Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Report


The UK's Contribution to the Air Campaign


The UK Sortie Rate

130 The UK contributed forty-eight fixed wing aircraft to Operation Allied Force, though not all were in theatre at the same time. Of these, twenty-eight were strike aircraft (Tornado GR1s and Harrier GR7s), seven were air defence (Sea Harrier FR2s flown off HMS Invincible) and thirteen were support aircraft (air-to-air refuelling tankers, E3D early warning aircraft and one Nimrod). In addition some eighteen helicopters were deployed to support NATO operations.[274]

131 The BDA figures quoted above[275] apply to NATO as a whole; none are available to determine the effectiveness of the munitions used by UK. The UK flew some 10% of NATO's strike sorties, but released under 5% of the total munitions used in the operation.[276] There is therefore little direct evidence on the effectiveness of UK's weapons against the opposition afforded by the VJ. This will not help in future force structure or procurement decisions. Indeed the US Report makes clear that in the NATO BDA process it was extremely difficult to link specific damage to a particular aircraft/weapon mix.[277]

132 The UK deployment was progressive. By the beginning of 1999, eight Harrier GR7s had been deployed to support the Kosovo Verification Mission, together with two Tristar air-to-air refuelling tankers.[278] The Harriers operated from the Gioia del Colle and the tankers from Ancona, both in Italy. Two E3D airborne early warning aircraft and one Nimrod were also in theatre. This force was increased in late March with the addition of four more Harriers, one Tristar tanker (and one more on 15 April) and another E3D Sentry. On 1 April, eight Tornado GR1s were made available, operating from RAF Bruggen in Germany and supported by three VC-10 tankers. On 12 April, HMS Invincible arrived in theatre and made her seven FA2 Sea Harriers available for air defence missions until her departure on 21 May. On 7 May, four more Harrier GR7s were deployed to Gioia del Colle and on 28 May the eight Tornados of 14 Squadron flying from RAF Bruggen were stood down in favour of twelve Tornados from 9 and 31 Squadrons deployed to Solenzara in Corsica and supported by five VC-10 tankers. This pattern of deployment reflects the escalating nature of the NATO air campaign more generally.

Basing of Aircraft

133 The deployment of RAF aircraft does also raise other concerns, which we examined in our inquiry. First, the use of a number of different air bases for a comparatively small number of aircraft created problems, not least logistically. This point is accepted by the Department[279] and clearly needs to be borne in mind for future operations. The second obvious shortcoming in basing arrangements was the use of aircraft based in Germany for operations in the Balkans. The consequential strain on pilots and other resources was considerable.[280] Crew were forced to spend long periods in the cockpit transiting to the theatre; substantial tanker support was required; and there was no guarantee that during the long flight the weather over the target would not have deteriorated to the extent that weapons could not be released. We were told that the use of aircraft flying from RAF Bruggen was due to the 'anticipated tasking rate and also trying to find a suitable base close to theatre'.[281] This reinforces our belief that the operation was launched on the basis of over-optimistic assumptions about its duration and intensity, and this suggests some failure of planning on the part of the MoD. Despite Sir John Day's assurances,[282] we retain a suspicion that these over confident assumptions may in part have arisen in response to overstretch in the RAF's capacity to deploy outside home bases.

Strike rate

134 A total of 1618 sorties were flown by UK aircraft during Operation Allied Force. Of these, 1008 were strike sorties leading to the release of 1011 munitions. Of these, 244 were precision guided weapons, 230 were gravity bombs and 531 were cluster weapons. Additionally, six air-launched anti-radiation missiles were fired.[283] The relationship of the UK effort to that of NATO as a whole is detailed in the Table below. The RAF provided a small percentage of the overall number of NATO aircraft used in the operation which was, of course, dominated by the US Air Force. But the UK also provided fewer aircraft than the French and the Italians. We were left with the impression that the RAF provided as much as it could given the pressures it was under, but despite the relatively low overall number of aircraft it did provide a relatively high proportion of strike aircraft rather than support.[284] Air Marshal Sir John Day told us—

    We had enough aircraft ... They were certainly the right type of aircraft. We happened to have aircraft that were best configured for bombing as opposed to air defence but that was what the pressure was for ...[285]

As Air Commodore Torpy told us—

We tried to offer what we felt was going to be the most useful.[286]

Compared to other European members of the Alliance, the UK was in this operation relatively well provided for with support aircraft.[287] This allowed the UK to provide a significant contribution in the form of air-to-air refuelling and airborne early warning aircraft. It is not clear, however, that the allied commanders felt they had the right overall mix of aircraft at the start of the campaign—indeed, we heard several authoritative claims that they did not.

135 UK aircraft conducted 15 attacks on 10 air defence targets, 99 attacks against 58 infrastructure targets and 530 missions against fielded forces. These represent the approximately 40% of UK strike missions in which weapons were released.[288] The number of munitions dropped by UK aircraft per strike sortie was significantly lower than the NATO average. The RAF flew 9.6% of NATO strike sorties, but dropped only 4.2% of the munitions. In part this was due to the poor weather affecting the use of precision guided munitions, something we discuss below. It may also be presumed that the relatively large bomb loads carried by US B-52 and B-2 aircraft also influence the comparison. Additionally, the respect for the rules of engagement shown by our pilots, and their insistence on not dropping munitions if at all uncertain of hitting their designated targets, may unfairly distort the comparisons.[289] But it may also suggest that the RAF may have a significant and more fundamental comparative weakness in this area.

Total sorties
Strike sorties
% strike/sorties
Munitions released

Source: Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis, p 30

Carrier-based Aircraft

136 The aircraft carrier HMS Invincible was on passage through the Mediterranean on her return from operational duty in the Gulf when the decision was taken on 9 April to divert her to operations in the Balkans. She arrived on station on12 April and remained within the Allied tasking order for the next 39 days.[290] She carried the usual peacetime complement of seven Sea Harrier FA2s with ten pilots. Of this small complement, we were told "approximately" two thirds were fully night qualified (presumably six or seven); this we were also told was normal for peacetime.[291] It is unclear what the wartime complement should be, and whether this could have been provided if requested. The National Audit Office (NAO), for example, reported that the Royal Navy suffered from shortages of trained aircrew.[292] This problem was not mentioned when our MoD witnesses were questioned about the numbers of night-qualified pilots,[293] nor did the MoD do so, when invited in a written question to expand on that answer.[294] Ten Sea King helicopters were also on board Invincible, and these were mainly engaged in humanitarian missions. An additional five Sea Harrier FA2s were kept available at RNAS Yeovilton to reinforce the operation, of which one was maintained at short notice to deploy.[295]

137 During Invincible's time on station, her Sea Harriers flew 102 combat air patrol sorties in support of Operation Allied Force, at an average of 15 sorties per aircraft. This compares with an average of 37 for RAF shore-based aircraft. The total number of sorties was dictated by the time deployed on station, which for Invincible was half of the 78 days of the air campaign, but the sortie rate was still lower for the Sea Harriers.[296] We were told that the intensity of participation was governed by the Air Tasking Order.[297] It seems that the tasks that General Short wanted the Sea Harriers to undertake did not require them to generate their maximum sortie rate.

138 Also, the Air Tasking Order did not require the Sea Harriers to exercise their other roles. All the sorties flown by the Sea Harriers were defensive counter air, in other words they were not required to undertake any ground attack missions. Air Commodore Morris, when challenged on this point, asserted that the Sea Harriers nonetheless had demonstrated their utility by helping to establish adequate control of the air to allow NATO operations to be conducted in Kosovo and later Serbia, and to free other multi-role aircraft to carry out offensive support missions.[298] The evidence for this is in part circumstantial since the Sea Harriers did not shoot down any Serbian aircraft, nor did they engage any with missiles. However we were told that Serbian aircraft were chased[299] and were illuminated with the Blue Vixen radar, [300] and that the Sea Harriers contributed to the campaign to suppress enemy air defences in which only two allied aircraft were shot down as a result of Serbian action.[301] Our naval witness stressed that the offensive bombing operation depended for its success on having combat air patrols up 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to deny the Serbs the opportunity of getting even one aircraft airborne for an offensive bombing mission.[302] The reason given for the Sea Harriers not flying any land-attack sorties was that they are optimised for the air defence role.[303] The Sea Harrier, unlike the Harrier GR7, cannot self-designate to drop laser guided bombs and requires another aircraft to designate targets for them.[304] The establishment of Task Force Harrier[305] was intended to integrate RAF and Royal Navy Harriers, pending their replacement by the Future Carrier-Borne Aircraft. The division of capabilities between the Harrier GR7s and the Sea Harrier FA2s has, however, been highlighted by the Kosovo campaign. Given the centrality of the two future aircraft carriers to the SDR strategy, the evidence that Invincible's carrier air group may not have been optimally constructed or tasked during the air campaign raises some significant questions that will need to be addressed in the acquisition of the UK's future carrier-borne aircraft. We look forward to reading the MoD's own assessment of the lessons of this operation for the future carrier programme. One paragraph in its Lessons report is hardly adequate.[306] Nonetheless, the presence of Invincible was a useful demonstration of political will, and the Sea King helicopters made a real and important contribution to the humanitarian operation.

139 Availability rates for UK aircraft remained high, particularly for the two key strike aircraft, the Harrier GR7 and the Tornado GR1.[307] Nevertheless a number of shortcomings and problems were apparent with British equipment, some serious and some of which have already been noted by the MoD.[308] Although aircraft losses were minimised, this was in part because they were mainly flying at medium altitude (above 15,000 feet) to avoid hand held SAMs. This is a height for which Harriers and Tornados are not best designed or equipped. Some of their weapons could not be released when aircraft were flying above cloud.[309] These factors, added to the political requirement to avoid collateral damage, meant that only 40% of strike missions actually led to weapons release.[310] Even if this can to some extent be accounted for by the effect of the rules of engagement and the discipline of UK pilots, it still suggests that if the UK is to be equipped to face similar challenges in the future, there needs to be some reconsideration of the balance of capabilities its strike aircraft possess. Overall, despite the heroic efforts of UK aircrew and support staff, we must conclude that the UK's contribution to the air campaign, in terms of actual fire power rather than support, was somewhat disappointing. We now examine the limitations of the aircraft weapons systems which may have contributed to reducing their effectiveness.


Air-launched Precision-guided Munitions

140 The most serious shortcoming in UK capabilities shown-up by the air campaign was the lack of a precision-guided weapons capable of being used in all weathers against static and mobile targets. RAF ground-attack aircraft are optimised for low level attacks against static targets.[311] At the outset of Operation Allied Force we were told that the intention was for the RAF to use only precision guided weapons.[312] Bombing at medium altitude, however, meant that it was difficult to distinguish targets with the necessary certainty to avoid civilian casualties. More importantly, the RAF's precision-bombing capability relied on laser designation of targets, which could not be used through cloud cover. Although some in the MoD were clearly surprised at how much of an effect this would have on the RAF's precision strike capability[313] others were not.[314] Poor weather and cloud cover persisted through the campaign—over two-thirds of the 78 days of the bombing campaign were affected by these conditions—so that laser designated weapons often could not be used.[315] By the end of the campaign, precision-guided weapons had accounted for only 24% of the weapons used by the RAF.[316]

141 Some commentators have suggested that difficulties encountered with the Tornado GR4 played a part in curtailing the RAF's laser-guided bombing performance. The ground-attack Tornados used in the air campaign were those still in the GR1 configuration, rather than those that had been updated to GR4 standard in the aircraft's mid-life update programme. The problem that limited the GR4's utility for precision strikes concerned the thermal imaging and laser designating (TIALD) pod. The TIALD system has been in service on a range of RAF aircraft types for some time.[317] Indeed, as our report on the implementation of the lessons of Operation Granby noted, the hurried deployment of pre-production TIALD pods in 1991 allowed the RAF to dispense with the tandem flying of (bomber) Tornados and (target-designator) Buccaneers in the Gulf War.[318] Subsequently the system's integration on the GR4 was part of the contract for the mid-life update programme let by the Tornado partners in 1994.[319]

142 Like its GR1 predecessor, the GR4 will be capable of dropping laser-guided munitions (notably Paveway IIs), but there have been difficulties integrating the aircraft's new systems with the TIALD pod. At the time of the Kosovo campaign the GR4 would not have been able to designate its targets, and would have had to rely on a separate aircraft to do this. Continued reliance on the GR1 aircraft does not appear to have directly curtailed the effectiveness of the delivery of laser-guided munitions. One of our witnesses from the MoD told us that the—

    GR1 was always going to be our favoured option, and it gave us the capability which met our needs at the time. We could have delivered GR4s had we wanted to and they could have been effective, but not in all of the roles that we might have wanted to use them for at that time.[320]

An interim TIALD capability for the GR4—at least as effective as that of the GR1—was planned to be available in July 2000, and a full capability by the end of the year.[321]

143 More generally, the Tornado's mid-life update, once fully delivered, should provide a significant enhancement to the aircraft's capabilities, including new systems to give it an all-weather and night-time utility, as well as an integrated TIALD system.[322] The conversion of GR1 aircraft to the new GR4 standard has, however, been much delayed. It was originally due to be completed in 1993,[323] but as of February this year only 50 of the 142 aircraft had been converted, and the MoD's current estimate is that the remainder will be delivered by February 2003.[324] While the RAF's laser-guided bombing performance may not have been significantly curtailed because of the unavailability of the GR4, the enhanced capabilities of the updated aircraft might have made the UK's contribution to the air campaign more effective in other ways, utilising its better all-weather and night-time capabilities—capabilities which proved to be in demand for Operation Allied Force. It is regrettable that, like other examples in this report, the Tornado mid-life update is another programme in which delays have prevented new and improved systems being available for the Kosovo campaign. The MoD and the contractors—BAE Systems—must get this programme back on track, and prevent any further delay.

Unguided Bombs

144 In response to its difficulties experienced in delivering guided munitions, the RAF reactivated its ability to use unguided ('dumb') bombs from medium altitude.[325] Neither the requirement for precision attack nor the poor weather conditions in this part of Europe could have come as a surprise. Given that, it is a cause for some concern that the ability of pilots to use 'dumb' bombs accurately had to be reactivated. The RAF had to conduct trials during the campaign to establish the degree of confidence in the accuracy of gravity bombs, and pilots in theatre were not trained for their use.[326] This suggests a lack of foresight on the part of the MoD.

145 The MoD acknowledged that this form of attack was a sub-optimal choice, and it is pursuing options to give it an all-weather precision capability.[327] MoD witnesses nevertheless argued that the accuracy of 'dumb' bombs is considerable and that it was sufficient to meet the stringent criteria of the rules of engagement against certain types of targets, though not all.[328] We note a recent report stating that only 2% of the 1,000lb unguided bombs could be confirmed as hitting the target.[329] Even accepting that a larger percentage may have hit the target but could not be confirmed as so doing, this is a distressingly low figure and at variance with the tenor of the evidence provided by the MoD. We were told that since there is less to go wrong with a 'dumb' bomb, the risks of collateral damage against certain targets may actually be lower.[330] The key point of course is that their acceptability depended crucially on the type of target attacked, and in particular on the risk of collateral damage or casualties associated with such targets.[331] The MoD's professed faith in the great utility of 'dumb' bombing in the Kosovo campaign suggests that it has been economical with the truth, if not attempting to mislead us. Dumb bombs may be more 'reliable' in the particular sense of the term as used by the MoD, but their future utility in peace support missions undertaken by a perhaps reluctant Alliance will be limited by the operational and political constraints of such endeavours.

146 One of the lessons of the difficulties of operating in the generally poor weather over Kosovo and Serbia was the utility of munitions guided by the global positioning system (GPS). MoD work is now in hand to review the balance of 'smart' and 'dumb' munitions, and to see whether new technologies can be used to provide an all-weather capability.[332] Specifically, the Chief of the Defence Staff explained that the MoD was examining the possibility of acquiring GPS-guided weapons such as the US JDAM.[333] It was also looking at the possibility of bolting GPS systems into 'dumb' 1000 lb bombs as a relatively inexpensive short term measure ahead of the introduction of other fully-fledged GPS-based systems. One area of perhaps particular promise would be to reap the benefits of laser-designation and global positioning systems. The MoD, it appears, is monitoring developments in the US to integrate GPS guidance into laser-guided Paveway bombs, so that if cloud were to interfere with the laser designation, the GPS guidance would still deliver it to within a few metres of the target.[334] More recently, in connection with the 2000 Spending Review, the Secretary of State announced that the MoD would "procure as soon as possible a new precision guided all-weather bombing capability for the RAF", using GPS technology.[335] The problems of intelligence, and fire control, for operations in areas (such as some built-up areas) where targets are extremely difficult to identify from the air, will remain.

Cluster Bombs and Anti-Armour Weapons

147 Greater investment in precision-guided munitions could also help to defuse one of the more controversial aspects of the bombing—the casualties caused by the use of so-called 'cluster bombs'. Each of these weapons contains 147 bomblets, primarily firing a plasma-jet able to penetrate armour, but having a secondary anti-personnel effect with over 2000 shrapnel pieces cut into the casing. The RAF is still reliant upon the use of such cluster bombs in certain roles (particularly anti-armour), and during the air campaign the RAF dropped 531 BL755 cluster bombs, designed principally to destroy tanks and other vehicles.[336] The MoD's report states that, of the targets engaged by the RAF, 530 were against fielded forces.[337] This strongly suggests that cluster bombs were used primarily for this purpose. Over 50% of the bombs dropped by the RAF were cluster bombs.

148 The BL755 has been in-service with the RAF since 1972. Even in 1991, the MoD acknowledged that experience in the Gulf War had shown that the bomb was no longer credible against modern main battle tanks.[338] Despite modifications since then to improve its capabilities, counter-measures[339] have developed faster so that tanks are now four times as likely to survive BL 755 bombing than in 1991.[340] Its main limitations are that it works most effectively when deployed by low flying aircraft (which also have to fly directly over the target); it is not guided; and on average around 5% of its 147 bomblets fail to explode.[341] However, there is evidence that the actual failure rate in Operation Allied Force was higher—possibly between 8% and 12%.[342] That means that the RAF left between 4,000 and 10,000 unexploded bomblets on the ground in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force. A report in Flight International, purportedly based on MoD operational analysis, suggested that only 31% of cluster bombs hit their targets and a further 29% cannot be accounted for.[343] Human Rights Watch commented—

    There are seven confirmed and five likely incidents involving civilian deaths from cluster bomb use by the United States and Britain. Altogether, some ninety to 150 civilians died from cluster bomb use ... After the technical malfunction of a cluster bomb used in an attack on the urban Nis airfield on May 7 ... the White House quietly issued a directive to restrict cluster bomb used (at least by US forces) ... Nevertheless, the British air force continued to drop cluster bombs ... indicating the need for universal, not national, norms regarding cluster bomb use.[344]

The Foreign Affairs Committee made a similar point.[345]

149 The weaknesses of the cluster bombs were highlighted in the Kosovo air campaign, where allied aircraft were not permitted to fly low, where, as we have rehearsed above, cloud caused many sorties using such free-fall (and laser-guided) munitions to be aborted, and where the avoidance of collateral damage and civilian casualties were high priorities. The RAF need not have been so handicapped, however. The MoD's Brimstone programme is intended to provide a stand-off[346] anti-tank guided missile with its own autonomous target-seeking radar which will not require continuous guidance from its launching aircraft. The MoD now expects it to enter service in October 2001, but that will be 10 years later than planned when the programme was launched in 1982.[347] The project will have then taken more than twice as long as it should have done,[348] a delay largely caused by the MoD itself, as the missile's requirements were re-evaluated and refined, including a delay of more than 5 years while the implications of the post Cold-War 'Options for Change' defence review and the lessons of the Gulf War were addressed.[349] The MoD has reported that its operational analysis has showed that Brimstone would be 20 times as effective against main battle tanks deploying modern countermeasures as the cluster bomb currently in service[350]— an advantage unavailable in the Kosovo conflict.[351]

150 The Secretary of State put up a stout defence of the use of cluster bombs, telling us—

    As far as cluster bombs are concerned, I regret that munitions are not always as effective as we would like ... We were aware that there was a small failure rate, in the order of 5% ... but a judgment has to be made. These are extremely effective weapons. They are the most effective weapons against armoured and certain kinds of soft skinned vehicles and, frankly, if we did not use the most effective weapons available to us we would be putting our armed forces at risk.[352]

The Secretary of State's claim that cluster bombs are 'the most effective weapons' for an anti-armour ground attack task does not, we believe, apply to the circumstances of this campaign. At the very least, their reputation as an indiscriminate weapon risks international condemnation, undermining popular support for an action. The UK needs a more discriminatory anti-armour system in order to move to an early end to reliance upon recourse to these weapons in inappropriate circumstances.

151 The MoD's Lessons from the Crisis[353] recognises the requirement for more effective engagement against tanks, other armoured vehicles and air defences.[354] At the end of July 2000, the Secretary of State announced that the UK would proceed with the integration of the Maverick anti-armour system onto Harrier GR7s,[355] and that missiles would be purchased in sufficient time to give an operational capability by the end of 2000.[356] The contract for the purchase of these missiles was subsequently signed in September 2000.[357] The Department sees Brimstone being complemented, rather than replaced, by the US Maverick anti-armour missile. Each has its different strengths. Indeed, when the MoD had chosen Brimstone back in 1991 it had evaluated it against the Maverick system. The MoD had noted that Brimstone would have been able to tackle many mobile targets in a given area (such as a tank formation), and that Tornado and Harrier aircraft could not have carried enough of the heavier Maverick missiles to defeat massed armour.[358] Brimstone's radar target-detection system makes the weapon considerably more effective where the target is obscured by cloud, fog or heavy rain than a weapon (like Maverick) which relies on electro-optical or infra-red systems.[359] In addition, while Brimstone would have an autonomous target detection and recognition capability, the pilot would have to lock the Maverick missile onto a particular target prior to launch, which in certain conditions would increase aircraft vulnerability.[360] But, crucially important in the Kosovo campaign and others like it, this characteristic may give the Maverick missile a lower risk of inflicting collateral damage,[361] and the MoD now envisage Maverick filling a capability gap for attacking solitary armoured targets in an environment with a high risk of collateral damage and consequently restrictive rules of engagement.[362]

152 The MoD has recently reduced its planned purchase of Brimstone missiles,[363] perhaps by 25%.[364] We trust that this will be more than balanced by the purchase of other precision munitions, such as Maverick missiles and GPS-based systems, but caution is required in substituting (rather than enhancing) such capabilities— each type of munition is best suited for different types of conflict. There is a case, as the MoD itself says in its Lessons report, for having 'a range of capabilities, to tailor the response to the target'.[365] It is clear that for air-to-ground attack, and even for just an anti-armour capability, a mix of weapons is required which the UK does not currently possess.

274  Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis, p.30; Ev p 240, para 1 Back

275  See para 112 Back

276  NAO, para 3.3 Back

277  DoD, p 81 Back

278  Ev p 191 Back

279  Q 110 Back

280  Q 116 Back

281  Q 110 Back

282  Q 79 Back

283  Ev p 57 Back

284  QQ 122-4 Back

285  Q 84 Back

286  Q 245 Back

287  Q 246 Back

288  Ev p 57 Back

289  Q 214 Back

290  Cm 4724, p 63 Back

291  Cm 4724 p 51 and Q 201 Back

292  NAO, p 31 ff Back

293  Q 201 Back

294  Ev p 256, para 69 Back

295  ibid Back

296  0.38 sorties per aircraft per day as compared with 0.47 for land-based aircraft Back

297  Ev p 241, paras 2 and 7; Q 247 and 248 Back

298  Q 197 Back

299  Q 218 Back

300  Q 196,197 Back

301   DoD, figures 13-15 Back

302  Q 215 Back

303  Q 199 Back

304  RUSI Journal June 2000 p25 Back

305  Formerly Joint Force 2000 Back

306  Cm 4724, para 9.3 Back

307  Q 107 and Ev p 240 Back

308  See for example Cm 4724, p 5 Back

309  QQ 83 and 381 Back

310  Q 240 Back

311  Cm 4724 para 7.38 Back

312  Q 88 Back

313  Q 86 Back

314  Q 147 Back

315  QQ 84-6 and 236 Back

316  Ev p 242, para 13; Q 88 Back

317  HC Deb, 11 February 2000, c344w Back

318  Fifth Report, 1993-94, HC 43, para 69 Back

319  ibid Back

320  Q 211 Back

321  Q 70 Back

322  HC Deb, 11 February 2000, c342w Back

323  Major Projects Report 1997, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC (1997-98) 695, p 99 Back

324  HC Deb, 11 February 2000, c343w Back

325  See eg Human Rights Watch Report on Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, February 2000, p 7 Back

326  QQ 89, 148-9 and 229 Back

327  QQ 1, 107, 450, 459, 463 and Cm 4724 para 7.38. Back

328  Q 469 Back

329  'Kosovo bombing misses the target, says MoD report', Flight International, 15-21 August 2000. Back

330  QQ 88, 143-4, 236-8, 254-8, 461 Back

331  See eg Human Rights Watch, op cit, p 7 Back

332  Ev p 243, para 19 Back

333  Q 84 Back

334  Jane's Defence Weekly, 15/3/2000 Back

335  HC Deb, 24 July 2000, c 778 Back

336  Ev p 257, para 77; Cm 4724, Annex F, p.70 Back

337  Cm 4724, p 70 Back

338  Major Projects Report 1999, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC (1999-2000), para 3.7 Back

339  Such as 'explosive reactive armour' and 'defensive aids suites' Back

340  HC (1999-2000) 613, op cit, para 3.8 Back

341  ibid Back

342  Note of meeting between the All-Party Parliamentary Landmine Eradication Group and NATO officials, 24 July 2000 Back

343  'Kosovo bombing misses the target, says MoD report', Flight International, 15-21 August 2000 Back

344  Human Rights Watch, op cit, p 8 Back

345  Foreign Affairs Committee, op cit, para 150 Back

346  Its range is 8 km Back

347  HC 91999-2000) 613, op cit, pp 59-63 Back

348  ibid, Figure 16 Back

349  ibid, p 63 Back

350  Thirty-third report of the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1999-2000, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1998, HC 247, p19 Back

351  HC (1999-2000) 613, op cit, para 3.8 Back

352  Q 1214 Back

353  Cm 4724 Back

354  Cm 4724, para 7.41 Back

355  ibid, para 4.5 Back

356  HC Deb, 24 July 2000, c 778 Back

357  Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 September 2000 Back

358  Thirty-third report of the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1999-2000, op cit, p 19 Back

359  Q 466 and Ev p 255, para 77 Back

360  Thirty-third report of the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1999-2000, op cit, p 19 Back

361  Q 466 and Ev p 255, para 77 Back

362  Thirty-third report of the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1999-2000, op cit, p 19 Back

363  HC Deb, 25 July 2000, c 544w Back

364  Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 July 2000 Back

365  Cm 4724, para 7.41 Back

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