Memorandum by Jan Zielonka, Professor
of Social and Political Science, European University Institute
in Florence
1. The rationale behind the European Defence
Project seems plausible. The military potential of Europe is not
negligible but, due to practical and procedural constraints, the
European Union ("EU") is unable to conduct any military
operation. Moreover, Washington often indulges in unilateral policies
and sometimes has a peculiar understanding of European interests.[17]
A European force that stands apart from the
United States of America ("US") and is able to perform
peace keeping operations in volatile parts of its own backyard
seems to be a well conceived proposition. However proponents of
the European Defence Project tend to emphasise its beneficial
aspects while ignoring potential risks, this report identifies
some of those risks.
2. The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki
European Council on Common European Policy on Security and Defence
("Helsinki Declaration") has produced different interpretations
across Europe. There is great confusion concerning the EU's medium-and
long-term policy aims in the defence field. There is a danger
that the Project will raise public expectations that cannot be
matched by capabilities. There is also a danger that symbolic
politics will leave little room for realpolitik. In the
context of peace and security, these dangers should be taken very
seriously.
3. The Helsinki Declaration envisages only
very limited European military capabilities. The Union has stated
an ambition to possess 50,000-60,000 soldiers able to perform
the full range of Petersberg tasks by the year 2003. The force
will not be very "rapid" because it is assumed that
deployment of this force would take some 60 days. (Note, however,
that the Helsinki Declaration talks in general terms about having
smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very
high readiness). Moreover, some experts argue that the Union would
need at least 100,000 soldiers to effectively conduct any ground
operation in the event of another Balkan crisis, not to mention
a much better logistics and intelligence capacity than Europe
currently possesses.[18]
National units will not be transformed into European ones, and
the Helsinki Declaration implicitly denies any ambition of creating
a European army.
4. Nevertheless, the decision taken at the
Helsinki European Council is truly historic, and quite radical.
So although the European defence potential is to be quite modest
in the years to come, it would be wrong to underestimate its impact
on European politics and transatlantic relations.
The decision is historic because there have
been several efforts aimed at creating some sort of European defence
since the early 1950s, and all of them failed.[19]
In fact when the Amsterdam Treaty talked vaguely about the "progressive"
framing of a common defence policy, few observers really believed
that it would actually lead to the creation of independent military
units within a short period of time.
The Helsinki initiative is also quite radical
because it breaks with Europe's long-standing civilian power status.
5. One can only hope that shifting from
a civilian to military power status will solve some existing problems
for the EU, however it will certainly create some new ones.
Because the current Union's power is not military
and hegemonic in nature it does not drive other states out (through
balancing mechanism) but instead attracts them. That is, its civilian
power attracts; it does not repel. Acquiring a military status
may help the Union to cope with local violence but may also raise
suspicion and induce balancing efforts. Following the Helsinki
Declaration, the EU's policies will be watched by both internal
and external actors as never before. To have a "gun at hand"
not only widens opportunities for action; it also endows one with
much greater responsibility for one's actions.
6. In this context, it is particularly important
to question whether a common defence policy of the Union is possible
without a workable common foreign policy? After all, it is important
to know of how, when and for what purposes the Union is going
to use its soldiers. However, a common foreign policy is frequently
paralysed, especially when faced with a crisis.[20]
And when soldiers are used, it is usually as part of the response
to a crisis.
7. For a common foreign and defence policy
to work smoothly it would be necessary to implement serious institutional
reforms within the Union. The most important priority is to find
effective ways for formulating the Union's basic political and
operational will.
There are three major solutions for helping
the Union accomplish this task:
(a) The first solution may be called "majoritarian"
because it advocates institutional reforms that would increase
the Union's capacity for internal conflict resolution.
(b) The second could be called a "conflict-avoiding"
solution because it advocates a search for substantive and procedural
strategies that will reduce conflict within the Union to more
manageable levels.
(c) The third solution may be called a "selective-involvement"
solution. It advocates reforms that would allow some Union decisions
and actions to be taken only by those members that are willing
and capable of doing so.
It is clear that each of these proposals would
go beyond procedural and organisational readjustments to touch
upon the difficult subjects of sovereignty, identity, legitimacy,
the scope of commitments, and membership rights. It is far from
certain that the Union is ready to embark on such a path.
8. When considering defence policy, it ought
to be remembered that issues of cultural identity and democracy
are especially salient, and here European credentials are especially
weak.
The EU does not need any particular kind of
legitimacy when sending electoral observers to trouble spots,
but sending soldiers is another matter. Before asking EU soldiers
to risk their lives, Europeans should have more democratic control
over the defence decision-making process. And, at the very least,
there would need to be some instinctive trust in EU institutions.
9. Efforts to create a European defence
policy are likely to produce concerns in the US about the undermining
of the role of NATO as a major European defence pillar. Although
Europe may well have misgivings about the ways in which the US
exercises leadership within NATO, the fact remains that NATO is
the best defence institution we have and it would be a pity to
undermine it before creating anything comparable. In any event,
the Helsinki Declaration can hardly be seen as a surrogate for
NATO.
10. It is unclear whether there is a genuine
market for a European military force. Kosovo has shown that NATO
can do the military job relatively well.
What is missing, however, is a European police
force to keep order after the soldiers have removed the major
perpetrators. In other words, what is needed is probably a sort
of European carabinieri, rather than a force of European soldiers.
The Helsinki Declaration briefly mentions the need for such a
police force, but does not go any further.
11. Those who believe that the Helsinki
Declaration should be the first symbolic step towards a genuine
European common defence policy must realise that such a policy
can hardly be confined to the peacekeeping tasks identified in
the Western European Union's ("WEU") Petersberg declaration
of June 1992.
A common defence policy must also include the
defence of vital interests against direct attack, as envisaged
by the Article V of the Brussels Treaty. It should probably also
address the issue of Europe's nuclear defence capability. For
example, are Britain and France prepared to extend their nuclear
umbrella to other European countries? Are the EU's citizens ready
to undertake the financial burden of the defence task? Are they
ready to accept casualties in a case of conflict?
12. The above listed catalogue of dangers
and risks should not justify an attitude or policy of benign-neglect.
There are at least four steps that the Union can undertake without
abandoning the civilian power status:
(a) Co-ordination and rationalisation of
defence procurement and spending;
(b) Simplification of European institutional
structures related to foreign and defence policy (by merging the
WEU and the EU, for instance);
(c) Creation of a European-militia to perform
peace-keeping or peace-policing operations; and
(d) Determining a joint European position
within NATO.
All this does not amount to a unified European
defence policy, but it will certainly enhance the already existing
Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP"). And strengthening
the existing CFSP system surely ought to precede any efforts aimed
at creating a common European Defence Policy.
14 March 2000
17 For a more elaborate argument concerning divergent
European and American perceptions see William Wallace and Jan
Zielonka, "Misunderstanding Europe," Foreign Affairs,Vol
77, No 6. (November/December 1998). Back
18
See eg an opinion of three Dutch defence experts published in
NRC Handelsblad,November 8 1999. Back
19
As early as May 1952, six European countries committed themselves
to engineering a new European superstructure needed to give direction
and legitimacy to the future European Defence Community. For more
details see Edward Fursdon The European Defence Community:
A History (London: Macmillan, 1980). Back
20
I developed this argument in Explaining Euro-paralysis. Why
Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics (London:
Macmillan, 1998). Back
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