Memorandum by Embassy of the United States
of America
It is with pleasure that we provide the House
of Lords with the views of the United States on the developments
of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense. The United
Kingdom has taken a leading role on this issue in both the European
Union and in NATO and we consider this leadership further evidence
of London's abiding role as a key NATO ally and a leading player
in the area of Security and Defense.
As Europe works to find ways to make a greater
contribution to collective defense and to have a capacity to act
militarily where NATO does not, the United States is not just
an interested observer. We are an active supporter. As Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said to the North Atlantic Council
last December:
There should be no confusion about America's
position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against
it, we are not ambivalent, we are not anxious; we are for it.
We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance
or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own—period, end of debate.
The basic reason for this stance is simple.
The security of Europe is a vital interest of the United States,
and properly managed, a stronger, more flexible—and yes,
a potentially more independent—European capacity for military
action will serve that common interest. The United States supports
the initiative for a European Security and Defense Identity because
we recognize that:
— Development of a foreign policy and
security dimension to the EU is a natural, even an inevitable,
part of the development of broader European co-operation.
— We know that the overwhelming majority
of Europeans—no less than we—realize that we must
maintain the strength of the NATO alliance as ESDI develops.
— Therefore, ESDI, if it develops along
the lines agreed in both NATO and the EU, will mean a stronger
transatlantic alliance, greater European capabilities, and a better
balance of responsibilities.
America's commitments and sacrifices in two
world wars, in the reconstruction of Europe after 1945, in resistance
to Soviet expansion, and in the effort, since 1989, to build a
Europe whole and free, are sufficient evidence of the importance
we place on the transatlantic relationship. That importance reflects
the continuing interest of the United States in Europe—economically,
politically, culturally, and strategically. The key to our common
interest in Europe's success is security. It is true the security
challenges now are very different from those of 1917, 1941, 1945
or even 1989, but they are real, ranging from regional conflicts
and ethnic hatred in nearby areas that threaten to spread to the
growing dangers from weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
Most of these threats arise outside Europe—or at least outside
NATO territory—geographically, but they affect European
security very directly. Without security against these threats
as well as against the classic threat of direct invasion, the
promise of a new century free of the horrors of the last will
prove hollow.
The foundation of our support for ESDI rests
on the confidence that a stronger—and more "European"—defence
contribution from Europe is not only compatible with a successful
future for NATO: it is essential to it.
The United States recognises Europe as a serious
and equal partner and genuinely understands why Europe at this
point in its development seeks a stronger and more united defence
role.
Forty-three years ago, representatives of six
European countries came together and signed a treaty laying "the
foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe".
The "ever closer union" foreseen in the Treaty of Rome
has become wider, deeper and more inclusive than anyone could
have predicted in 1957. Today, Europe is moving to the newest
element of the "ever closer union"—a European
Union competence in foreign policy and defence issues. It is both
inevitable and right that as Europe develops its economic, social
and political integration, it should develop in parallel a common
approach to foreign and security policy and the practical capability
to implement such a policy, including by military force, if necessary.
The United States not only acknowledges this impulse for European
projects to improve defence capabilities, we recognise that realising
that prospect implies that Europe will have a greater weight in
NATO proportional to its greater capability and contributions.
No doubt there will be times when the US regrets this change,
but it is a reasonable and wholly acceptable price for a better
balance of burdens. We also recognise that, correspondingly, there
would be the possibility of independent European action, in case
to NATO chooses not act, whether because the United States did
not want to join in or for any other reason.
There can, however, be no question of Europe
needing to prepare for a United States withdrawal from Europe.
There is debate within the United States on our long-term role
in Europe, but there is a broad consensus that the United States
intends to remain fully engaged in European security issues, both
politically and militarily. Our deployment of troops, our active
engagement in European issues and the broad support for NATO across
the political spectrum testifies to that. It is overwhelmingly
likely that in any situation where anyone's military involvement
on a significant scale is justified, and where there is a consensus
in Europe to undertake a military operation, the United States
would be part of the operation. Still less plausible is the case
of a crisis where the US was prepared to participate in a NATO
operation, but the European allies preferred to act alone.
The task, therefore, is how to allow all allies
to work together more effectively, not how to manage without the
United States. Indeed, there is at least as much reason to be
concerned that some Europeans may be deluded into thinking that
Europe can isolate itself from the very real, but geographically
more remote, threats it still faces, confident either that Europe
can opt out of dangers, or that they can be dealt with by the
Americans alone. One important reason to welcome the initiative
for a distinctively "European" dimension to defence
is that it will strengthen the voices in Europe who recognize
that European isolationism is not a safe or a realistic option—and
that the problems of security cannot be left exclusively to the
US.
At the same time, we recognize that there is
utility to Europe having a capability to choose to act alone in
the cases where NATO, for whatever reason, is not engaged. Such
cases are a logical possibility, even though we think it unlikely
in practice that there would be a case where the European nations
are willing to undertake a significant military operation and
the NATO nations, including the US, are not prepared to participate
to have the operation conducted through NATO.
It may seem paradoxical that a distinctively
European defense capability should help NATO. The answer is that
a strong Europe is a strong NATO. ESDI is a key element in improving
the defence capability of European nations. The commitment of
our European partners to assume greater responsibility in the
area of security is central to the continued strength of NATO
and of America's commitment to transatlantic security. Stronger,
more capable European partners will enhance our ability to support
common values and security interests. A stronger Europe will fortify,
rebalance, and modernise the North Atlantic Alliance to meet future
challenges to our shared security.
Creating a new European defense capability closely
linked to NATO is not a new project. Since at least 1996, the
United States, the European allies, NATO, the WEU and lately the
EU, have been working to create a European Security and Defense
Identity—and to build it with strong links to NATO, yet
also capable of independent action. We have made much progress
already—in the CJTF concept, in the agreement at Berlin
to build NATO-WEU relationships, and in the Defense Capabilities
Initiative, which antedates both the United Kingdom proposals
and the Kosovo lesson. The task is to complete the work.
At the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999,
the 19 members of NATO welcomed "the new impetus given to
the strengthening of a common European policy in security and
defence by the Amsterdam Treaty . . . "They expressed the
Alliance's readiness to work with the EU to forward that goal,
in particular, by extending to the EU, at the appropriate point,
the commitment already made to the WEU to make NATO assets available
for planning and operations on a case-by-case basis, consistent
with NATO's own process and priorities.
Last December at the EU Summit in Helsinki,
the leaders of Europe focused on improving their military capabilities
and recognised NATO's central role in collective defence and crisis
management, even as they committed themselves to "develop
an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a
whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations
in response to international crises". Looking back on 1999,
we believe that at Washington and Helsinki, and in the work done
to formulate the DCI, NATO and the EU have succeeded in laying
the groundwork for an ESDI.
Of course, there are inevitably conditions to
this confidence and the support these ideas enjoy. Lord Robertson,
who played a key role in ESDI as Britain's Minister of Defence
and continues to do so as NATO Secretary General, has articulated
the following formulations of the necessary foundation of ESDI
and NATO: "the three I's": indivisibility of the transatlantic
link, improvement of capabilities, and inclusiveness of all Allies.
Indivisibility of security. In building the
European capabilities, it is, I believe, agreed that we must not
weaken NATO, the most successful and enduring multinational alliance
in history. There is some danger that the rhetoric of "autonomy"
and "independence" from the European side, and of "let
the Europeans do it" from the American will get out of hand.
There needs to be not only a private conviction, but a frequent
public affirmation, that both European and American governments
are committed to the proposition that NATO must continue to be
a strong and effective instrument of security for the Euro-Atlantic
area and the principal forum for political, as well as military,
co-operation on security matters.
An important aspect of the relationship between
NATO and the EU capability will be "separable but not separate".
The principle must be maintained that Europe will act alone (and
would only want or need to act alone) only where NATO itself is
not engaged—not because NATO has some abstract right to
priority, but because any different approach would mean duplication,
if not competition, and would be wasteful at best and divisive
at worst.
The EU will naturally have to have a capability
for independent decision and directions, including "strategic"
planning, but should not replicate NATO's operational planning
system or its command structure. Instead these NATO capabilities
should be available to the EU from NATO as needed. ESDI should
build on existing NATO-WEU links to provide EU CFSP mechanisms
with assured access to NATO planning capabilities, and presumed
access to NATO collective assets and capabilities for those EU-led
operations to be decided on a case by case basis. Close co-ordination
and transparency between NATO and EU planning will be essential
if only to ensure that, if the question of EU access to NATO assets
for an operation arises, all NATO members are comfortable with
the proposed operation.
Formally, NATO and the EU will maintain independence
of decisions—but in practice, they have to be closely linked
and co-operative, not competitive, and between NATO and the EU
there needs to be complete mutual transparency and co-ordination.
Of course, for those cases where NATO is not engaged, Europe needs
to have both the military capacity to act and the institutions
to reach a decision on whether to do so and to conduct the operation.
Additionally, there can be no question of an "EU Caucus"
inside NATO: NATO decisions must continue to be reached in real
collective discussion, so that NATO will remain, in fact as well
as in rhetoric, the principal forum for security consultation.
The alternative would be unacceptable, not so much because a more
assertive group of EU-members would reach decisions and then seek
to impose them on the other allies, as from a danger that NATO
would be paralysed waiting for decisions to be made in EU channels
before NATO could discuss issues seriously.
Therefore, we favour moving forward rapidly
with building the needed NATO-EU links. In the short term, this
means formalising NATO-EU co-operation beyond the occasional breakfasts
that NATO Secretary General Robertson has with Javier Solana in
his new capacity as High Representative for the EU CFSP. Some
argue that the EU first has to complete the internal process of
developing ESDP before turning to these matters. However, if we
want to ensure that NATO and EU processes are mutually reinforcing,
we need to develop institutional ties during the Portuguese EU
Presidency. We recognise that the EU will need some institutional
structure for the NATO-EU discussions to be productive, but the
interim EU institution are sufficient to provide a valid EU side
to the NATO-EU links. Maximum transparency between NATO and the
EU as the latter develops its institutional security architecture
is the best way to ensure that everyone's equities are covered
and duplication is minimised. We also need practical working contacts
to hammer out the procedures and arrangements to permit NATO planning
and assets to be provided to the EU when needed. In pushing for
NATO-EU ties, of course, we fully respect the sovereignty of European
Union decision-making.
Improvement of the capabilities. The war in
Kosovo—a just war if there ever was one—dramatised
that NATO must and can find the political will to respond to new
security challenges. It highlighted that NATO can—and did—
conduct a highly effective military operation. But it also made
obvious the gap between the US and European contributions—not
of courage, skill, political will, or commitment, but of military
capability in the fields most relevant to modern warfare. To close
that gap, our European allies and partners must take steps to
improve their capabilities in the key areas of deployability and
mobility, sustainability and logistics, communication, command,
and control, effective engagement and survivability. Doing so
will contribute to both NATO and EU capabilities, and better balance
burdens, responsibilities and influence inside NATO.
Powerful, deployable, flexible, sustainable
and effective military forces geared to the challenges they are
likely to face are essential to protect European security. The
United States will continue to do its part—and there have
been lessons for America, as well as for others, from the experience
of the Kosovo war. But it is also true that increased European
focus on and capability for defence will be a key element of assuring
that NATO itself remains strong and able to meet the new threats
to security we will face together in the coming years—and
it is no secret that in this regard, Europe has some catching
up to do.
Catching up will require a significant shift
in the force structure of European militaries. Providing a European
dimension to defence can reasonably be expected to help focus
attention on the need to improve European forces and aid in finding
both the resources and the will to do so.
It is of critical importance in this connection
that the priorities of the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative
and of the EU's program of defence improvements, including the
"headline goal" of a deployable force of 50,000 to 60,000
troops, are not only compatible but also largely identical and
mutually reinforcing. Indeed, these themes are also consistent
with the priorities for defence restructuring and modernisation
set on a national basis by Britain, France, the Netherlands, and
other allies.
Actually executing the programs laid out under
both headings remains essentially a national task, a job for individual
nations. Neither NATO nor the EU will, for the foreseeable future,
actually dispose of significant military power, aside from national
contributions, except for some headquarters, communications systems,
and, in the case of NATO, airborne surveillance. Even where units
are nominally multinational, or pledged to NATO or the EU, it
will remain an issue for national decision whether they will actually
join an operation, a decision that will be made in the specific
context of a crisis. Thus, greater capacity for the European nations
to make contributions to modern military operations will be available
for either NATO or EU-led operations and that greater capacity
will strengthen equally the potential of both institutions.
The key, of course, is actually to do what has
been outlined. Appropriate institutions are needed for ESDI, but
unless accompanied by appropriate improvement in capabilities,
these institutions will have little to command. The EU commitment
at Helsinki to a "headline goal" for a corps-size deployable
force soundly focuses on capabilities and concrete measures—for
that force would be available equally for EU-led and NATO-led
operations. So, at a less publicised level, do the areas of emphasis
initially identified by the United Kingdom and Italy and now adapted
at Helsinki for greater European efforts.
This is not fundamentally a problem of gross
resources—European allies spend two-thirds to three-quarters
as much on defence as the United States and have nearly half-again
as many troops under arms. The central task is more efficient,
more focused, better-planned and co-ordinated use of such resources.
It is for European nations to decide on defence industrial policy,
but it is hard to believe that a "Buy European" policy
will serve efficiency in the use of limited defence resources,
much less criteria of military effectiveness and operational capacity
in coalition warfare. A better approach is the transatlantic one,
and the United States recognises that there are steps we need
to take to make that approach more attractive. The hard fact remains,
however, that reform is difficult, and in the end, improved capabilities
will require more resources—or at least no more cuts in
defence budgets overall. They also call for the political will
to change established patterns and challenge entrenched ways of
doing business.
Inclusive of all allies. Finally, the new European
capability must take account of the fact that while European security
is indivisible and universal, the primary institutions that deal
with security, NATO and the EU are not as yet universal, nor are
their memberships identical. The non-EU allies must be fully included.
This is especially important regarding Turkey—but it also
affects Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
Moreover, those European states that are in neither NATO nor the
EU must have a path to join in the common efforts.
Recognising that, by definition, the EU and
the EU alone must finally decide on EU missions, the non-EU NATO
allies have to be able to participate in ESDI in meaningful ways,
such as planning and preparation, not just signing on after all
decisions are already made. There are several reasons why we believe
that these six countries deserve special status above and beyond
what other EU partners should have. First of all, they want to
contribute, they have military means to bring to the table, and
they have experience as Associate Members of the Western European
Union. Moreover, any significant EU operation will likely require
assets from NATO, which would require a NAC decision in which
all allies, including the six will participate. The EU members
should not, in their own interest, want to complicate getting
assets by excluding the non-EU Allies from having input into the
shaping of the policy leading up to the operation.
As we look ahead, we readily acknowledge that
there is still hard work to be done to realise an ESDI that benefits
both sides of the Atlantic. It is in the interests of both the
Alliance and the EU that such work is done well and expeditiously.
The promise of ESDI—a strong European pillar in NATO and
a new step in the united Europe envisioned by the drafters of
the Treaty of Rome—is a goal worth co-operating to achieve.
A stronger Europe means a stronger Alliance, and a stronger Alliance
is better able to deter the threats and maintain peace and stability.
29 February 2000
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