Examination of witnesses (Questions 240
- 259)
WEDNESDAY 22 MARCH 2000
VICE ADMIRAL
SIR IAN
GARNETT, AIR
COMMODORE VAUGHAN
MORRIS, COMMANDER
TOM HERMAN
OBE, COMMANDER RICHARD
HAWKINS and AIR
COMMODORE GLENN
TORPY
240. Would that have led to the outcome of only
40% of the missions actually releasing a weapon? Would what you
have just said have influenced that?
(Air Commodore Morris) The percentage of missions
where weapons were actually released was purely because we were
operating under strict rules of engagement. There was never any
emphasis on people to drop the weapon. I would always say it is
far better to come back with your weapons safe and sound and go
back and do it later if necessary. People were always extremely
selective about what they did. Sometimes they might have been
allocated a target, but through their own on-board identification
process they were not satisfied that they were able to prosecute
within acceptable limits.
241. There would be no pilot in a position to
say, "The kind of array of weaponry I had was not suitable
for this job. I was not sent to do a job that my weapons do not
match now and that is why I am not going to prosecute it"?
(Air Commodore Morris) I think if you ask any air
crew member he would always like to have different weapons, but
they had to operate with what they had at the time. Yes, of course,
there may be other options out there which will give them greater
flexibility still and in certain circumstances would have been
able to have prosecuted more targets.
242. The Chairman started by trying to make
comparisons between our performance against the US. Can you let
me know about the French? How does 40% relate to others that were
in theatre at the time in relation to weapon releases?
(Air Commodore Morris) I quite honestly do not know
that detail. Quite honestly, I was never in a position where I
was trying to score cards for the different nations, I was just
interested in what we were doing and how the coalition overall
was going about achieving its objectives.
243. We as a Committee need to know how each
one of the members of NATO—
(Air Commodore Morris) I do not know that information.
244. Having all this in mind, I have this slight
suspicion that perhaps you did not have the sort of weaponry that
you could have done with. If you had had more missions that were
allowed to go ahead and more missiles that were fired, what effect
would that have had on stock piles?
(Air Commodore Morris) If we had fired more, of course,
you would have to balance that up against the overall effect of
conducting that attack. I would like to think that if we had been
able to conduct more attacks we would have achieved our goals
more quickly. It is very difficult to measure in fact, but we
always measure that consumption against the exercise of trying
to achieve the required effect. It is a bit of a hypothetical
question which I am afraid I cannot answer accurately.
Laura Moffatt: What we are attempting
to do is to make sure that in the future you are not exposed and
find yourself without the weapons you actually need.
Mr Cohen
245. Firstly, the figure for allied sorties
which were strike sorties was 27%. The figure for the RAF was
62%. Does doing so many more strike sorties disguise the fact
that we actually lacked support aircraft and had to rely on the
US for that function?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) As was mentioned earlier,
some countries only provided support assets. We were quite content
to provide strike as well as support assets, and that is why our
proportion of strike assets was slightly higher. Coming to what
we would like to have, it has already been stated, I think, in
public evidence that we would like to have a greater suppression
of enemy air defence capability, along with other things. It is
a balance, but this is an area that I think the MOD will be looking
at very closely.
(Air Commodore Torpy) I think, going back to your
question about support assets, when the statement of requirement
from NATO was circulated to the nations and the United Kingdom
looked at what we could offer, we took a judgment on what would
be of the most value to the operation. We felt that contributing
strike asset aircraft that were capable of offensive operations,
like GR7s and GR1s, was clearly going to be a very important part
of the operation. Also, we do have in our inventory a very good
range of support assets like our E3Ds, our air-to-air refuelling
aircraft, and we actually deployed up to nine tankers to the operation,
which was clearly a critical resource taken in the wider context
of that operation. We tried to offer what we felt was going to
be the most useful.
246. If we had been asked to do the support
function, could we have done that?
(Air Commodore Torpy) Absolutely. Indeed, the United
Kingdom is better off than any other European nation in terms
of our support assets.
247. On the statistics, and my questioning is
mainly about statistics, the sortie rate for the RAF was 37 and
the Royal Navy was only about 15. Why was it so low? It is a bit
worrying seeing as we were embarking on a major carrier programme.
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) I think the Navy carried
out 102 sorties at a rate of 15 per aircraft, but they were only
in theatre for about a month, whereas the Royal Air Force Harriers
were there for 78 days. I think that is the principal explanation.
248. You would expect that, in any longer operation,
the Royal Navy would increase the sortie?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) The sortie rate is
in response to the requirement of the person commanding the operation,
General Short. We offer aircraft. He determines, in his air tasking
order, what each country should contribute. I am sure Commander
Hawkins can give you an indication of the sortie rate that might
be generated.
(Commander Hawkins) We are talking about different
roles in terms of the air defence and the other assets, but I
think if you were to take the period over which the Sea Harriers
were involved in the operation, the sortie rate per aircraft was
broadly comparable. I am not sure whether that is a useful figure
to work with, because the position was different. Had Invincible
been there longer, of course, the sortie rate would have been
the same, but the total sorties per aircraft would have gone up.
249. Do I detect a problem then, that the Royal
Navy is slow to get up to a high sortie rate?
(Commander Hawkins) I do not think so.
250. It takes time to do it.
(Commander Hawkins) I do not think so. We were operational
and on task within two days of entering the theatre.
251. I just want to follow up Laura Moffatt's
questions to a degree. I have looked at the Ministry of Defence
statistics and I heard the answer that was given previously. I
presume that there is a case for using non-precision guided weapons
against fielded forces, a case for using the precision guide where
there is a specific target, and presumably there is a gap in between
where you would say—
(Air Commodore Morris) If you identify a fielded force
which is in an area which is possibly going to incur collateral
damage, then in those circumstances it is probably best to use
precision.
252. Against fielded forces?
(Air Commodore Morris) Yes.
253. What about night fielded forces?
(Air Commodore Morris) In Kosovo, never at any time
did you look into an area and find that there was a mass of vehicles
or troops. You will have occasions when you require precision
in those circumstances if you want to prosecute an attack.
254. It is the case for non-precision that I
am trying to explore and the circumstances for it. I can see you
are making a case with the non-precision guided weapons being
used against fielded forces. Where else?
(Air Commodore Morris) There are other targets that
you can use non-precision against. I gave the example of a large
area target, such as a POL site, which may be the size of 10 football
pitches. In those circumstances you could use non-precision weapons
with very good effect because you drop more than one.
255. A what site, POL?
(Air Commodore Morris) Petrol, oil and lubricants.
Fuel depot.
256. I have looked at the MOD statistics and
I have run through them, and these are off-the-cuff calculations,
but I have worked out that the percentage of missions where weapons
were released and where there was obviously a clear case for non-precision
guided weapons against the fielded forces is something like 15%,
and yet 75% of the actual weapons that we used were non-precision
guided weapons. That is a big disparity.
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) I think this brings
home the point that against fielded forces—we have discussed
already how difficult they were to find—the pilots were
not going to risk dropping non-precision weapons against targets
that they could not positively identify.
257. They were not going to risk dropping precision
guided weapons?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) They did not drop precision
guided weapons against fielded forces generally, they dropped
non-precision guided weapons.
258. But they did drop them, they dropped them
in 75% of the cases. Of all the weapons used, 75% were non-precision
guided.
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) Correct, and many of
those were not against fielded forces, they were against other
targets.
Chairman: Thank you. We have asked half
of the questions that we intend to and we have 17 minutes to go.
I am not sure how we are going to ask 11 questions in that time.
We will start with Mr Viggers.
Mr Viggers
259. The classified memorandum on the accuracy
of employing guided missile systems, should go into some detail,
giving the percentages of certainty of the missile striking within
different distances.[1]
I am particularly interested in the subject. As to the targeting
directive, did this come complete with a manner of carrying out
the operation, or were you simply given targets, or were you told
that these were suitable for cluster bombs, depleted uranium or
TLAMs?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) The list of targets
is separate and totally different from the targeting directive
I received. My targeting directive described to me the sort of
targets that United Kingdom forces were allowed to attack, the
ones that we were not allowed to attack, the degree of collateral
damage that we should seek to avoid, the risks to civilians and
many other factors like that, which constrained, in essence, what
targets, generated by NATO, United Kingdom forces could accept.
Sometimes it was clear-cut, sometimes, as you have heard, it was
not clear-cut, and there were discussions between the men in theatre
and the headquarters as to whether a particular target matched
the direction I was given in my targeting directive. That was,
if you like, an instruction to me, which was totally different
from the list of targets that was generated by NATO.
1 Q144. Back
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