Memorandum by Richard G Whitman, University
of Westminster, and Karen E Smith, London School of Economics
INCORPORATING DEFENCE
INTO THE
EU: POTENTIAL OBSTACLES
The integration of the WEU into the EU poses a number
of obstacles that will need to be overcome. Consideration will
have to be given to the reform of decision-making procedures,
the implications for non-EU states and the neutrals, and the future
of the WEU's Article V guarantee.
Decision-making reform
The current complexity of decision-making involving
the EU and WEU is untenable when compared to the ambitions that
the EU Member States set for themselves in the Treaty of Amsterdam
and subsequently at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils.
Firstly there is currently no decision-making system in place
that can take decisions on the use of military force in a timely
fashion. Secondly, the EU lacks the capacity to plan and to make
informed decisions when it wants to have recourse to military
force.
A related issue is the creation of a support
system for decision-making. The EU and WEU have very different
decision-making cultures. The WEU has a much greater concern with
the security of information; the EU would have to develop mechanisms
to ensure secrecy and confidentiality.
The implications for WEU associate members, partners
and observers
The WEU currently carries out the majority of
its activities "at 21" (Full Members, Associate Members
and Observers) and long ago blurred legalistic distinctions between
different categories of membership. The loss of such an arrangement
would end one of the real contributions that the WEU has made,
providing a forum in which European NATO and non-NATO states work
in close proximity on military security matters.
The efforts on the part of the WEU to draw 28
states (including the Central and East European "associate
partners") into a common framework of participation would
be lost if inadequate attention is paid to retaining and enhancing
the current level of interaction. This is one area in which EU
Member States currently enhance their own security by blurring
organisational boundaries and binding non-EU Member States into
collaboration on military security matters.
The key appears to be the retention—or
attainment—of what has been called "variable unity".
Essentially this is an inclusive rather than an exclusive approach.
In short, how can all members, observers, associates, and even
associate partners—partners in the building of a common
defence policy, and an eventual common defence—achieve greater
effectiveness without excluding any one group of states? The EU
will need to create a new forum which permits such collaboration.
What does integration mean for article V of the
Brussels Treaty?
A key issue for resolution is the collective
defence guarantee contained within Article V of the Brussels Treaty.
This poses a problem particularly for the neutral (or "post-neutral")
states. The WEU observer states (Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden
and Denmark) that are also "neutral" (Ireland, Austria,
Finland and Sweden) are more accurately described as "post-neutral",
because they have signed up for the Amsterdam Treaty's objectives
in the defence field and have become members of NATO's Partnership
for Peace programme. However, this does not mean that these post-neutral
states (and Denmark) would contemplate the transfer of the Article
V guarantee contained within the Brussels Treaty into an EU Treaty.
Are they now going to be pressured into renouncing their neutrality
(such as it is)?
The guarantee contained in Article V of the
Brussels Treaty raises a number of questions. Should the EU Member
States want to have a collective defence guarantee outside of
NATO? In other words, is the EU to become an alliance? Is it necessary
to have such a guarantee between EU Member States in the absence
of any credible scenarios in which one EU Member State would face
an armed attack in Europe? Indeed would the EU be capable of assuming
responsibility for collective defence? Or would a defence guarantee
merely be "symbolic", to reinforce solidarity among
the Member States? Despite the fact that the WEU Member States
long ago decided to leave the Article V guarantee to NATO, and
that such a guarantee has not been tested to date, it is unlikely
that Article V will prove to be an ignored ghost at the reform
feast. For a number of EU Member States Article V is politically
significant and a commitment to collective defence is deemed too
important to drop. But importing Article V into the EU Treaty
will be extremely difficult, given the implications this poses
for the neutral states in particular, as well as for the future
development of the EU.
SUBSTANCE OF
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
The division of responsibility currently envisaged
for the EU and NATO is practicable as long as the EU develops
the necessary capabilities to engage in the Petersberg tasks.
The EU set itself a headline goal to develop a certain level of
capabilities by 2003, but the tenability of this deadline remains
questionable. In addition, the formulation of lending CJTFs to
WEU/EU remains untested. The provision of CJTFs by NATO does leave
future EU operations subject to a veto by key players in the Atlantic
Alliance. The real question is whether the EU will be able to
directly adopt, and adapt to, the WEU-NATO relationship that has
been put in place.
The EU is committed in the Treaty of Amsterdam
to creating greater co-operation between its Member States in
the field of armaments. The EU will inherit a number of WEU initatives
in this area with the integration of the WEU into the EU. The
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Western European
Armaments Organisation (WEAO), which currently operate as subsidiary
bodies of the WEU would not sit easily with EU organisational
arrangements. Importantly, the participants include Norway and
Turkey which illustrates the extent to which Associate Members
are integrated into the work of the WEU. Both WEAG and the WEAO
raise questions about Europe's defence equipment procurement and
production capacity. The creation of Organisation Commune de Co-operation
pour L' Armament (OCCAR) between the United Kingdom, France, Germany
and Italy is illustrative of the frustration with the limited
achievements of the WEAG.
Under the current arrangements for parliamentary
oversight of security and defence policy, the WEU Assembly oversees
the WEU and the European Parliament has very limited powers to
monitor the CFSP. The European Parliament naturally seeks to accrue
the powers of the WEU Assembly for itself. A past proposal by
the European Strategy Group, in association with the WEU Institute
for Security Studies, was that there should be the replacement
of the existing WEU Assembly by a Common European Parliamentary
Defence Committee comprising representatives of the European Parliament
and members of the security and defence committees of the national
parliaments.
Implications for the Future of the EU
The development of an EU military capability
represents the transformation of the Community model of integration.
The EU would essentially be choosing a path of development similar
to that of traditional nation states, in which military force
is one possible option in the exercise of foreign policy. Until
recently, the EU has been a "civilian power", largely
dependent on economic power and generally interested in exporting
its own model of inter-state relations, based on integration and
interdependence. The EU now seems ready to abandon its civilian
power image, but whether it should do so is one aspect of the
current discussions on defence integration which has hardly been
considered.
Furthermore, the stated intention of enhancing
the EU's military resources carries a price: it sends a signal
that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it
should be used to further the EU's interests. An EU intervention
capability could be seen by outsiders as a step towards the creation
of a more aggressive EU which uses military instruments to pursue
its own interests. It should be a matter for concern if developments
in this field negatively impact upon the perceptions held of the
EU by third parties in Europe. There is real concern in Europe's
neighbours to the south and further east that the development
of Petersberg capabilities is designed to facilitate direct intervention
in those regions. Addressing these concerns might entail creating
mechanisms for consultation and even involvement in the EU's eastern
neighbours. A more inclusive, participatory framework—perhaps
even loosely modelled on the Partnership for Peace programme—could
reduce the risk that defence integration within the EU will spark
a "security dilemma".
Defence integration within the EU will also
have implications for its relations with Russia, in particular
in the context of enlargement. The EU is, after all, also set
to expand to three Baltic republics which until a decade ago were
part of the Soviet Union. If these three countries are joining
an EU that is rapidly integrating in the defence field, Russia
may find that it has some reason to be concerned about EU enlargement,
and not just NATO enlargement. This would be compounded if the
EU were perceived to be readying itself for intervention in areas
close to Russia.
The key concerns for the United States in this
area have been clearly articulated by Madeleine Albright: there
should be no "decoupling" of the transatlantic link,
"duplicating" of defence resources, or "discrimination"
against non-EU European NATO members. With a change of President
in the United States the position of an incoming administration
may be more hostile to developments than is currently the case.
This would have implications for the use of CJTF by the EU as
well. Again, the EU will have to establish the mechanisms to ensure
continued and even strengthened consultations across the Atlantic.
The successful implementation of the EU proposals
for the defence area will make a significant difference to the
EU's capabilities. However, this should not distract from the
fact that the EU's most influential foreign policy tools remain
economic and financial. The development of a military security
capability for the EU should be viewed as an adjunct of other
reforms needed in decision-making and implementation needed to
make the EU a more significant regional and international foreign
policy actor. In this respect, the Helsinki European Council's
conclusions on non-military crisis management should be carried
out.
February 2000
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