Examination of witnesses (Questions 260
- 279)
WEDNESDAY 22 MARCH 2000
VICE ADMIRAL
SIR IAN
GARNETT, AIR
COMMODORE VAUGHAN
MORRIS, COMMANDER
TOM HERMAN
OBE, COMMANDER RICHARD
HAWKINS and AIR
COMMODORE GLENN
TORPY
260. When you were given the targets, were you
given a choice of the manner of carrying out the attack on that
target?
(Air Commodore Morris) Within the Combined Air Operation
Centre we have what we call the target shop, where they would
try to marry up targets to weapon systems through different nations
and they are all regarded as NATO assets. In certain circumstances
they would also give a preferred weapon to target matching recommendation,
but it was really down to the national commanders to decide whether
the targets were going to fit in with their constraints and whether
that recommendation was appropriate or not in terms of the weapon
they were going to use. So it was a national responsibility to
clear the target for the attacks that we prosecuted and also the
target weapon that was going to be used. In some circumstances
I can clear that target, but in other circumstances I would have
to consult the PJHQ to get the necessary clearance.
261. Is there thought to be any political sensitivity
about the use of either cluster bombs on the one hand or depleted
uranium on the other?
(Air Commodore Morris) From a national perspective,
depleted uranium did not come into the argument as far as we were
concerned in the CAOC. As far as cluster bombs were concerned,
everybody was well aware of cluster bombs, the nature of them
and the possibility of unexploded ordnances. The same applies,
of course, to conventional weapons as well, 1,000lb bombs, you
can have some that fail to detonate, so we are extremely aware
of that and none more so than the air crew who are asked to release
them and to make sure that they always use the minimum number
of weapons and only on the appropriate occasions.
262. Who decided when TLAM should be used?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) TLAM was offered to
NATO and it was woven into the air tasking order as just one all
weather precision guided weapon supplied by the United Kingdom
to be used against high value strategic targets.
263. Was its performance satisfactory in the
general context of the Kosovo air campaign?
(Commander Herman) Yes, absolutely. It was outstanding.
264. It came into service quite quickly. Was
it integrated into the United States TLAM system?
(Commander Herman) We fired the first weapon at the
back end of November of the preceding year, and you can imagine,
therefore, it was a bit of a rush to bring it into service operationally
a few months later. So the concept that we used was a simple and
robust structure so that we could ensure that we achieved the
aim we wanted with it. It was very much a part of the campaign
and integrated with the other precision guided munitions that
were being used.
265. How did its accuracy compare with other
weapons which were used in the campaign?
(Commander Herman) Tomahawk is well known to be an
extremely accurate, robust weapon, and it exceeded our expectations
of it throughout.
266. Has the Royal Navy taken the view that
it has been so successful that it should be brought further into
service and at what speed?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) I am not familiar with
the details of the introduction into service of Tomahawk. I can
give you a note on that if you wish. There is a plan to introduce
it into, I think, all of our submarines. I do not know the dates,
but I can let you know.
Mr Brazier
267. Could I just pick up two rather wide ranging
questions? The first one is, are you satisfied that the United
Kingdom crisis managing practice and procedures across Whitehall
departments, Cabinet Office, FCO, MOD, DfID, and Treasury are
sufficiently joined-up to facilitate the provision of timely strategic
direction to you? You mentioned at the beginning, in discussing
aims, that some of them were aims which those other departments
have central roles in.
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) Can I refer to the
Defence Crisis Management Organisation of which I am a part? That
is the PJHQ and the MOD, it does not include the Treasury and
other departments of state. Yes, is the answer to the question.
268. I did not hear that bit in the middle,
you said, "which includes"?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) PJHQ and the Ministry
of Defence are the two parts of the Defence Crisis Organisation.
Clearly other departments of state were represented in discussions
held by the DCMO, but so far as I am concerned the DCMO, as such,
worked very well during the campaign.
269. Were DfID represented there earlier?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) Yes, they were, but
they come in at the ministry level.
270. The second question is a very wide ranging
one and no doubt in subsequent sessions we will get into it in
more detail, but just in general terms, were you satisfied with
the ability and readiness of the single service's ability to deliver
to you the forces and, critically, the logistic support for all
the various things you were being asked to do?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) Yes.
Chairman: Thank you. There were more
questions that Mr Brazier was going to ask. We will cut down the
questions on support, but Mike Gapes has one question on support
which he would like to ask now.
Mr Gapes
271. How long would you have been able to sustain
the United Kingdom effort at the levels which were being applied
immediately prior to the cessation of the air campaign?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) I will be honest, I
do not know because I did not have all of the details of the stock
piles that we have in this country. I know that the United Kingdom
was not constrained in any way, right up to the end, in carrying
out its part in the campaign. How long we could have gone on for
is a question for the MOD, because they have the details of the
stock piles and I do not.
272. Do you have a rough idea?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) I do not and I would
not even guess. It would be wrong for me to speculate.
273. Would you say weeks or months or days?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) I do not think it is
wise for me to continue.
Chairman
274. Thank you. Another question, should DfID
be represented at operational level? You said they would. Should
they be?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) It is something we
are looking at. We recognise that there are strong links across
Whitehall with regard to DfID and MOD. Once in theatre we have
very effective links with the international organisations, non-governmental
organisations, and DfID. What we are looking at is whether we
need to establish a slightly stronger link. We do have a link
with DFID, but whether we need to establish a slightly stronger
link between DfID and PJHQ is something that we are thinking about.
275. We have some questions on information operations.
We will write to you about them, but we are going to have a public
session on the relationship between the media and the conflict
(a) here, and (b) in NATO, and we are in negotiations for speakers.
In terms of cost, to what extent were your operations during the
campaign constrained by costs?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) They were not.
276. So no one said, "Do not fire X missiles
because it is too expensive"?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) The budget I have given
to me as a programme is clearly something that I have to live
within, but operations are cost excepted. It is up to the Ministry
of Defence to govern what state an operation is in and that did
not hamper me at all.
277. As a top level budget holder, one of your
tasks is to account for the cost of UK operations. How easy was
it to determine likely costs in advance? To what extent were you
able to provide accurate estimates?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) The estimate, I think,
was provided by the MOD. They estimated how much the operation
would cost. The spending of the money is done through me, and
broadly speaking what was spent roughly, from memory, matched
the estimate. I do not have the details, but I can let you have
them if you wish.
Mr Gapes
278. Could the alliance have conducted a successful
opposed entry of ground forces with the US providing only air
support?
Mr Viggers: While you are thinking, did
your plans include the possibility of an opposed ground entry
land campaign?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) Yes.
279. Without the US?
(Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett) My illustrative planning
did not. My illustrative planning always assumed that the United
States would be part of that entry.
| 
