notably in respect of Germany as the biggest
and richest EU member almost a sine qua non of any truly
substantial new collective achievement); to take domestically-uncomfortable
decisions required to secure from those inputs national military
outputs better attuned to the likely needs of the future; and
to accept the costs and inconveniences of coordinating these national
outputs more efficiently so as to produce a stronger collective
output. It is to be hoped that the drive will include establishing
practical machinery—eg for information exchange, monitoring
and collective scrutiny of concrete achievements—to apply
that stimulus to maximum effect.
5. As the above discussion implies, the
emphasis ought to be more on developing practical military capabilities
for use a" toutes fins utiles than on debating political
conditions, scenarios and goals. If usable military instruments
are in place, the specific circumstances of particular emergencies
will usually shape their political management. It seems very desirable
accordingly that the enterprise should move as speedily as possible
to the sphere of defence professionals, to tackle concrete matters
like improved quality, greater commonality and compatibility and
more frequent inter-operation in such fields as force size and
structure, readiness, deployability, communications, logistics,
training, infrastructure, medical support and public relations,
as well as operating doctrines and procedures. In all these respects
I hope is beyond argument that NATO practice, criteria and standards
are always to be taken as the benchmark.
6. It will clearly be desirable to exploit
particular national strengths and specialisms in the apportionment
of tasks. Not all countries cover everything in depth, and it
may well be sensible to invite some—perhaps especially the
smaller countries?—to concentrate on certain functions,
provided that a minimum of commitment to the risk-carrying front-line
tasks is maintained. It is doubtful however whether thoroughgoing
interdependence—that is, conditions in which one country
relies wholly on another for some crucial component of basic military
effectiveness—can yet be the general model within Europe.
That would require either a sense of being a common polity in
a degree as yet far from achievement, or else an acceptance of
the pace of the most reluctant (which, amid the diverse histories
and traditions of European countries in military matters, might
sometimes prove to be very reluctant).
7. I keenly hope that the focus of the endeavour
will not be blurred by any attempt to weave into it new attempts
at collaboration in the procurement of defence equipment. Such
collaboration may or may not now merit fresh attention; but past
experience amply demonstrates the formidable industrial, political
and financial as well as military complications, which beset it.
To encumber the St Malo/Helsinki drive with such a burden would
risk seriously impeding its pace and its prospects.
8. I am of course aware that the design
and management of the endeavour raises especial complications
in the institutional dimension, given the overlap/underlap problems
that result from the facts that important European members of
NATO are not, and not soon likely to be, members of the European
Union, and that conversely certain members of the European Union
are not, and not soon likely to be, members of NATO. I have no
detailed comments to offer on the resolution of these difficulties;
but I hope that two key principles will be accepted as being a
strong presumption of transparency in dealing with all interested
countries, and the avoidance of any veto power for those who may
elect to stand aside from action either generally or in particular
situations.
9. Transparency in information and indeed
in regular consultation will be of particular importance in relation
to the United States. It may be that some reactions visible in
the United States to the initiative are unduly critical or apprehensive;
but it is then all the more necessary to frame public explanations
by Europeans of its nature and purpose in ways that do not encourage
such reactions. There are, across the US political spectrum, already
enough sceptics about US multilateral engagement through NATO
and about some perceived European attitudes. It will be damaging
to risk feeding these, in relation to the initiative, by talk
of "independence" in tones or context which US hearers
may interpret (not always mistakenly?) as intended to appeal domestically
to the gut anti-Americanism still present here and there in Europe.
10. It is no doubt conceivable that if the
initiative makes great and sustained headway for many years it
could eventually face questions to which the answers would differ
according to whether the ultimate underlying aspiration was (in
simplifying shorthand) to do things better with the United States
or without the United States—questions like whether to duplicate
in full form very-high-cost-high-technology capabilities for which
the West at present relies almost entirely upon the United States.
But that fork in the road lies, on any realistic view, far ahead;
and I suggest that Europe would do best now to concentrate not
upon contentious political theorising about what route ought or
ought not to be taken, and with what implications, if it is ever
reached but upon practical Western-contribution advance along
nearer stretches which will provide challenge enough.
13 March 2000
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