Examination of Witnesses (Questions 660
- 679)
WEDNESDAY 10 MAY 2000
GENERAL SIR
MIKE JACKSON
AND MAJOR
GENERAL JOHN
REITH
660. Still very small.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) We were aiming, at that
stage, for what became KFOR Plus, not 25,000 but getting on for
50,000. Then actually the other nations who had not deployed and
indeed those nations who had and were going to put more in did
so. I think we got up to 50,000 by late July, a month after entry,
something of that order. It takes time, it does take time unless
you are prepared to redeploy before the event.
661. That still would have been very small had
you faced something at the other end of the spectrum in terms
of your seven options.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Indeed. We had the peace
implementation grown, which had to result from some form of agreement
which therefore required Milosevic to concede to whatever minimum
conditions we were laying down in that agreement, of course that
was what did happen at Kuminova—had that not happened, had
the decision been to prosecute this conflict to the point of coercing
Milosevic to concede those principles by means of offensive ground
operations into Kosovo then we would have had to build a very
much larger force—very much larger by a factor of 10/12,
15 plus. KFOR was something which not all observers and some media
had difficulty in understanding. They saw some tanks and thought
this was something it was not.
662. Thank you.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) It would have taken time
and a lot of effort to have built it to a war fighting machine.
Mr Brazier: Absolutely.
Dr Lewis
663. General Jackson, at the outset it was publicly
stated that ground troops would not be used to force their way
in. Are you aware of, and if so will you tell us, at what stage
was it covertly conveyed to Milosevic that the threat of a ground
attack had been reinstated?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) I do not know if it was
covertly transmitted to Milosevic or not. Again, if it was properly
covert then I probably would not know anyway.
Laura Moffatt
664. Exactly.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) There were—there
were, were there not—public signs that the atmosphere was
changing from the initial publicly stated position. I recall,
I think it was the President of the United States in mid May said
"no options are ruled out", a phrase, if that is not
verbatim, very similar to that. Milosevic can work out with the
difference between those two statements and come to the obvious
induction. Covert, I have no idea but we all saw a change in public
statements and the thrust of public statements as time went on.
Dr Lewis
665. Yet, I am sure you were aware of many developments
which were going on in the campaign which were not available to
the public, and all I am asking is whether you were informed at
any time before there was any perceptible public shift that the
ground force option was being reinstated? My justification for
asking this is that the Chief of the Defence Staff counted the
threat of ground force attack as one of the four main factors
that he regarded as compelling Milosevic's compliance. Surely
it is quite legitimate to ask at what point you think that really
began to bite?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Indeed. I am sorry if you
think I am trying to evade the issue, I am not at all. I would
say this, would I not, I completely agree with the Chief of Defence
Staff. One's own analysis tells you that one of the several pressures
operating on Milosevic in late May/early June when he did decide
to concede was, I am quite certain, the threat of a ground invasion,
one which he would have lost, and he knows that. How was that
message was conveyed? I am not actually privy to whatever diplomatic
or other signals may have been sent to him by whatever route.
Those who do these things do these things covertly. I would just
say I think to the lay observer there was enough in the media
to show that the game was moving on. There was serious thought
starting to be given to what needed to be done next if the bombing
did not achieve its mission.
666. At the end of Mr Brazier's questions you
started to touch on my next two questions but rather than trying
to dissect them I shall put them as they stand. If you had had
to make an opposed entry into Kosovo late last summer, do you
believe that force levels and capabilities would have been appropriate
and sufficient to counter the level of opposition that was then
expected?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) We must be careful here
again, if I can use the trite phrase, comparing apples and oranges.
Indeed, up to the point we went in KFOR was configured, structured
and sized as a peace implementation force. Had we had to force
our way into Kosovo against opposition—and frankly it would
have been very difficult to estimate the nature, both by size
and morale of that opposition two months down the range or whatever
it was going to be—had we had to do that we would have had
to build, as I say, a much larger force, a much heavier hitting
force to do that job. That would have taken some time and some
effort.
667. Right. Now let us assume that you decided
to do that and build up that larger force, how formidable a Serbian
force would you have expected to encounter and how did this relate
to what you later found in reality on entry into Kosovo?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) What we found on entry
into Kosovo was a sizeable part of the VJ, the Yugoslavian Serb
Army, estimated at up to 400 main battle tanks, some 200 artillery
pieces, perhaps 20,000 soldiers, and of course 20,000 thereabouts
special police as well, a pretty sizeable force. That said, the
Yugoslav Army has not fought a conventional war as it is constructed,
it has only been occupied in what they call internal security.
So although the numbers are quite large, the capability is not
one I think that would have given a properly organised, trained
and equipped western NATO force any great problem.
668. Is it true that according to a suppressed
US air force report which has now been leaked that only 14 tanks
were destroyed, not the claimed 120; that only 18 armed personnel
carriers were destroyed, not the claimed 220; and that only 20
artillery pieces were destroyed not the claimed 450. If it is
true that the battle damage assessment was so overrated, what
might have been the effect on force level requirements of that
over-optimistic assessment? Are you still confident that, had
you built up the forces to the level you had anticipated needing
to do the enforced entry, that would have been sufficient to meet
what you would have found, given the knowledge now of what had
not been destroyed?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Yes, because I think my
previous answer was couched against the numbers.
669. Right.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Rather than the—shall
we say—more optimistic ones which you quoted there.
Chairman
670. If we had been obliged to begin a ground
war had approval been given had enough countries signed up, bearing
in mind the meteorological circumstances, the climatic circumstances,
despite all the roads that General Reith was building and the
air fields he was building—or we thought you were building
or they thought you were building—would you have had time
to have got in a campaign before the climate sufficiently deteriorated?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Obviously we had worked
out as carefully as we could what these time constraints were.
By the mid summer in FYROM we had 200,000 plus in camps. You had—
(Major General Reith)—nearly 500,000.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) So three quarters of a
million people, shall we say, in round terms, living in refugee
tents in the two countries. Fine, in a Balkan summer, extremely
unpleasant and indeed life threatening no doubt for the elderly
and the sick in a Balkan winter which can be very, very hard.
I think the logistics of winterised accommodation for that number
of people were horrific. On that basis the time planning would
have been that we would have needed, given, if you like, the hard
onset of winter by early November/mid November at the latest,
given we needed a month or so to get the refugees back, given
we would wish to give ourselves a month for military operations
to achieve the conditions to get the refugees back, it did not
take a great deal to work out that we were approaching a decision
in perhaps mid to late June to actually start to deploy and put
together a force. Now that does not mean to say you have to use
it but you cannot use it unless you have got it into the right
place. Bringing it together, transporting it and getting it into
concentration areas, wherever they may have been, is a time consuming
affair, particularly for the size of force we are talking about.
671. Even if various countries had said they
would have contributed the best resources available it would have
been a pretty tight fit to have got in a one month campaign.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Chairman, you have a simple
time and space problem, ships only go at so many knots and it
takes so long to get from A to B. There is also then actually
getting the force organised in its waiting area, hopefully getting
in some training and putting it together. This takes time.
Chairman: Thank God it took the course
it did is all I can say.
Mr Brazier: Absolutely.
Mr Hood
672. General, we have heard earlier estimates
that upwards of 150,000 troops would have been required to conduct
a ground force opposed entry into Kosovo. Did you provide that
figure? If you did not who made the estimate?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Again I go back to informal
planning and formal planning. Of course there was informal planning
going on. I have no doubt every Ministry of Defence in the Alliance
was doing some informal planning to see what it might mean nationally
for their own forces. Certainly there was informal planning going
on in SHAPE, and certainly in my own headquarters. Now, it had
not got to the point where any formal decision was even on the
immediate horizon, although time was beginning to press. There
were a number of variables which we did not know and would not
have known until the relevant strategic political decisions had
been made. Neither had any definitive judgment been made upon
the size of the force, what avenues of approach it would use and
what its objectives would be. There were a number of possible
objectives. So I think we need to be careful here that we do not
start judging size against something when you have not stated
what the mission is. But, had the mission been to evict from Kosovo
a battered but not necessarily defeated Pristina Corps, which
was the main body of the VJ in Kosovo, and given the nature of
the ground which was very difficult, given that Kosovo was basically
ringed by mountains with very few routes in, 150,000, a full blown
corps seemed to us to be the minimum we would need to be looking
at.
673. Given your state of preparation for an
opposed ground force entry in March 1999, how long would it have
taken to assemble, train and prepare the necessary forces before
entry would have been possible?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Yes. It would require the
right decision making, of course. I think the generally held view
was that once a decision had been made some two months would have
been required to deploy, assemble and ready the force for operations.
674. The Chief of Defence Staff in evidence
stated that the UK had been prepared, if asked, to commit a ground
force of some 50,000 troops, regular and reserve. Did this surprise
you?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) No. No, it did not. If
I can expand on that. It was quite clear the strength which had
been put behind the British Government's approach to this whole
problem and therefore it did not surprise me that we were willing
to go to that number.
675. Which other nations did you expect to contribute
and which specifically had said they would not contribute?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) I know of no definite national
position from anybody other than my own nations because I do not
think any other leader made such a pronouncement. I do not think
I can speculate on it.
676. Of the UK's 50,000, the Chief of Defence
Staff stated that around 12-14,000 would have been reservists.
Would that number surprise you?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) No. 50,000, if they were
not to include reservists, would be half of the trained army.
It does not surprise me at all that it would be sensible to look
to the reserves to assist that. It is precisely one of the reasons
we have reservists.
677. That being so, General, from your knowledge
of the UK's reserves, how well prepared do you think they would
have been to have done the task?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Let me say this. In my
opinion, I would have every confidence that they would have been
there. I know the TA quite well, I have served with them myself
once. Their enthusiasm and willingness to get involved is always
a source of delight. But, you must remember that I am here as
a NATO commander, speaking from events as I saw them, I do not
really think that I can give you or should give you a judgment
along those lines. That would be better put I think to somebody
here who was in the national chain of command.
Mr Hood: This Committee shares your support
and enthusiasm for the TA, unfortunately others within the MoD
do not.
Chairman
678. If Sierra Leone is going to go pear shaped,
could you raise 50,000 to go anywhere now you have changed hats,
General?
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Needs must, yes. If it
is needs must.
679. I think 50,000 was a little bit on the
optimistic side, unless they included Group 4 and Securicor.
(General Sir Mike Jackson) Again we get into this
sometimes unhelpful shorthand of talking about numbers. What we
really want to be talking about is what sort of capabilities we
are looking to. If the hypothesis is 50,000, of which shall we
say 10,000 are reservists/TA leaving 40,000 to be found by the
regular army, yes it would be done if the crisis required it.
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