House of Commons - Defence - Fourteenth Report

Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Report

III. THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

PHASE 3: STRIKES AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS

119 Phase 3 (or Phase 2A) of the campaign was not separate from Phase 2, but was conducted in parallel to it. The first air strikes against Belgrade took place on 3 April, and the first involving RAF aircraft on 7 April. In this phase, targets that represented Serbia's war infrastructure were attacked, such as bridges, arms production centres and military bases. These attacks could be seen as forming an element in the strategy of denial by cutting off routes for entry to Kosovo from Serbia and constraining fuel supplies and the ability to command and control forces. But their purpose was also to convince the Serbian leadership that its military forces would be destroyed piece-by-piece if it did not comply. Finally, the basis of the Serbian leadership itself was attacked, in the targetting of power stations, public facilities, and media offices. The MoD's Lessons from the Crisis, which does not distinguish strategic and tactical targets, reports that—

NATO attacked a total of 440 static targets during the air campaign, with more than three-quarters assessed to have suffered moderate to severe damage. NATO figures suggest that the targets destroyed or significantly damaged included:

—  14 command posts
—  10 military airfields
—  over 100 military aircraft
—  34 road bridges
—  11 railway bridges
—  29% of all Yugoslav/Serbian ammunition storage capacity
—  57% of petroleum reserve capacity
—  all Yugoslav oil refineries[

249

120 The US DoD's After Action Report to Congress gives rather more detail on the different processes involved in assessing damage to fixed as opposed to mobile targets. Damage to fixed targets is inherently more easily verifiable but additionally, after KFOR's deployment into Kosovo, an assessment team was able to visit a representative sample of fixed targets such as tunnels, bunkers, petroleum facilities and other facilities. Generally the post-strike inspections confirmed the in-campaign assessments. Although the destruction of around 100 aircraft on the ground is classified under attacks on fixed targets, it is presumably possible to conceal the evidence of such attacks in the same ways as for damaged mobile targets. This number is interesting, as it compares with only 6 Serbian fighters destroyed by the Allies in air combat.[250] These relative levels of apparent effectiveness against aircraft in the air and on the ground may at least give some pause for thought as to the balance between ground attack and air defence capabilities in the UK's inventory of aircraft. These need to be considered carefully if Operation Allied Force is to be seen as representing any kind of template for future air operations in which the UK and NATO are likely to become engaged. In neither the Gulf War nor in Kosovo did the enemy get any significant air forces off the ground. If this is a pattern likely to hold true in the future, the Alliance and its constituent nations may need to reconsider their long-term procurement policies relating to aircraft. We invite the MoD to respond to this argument, which we advance only tentatively at this point, in its response to this report.

121 The choice of targets during this phase was controversial, and the risks of collateral damage were high. Civilian casualties were another of the weak spots of the Alliance targetted by Milosevic's counter-coercive tactics, and the Serbian propaganda machine exploited them to maximum effect. The considerable efforts made by the RAF, together with other NATO air forces, to keep collateral damage to a minimum were largely successful. The Chief of Joint Operations told us that UK attacks, so far as we know, did not result in any collateral damage.[251] However, there was some collateral damage. On 7 May, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was hit by US JDAM missiles.[252] The Secretary of State told us—

253

On the same day cluster bombs fell on a market in the town of Nis. On 10 and 11 May attacks turned towards road, rail and telecommunication links. On 19 May cluster bombs hit a Belgrade hospital, and the following day a prison was hit. On 30 May, a train crossing the Varvarin bridge was accidentally struck, causing civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch drew particular attention to this incident, commenting—

254

122 Quite apart from the bombing errors that were made and which might be expected in such an operation, the bombing of "leadership nodes" raised the problem that such targets were not unambiguously military. The attack on 23 April on the Belgrade TV station was very controversial. The tower was regarded both as a legitimate leadership target in such a coercive campaign and also, as an element of Serbian communications, a legitimate military target. But that cannot disguise the fact that it was also a civilian facility. Again, Human Rights Watch were highly critical of this attack—

255

Such targetting certainly raised extremely delicate legal and presentational issues for the NATO Allies and continues to be a major factor in the public debate surrounding the whole operation.

123 It was hoped, though not necessarily expected, that a short campaign—even the preparations for one—might convince Milosevic of the political will within NATO to use force and remain united.[256] When it became evident that a short campaign of bombing would not achieve this, as the Chief of Joint Operations made clear to us, the purpose of the lengthening bombing campaign was to create graduated pressure on the Serbian leader.[257] Generals Jackson and Smith were both convinced that the bombing campaign in Serbia was more key to the achievement of NATO's objectives than that conducted against the VJ and MUP in Kosovo itself.[258] Lord Gilbert believed that—

259

The Chief of Joint Operations pointed out that the campaign had to be measured by its effects and in practice, its discernible effects on Milosevic himself.[260] But it is apparent from the evidence we have taken that, on the UK side at least, little detailed analysis was conducted of how Milosevic and his élite would be likely to react as the target of a coercive campaign. Indeed, our witnesses retreated to the position that a proper understanding of such an individual is essentially impossible.[261] We believe there was insufficient understanding within the Alliance of the character and mentality of the dictator.

124 An examination of the choice of strategic targets during this phase of the campaign does not readily reveal a clear pattern of a graduated strategy of coercion or evidence of increasing coercive effectiveness. Some of the targets appear difficult to justify. No clear explanation of the decision to bomb the Danube bridges at Novi Sad yet appears to have been given. As Novi Sad was one of the principal centres of opposition to Milosevic, with an articulate opposition mayor, this seems a particularly odd decision. The attack on the TV station—though undoubtedly of some military worth—appears to have been only marginal in its effects on Serbian command and control capabilities. It seems impossible to disentangle the relative effects of these attacks in fomenting opposition to the Belgrade régime and in hardening nationalist sentiment, or assess the final balance of advantage to the Alliance between these effects. Perhaps the most important lesson, from a political rather than a military perspective, is the uncertainty that attaches to devising such a strategy, an uncertainty which is greatly increased if the coercer is bound about by many political inhibitions on their choice of targets and by an overwhelming need to avoid handing the adversary the propaganda advantage of major civilian casualties. Moreover, the essentially psychological basis of such a strategy, combined with the difficulty of assessing its effects in a timely fashion, means it is extremely difficult initially to calibrate and subsequently fine-tune targetting policy in such circumstances. The final lesson must be that any decision to use airpower in pursuit of a coercive strategy must be approached with a combination of caution and determination. The Alliance, underprovided with intelligence, and uncertain about whether it was pursuing a strategy of coercion or denial, contained both approaches within it—but did not reach a consensus about where the right balance between the two lay.

Sea Embargo

125 During the 'strategic' phase of the bombing, air strikes concentrated in part on attacking POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant) facilities. This raises the question of why the Alliance failed to mount an effective sea embargo to stop oil entering Serbia by sea (via Montenegro for example). In a speech to the Brookings Institute on 9 June 2000, General Wesley Clark commented—

... I believe that the use of force should be the last resort. It has to be a credible and capable option, but it has to be the last option that's chosen. That is to say, when it's used, it should be used in concert with all of the diplomatic, economic and legal elements of power. And yet this was a situation in which it was very difficult to do this because in these circumstances, we were engaged in a limited conflict. It wasn't a declared war. There wasn't an invalidation of the Law of the Sea, for example. So we had oil still being shipped into Serbia at the same time our pilots were risking their lives, flying overhead trying to bomb the oil. It's not the best way to use military power or other elements of power.[

262

Lord Gilbert, referring to "the incredible shambles we found ourselves in over the oil embargo", elucidated some of these legal problems as he saw them—

263

The MoD reported that at the Washington Summit in April 1999, Defence Ministers were instructed to determine ways that NATO could contribute to halting the delivery of war material, including by launching maritime operations. (The EU had agreed an oil embargo on Serbia on 23 April which came into effect on 1 May.[264]) Work at NATO focussed on the examination of the scope for a possible naval 'board and search' operation, taking into account the legal basis for the implementation. This examination continued until the end of the air campaign.[265] Vice-Admiral Haddacks told us—

266

The MoD nevertheless believe that few petroleum products reached Serbia via ports in Montenegro after 1 May.[267] The dilatory approach by NATO nonetheless seems disturbing. It is to be hoped that the lessons of the failure to agree on how to enforce an oil embargo will be learned so that they may be applied in future circumstances.

OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS

126 In assessing the overall effectiveness of the air campaign, we are therefore hampered by two particular uncertainties. The first, on a practical level, is the revealed shortcomings of NATO's battle damage assessment, and the inability to assess fully the damage done to strategic targets while Milosevic remained in control of Serbia. The second, on a more political level, is the difficulty of disentangling the coercive impact of the attacks on Serbia.

Battle Damage Assessment

127 There is a general consensus that all was not well with NATO and UK BDA. As far as UK is concerned this has been recognised. The MoD's Lessons from the Crisis reports that—

In the light of our experience during the air campaign, the UK national Battle Damage Assessment/targeting process has been fully reviewed and a series of recommendations for follow-up action highlighted. These include:

—  the need to ensure the most appropriate mix of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets is available to provide Battle Damage Assessment;

—  sufficient background information should be compiled to enable the accurate assessment of the impact of operations and of an adversary's remaining capability;

—  and the limitations of the human eye and weapons systems video should be recognised and, where possible, supporting intelligence material obtained.[

268

The Chief of Joint Operations explained to us—

269

The MoD has also confirmed that it will include all the recommendations on the BDA process in future standing operating procedures.[270] In the US, further study is underway within the Department of Defense to integrate the findings of all available data and to develop insights 'on a variety of important topics'. These topics include understanding attack effectiveness, what systems proved most accurate and timely in helping the assessment of attack effectiveness, and how should the inevitable uncertainty over this information be handled.[271] Work to improve battle damage assessment capability is overdue.

Coercive Effect

128 The MoD's short answer to the question 'How much damage was done?' was 'Enough'.[272] Although there is no doubt that the air operations had a substantial effect, a number of questions remain unanswered. General Wesley Clark analysed the campaign constraints with some precision in an address to the Brookings Institute on 8 June 2000—

273

These political realities will continue to be a feature of future NATO operations. But questions remain. Could a more intense operation earlier have produced a result earlier? Could concentration on different target sets have produced earlier results? Could a different choice of weapons have produced earlier results? Would less intense operations have delayed Milosevic's concession? These questions cannot all be answered with certainty—that does not mean that some attempt should not be made to do so. We do not have access to the information needed to try to answer them. But for the MoD to say that "enough" damage was done is not good enough. The MoD, and the Alliance more generally, cannot simply rely on the response that because Milosevic conceded, the campaign was a success. They need to demonstrate that they have seriously addressed these questions before they are faced with another situation in which recourse to military force for coercive diplomacy is chosen.

129 There are also some practical lessons to be tackled which arise out of the experience of the air campaign. NATO needs to have an improved and standardised target approval methodology in future. The level of national scrutiny should be limited to only the most sensitive targets. NATO must ensure that combat assessment teams are staffed by those who would not have restrictions on their access to information because of its classification. Sufficient analysis needs to have been carried out before hostilities begin to enable targets to be matched with specific mission objectives.

249 Cm 4724, para 7.16 Back

250 DoD, p 69 Back

251 Q 141 Back

252 QQ 925-930. On 28 November 1999, Mr John Sweeney, writing in The Observer, alleged that the targetting of the Chinese Embassy was deliberate (by the USA). We wrote to him inviting him to substantiate his claims on 20 July 2000, but have received no response. Back

253 Q 1227 Back

254 Human Rights Watch, op cit, p 7 Back

255 ibid Back

256 Cm 4724, para 3.1 Back

257 QQ 1, 2 and 47 Back

258 Q 727, Q 731, Q 974 Back

259 Q 1074 Back

260 Q 7 Back