Examination of witnesses (Questions 400
- 419)
WEDNESDAY 29 MARCH 2000
VICE-ADMIRAL
SIR ALAN
WEST and MR
RICHARD HATFIELD
400. What you are saying is that it was suppressing
their forces, not destroying them?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) Very much so. It was
having a real impact on their operations.
401. Finally, what were the conclusions of the
intelligence assessment to consider the outcome of any opposed
entry into Serbia or Kosovo?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) In intelligence terms
what I do not do is the full scenario work that goes through.
In intelligence terms we felt this was a practical endeavour and
we gave advice as to how we thought the best way of pulling that
campaign together would go. However, there would have been casualties.
I cannot remember what the casualty figures were. What we were
trying to do was optimise a plan with minimum casualties to us.
I think in terms of casualties to the Serbs it would have been
quite catastrophic and they would have taken extremely heavy casualties.
Thank goodness we did not have to go to that plan.
Chairman
402. Thank you. We will have to rattle through
these sections now. In analysing what the Serbs were doing and
reacting to what we were doing, did you gain the impression that
they were either pretty smart in analysis or that they had access
to very classified NATO information or information from the British
or the French or whoever?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) ***
403. Clansmen?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) *** There might have
been an air campaign a year before, they dispersed materiel. ***
404. What about the story in the media a couple
of weeks ago about the potential leaking of information through
NATO in the early stages of the war? The Yugoslavs or the Serbs
seemed remarkably able to anticipate where the bombs were going.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) As I say, going back
to what I said, if you look at a plan, if somebody is about to
attack the UK I think I could write down quite quickly where I
thought the key places they would be attacking would be. There
was an element of that. I think one is always worried the more
people you have privy to a secret the more concerned one gets
inevitably. NATO is a very large group of nations. I would have
thought the most leaky thing possible might have been people chatting
in the margins of things with the media trying to be helpful and
saying a little bit more than they should probably. I am not aware—or
if I was we have got rid of them—of a spy in there who was
giving information. ***.
405. How many Brits do you reckon had access
to the Air Tasking Order?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) That has to be narrowed
down again.
406. Not Brits in NATO, Brits operating in the
UK?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) *** We are talking about
handfuls of people.
Mr Cohen
407. One quick question: did the Defence Intelligence
Service identify any UK military personnel who were collaborating
with the Serbs between 1995 and 1999?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) Did the DIS identify
them?
408. Yes?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) Not that I am aware of.
Chairman
409. Or the MoD police?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) ***
Mr Cann
410. The US, of course, has very much a larger
intelligence capability than we have. Do you think we rely on
it too much?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) I think we are extremely
lucky that we have got such a good ally which has such an amazing
intelligence capability. You are absolutely right, their intelligence
capability is amazing. They have spent huge amounts of money on
collection, particularly on the technical aspects of collection.
Now we get access to that because of our special relationship
but also we give them quite a lot of value added, we give them
some very good things. There are certain things, for example some
aspects of *** therefore, that is a good exchange. They value
very much indeed our analysis. ***, where we provide things which
they cannot really do. It is not just a one way street. We do
give them a lot. Indeed, when I had senators and congressmen visiting,
I surprised myself, I actually put together a package of all the
things we do that give value added American help. It was actually
a very substantial list and gave their congressmen and senators
quite a belt as well, I think they were slightly surprised. ***.
411. Knowledge, of course, is power. Do you
get think they have ever abused the fact they have got knowledge
and we have not?
(Mr Hatfield) I do not think that is an intelligence
question.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) No, that is for the Policy
Director.
(Mr Hatfield) I do not think that is even a question
for me.
412. Some people say that they were more pro
going into Kosovo than we were, I rather got the impression myself,
personally, that it was us who were the leaders in the matter.
It is a question, is it not, that the intelligence can be used
if you suppress intelligence to produce a result in NATO?
(Mr Hatfield) I think one of the points the Admiral
is trying to bring out is though the Americans' intelligence machine
is incredible, we do not take the Americans' interpretation necessarily
for granted. What we take from them, it has to be said, is information.
Quite apart from what we may add to the value, we can make our
own assessment of the same data which is not quite the same thing
as relying on it to survive.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) As I said, it is our
analysis that they value so highly because we come at it from
a different way. We will come out very often, on the same data
that is collected, with a different assessment.
Mr Gapes
413. Can I take you on to the NATO side of this.
The assessment of the intelligence, whether it was our assessment
of our own information or what we have gathered from elsewhere
that we gave, was properly handled within the NATO command structure
so that decisions which were taken were based upon all relevant
material?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) I cannot really answer
that. All I would say is that NATO depends on intelligence from
all the nations. It does not have its own intelligence capability
per se. The UK have a very, very good track record of the intelligence
we give to NATO. We are probably, if not the best, one of the
best and I would say the best at times in what we give to NATO.
Then that is put into the NATO machine, their intelligence machine,
and they have to pull together the bits from all the nations and
then give advice to their command.
(Mr Hatfield) I think the answer to your question
is, yes, nothing is perfect ever in any system but we had no complaints
about the way the NATO system was pulling the information together.
414. Do you think there would be an advantage
if NATO had its own intelligence assessment capability as opposed
to having to rely on information fed in nationally?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) It can assess, it just
cannot collect.
(Mr Hatfield) Yes, it does not gather.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) There is an assessment
function there, although I have to say quite often they are delighted
to get assessments from nations because of the sheer capacity
to be able to do it.
415. Did the way in which this crisis developed
and the way in which there were sometimes some difficulties mean
that strains have made it more difficult for the future for effective
use of material and the way in which the NATO countries co-operate
together? Are there any worries you have about the way you think
this has gone for future co-operation?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) NATO has gone through
a lessons learned package as well, they are looking at lessons
learned. ***.
(Mr Hatfield) I think that is part of the wider lessons
NATO has learned, that it was not configured, optimised, to fight
that sort of operation. It is the first operation of that type
and it has learned a lot of lessons from it which I think, in
answer to your question, means it hopes to be better in the future
rather than worse.
Mr Gapes: We will wait and see.
Chairman: Thank you very much. Mr Cann
has two questions.
Mr Cann: I rather thought you were doing
number 11, Chairman.
Chairman: No, I am scrubbing that.
Mr Cann: Did we use reservists at all?
Chairman
416. In the intelligence role.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) The answer is yes, I
used quite a lot of them. I want to use even more of them in the
future.
417. If they are there.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) I am sure they will be
there. Now that people look at our objectives and relate our pay
to it, I have put it as an objective to one of my 2 Stars and
I am sure he will come up with the goods at the end of that. I
did make a lot of use of them. The Committee will be interested
to know that the Flight Lieutenant sitting behind me is actually
our expert on ICTY and she has provided all of the focused data
to the tribunals looking at war crimes in Kosovo. She has been
working with me since early April as a reservist who was called
up to do that and is doing that work and, in fact, has assisted
me on putting together some of the data for today. As I say, I
do use reservists a lot and I want to use even more of them in
terms of interrogation, for example. All of my interrogators are
reservists because they are very bright people and you can get
the ones you want with degrees who are keen to do their bit and
I like to utilise them. I use them as much as I possibly can and
hope to use more.
Chairman: We can only afford to ask that
question on reservists when my colleague, Brazier, is out of the
room otherwise we would never escape.
Mr Cann
418. How many people have you got who speak
Serbo-Croat?
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) I do not know the number.
Chairman
419. Please write to us.
(Vice Admiral Sir Alan West) Yes, I can let you know.
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