Memorandum by Reinhardt Rummel, Hannes
Adomeit, Alrun Deutschmann, Thomas Frisch, Joachim Rohde, Stuart
Samuels, Peter Schmidt and Klaus Schwarz
1. PROCEDURE
FOR INCORPORATING
DEFENCE INTO
THE EU
(a) It is proposed that the WEU will be integrated
into the EU. How can this be done? What are the main obstacles
to this goal?
The fate of the WEU (concerning particularly the
organisation as well as the treaty) is still unclear. In the course
of the debate, the interests of the member states in a quick absorption
of the WEU by the EU lessened, thus giving way to an emerging
consensus to transfer in a first step not all, but most of the
functions of the WEU to the EU and adopt them to the needs of
the Union, in particular concerning the establishment of the new
permanent political and military bodies within the Council (PSC,
MC, MS). For the reason that these new institutional arrangements
may require changes to the CFSP part of the Treaty, the new committees
have been set up since March 2000 as interim measures, with the
establishment of the MS following later due mainly to non-aligned
member states, who for fear of "militarisation" of the
EU are not yet prepared to accept the development of a full-fledged
defence policy. The use of the EU's flexibility clause might help
to gain agreement from the non-aligned member states, but this
would reduce the effectiveness of the solution.
Under the WEU Treaty the governments have to
report to the WEU Assembly. What should happen to the Assembly?
Should it be dissolved or should its duties be taken over by the
European Parliament?[15]Should
the countries that are not full members of the WEU be included
in the CFSP? To exclude them is politically unfeasible and strongly
disliked by the US. But to include them would further complicate
the Union decision-making process and hinder effectiveness. Other
obstacles to the merger of the EU and the WEU are issues like
the future of the WEU Treaty, especially its Article V mutual
assistance clause, and of the WEU Assembly. It seems safe to assume
that the statement of the Cologne Declaration, that "the
WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose"
by the end of the year 2000, will not materialise. The continuation
of the WEU as a sort of rump organisation with its Treaty remaining
in force seems to be more likely, for some time at least. Should
the transfer of its main functions to the EU structure work, new
decisions will have to be taken on what to do with the rest of
the WEU and its Treaty.
(b) How do current proposals for integrating
defence into the EU differ from the agreement at the June 1996
NATO Summit that operations could take place under WEU political
and strategic direction?
At first glance, the current proposals for integrating
defence into the EU do not change the Berlin parameters for the
implementation of ESDI within NATO. They simply replace the WEU
with the EU and give the Union direct access to military advice
and capabilities for the conduct of Petersberg operations. A second
look reveals, however, that the EU is now embarking carefully
toward a certain degree of autonomy symbolised by the headline
goal of a multilateral rapid deployment force and the ambition
to create related infrastructure such as a long-range air transport
capacity. Moreover, the shift from WEU to EU directed Petersberg
missions is remarkable also because of the build up of operational
bodies within the wider decision-making context of the EU including
non NATO members.
The links which have been established between
the WEU and NATO should be preserved. Adjustments and supplements,
however, seem to be necessary since NATO and the EU operate at
different levels. This is not merely an issue of differences in
membership or of organisational culture. It is above all a difference
between a military-political organisation and a much broader and
more ambitious economic-political entity in which the military
component is integrated in a comprehensive (civil-military) approach
towards crisis-management. Yet, there are moderating factors to
these differences: NATO can also be active in economic and diplomatic
fields; the EU is not establishing a European army; and territorial
defence stays for the time being within the WEU-NATO setting.
(c) Is the timetable for the proposed new
arrangements realistic?
The timetable for the proposed new arrangements
is ambitious and challenging. The new institutional set-up with
decision-making competencies is already being put in place, but
to get the new bodies up and running the modalities of their relations
within the EU framework, the principles of co-operation with member
states and of consultation between NATO and the EU, including
access to and exchange of classified information, need to be worked
out and appropriate locations need to be prepared. On the military
side, meeting the European headline goal (readily deployable forces
and capabilities in the field of command and control, intelligence
and strategic transport) largely depends on the willingness of
member states to develop a common defence policy and to agree
on a process of reducing the divergences through harmonising national
military planning, procurement and financing activities. While
the headline goal of 50,000-60,000 may be formally met by the
2003 deadline, it may rather take one or two decades to build
up a serious European defence capability capable of carrying out
the full range of Petersberg tasks.
(d) How will the different memberships of
NATO and the EU affect the new security arrangements? At present
four EU member states (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden are
outside NATO. What effect will their status have? How will Turkey's
position be handled? How will NATO's non-EU members be handled?
The divergence of memberships and non-memberships
of the EU, WEU and NATO will continue to cause problems for some
time to come. In principle, the decision-making autonomy of the
Council is to be maintained, including the former observers, who
may not be able to fully participate in EU operations, but can
use their right of "constructive abstention" notably
if an EU-NATO link is used. With non-EU European NATO members
and the so called associate partners appropriate structures for
dialogue and information need to be agreed. In the case of using
NATO assets and capabilities non-EU European NATO members are
entitled to participate in EU-led operations if they so wish.
In the event of operations without recourse to NATO assets they
will be invited to participate. This concession outside the ordinary
EU procedures applies notably to Turkey. How this will affect
the cohesion of the Union on the one side, and the smooth co-operation
between the EU and NATO on the other, remains to be seen. The
US is very keen that non-EU members of NATO are not discriminated
against in any way.
2. SUBSTANCE
OF EUROPEAN
DEFENCE
(a) Under the new proposals, NATO is to guarantee
European security while the EU may conduct the Petersberg tasks
of crisis management, conflict prevention and peace-keeping. Is
this a practicable and desirable division of responsibility?
The EU member states have declared that they aim
at a partnership among equals with the US, including autonomous
capabilities agreed on at Helsinki. It is of importance to note
that a sharing of responsibility was not discussed, being something
which might be put on the agenda within the next decade when the
Union has proven its capability to act to itself and to the world.
Since Helsinki, it is the declared aim of the EU to respond when
NATO as a whole, that is the US, is not willing to become engaged.
If the WEU as a whole is merged into the EU,
then the question of collective defence will inevitably arise
as a collective defence agreement already exists for most of the
EU members within NATO. What is more, the threats that NATO countries
are likely to face in the coming years will not be the ones involving
a direct attack on the homeland, but will rather involve their
interests in neighbouring regions, precisely the sort of situation
where the ability to project force, which is the objective of
the Helsinki Headline Goals, is required. Operations such as the
Kosovo intervention require the full scope of NATO conventional
capabilities. Was the NATO operation in Kosovo defending European
security or was it "crisis management, conflict prevention
and peace-keeping"? In the post-Cold War world, these are
not easily separated. Furthermore, due to the transatlantic defence
technology gap, low defence spending and delay in force reforms,
the EU will continue to rely on NATO, that is American assets.
One difference, however, is the fact that the
tasks that the EU wants to carry out are military and civilian,
reflecting this new type of non-conventional threat. Many of these
problems have civilian backgrounds that can only be solved by
civilian means of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-keeping,
an area where NATO is not qualified. Or, as was seen in Mozambique,
it can be a case of military tools conducting purely civilian
operations. Furthermore, in such environments there exist multiple
actors, military and civilian, which need to function as interlocking
institutions.
Taken together, different types of contingencies
ask for and bring about a sharing of responsibilities rather than
a division of responsibilities between the EU and NATO.
(b) Is adequate provision being made for the
funding of new defence arrangements? Is there any reason to believe
declarations on defence will translate into actions and expenditure?
How will national commitments be scrutinised to ensure all governments
are meeting their obligations? Is there a review mechanism and
an agreed timetable?
It is clear that to increase capabilities there
will have to be increases in defence expenditure. This is generally
acknowledged. But how this should be achieved is not so clear.
Member states are not keen, to put it mildly, to spend more money
on defence, especially those whose government spending is now
restricted by the Maastricht criteria, and the subject tends to
be avoided. On average, defence spending by NATO's European allies
has dropped by 22 per cent since 1992. The US spends about 3.2
per cent of its GDP on defence, France 2.8 per cent, the United
Kingdom 2.6 per cent and Germany 1.5 per cent (only Luxembourg
spends a lower percentage). Europe also spends 25 per cent (amounting
to $10 billion) less on research and development in defence and
security affairs than the US. In Germany, there is very little
public support for increasing defence spending. Instead, much
is being made of trying to spend money more wisely and creating
greater efficiencies by co-operating more closely on the European
level. As Foreign Minister Fischer put it, self-sufficiency in
crisis management need not be in conjunction with higher costs.
The type of new capabilities required, however, cannot be afforded
at present levels of defence spending.
The French defence minister, Alain Richard,
recently proposed in Sintra, Portugal, that each member state
devote 0.7 per cent of its GDP to spending on "military investments".
What this actually means in terms of extra expenditure is, however,
far from clear. This is a figure which could be interpreted to
be fulfilled in various ways. What would it mean, for instance,
to the current varying defence expenditures of the member states?
How would a consensus be achieved and a commitment be arranged?
One can assume the mechanisms being comparable
to those of NATO; the WEU has already adapted to NATO arrangements.
This being the case, the EU would not want to (and cannot) take
a major leap forward, since it is the same ministers who decide
(about European security matters) in NATO and EU bodies. A timetable
for the creation of European capabilities was introduced by the
British Government and the High Representative for CFSP, Solana,
at the first meeting of the ministers of defence in Portugal.
(c) Now that the EU is committed to creating
a European defence capability, does this require the creation
of a European armaments industry, a common procurement policy
and standard military operating procedures and methods? If so,
is this technically feasible?
Given the budget constraints and the capability
gaps of Europe's armed forces the development of a European defence
capability will only be possible if the available resources are
spent as efficiently as possible. The partially drastic reduction
of R&D and procurement budgets around Europe combined with
the increasing costs of modern equipment, the redundancies in
industrial capabilities due to the dominance of national defence
industrial policies and the associated redundancies of armament
programmes in Europe (ie three fighter programmes) and the size
(over-capacities) of Europe's defence industries requires the
"transnational" rationalisation of European defence
industrial capabilities. Thus the concentration and rationalisation
on a merely national basis will no longer suffice, not only in
the aerospace sector, but also with regard to land and naval systems.
In addition, the growing relevance of dual-use
technologies with the short modernisation cycles and the limited
R&D and procurement budgets will require changing the procurement
system/procedures to shorten the development and procurement cycle
and to allow for a closer integration of industry in the formulation
of how to technically address future military requirements. This
change in the way of doing the procurement business will require
a closer partnership between industry and armed forces.
In addition as industry is moving from merely
developing and producing equipment for the armed forces to an
instrument that supports (maintains and improves) the equipment
over the whole life cycle (due to outsourcing etc) armed forces
will become more dependent on defence industrial support during
the preparation or even the conduct of military operations. This
again will require a very close partnership between the armed
forces and their supporting industry. Thus, if Europe wants to
act independently from US support (including industrial support
by US companies having equipped European forces) it will need
its own armament industry. As a first step towards this goal,
Europe should harmonise the political framework under which the
defence industry operates in Europe and implement the Letter of
Intent (on measures to facilitate the restructuring of the European
defence industry) recommendations quickly.
A common procurement policy as the counterpart
to a restructured European armaments industry is a necessary prerequisite
to spending scarce R&D and procurement resources in an efficient
way and allowing industry to do long term cost saving production
planning.
In order to allow common procurement and thus
high production runs, the tactical and technical requirements
for new military equipment must (to some degree) be harmonised.
Thus European armed forces who (probably with the exception of
France) already follow in certain operation doctrines and procedures
commonly developed by NATO should use every opportunity to develop
common doctrines and procedures for the whole set of missions
Europe wants to be prepared for. It should do so in the NATO context
in order to assure interoperability with US forces.
To further this, Europe (better NATO) should
establish experimental programmes to explore new operational concepts
and technologies for the purpose of co-evolving common enhancements
to coalition operations for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and
regional conflict.
(d) How is parliamentary accountability best
assured in this sector?
After the shift of Petersberg tasks from the
WEU to the EU, democratic control of ESDP still needs to be adapted
and should be part of the wider treaty amendments that are necessary
to legitimise (permanent) bodies within the EU that decide on
defence matters. Whether parliamentary accountability is achieved
via the European Parliament, the old Assembly, or a new "European
Security and Defence Assembly", as has been proposed in the
European Parliament by the Social Democrat Wolfgang Behrendt,
in addition to member states' parliaments needs to be debated.
Several questions need to be considered in any decision: inclusion
of the various partners, associate members and observers; the
range of competencies (Petersberg tasks and/or territorial defence);
use of common infrastructure (as happens, for instance, within
NATO with AWACS etc).
3. FORCE STRUCTURE
(a) How can a European Union capability be
developed in practical terms? How will the required satellite,
transport and intelligence capacity be achieved?
There will not be so much a build-up of a European
Union capacity as an allocation or re-allocation of national resources.
There will be no large military build-up or increase in the size
of militaries. The mobility and readiness of troops to deploy
to crisis regions will have to be increased. Apart from military
groupings such as Eurocorps, these will be mainly national capabilities
that are allocated for this purpose. In many cases these units
will still be allocated for other national or international tasks
as well. It should be understood that the required satellite,
transport and intelligence capacities are not new needs that have
arisen as a result of the EU's commitment to take on the Petersberg
tasks. These are areas where European powers have acknowledged
their deficiencies for some time and were already working on solutions
long before Helsinki (for instance the Future Large Aircraft [FLA]
requirement for a large transport aircraft).
(b) At present, most European armed forces
rely heavily on conscription. How will this affect their ability
to perform their new obligations?
The German army still relies extensively on
conscription and it is unlikely, given the political situation,
that this will change in the near future. It should be noted,
however, that such a system of conscription is not synonymous
with the one employed by the United Kingdom after the Second World
War. A large number of the non-professional (or non-full-time)
part of the armed forces does indeed consist of young men conscripted
for a short period (in the case of Germany ten months). But this
system allows for an arrangement where those who have been conscripted
or professional soldiers continue to serve as reservists in the
following years, similar to the Territorial Army in the United
Kingdom. Furthermore, within Germany conscription is not judged
purely on its military merits. In terms of Germany's recent history,
it is seen as a "citizen army" that helps to guarantee
democratic oversight of the military. And any attempt to end conscription
would also mean the end of "community service" (the
civilian alternative that is offered to those who object to military
service) and the extensive social contribution this provides to
German society.
The Ministry of Defence set up a commission
on Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr, which is
due to deliver its recommendations, including the future of conscription,
in May 2000. It is likely that any change will entail an attempt
to make the conscription system more flexible, as the German defence
minister, Rudolf Scharping, suggested on 2 April, while keeping
the basic structure: professional soldiers, conscription and community
service as an alternative to conscription. This could, however,
be upset if the recent ruling about women in the Bundeswehr is
taken further to apply to conscription.
Contrary to the expectations of many, the professionalism
of these soldiers has been proven serving alongside career Bundeswehr
soldiers in the Balkans. Indeed, many German commanders have found
the skills these soldiers bring with them from their civilian
lives especially useful in fulfilling the rather unconventional
military tasks they are entrusted with in the Balkans. The advantages
and disadvantages of conscription can be discussed but it became
clear in the Balkans that such a system, at least one that combined
conscription with professional soldiers would not be completely
incompatible with the Petersberg tasks.
(c) Steps are being taken to provide for a
European rapid-response force of 60,000. Is this the right approach
and will it be adequate for future needs? Should there be provision
for a standing European army?
60,000 by itself will not be enough. There will
need to be a commitment to something like three times this amount,
in order that 60,000 are available at any one time and sustainable
for at least one year.
The Balkans are usually in people's minds when
one thinks of what this force will have to be able to do. But
if one looks at the military force that was necessary to accomplish
this task then what has been proposed certainly is not enough.
The overwhelming factor in the allies' decision to go ahead with
the campaign was the ability to dominate with air-power and thereby
reduce to minimal the risk of casualties. This air-power and the
infrastructure needed to use it (command and control, intelligence,
strategic airlift and satellite coverage), however, was overwhelmingly
American. These components, along with naval power, are mentioned
in the Helsinki document, but to achieve European capacity would
require huge and prolonged investment.
At Helsinki, the creation of a European force
was ruled out, the question of whether there should be a standing
European army is thus purely academic. The crucial point is, however,
that multinational forces like "Eurocorps" are deployable
and can become operational because of their integrated permanent
staff.
4. GENERAL
(a) Defence is part of the core sovereignty
of a nation state. What does the addition of a defence capability
imply for the broader development of the European Union as an
international organisation?
A European federation is still a long way off, if
it will happen at all. This is more the case in foreign and security
policy. At least in the medium-term it will remain a mix of national
and European policies and this is to be welcomed. The complexity
of security policy under current conditions means that some sort
of inner circle of the "capable and willing" is necessary,
at least while the system is being developed.
(b) Can the current intergovernmental model
of decision making preserve national interest and at the same
time deliver efficient decision-making? Is the intergovernmental
model durable?
It can be expected that, at least for the foreseeable
future, individual national interests will be preserved, in much
the same way as they are now, at the expense of efficiency. Qualified
majority voting (QMV) will not be applied to military matters
and while it can be applied in common actions and positions, member
states can still exercise a veto by stating reasons of national
interest. The use of armed force will, therefore, as is also the
case with NATO, be based on unanimity. The planned enlargement
can only complicate this further.[16]
While the creation of new bodies and positions
can be regarded as positive in terms of creating a more European
security and defence identity, there are many indications that
the change will not be as substantive as some would like to think.
The High Representative will certainly not be the single telephone
number that Kissinger hoped for. As was elaborated at Helsinki,
he will "assist" and report to the intergovernmental
Council. It will remain essential for the US and other foreign
powers to work closely with the various European capitals. The
high representative's subordinate position to the member states
will be especially clear when one of the larger states holds the
Presidency. Furthermore, there remains a division of responsibilities
within the EU, with the Commission president and the external
relations commissioner having says in the decision-making process.
The modifications after Helsinki will lead to
more "Europeanised" foreign and defence policies, but
the changes will be gradual. National interests and national policies
will remain dominant for some time to come, and this will be at
the expense of an assertive ESDP or CFSP.
(c) How will the new arrangements affect relations
with (a) the United States, (b) Russia and (c) Europe's "near
abroad"?
Transatlantic tensions about the relationship
between the "new EU" and NATO do exist. There are significant
differences in strategic vision as well as in the practicalities
of force planning and military capabilities. The US is very keen
that Europe improve its military capabilities, but believes this
should be done by building a stronger and more modern military
force, rather than creating new institutions. It would be possible,
however, that such an increased capacity would lead to the US
being less prepared to undertake security investments in Europe.
The greatest concern for the United States is to preserve NATO
as the primary security organisation in Europe and there are fears,
at least by some, that the present course will threaten NATO.
Why, it is asked, do the European NATO members need a second defence
institution, created outside of NATO, to meet NATO requirements?
It is therefore stressed by Washington that NATO's military structures
should not be duplicated and that non-EU members of NATO should
not be discriminated against. The inclusion of a collective defence
clause (which is already part of the WEU Treaty), for instance,
would raise questions, this being the major justification for
NATO's integrated military command structure (what makes it unique).
A more unified and assertive European defence identity could also
be problematic if it led to an increasingly bilateral EU-US relationship
that would bypass NATO as the main body of transatlantic security
dialogue.
So far, the responses in Russia to the new arrangements
have been rather scarce. Discussion has been limited to foreign
ministry officials and a small circle of international security
and defence analysts. The general reaction has been a mixture
of caution and guarded support and approval. Caution seems to
have been predicated upon uncertainty as to how "serious"
the EU's commitment to a common security and defence policy really
is; how much funding will be devoted to the effort; how large,
modern and effective a European military force will ultimately
be; and above all, how autonomous it will be in relation to the
United States and NATO. It is the last point also that determines
guarded support and approval for ESDP. The Russian foreign policy
establishment perceives the United States as the driving force
behind NATO and the Atlantic alliance as an instrument of global
US policy and strategy. As authoritatively codified in Russia's
new national security concept, that establishment also regards
Washington as being prone to using military force to achieve far-reaching
foreign policy objectives and to create a "unipolar"
world based on force. Europeans, in contrast, are often seen as
a moderating influence on US policy. ESDP is being interpreted
in that context as one of the possible instruments to provide
this influence with a higher degree of effectiveness.
The impact of the EU's dynamics in defence matters
on the countries and the regions adjacent to the EU and its member
candidates needs to be handled with care. A mere notion of "near
abroad" in this context risks producing disastrous consequences.
The EU will need all its skills to make its neighbours understand
and accept that the Helsinki move toward autonomous defence operations
was an indispensable step toward improved security.
(d) Do the current proposals make a qualitative
difference to the development of a European capability?
How far these proposed changes make a qualitative
difference to the development of a European capability will depend
on the extent that the political will that created them is maintained.
Particularly the Kosovo crisis has brought home to European politicians
how dependent Europe is on US military power, and how wide the
gap is that exists in capabilities. But it was not something new.
It was just made more obvious, or perhaps more difficult to ignore.
Therefore, as the Kosovo air campaign moves further into the past,
and the day to day problems of running and rebuilding Kosovo take
up more attention, it will become less politically viable to increase
military spending to the extent necessary to make the changes
hoped for post-Kosovo. The other areas (conflict prevention, peace-building,
non-military crisis management) are all very deserving of more
investment. But this will not fulfil the ambitions expressed by
Europe's leaders in the last year. And it will certainly not help
the perceived gap between the US and Europe.
For many American observers, the proposed changes
risk duplicating institutions and increase the chance of diverging
interests and views, without reducing the capability gap between
the EU and America. For them what is needed is an increase in
defence spending, an increase in research and more focus on the
ability to project power. The political will needed in the member
states to find these extra resources is, however, very unlikely
to materialise despite the Helsinki dynamics.
7 April 2000
15 See the discussions of the two assemblies at their
joint meeting in Brussels on 28 March 2000. Back
16
In this context the problems of representation and legitimisation
will become more severe: The votes attributed to each member state
do not sufficiently reflect population size, this being the crucial
point in German positions on the reform of QMV. There would also
be differences because member states supply different capabilities
to joint operations. Therefore, while having been particularly
important in establishing the internal market, enhancing the application
of QMV in security affairs might lead to more problems than solutions. Back
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