Select Committee on Defence Sixth Report


SIXTH REPORT

The Defence Committee has agreed to the following Report:—

THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NEW

CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER

Background

1. On 4 January 2000, Professor Sir Keith O'Nions took up his duties as the Ministry of Defence's Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), replacing Sir David Davies.[8] The CSA heads the Department's central scientific staff and is responsible ultimately for all advice given to Ministers on science, technology and operational analysis.[9] His principal areas of work include—

  • Defence Research: The CSA is the budget holder for the MoD's £450 million expenditure on 'corporate' and 'applied' research[10] (we described these components of research in our report last Session on Defence Research[11]). CSA staff also assist, and provide advice to, other organisations within the MoD which set the requirements for new defence equipment and weapon systems, and those who procure such equipment and support it in-service.

  • Equipment approvals: The CSA chairs the MoD's 'Equipment Approvals Committee' which makes procurement recommendations to Ministers.

  • Nuclear safety and effectiveness: The CSA is responsible for advising Ministers on the safety of Royal Navy nuclear propulsion systems and the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, as well as acting as the MoD 'customer' for the nuclear warhead intellectual capability at the MoD's Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).

2. The last of these has been much in the news lately, with the Secretary of State for Defence reviewing the safety implications of proceeding with the recently let contract to run AWE sites.[12] The contract had been awarded to the AWE Management Ltd consortium which included British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, the operator of the Sellafield reprocessing plant. On 29 March, the Minister for the Armed Forces announced that the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate was satisfied that AWE Management Ltd were able to operate AWE facilities safely and effectively,[13] and that Ministers had decided that the consortium would operate the sites, as contracted, from 1 April 2000.[14] The CSA's involvement in this affair is not significant[15] and we have not dealt with these matters in this report.

3. The CSA's organisation is closely involved in the work of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) which is responsible for the majority of the MoD research programmes. We have during this Parliament closely monitored the MoD's changing approach to research and the role played by DERA. Most recently, in our Defence Research inquiry we raised a number of concerns about the MoD's research strategy, including the low level of defence research funding and the challenge of accommodating the lead being taken by the private sector in some areas of technology. In our report we also recommended that the MoD's then current plans for a public-private partnership for DERA should not proceed,[16] primarily because of the likely adverse implications for the MoD's ability to remain an 'intelligent customer' for its research, its collaborative research programme (particularly with the US) and value for money. The Government's January 2000 response indicated that the MoD was still examining the way in which a public-private partnership might be taken forward,[17] and on 17 April the Minister for Defence Procurement announced revised plans for such a scheme. We will be examining these closely in a separate inquiry.

4. Against that background, this brief inquiry served two main purposes.

  • First, we wished to review the appointment of Sir Keith and the work of his organisation, in pursuit of our objective of examining key new appointments in the Department.[18] Unlike some other parliaments, the House does not have any formal role in confirming public appointments, which we see as an omission. Nonetheless, we consider it important that the House has an opportunity—presented by this report—to be informed about his appointment.

  • Second, we took this opportunity to sustain our monitoring of the further development of the MoD's research strategy, picking up some of the outstanding issues from the Government's response to our Defence Research report, in view of the Chief Scientific Adviser's central role in taking this strategy forward.

The New CSA's Appointment

5. Sir Keith O'Nions was appointed as Chief Scientific Adviser after an open competition.[19] His contract is for three years, with an option for it to be extended by mutual consent for a further two years[20] (and over many years, the trend has been for appointments to last for five years).[21] His salary of some £110,000 a year[22] is not performance related.[23]

6. When we examined the appointment of the Head of Defence Export Services, questions of conflict of interest were important because that postholder usually came from industry and his MoD organisation[24] was involved in supporting the products of particular firms in particular markets. However, with the bulk of the MoD's research placed with DERA rather than directly with academic institutions, such issues have much less significance in the case of the CSA's recruitment from academia. Sir Keith had to give up his membership of the Council of Science and Technology because of that organisation's requirement for its members to be independent,[25] and there were other activities that he volunteered to give up.[26] Given the importance of keeping current his scientific expertise and perspectives, however, we were pleased to hear that he had not been required by the MoD to relinquish any of his existing academic positions on taking up the post.[27]

7. The previous CSA, Sir David Davies, left the Department in Easter 1999. The appointment of his successor—Sir Keith—was announced in July 1999, and he took up his post in January 2000.[28] We asked why such an important post had remained unfilled, and the MoD told us that another candidate had been identified at interview but had then declined to take up the appointment. This required the Department to relaunch the recruitment exercise, as a result of which Sir Keith was selected in May 1999.[29] Although Sir David Davies agreed to stay on until 30 April, Sir Keith's other commitments prevented him taking up the post until this year.[30] Sir Keith told us, however, that from last August he was able to devote about a day a week to briefings, making visits to DERA and getting up to speed with some of the key issues, and thus helping to minimise the gap in the provision of advice for the Department.[31]

8. Sir Keith comes to the MoD having had a distinguished career in earth sciences, including holding the Chair of Physics and Chemistry of Minerals and head of the Department of Earth Sciences at Oxford University since 1995,[32] and work in geology and geochemistry faculties of universities in the UK, Europe and North America.[33] When we asked whether such a specialisation would allow him to deal with the technologies perhaps more typically associated with defence equipment, he told us that—

    Science in the Ministry of Defence is immensely broad; it covers everything from mathematics through to material sciences, through technology, and in some areas now really rather advanced studies of the genome and molecular biology and so on ... There is not any single scientist around, to my knowledge, anywhere in the world whose experience covers the whole spectrum in depth; anybody that is appointed will have some real expertise in a narrow part of it, and I have my own expertise in the study of materials and in particular physical or chemical behaviour of materials ... I think the strength that one hopes one might bring to the Ministry of Defence is a broader perspective of science that has come from other things that one has done with one's career ... I have been an adviser on research councils in the United Kingdom, much involved with the National Science Foundation in the US, I was involved with NASA when I lived in the US and subsequently, [and] I am an adviser to the California Institute of Technology, the Max Planck Institute in Germany, Institute Physique de Globe in Paris.[34]

9. The CSA has traditionally been recruited from outside the MoD, not least in order to benefit from such external perspectives on scientific issues.[35] We believe this practice has merit, but we trust in future competitions for this post that internal candidates will not be ruled out. Sir Keith has had no previous involvement in military matters,[36] but he believed this could present advantages. He highlighted areas like operational analysis, which involved not just analysis of specific defence scenarios but also mathematical and modelling methodologies which do not need a grounding in defence knowledge.[37] He told us that so far he had not found a lack of experience of defence to be any hindrance.[38] He also considered that skills developed outside the MoD bring a difficult dimension to scientific advice compared to that available to staff within the MoD.[39] The scope of the science covered by MoD research requires the Chief Scientific Adviser to have a depth and breadth of knowledge. Sir Keith seems well-equipped to bring a wide range of expertise to bear on his new work.

The CSA's Role

10. The CSA's organisation plays an important role in all stages of the equipment procurement cycle[40]—the definition of requirements, scientific research, acquisition and in-service support. The CSA is responsible for the corporate research programme managed by his deputy[41] and the applied research programme which he delegates to the newly established Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability).[42] CSA staff are also involved in integrated project teams in the Defence Procurement Agency and Defence Logistics Organisation, which are responsible for the through-life acquisition and support of particular classes of equipment. This involvement in project teams is not extensive, however, and Sir Keith did not see any danger of conflicts of interest within his organisation when equipment programmes were presented to the Equipment Approvals Committee for consideration.[43]

11. These various CSA roles have been reshaped in the last year or so, as reforms introduced by the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) have been put in place—the establishment of the Defence Procurement Agency, Defence Logistics Organisation and the Equipment Capabilities organisation, and working within a framework of the new procedures of the smart procurement initiative.[44] Sir Keith believed that if the MoD stuck rigorously to the philosophy of smart procurement it should lessen significantly the chance of things going badly wrong after an equipment project's so-called main gate[45] approval by the Equipment Approvals Committee.[46] He had found the methodology used in technical risk assessments to be sound. He considers that, although the risk would never be reduced to zero, if smart procurement principles were operated across the board the MoD should be able to secure significant reductions in project risks.[47] More generally, he believed that the MoD's smart procurement initiative and other organisational changes arising from the SDR had produced a healthier climate for managing procurement, with CSA staff being closely involved with those in the applied research programme, the equipment capability area and in integrated project teams.[48] The new procedures and organisational structures of smart procurement should indeed produce a healthier environment for managing the equipment programme, and in our recent inquiry on the MoD annual reporting cycle we heard examples of some of the potential savings envisaged by the Department.[49] Whether risks will be reduced to such an extent that projects will no longer go off the rails, however, will become apparent only when projects exposed to the new regime are delivered. We will continue to monitor closely the MoD's performance in managing risk in its equipment programme.[50]

12. Within the equipment cycle, one of the CSA's most important and high-profile roles is as chairman of the Equipment Approvals Committee (EAC), which evaluates and approves equipment procurement programmes. In addition to the CSA, the Committee comprises: the 2nd Permanent Under Secretary, as the MoD's Accounting Officer's representative; the Chief of Defence Procurement, as the provider of the equipment to meet the requirement; the Chief of Defence Logistics, representing those who will maintain and support the equipment once in-service; and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, representing the equipment's user. The Committee has a collective responsibility for advising Ministers on major procurement decisions, and as its chairman the CSA's contribution is to bring an independent perspective to procurement considerations, encompassing scientific aspects, the choice of technologies, assessments of risk, and the adequacy and appropriateness of supporting operational analyses.[51]

13. Procurements worth less than £400 million are usually delegated to meetings of the subordinates of the Equipment Approvals Committee members.[52] Although only two months in post, the new CSA had already had to chair a meeting at which the Committee had considered two very important programmes: the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) for the Eurofighter/Typhoon and the MoD's strategic airlift programmes. As chairman, the CSA's job is to "ensure that the advice that goes to Ministers is comprehensive and balanced".[53] He considered that the quality of the analysis and scrutiny in cases submitted to the Committee had made consensus decisions quickly achievable,[54] although this represented the reconciliation of often conflicting views at lower levels in the Department. He believed that—

    ... there has to be some merit in having a Chairman who is clearly representing technical fairness and could not be seen to have a particular Service allegiance. ... It may well be that there is a little more adversarial behaviour at the lower levels now which is extremely healthy. For example, people in the CSA area have a role in scrutiny and analysis of ... what comes from the customer and the procurer. This may be based on some of the same evidence that is emerging low down which may well come from DERA, for example, but it is set up in a way where there really is an independent assessment of that evidence by people in the CSA area ... I can assure you that the gloves come off down there. This is a very healthy thing. It is the quality of what goes on down there that is essential to the smaller group of people [in the EAC] reaching a sound consensus quickly ...[55]

14. The bottom line for the EAC, we were told, is value for money—an assessment of technical capability and the costs of the project.[56] As part of its advice to Ministers the Committee draws attention to the views of other Government departments such as the Department of Trade and Industry[57] and the Treasury on, for example, the implications of a particular decision for UK industry.[58] Ministers, however, "may well give a different emphasis to some of those elements",[59] and inter-departmental consultation also takes place at Ministerial level once MoD Ministers have considered an EAC recommendation.[60] Sir Keith therefore drew a careful distinction between the responsibilities of his Committee and those of Ministers—

    ... we will be alert to industrial impacts because the DTI, for example, may approach us and say "Well, if this particular project was placed in the UK it may have this impact on a capability, or on jobs, and so on." [Ministers'] ... attention will be brought to that [aspect] in the advice that we bring forward. There is a great distinction between that, and offering advice in such a way that it is politically convenient or inconvenient, and I have absolutely no doubt where our responsibility ends. I do not believe there is any confusion in the minds of Ministers either.[61]

The careful limitation of the Equipment Approvals Committee's role to that of an independent source of advice on equipment cost-effectiveness is important and right—it would be wrong for it to have to assess the weight of factors which depend essentially on political judgements in making its recommendations. If Ministers follow a course that does not reflect their advisers' recommendations which are based on value for money, they are required to give a direction to the MoD's Accounting Officer,[62] who is currently obliged to notify the Treasury and the Comptroller and Auditor General, and thereby the Committee of Public Accounts. While that Committee is primarily concerned with the propriety and value for money of departments' expenditure, our remit extends to wider matters including policy considerations.[63] We recommend therefore that in future such Directions are also submitted to the Chairman of the Defence Committee.

The Status of Science in the MoD

15. The CSA's role is an important one, and his organisation needs to be well positioned to ensure that scientific advice gets a proper hearing within the Department. One of his tasks is to chair the Defence Research Committee,[64] which is required to review and endorse the overall balance and content of the Department's research programme. Its responsibilities involve ensuring that the research programme reflects evolving defence policy and procurement priorities; advising on the appropriate balance between shorter and longer term research; and promoting value for money in defence research.[65] The Defence Research Committee is due to report to the Secretary of State later in the Spring on the overall health of the MoD research programme, but when we asked for this report we were told that it constitutes 'advice to Ministers'.[66] We are disappointed that once again the MoD has declined to let us see such an important document, at the heart of a select committee inquiry, citing such grounds. If this is still the Department's position when the Defence Research Committee's report is prepared, the MoD must at the very least distil for us those matters that summarise the state of health of the programme, leaving out if necessary the recommendations and other 'advice' it provides for its Ministerial audience.

16. Sir Keith highlighted his own position within the decision-making machinery of the Department, including his membership of the top level committees in the Department—the Finance Planning and Management Group and the Defence Council—and his personal direct access to the Secretary of State.[67] This, Sir Keith told us, meant that the CSA had—

    ... a very high profile and engagement at the most senior levels of the Department ... one is plugged in at a very high level, which is not always true of science and technology elsewhere in government departments.[68]

17. Amongst the 130 staff in the CSA's organisation there are a large number of people across a wide range of scientific disciplines, many of whom have already had substantial careers in science and technology in defence establishments, such as DERA.[69] In our Defence Research report, we highlighted the risk that the public-private partnership then proposed for DERA might prevent the scientific expertise of central MoD organisations, like the CSA's organisation, being refreshed with staff from DERA.[70] The issue was not properly addressed in the Government's response to our report,[71] so it was gratifying to note that in this area Sir Keith shared our analysis—

    Historically, many people have come into the CSA area during careers principally within DERA ... and then gone back into their research jobs in those organisations ... It is not obvious ... that in the future that is going to be such a normal route for people coming into the CSA area. With a public-private partnership in DERA, one can envisage some different relationships developing, and I think I am going to have to be imaginative in the way in which I refresh and populate the CSA area in the future. It may not be done in the same way as it has been done in the past.[72]

18. In addition to the CSA and the Defence Research Committee, there are a number of other sources from which Ministers receive external perspectives on the MoD's research programme and the state of science in the Department. Perhaps the most significant of these is the Defence Science Advisory Council, which comprises over 150 external independent advisers across a number of areas of science and technology, drawn from industry and academia.[73] It peer-reviews the MoD's research programme and meets regularly to formulate advice for the CSA and the Secretary of State.[74] Other external advisory committees deal with nuclear safety and effectiveness, Gulf War illnesses, biological and chemical countermeasures, research ethics and animal welfare.[75]

19. Sir Keith believed that the Ministry of Defence set a high store on science and technology informing its policy—probably, he thought, more than any other government department.[76] It is heartening to hear praise for the strength of the MoD's science and technology base coming from a relative newcomer to the Department. The future high profile of these critical elements depends on a sound and adequately funded research strategy.

The MoD's Research Strategy

20. Our defence research report of last year described work under way by the MoD and industry to establish an overarching defence research strategy. Its aim was to lay a knowledge foundation across a broad area of research and technology, so that the MoD could remain an 'intelligent customer' for defence equipment and know-how, and then to identify 'towers of excellence' in particular technologies which should rise above such a foundation. Critically, the strategy seeks to establish for each of these towers of research expertise whether it should be led by industry, the MoD or by others. In our report, we welcomed the methodical approach being adopted, but warned that it would be a missed opportunity if the exercise were not undertaken in a logical manner, with research funding following the strategy rather than the other way around.[77]

21. Since our report, discussions have continued between the MoD and industry to develop further the towers of excellence model, and are expected to continue throughout this year.[78] In its response to our report the MoD told us that—

    The level of funding for research must take account of the many other competing calls on resources allocated to defence. The MOD's work on Towers of Excellence is not concluding that defence research can be reduced still further ... The US spends about ten times as much as the UK on research, and about two and a half times as much as the whole of the European Union. Even in the event of a considerable increase in expenditure, the UK would be unable to match that of the US on research. These ratios suggest that we need to be selective about the technologies we develop nationally or on a European basis, and be prepared to use US technologies in other areas ... The purpose of the Towers of Excellence model, therefore, is to be selective in a rational way about the research we should undertake, and about making the necessary choices in partnership with industry. It is not a model for reducing our expenditure on research[79] ...

However, in terms of the strategy's implications for research funding, the MoD said that it—

    ... accepts the [Defence] Committee's point that in a perfect world funding decisions would flow from strategy. No organisation, however, can develop strategies in isolation which may be unaffordable. Strategies must take account of funding constraints, but this does not mean that they are necessarily flawed.[80]

22. The CSA's message to us was similarly double-edged, indicating that he was prepared to defend his research budgets, but that at this early stage in the post he did not see any glaring gaps in the research programme—

    The corporate research programme and the applied research programme is under the control of the Chief Scientist by direct delegation from the Permanent Secretary. It can only be modified by the Finance Planning and Management Group, of which I am a member, so I have every opportunity to defend that budget ... I have looked at the research programme [however] ... and I have not found any real horrors, such as "Oh, my goodness, there is this great hole here. There is this new technology developing, it is going to change the world of defence and we have not got a penny of expenditure in it." I have not found areas like that. We are not in a disastrous situation and we are not in a situation where you could say there is great inadequacy in what we are doing.[81]

23. Against the background of the size of the budgets that the MoD makes available for defence research, the new CSA saw it as an important part of his work to facilitate international collaboration[82] on defence research[83]—

    Given the size of our research budget, which is substantial but ... only about one tenth of the United States', in order for us to have the access to knowledge that we require to run defence properly, collaboration is exceedingly important. So, in some ways we are driven on that basis alone to much greater collaboration with Europe, but there is considerable enthusiasm for it there. That, to some extent, offsets the reduction in the amount of money we ourselves have to spend on research.[84]

24. Underlying the whole debate about research budgets, and the future status of DERA, is the inherent difficulty of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of defence research. Sir Keith told us that he wants to be able to develop the measurement of research's value for money—an area where outcomes have been difficult to establish, in the wider research environment as well as in the MoD.[85] He told us that he was—

    ... trying to quantify [outcomes] and to put up an appropriate level of defence for science and technology ... on the basis of advice I can get about what our science and technology programme should be doing. This is going to be particularly the case as we move into a public-private partnership for DERA, which is going to shift the equation a bit.[86]

25. The question of value for money and the funding of research is closely tied up with the wider issue of DERA's ownership, which we have discussed extensively elsewhere.[87] Private ownership may well influence the availability of finance, but it may also have consequences for the MoD's intelligent customer capability, and thus in time for the cost-effectiveness of its research expenditure. The MoD's response to our defence research report acknowledged that impartiality of advice is essential to support intelligent decision-making, and that the only way to ensure this was through direct public funding of core research.[88] The ability of the MoD to retain its intelligent customer status had been raised by many stakeholders during the last consultation process for the originally proposed public-private partnership,[89] however, and Sir Keith acknowledged that ensuring the research foundation layer remained sufficient for this purpose would be a challenge.[90] Across the research budget more generally, however, the CSA was more relaxed about the ability of the private sector to provide impartial advice—

    I do not see any reason why people working in private sector organisations who are giving advice to anybody, government or business, should necessarily be partial. We are accustomed to advice coming from big consultancies in the environmental area ... We get advice extensively everywhere from management consultants, financial consultants, merchant bankers and so on. You may or may not have different views on the partiality or impartiality of their advice, but I am sure that they are engaged on the assumption that their advice will be impartial.[91]

The Chief Scientific Adviser is the figurehead of the MoD's publicly-funded, impartial, scientific advisory capability. He will not be able to discharge his functions properly if he is deprived of access to sufficient staff, of sufficient expertise and with sufficient experience, to enable him to provide advice of the right quality. The continued ability to retain impartial scientific advice is, as we have made clear time and again, a crucial criterion by which we shall judge whether the future plans for DERA's ownership and structure are appropriate. We wish Sir Keith well in his new post, and trust that he receives the support he needs to discharge his duties effectively.


8  MoD Press Notice 276/99; 6 July 1999 Back

9  Ev p 21, para 2 Back

10  'Corporate Research' covers work with a military potential but currently without a defined military need, or work with a multiplicity of military needs (such as a research on corrosion). 'Applied Research' is aimed at developing solutions for specific military needs, including the development of capabilities for future equipments. Back

11  Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, Defence Research, HC 616, para 15 Back

12  HC Deb, 21 February 2000 c1223 Back

13  HC Deb, 29 March 2000 c159w Back

14  ibid Back

15  QQ 147, 148 Back

16  Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, op cit, para 121 Back

17  HC (1999-2000) 223 Back

18  Last Session, we took evidence from Mr Tony Edwards soon after he took up his duties as the Head of Defence Export Services, and reviewed the work of his Defence Export Services Organisation (Second Report, Session 1998-99, The Appointment of the new Head of Defence Export Services, HC 147) Back

19  Ev p 21, para 3 Back

20  Q 15 Back

21  ibid Back

22  Ev p 22 Back

23  Q 21 Back

24  The Defence Export Services Organisation Back

25  Q 93 Back

26  Q 18 Back

27  Q 18 Back

28  MoD Press Notice 276/99; Q9 Back

29  Ev p 22 Back

30  ibid Back

31  Q 10 Back

32  MoD Press Notice 276/99 Back

33  ibid Back

34  Q 4 Back

35  Ev p 21, para 2 Back

36  Q 27 Back

37  Q 27 Back

38  Q 28 Back

39  QQ 13, 34 Back

40  Q 67 Back

41  The Deputy Under Secretary (Science and Technology)-currently Mr Graham Jordan Back

42  QQ 97, 98 Back

43  Q 128 Back

44  We reviewed in some detail the components of the smart procurement initiative in our report on The Strategic Defence Review (Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, HC 138-I, paras 333-351) and the MoD Annual Reporting Cycle (Second Report, Session 1999-2000, HC 158, paras 129-138) Back

45  Under the more streamlined procedures of the smart procurement initiative, the EAC only considers projects at two points-the 'initial gate' after the concept stage, and the 'main gate' after the assessment stage, at which point about 15% of a project's development costs ought to have been incurred Back

46  QQ 122-124 Back

47  QQ 122-124 Back

48  Q 77 Back

49  Second Report, Session 1999-2000, op cit, para 132 Back

50  Including through the Committee's annual Major Procurement Projects Survey. Our first report in this series was our Eighth Report, Session 1998-99, Major Procurement Projects Survery: The Common New Generation Frigate Programme, HC 554 Back

51  Ev p 22, para 8 Back

52  MoD 'Smart Procurement Handbook', on MoD website Back

53  Q 113 Back

54  Q 72 Back

55  Q 116, 117 Back

56  Q 120 Back

57  In our Seventh Report of Session 1997-98, HC 675, paras 8-10, we called for greater involvement by the DTI in EAC deliberations Back

58  Q 120 Back

59  Q 120 Back

60  Ev p 25 Back

61  Q 131 Back

62  Following the Pergau Dam case, the Committee of Public Accounts recommended that Accounting Officers obtain Ministerial directions (and communicate these to the C&AG without delay) when Ministers do not follow advice concerning 'prudent and economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness', to complement already existing arrangements when the regularity and propriety of government expenditure is involved (Seventeenth Report of Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1993-94, HC 155, para xiv). The Government accepted this recommendation (Treasury Minute 1993-94, Cm 2602, para 13), requiring that directions concerning 'economy, efficiency and effectiveness' be sent to the C&AG. Back

63  Standing Order No. 152 Back

64  There is also a similar 'Defence Research Committee (Nuclear)'-Ev p 25 Back

65  Ev p 22, para 4 Back

66  Ev p 25 Back

67  Q 29 Back

68  Q 29 Back

69  Q 75 Back

70  Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, op cit, para 94 Back

71  HC (1999-2000) 223, p xi Back

72  Q 79 Back

73  Ev p 24 Back

74  Q 54; and Ev p 24 Back

75  Ev pp 24, 25 Back

76  Q 28 Back

77  Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, op cit, para 51 Back

78  Ev p 22 Back

79  HC( 1999-2000) 223, p vi (paras 58, 59) Back

80  ibid Back

81  Q 46 Back

82  The UK's main collaborative partners are listed at Ev p 23 Back

83  Q 38 Back

84  Q 36 Back

85  Q 41 Back

86  Q 46 Back

87  Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, op cit Back

88  HC (1999-2000) 223, p vii (para 60) Back

89  ibid, p xi (para 94) Back

90  Q 33 Back

91  Q 82 Back


 
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