After Rambouillet
57 The failure of Rambouillet further narrowed the
diplomatic options open to the international community. NATO had
threatened coercive action in October 1998 and secured, partly
through this means, an agreement from Belgrade which had not been
honoured. The KLA had intensified its campaign of insurrection
and the Racak massacre had symbolised the unwillingness of Belgrade
to moderate its military campaign against the KLA. Now the Rambouillet
talkswhatever their limitations as a negotiationhad
been treated with contempt by the Belgrade leadership. Intelligence
sources confirmed that Milosevic believed that Alliance unity,
let alone wider international unity could not be maintained against
him.[126]
From his perspective, and given the difficulties of the UN in
negotiating the wording of UNSCR 1199 and 1203, the EU's difficulties
in adopting a united front against Serbian policy, and the undercurrents
of Rambouillet, this was not an unreasonable assumption to make.
He continued to overplay his hand. After the failure of the
Rambouillet talks, compelling Milosevic's compliance with the
agreement made in October 1998 became the default policy of the
Alliance.
58 In the months leading up to March 1999, military
exercises, additional deployments and preparations to engage in
phased air operations were all intended to demonstrate NATO's
resolve. Similarly, preparations to deploy NATO ground forces
into Albania and Macedonia had to an extent (though perhaps insufficiently)
indicated a readiness to act to prevent the crisis spilling over
from Kosovo into neighbouring countries.[127]
However, the MoD's own report on Lessons from the Crisis
comments
Lessons have been learned
at NATO, and planning procedures and the functioning of the headquarters
in Brussels are being updated as a result. NATO and the UK have
learned practical lessons on the ways in which NATO planning is
conducted ... The planning procedures for NATO non-Article 5 (ie
non-collective defence) operations are being considerably streamlined,
which should result in speedier operational planning and comprehensive
and effective contingency planning in peacetime.[128]
We concur with the implicit recognition in these
words that NATO's planning procedures in the period leading up
to March 1999 proved too reactive and too cumbersome to move at
the pace demanded by events in Kosovo. We
discuss the wider lessons for NATO's configuration and procedures
later.
59 Military preparations were still in progress when
attempts to resolve the crisis diplomatically broke down. By 20
March it was estimated that since the start of Milosevic's campaign
of ethnic cleansing around 500 ethnic Albanians had been killed
in VJ and MUP action and some 400,000 had by then been displaced
from their homes.[129]
In response to the growing crisis on the ground, the OSCE Chairman
in Office decided to withdraw the KVM. On 22/23 March Richard
Holbrooke made a final visit to Belgrade, but was still unable
to persuade Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet terms, and on
23 March the NATO Secretary General confirmed that he had given
authority to SACEUR to begin the air campaign. On 24 March 1999
the then Secretary of State, George Robertson, told us
President Milosevic has failed
to respond to the most intense diplomatic efforts and the time
has now come for NATO to act. Our military objectiveour
clear, simple, military objectivewill be to reduce the
Serbs' capability to repress the Albanian population and thus
to avert a humanitarian disaster. Military action has the agreement
of all 19 NATO nations ... While at this stage I would not wish
to speculate on what elements may be involved in any initial military
actions, I would like to stress that whatever action is taken,
that action is taken on behalf of all NATO Allies with the aimthe
clear and, I believe, justified aimof averting a humanitarian
disaster.[130]
NATO commenced air operations against Serbia. As
Mr Cohen, US Secretary of Defense, and General Shelton, Chairman
of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed in their evidence to
the Senate Armed Forces Committee
On March 24, 1999, the United
States and its NATO allies turned from a path of diplomacy backed
by the threat of force to a military campaign supported by diplomacy.[131]
112