Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Report


The Nature of NATO's Strategy


60 When air strikes began on 24 March 1999, NATO's strategy had in a sense already failed, since its purpose had been to persuade Milosevic to desist from his brutality without recourse to the actual use of military force. The Alliance had evidently underestimated the value Milosevic placed on holding on to Kosovo and the price he was prepared to pay to do so. In launching the air strikes, NATO had been forced into a course of action it would have preferred to avoid, even if there were hopes within the organisation (as there certainly were outside the corridors of power) that the operation would be over more quickly than proved to be the case. We were told that, among UK officials at least,[132] there was a general expectation that the Allies would have to be prepared for a long haul if necessary. This is a retrospective view. But as Sir John Goulden told the Foreign Affairs Committee

    There were a lot of people in NATO, just as there were a lot of people in all the capitals, who wondered whether it might be possible to get Milosevic to blink before using force or after just using a small amount. There were two theses ... The second thesis was just a few bombings and he would then be able to turn to the really hard line people or to his public and say "look, we do not want more of this, let us give in". A lot of people in NATO thought that, just as a lot of people in London, in Paris and other countries. The media thought it too.[133]

There can be little doubt that the expectation amongst many in NATO and in the UK was that Milosevic, when faced with a credible threat or the use of significant and potentially damaging force against him, such as air strikes, would quickly concede to NATO's demands. The MoD's report on the Lessons from the Crisis confirms this.[134] Although we were assured that NATO had planned for a long haul, we still believe that the hope that the campaign would last only a few days helped to shape a strategy that proved to be flawed.

61 The military operation was bound to be complex because of the political constraints under which it would have to operate. The need to maintain NATO unity would be a paramount consideration. Force would have to be used in a discriminating way for political reasons, out of humanitarian concern and out of the need to respect international law.[135] Popular support for the operation throughout NATO could not be taken for granted, and a longer campaign might raise difficulties on the domestic political scene of some of the allied states, not least because it was anticipated that the media pressure would be intense and would have a major effect on domestic support.[136] Furthermore, the requirement to minimise allied casualties would mean it could not be achieved without the deployment of very substantial forces from the outset, and this too would add to its complexity as well as its expense. This risk-averse mentality is one which, it is widely recognised, is going to have to be factored in to any future operation of a similar nature. Political, humanitarian, legal and public relations considerations had a profound effect on the nature of the strategy adopted by the Alliance.


62 A further complicating factor lay in the humanitarian crisis which surrounded the whole operation which was to add to the difficulties of carrying out military tasks.[137] We taxed several of our witnesses on whether they might have better predicted the Serbian reaction to the start of the bombing campaign. We were told, variously—

    I do not think we were prepared for the scale of the displacement of people that we saw at that point ... I think we were surprised by the scale and ferocity of the ethnic cleansing that took place after NATO's action began but there was a plan, an intention, to be doing those sorts of things anyway. It was just that we did not expect it to accelerate so quickly.[138]

    As a particular type of act we had not predicted that huge movement of people consciously, not refugees fleeing, outside the borders of Kosovo.[139]

    Perhaps with hindsight, one military objective that we did not pick up on ... was the humanitarian one ... We were unsighted on that ...[140]

Sir John Goulden, the UK Ambassador to NATO, also confirmed—

    We were surprised by one angle. We were not surprised that there was a major campaign starting in early March. Before the campaign started there was an ethnic cleansing campaign of great intensity in the middle of March. We were not surprised that they were razing villages to the ground using the totally disproportionate methods that the Serb forces use. We were not surprised that they were pushing people out into the hills. There were large numbers of displaced persons. By the time we started the campaign there were 250,000 displaced people. The bulk of our information pointed to substantial numbers of people being made homeless within Kosovo. However, we were not expecting, and past history did not lead us to expect, that there would be massive deportations in that organised and brutal way.[141]

63 Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee expressed their view on the causes of the enormous increase in the flow of refugees that followed the start of the air campaign and the Serbian expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo.[142] They concluded that—

    ... regardless of the accuracy of reports of [the existence of a pre-determined strategy for ethnic cleansing under the code name] "Operation Horseshoe", there were orchestrated elements to the campaign of explulsions, which could be described as a plan. Outside observers could have been aware of this plan as it would have required significant preparation. We also conclude that the withdrawal of OSCE monitors together with the international media and the start of NATO's bombing campaign encouraged Milosevic to implement this plan.[143]

It is clear, however, that whatever pre-planning was involved, once attacked Milosevic deliberately tried to manipulate the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians into neighbouring countries as part of his counter-coercive strategy to overwhelm the allied forces in place and put pressure on neighbouring governments. It is also evident that the scale and brutality of the expulsions took NATO by surprise—which must be counted a failure of imagination in assessing how effectively an adversary like Milosevic was likely to identify the Alliance's Achilles heel.[144] It was, as General Naumann said, 'a massive expulsion of people as an instrument of asymmetrical response'.[145] We have discussed this concept of asymmetrical warfare in our earlier reports on the UK's and NATO's preparedness for contemporary threats.[146] The Kosovo crisis underlined the importance of these considerations. Once expelled, large numbers of refugees came to be manipulated by governments, used as a leverage for increased aid, or as a source of recruits. The refugees certainly swelled the political authority, and the ranks, of the KLA; they also became a significant factor in the efforts to maintain political stability in Albania and, more especially, in Macedonia.

64 No one apparently foresaw the scale of the possible requirement to provide emergency relief to large numbers of displaced persons; indeed, as far as we have been able to ascertain, it was not an objective given to military planners until the last moment.[147] We discuss the humanitarian operation in some detail below.[148] But it is apparent from our evidence that insufficient military planning of consequence in 1998/early 1999 was directed towards the provision of humanitarian support.


65 So far as the UK government's part in the formulation of NATO's strategy is concerned, it is fundamental to understand that, as the MoD put it—

More explicitly, MoD told us that—

    In the case of Kosovo, although some national planning was undertaken, NATO led on the vast majority ...[150]

In effect, the UK could seek to influence strategy but, ultimately, it could not dictate it.

66 As the Chief of Joint Operations remarked, coalition warfare is complicated.[151] Whilst the reasons for adopting a multinational (coalition or alliance) response may vary, the aim is usually to accomplish an objective which a nation either does not wish to, or could not, achieve unilaterally. Depending on the circumstances, there will be differing degrees of national interest at stake and upon this will depend the strength and nature of the contribution to the multinational operation and the cohesion of the Alliance itself. Contributions must be judged not only on the capability of the forces provided but also by the full range of political and military benefits they bring to the operation. The political advantages of multinational co-operation include sharing political risks, demonstrating collective intent and, by acting in unison in pursuit of a common cause, bringing greater international pressure to bear on an adversary than a single nation would be able to do on its own. The military advantages are that co-operation adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities) to a force, as well as providing access to national or regional logistic infrastructures and, in certain circumstances, access to high value information and intelligence.

67 The importance of being able and ready to respond to crises multinationally was emphasised in the Strategic Defence Review—

    … future operations will almost always be multinational ... This means that we do not need to hold sufficient national capabilities for every eventuality, just as we did not plan to defeat the Warsaw Pact on our own. But it also means that we need balanced, coherent forces which are capable of operating effectively alongside forces from other countries (including in NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, which Britain leads), and this requirement must be reflected in training and equipment[152]

Operation Allied Force demonstrated many areas of imperfection and inadequacy in co-ordinating multinational operations requiring considerable further effort and determination to resolve. As Vice-Admiral Paul Haddacks, the UK Military Representative at NATO, told us—

    There are all kinds of doctrinal issues that arise out of the whole campaign. They are not so much doctrinal contradictions, but doctrinal gaps in the whole NATO doctrine library. NATO has frankly been behind the power curve in keeping its doctrine close up with its policy and there is a vast raft of work now in train at the moment in Brussels to rectify that doctrinal deficiency.[153]

He also told us that—

    We have learned lessons on the whole operational planning process which in this crisis worked okay, but were not necessarily coherent and joined up. In the wake of the crisis we have taken a very hard look at the whole operational planning structure and methodology and we have decided that there are better ways of doing it.[154]

68 On a political level, Sir John Goulden, the UK Ambassador to NATO, emphasised that how NATO functions—

    ... is the key to understanding how this operation worked and how future operations are likely, in practice, to be handled. The culture is, of course, one of consensus. In NATO we can do things only if 19 countries agree. That involves compromise and that compromise has to seek the best results, not just on the military side of the graph, but also on the political side and there has to be unity on the Alliance side.[155]

He went on to add that "compromise is not normally at the lowest level", a point on which his emphasis differs from that of General Naumann, who told a US Congressional Committee that in a coalition "the slowest ship determines the speed of the convoy" and that "the pace and the intensity of military operations will be determined by the lowest common denominator."[156] These two glosses on events are not necessarily contradictory, though they perhaps illustrate the different perspectives of the diplomat and the military man. NATO's dependence upon achieving consensus amongst member states for its actions will inevitably require individual nations to accept what are, from their perspective, less than ideal solutions. During the Kosovo crisis these compromises cut both ways—overcoming the reluctance of some Allies to commit themselves to military action while curtailing the willingness of others to use what seemed to them appropriate force. That factor, as our witnesses continually emphasised, determined the strategy adopted more than any other.


69 In the day to day evolution of its strategy, NATO had found its options narrowing during 1998-1999 and by March 24 felt it had no other realistic choice but to initiate military action. The Chief of Joint Operations, Vice-Admiral Garnett, was emphatic that the aims of possible UK military involvement in Kosovo "were absolutely clear".[157] But in pursuit of what political goal? On 24 March 1999, George Robertson told us that—

    If military action has to be taken, it will be taken with the heaviest of heavy hearts. It will be taken with precision guided weapons, and it will be taken against only military targets with a very clear objective, not to bomb common sense or even self-interest into the mind of President Milosevic, but to reduce the military capability that is being used against a civil population.[158]

He emphasised again that—

    Our objective here is not to try and get into his mind. It is to use strategic precision bombing on military targets to reduce his ability to order the kind of ethnic cleansing that we have seen up to now.[159]

And he told the House the following day—

    This is a limited action with a strictly humanitarian objective, which we believe can be achieved through air strikes.[160]

On 21 June 2000, the current Secretary of State told us, "frankly, we were seeking to coerce Milosevic—to back down".[161] The Chief of the Defence Staff similarly stressed that—

    ... we were not at war with Serbia, we were ratcheting and putting the programme up, the plan up, and putting increasing pressure on Milosevic.[162]

General Wesley Clark told a NATO press conference on 25 March that—

    ... we are going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate and ultimately, unless President Milosevic complies with the demands of the international community, we are going to destroy [the Serbian] forces and their facilities and ... support.

After the campaign, General Clark has been reported as saying that the war, "...was an effort to coerce, not to seize".[163]

70 On 24 March 1999, NATO's political leaders declared their aim in commencing military operations against Serbia to be one of denying the Yugoslav forces the ability to prosecute their campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovo Albanians. This was to be achieved, supposedly, by strikes against Yugoslav fielded forces on the ground in Kosovo. By the end of the campaign, and retrospectively, the central purpose of the campaign was said to be that of dissuading Milosevic and his henchmen from directing this brutality and coercing them to negotiate a settlement. This aim required quite different tactics. The confusion of purpose indicated by those preliminary and ex post facto descriptions of its objective, we believe, dogged the campaign. We conclude that NATO did not make manifest at the start of Operation Allied Force the necessary clarity of purpose about the aims of its military intervention in Kosovo. When asked whether he thought that the strategy adopted by NATO was soundly based and well chosen, the Chief of Joint Operations responded rather tersely—

    It reflected the political realities of the Alliance.[164]

71 In the event, the strategy adopted proved to be a less than ideal mixture of these concepts of coercion and denial. The compromises forced upon the North Atlantic Council by the need to find consensus meant that the politicians and diplomats directing the NATO military planners did not demonstrate, by 24 March 1999, a clear grasp of the nature of the strategy they had committed themselves to pursuing. A strategy of denial involves the use of military force to prevent the use of ground, facilities or forces by an adversary through destruction or constraint. This destruction may be real or threatened. A strategy of coercion, which may incorporate tactics of denial, depends on the ability to convince an adversary that a threatened hurt will be inflicted if they do not comply, and that the coercer has the ability to escalate the hurt in the face of continued non-compliance until the cost to the adversary becomes unsustainable. Clearly, a coercive strategy requires an accurate analysis of the attitude of the target, its propensity to change, and its attitude to those things it will find hurtful to have attacked. This points up one of the central dilemmas of using the threat of coercive force. Where it works, it may be regarded as the most efficient use of force to achieve political objectives, but because it is a fundamentally psychological concept there is little basis for reliable calculations as to when it will, or will not, work. In this case, its failure to have the desired effect on Milosevic's decisions in the opening phase of the campaign then faced the NATO Allies with another challenge to their credibility and a requirement to find ways of increasing the pressure whilst retaining the vital element of unity.

72 While successful coercion may with hindsight be regarded as an efficient use of force, it is a strategy which may have many unintended consequences if it works at a less than optimal level. Not least, it can provoke counter-coercive measures aimed at the weak spots of the coercer—and this is precisely what happened when Milosevic stepped up the pace and brutality of his campaign of ethnic cleansing. Coercion demands that those who adopt it as a strategy can demonstrate to their adversary their determination to carry it through. And where a coercive strategy is feasible, credibility and resolve are all-important. Whether starting from a low or high operational tempo, coercive operations are more effective when an adversary is convinced that their severity will be continuously escalated. On 24 March NATO had already failed to convince Milosevic of its commitment to match threats with action. This failure to demonstrate a credible capacity to escalate to Milosevic, or convince him of the Alliance's resolve and preparedness for the campaign to endure more than a few days, was due, at least in part, to the lack of an unambiguous determination in all members of the Alliance to see the job through to the end.

73 We now examine what we perceive to be some of the consequences of that lack of clarity and determination. But before doing so, it should be made clear that we recognise that confusion of purpose is often a feature of war. In this multinational offensive, it is not altogether surprising that such conflicting views about the purpose of the operation existed and that levels of commitment amongst the Allies differed. This seems an almost inevitable consequence of a disparate alliance fighting a war of choice. General Smith, however, pointed to a much bigger issue when he told us—

    ... we were using NATO and its equipment for a purpose that was not what the construct had been designed for. We were applying it in a very new situation to achieve an objective that was a coercive objective, a deterrent objective, and actually to change someone's intention when the whole machine was designed to destroy an attacking force and thereby deter.[165]

He later added—

    ... we have got to produce a more overarching context in which to employ force. [It is] about building in a capacity to escalate.[166]


74 One of the most controversial questions which has been asked ever since 24 March 1999 concerns NATO's failure to indicate before that date that, alongside the threat of air strikes, it was prepared to seize ground in Kosovo in pursuit of its aim of stopping the ethnic cleansing and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. The Alliance began by ruling out this option, but it was reconsidered very seriously at the eleventh hour of the campaign. Many have asked whether the public eschewal by a number of major Alliance politicians of this option during the final stages of the search for a diplomatic solution and the early stages of the air campaign, contributed to Milosevic's readiness to gamble on the Alliance backing down or giving up before the damage done to Serbia became unsustainable.

75 Once again, it is the multinational nature of the operation which most determined this decision.[167] General Naumann told us he had done some preliminary, conceptual planning for a forced ground entry in the summer of 1998. He went on to describe how—

    I presented the results of this in July or August 1998 to the NATO Council and we were told that these options had to be put on the shelf. I saw a lot of pale faces around the table when I presented to them what it meant to enter Yugoslavia against the opposition of the Serb armed forces. We would have won without any doubt, but it would not have been easy.[168]

As General Naumann indicated, military planners were acutely aware of the need to maintain NATO credibility and to back up threats to use force by demonstrating a readiness and capability to use force on a scale which might plausibly achieve its stated goals. He told us—

    ... if you start an operation like Kosovo but rule out by public statements that you are willing to see it through, a ruler like Milosevic who does not feel much responsibility to his people and his country, who has just one interest, namely to stay in power, may come to the conclusion, "I could try to sit it out since they will not go down the road"... I have stated I do not know how often in the NATO Council ... the same two points. You have to tell us what is the political objective and if you tell us to use force please be prepared to see it through. This preparedness to see it through is not there if you rule out in public statements the use of ground forces and that was the element which removed uncertainty from Milosevic's mind.[169]

76 But after September 1998, military planners had effectively set aside further planning for a ground option, which it was evident would not be supported by all Alliance members. For example, the Commander of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC), Lieutenant-General Sir Mike Jackson, stated that his—

    ... focus for 1998—and indeed, it remained that until perhaps May of last year [1999]— was how to put together and how to operate a peace implementation force which would put into effect whatever agreement may be achieved between the various parties involved in the Kosovo conflict.[170]

He stressed that—

    There was no question during our summer planning and subsequently that this force would be anything other than a peace enforcement force, in exactly the same light as IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia.[171]

It would appear that no serious and detailed planning for the contingency of an opposed ground entry into Kosovo took place within NATO after August 1998. It was only resumed in April 1999.[172]

77 We sought to elicit from witnesses the extent to which US views dominated decision-making during the military planning process, particularly in relation to the ground option. None considered there to have been an overwhelming influence although DSACEUR, General Sir Rupert Smith, observed that—

    The power of the major contributor to the actual venture, as opposed to the Alliance as a whole, is something you can recognise. They are the ones that are carrying the risk. They tend to be the ones who are making the decision. It does not have to be the Americans.[173]

Similarly, the present Secretary of State agreed that—

    ... if you bring large amounts of equipment and personnel to the party you undoubtedly have a very considerable degree of influence as to how that equipment and those personnel are used ... Nevertheless, there was an absolute determination on the part of the United States to operate as part of an Alliance and that, undoubtedly, was the case. There are tensions in that kind of process ...

78 Among the tensions within the Alliance, it is evident that there was initially little enthusiasm in the US to become engaged on the ground in Kosovo. The US Defense Secretary had said in October 1998 that he would not even commit American ground troops to a peace-keeping force.[174] No doubt the US position would have served to encourage other doubting NATO nations to adopt similar positions. To most if not all nations, it would have been inconceivable to engage in forced entry into Kosovo without the participation of US ground forces. US influence undoubtedly played a major part in shaping decision-making during the military planning process (as well as during the military campaign itself). It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise.

79 In pointing to the lessons to be learned, General Naumann made clear his belief that one of the keys to success is the need to preserve uncertainty in an opponent's mind about the consequences he might face in the case of his rejection of peaceful solutions. He went on to say—

    NATO nations did not pay heed to that experience during the Kosovo Crisis. It became most obvious when NATO began to prepare for military options but some NATO nations began to rule out simultaneously options such as the use of ground forces and did so, without any need, in public. This allowed Milosevic to calculate his risk and to speculate that there might be a chance for him to ride the threat out and to hope that NATO would either be unable to act at all or that the cohesion of the Alliance would melt away under the public impression of punishing air strikes.[175]

The Chief of the Defence Staff was similarly clear on this point—

    I would like to have seen a ground option planned before the first bomb was dropped. I believe it was important to do that because you need to face Milosevic with different options.[176]

But, he explained—

    We obviously had to go along with what the market would bear. Other countries were less keen on it.[177]

But it is not so evident that the UK was exactly enthusiastic about the possibility of a ground option. As the Permanent Secretary commented—

    ... ideally one aims to put uncertainty in the mind of an aggressor but there were also very big political realities there. If you are going to threaten things you have to be able to back it up, you have to be able to do it quite swiftly, and it was not possible to do so. Consider the amount of civilian casualties you would have inflicted and created by an opposed ground force operation ... If it had been an opposed ground force invasion the casualties would have been enormous and we would have been rightly criticised for that sort of carnage. Now these were real political calculations and practical calculations that had to be made at the time.[178]

On 24 March the then Secretary of State, George Robertson, told us—

    It is a pretty unanimous view of the military commanders that we should not get involved in a land campaign because the sheer numbers that would be involved are so considerable and that is why, when I spoke to our troops on a hillside in Macedonia three weeks ago, I gave them the commitment that they would not fight their way into Kosovo.[179]

In the case of UK, we know it would have been difficult to contribute to such a force on the scale required, not least due to the overall levels of commitment facing our Armed Forces in 1998/99.[180]

80 We conclude that, although they represented the only politically acceptable position within the Alliance, the public pronouncements made throughout 1998 and well into 1999 giving the impression that Alliance leaders, including those in the UK, had discounted a forced entry ground option as part of their military strategy, were in military terms a serious error of judgement. They signalled a lack of resolve on NATO's part; they resulted in serious military planning and preparation for such an option effectively being discontinued between August 1998 and April 1999; they hamstrung the Alliance's diplomatic leverage for securing Milosevic's compliance without recourse to military means; and they removed a critical element of uncertainty and danger from Milosevic's assessment of the Alliance's intentions. Moreover, they are likely to have given comfort to Milosevic and strengthened his hand on the domestic front, and so to have been a significant factor in encouraging the Serbian élite to continue to support him in defying NATO. Finally, they enabled Milosevic to shelter much of his military equipment underground, rather than leaving it deployed to meet the possibility of a ground attack. This severely weakened the impact of the air attacks against forces in the field.

81 The MoD's own report on Lessons from the Crisis comments—

    Planning for future military operations, to be useful and relevant, needs to take into account diplomatic, legal and political factors. Planning should cover as many military options as necessary, but, in practice, priority will usually be given to one or more of these. This was the case with the air campaign option in the Kosovo crisis. In the course of the Kosovo crisis, NATO considered a wide range of options. The priority given to making a success of the air campaign meant that some others were not pursued in detail. But all options remained on the table, as the NATO Secretary General made clear during the campaign.[181]

This last claim is not consistent with the evidence we have taken—the ground option was only 'on the table' between August 1998 and April 1999 in the sense that it had been cast aside. The more truthful point is made in the MoD's next sentence—

    ... the bottom line is that maintaining NATO unity made possible the achievement in full of our shared objectives.[182]

But maintaining NATO unity carried a high price. The report goes on to say—

    Within this context, planning for a range of options will help maintain our flexibility of action and the highest possible level of uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries. It will also be important in future operations, as was the case in the Kosovo air campaign, that when a clear commitment is made to use force, this is sustained for as long as necessary to achieve the agreed objectives. If potential opponents are convinced of our purpose and determination, they are less likely to push us to the use of force.[183]

This is putting a very positive gloss on what was actually a much more ambivalent and confusing public presentation of the Alliance's strategy. But it seems a muted, if welcome, acknowledgement that political pressure to maintain Alliance consensus led to some unforced strategic errors in the way in which the threat of military force was deployed prior to and immediately after 24 March.

82 However, conducting military operations in Kosovo, with its extremes of climate and variable weather patterns, also presented particular difficulties which we examined in some detail.[184] Routes in and out, especially through Albania and Macedonia, are few, with the lines of communication potentially stretched. If forced entry had been required, then the terrain favoured the defender.[185] Accurate assessment of the military capabilities of Serbian and KLA forces would also have been important in estimating the resources NATO needed to execute a forced entry option successfully. The VJ was a well-equipped and trained fighting force, operating in favourable terrain. Some of our witnesses told us that it is unlikely that the VJ could have resisted a serious NATO ground assault for more than a few days.[186] However, it would have been extremely difficult for NATO to deploy its technically far superior troops to such a hostile environment, even with air superiority gained. If the Serbian troops had put up robust resistence there could have been significant casualties. But as Air Marshal Sir John Day commented—

    There is no point in threatening ground forces if you have not got the organisation ready to mobilise those ground forces. Milosevic, as any other opponent, is very shrewd and if we, the NATO Alliance, had threatened the use of ground forces and he did not see ground forces starting to mobilise, he would have started to see fissures in the Alliance as to who was prepared to react quickly and who was not, that would have been a complete own goal for NATO.[187]

We discuss in more detail below the state of readiness of the Alliance's ground forces towards the end of the campaign. It is clear that the lack of enthusiasm in most allied governments for justifying to their electorates the case for a forced ground entry caused inhibitions to be placed by politicians on NATO's military staff even to plan for a ground option. Given the failure of NATO to plan and prepare earlier, even if the threat of a ground attack had been made publicly before 24 March 1999, it would have taken time to become credible to Milosevic and his Generals.

83 The consequence was that by 24 March 1999 NATO had to initiate military intervention in order to fulfil its threat of the use of force, and that it had no other choice but to hope that an air campaign would succeed in delivering its political objectives.

132  QQ 361-363 Back

133  HC 28-II, Q 42 Back

134  Cm 4724, para 3.1 Back

135  ibid, Chapter 7; Ev p 241, para 8 Back

136  ibid Back

137  Cm 4724, paras 3.15 to 3.17 Back

138  Q 68 (Mr Kevin Tebbit) Back

139  Q 344 (Mr Richard Hatfield) Back

140  Q 864 (Vice-Admiral Paul Haddacks) Back

141  Q 884 Back

142  Foreign Affairs Committee, op cit, paras 82 to 105. Back

143  Foreign Affairs Committee, op cit, para 98 Back

144  Q68, Q69, Q72, Q78, Q1006 Back

145  Q 1006, Q 1008 Back

146   See eg Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, The Strategic Defence Review, HC 138-I, paras 82 to 161 Back

147  Q 589 Back

148   See paras 213 ff Back

149  Cm 4724, para 5.7. Back

150  Ev p 255, para 63 Back

151  Q 159 Back

152   Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essay Six  Back

153  Q 875 Back

154  Q 873 Back

155  Q 836 Back

156  Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 3 November 1999. Back

157  Q 117 Back

158  Third Report, Session 1998-99, The Future of NATO: The Washington Summit, HC 39, Ev p 147 Back

159  ibid, Q 375 Back

160  HC Deb, 25 March 1999, c 618 Back

161  Q 1117 Back

162  Q 93 Back

163  Washington Post, 21 September 1999 Back

164  Q 285 Back

165  Q 960 Back

166  Q 973 Back

167  Cm 4724, para 5.2. Back

168  Q 1015 Back

169  Q 984 Back

170  Q 609 Back

171  Q 627 Back

172  Para 261 ff Back

173  Q 910 Back

174   Foreign Affairs Committee, op cit, para 114 Back

175   Evidence to Senate Armed Forces Committee, November 3, 1999. Back

176  Q 26 Back

177  Q 28 Back

178  Q 56 Back

179  HC (1998-99) 39, Q 373 Back

180  Second Report, Session 1999-2000, Ministry of Defence Annual Reporting Cycle, HC 158, para 88 Back

181  Cm 4724, para 6.35 Back

182  ibid Back

183  ibid, paras 6.35 and 6.36 Back

184  QQ 665-682 Back

185  Q 681 Back

186  Q 396 Back

187  Q 55 Back

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