Unguided Bombs
144 In response to its difficulties experienced in
delivering guided munitions, the RAF reactivated its ability to
use unguided ('dumb') bombs from medium altitude.[325]
Neither the requirement for precision attack nor the poor weather
conditions in this part of Europe could have come as a surprise.
Given that, it is a cause for some concern that the ability of
pilots to use 'dumb' bombs accurately had to be reactivated. The
RAF had to conduct trials during the campaign to establish
the degree of confidence in the accuracy of gravity bombs, and
pilots in theatre were not trained for their use.[326]
This suggests a lack of foresight on the part of the MoD.
145 The MoD acknowledged that this form of attack
was a sub-optimal choice, and it is pursuing options to give it
an all-weather precision capability.[327]
MoD witnesses nevertheless argued that the accuracy of 'dumb'
bombs is considerable and that it was sufficient to meet the stringent
criteria of the rules of engagement against certain types of targets,
though not all.[328]
We note a recent report stating that only 2% of the 1,000lb unguided
bombs could be confirmed as hitting the target.[329]
Even accepting that a larger percentage may have hit the target
but could not be confirmed as so doing, this is a distressingly
low figure and at variance with the tenor of the evidence provided
by the MoD. We were told that since there is less to go wrong
with a 'dumb' bomb, the risks of collateral damage against certain
targets may actually be lower.[330]
The key point of course is that their acceptability depended crucially
on the type of target attacked, and in particular on the risk
of collateral damage or casualties associated with such targets.[331]
The MoD's professed faith in the great utility of 'dumb' bombing
in the Kosovo campaign suggests that it has been economical with
the truth, if not attempting to mislead us. Dumb bombs may be
more 'reliable' in the particular sense of the term as used by
the MoD, but their future utility in peace support missions undertaken
by a perhaps reluctant Alliance will be limited by the operational
and political constraints of such endeavours.
146 One of the lessons of the difficulties of operating
in the generally poor weather over Kosovo and Serbia was the utility
of munitions guided by the global positioning system (GPS). MoD
work is now in hand to review the balance of 'smart' and 'dumb'
munitions, and to see whether new technologies can be used to
provide an all-weather capability.[332]
Specifically, the Chief of the Defence Staff explained that the
MoD was examining the possibility of acquiring GPS-guided weapons
such as the US JDAM.[333]
It was also looking at the possibility of bolting GPS systems
into 'dumb' 1000 lb bombs as a relatively inexpensive short term
measure ahead of the introduction of other fully-fledged GPS-based
systems. One area of perhaps particular promise would be to reap
the benefits of laser-designation and global positioning
systems. The MoD, it appears, is monitoring developments in the
US to integrate GPS guidance into laser-guided Paveway bombs,
so that if cloud were to interfere with the laser designation,
the GPS guidance would still deliver it to within a few metres
of the target.[334]
More recently, in connection with the 2000 Spending Review, the
Secretary of State announced that the MoD would "procure
as soon as possible a new precision guided all-weather bombing
capability for the RAF", using GPS technology.[335]
The problems of intelligence, and fire control, for operations
in areas (such as some built-up areas) where targets are extremely
difficult to identify from the air, will remain.
Cluster Bombs and Anti-Armour
Weapons
147 Greater investment in precision-guided munitions
could also help to defuse one of the more controversial aspects
of the bombingthe casualties caused by the use of so-called
'cluster bombs'. Each of these weapons contains 147 bomblets,
primarily firing a plasma-jet able to penetrate armour, but having
a secondary anti-personnel effect with over 2000 shrapnel pieces
cut into the casing. The RAF is still reliant upon the use of
such cluster bombs in certain roles (particularly anti-armour),
and during the air campaign the RAF dropped 531 BL755 cluster
bombs, designed principally to destroy tanks and other vehicles.[336]
The MoD's report states that, of the targets engaged by the RAF,
530 were against fielded forces.[337]
This strongly suggests that cluster bombs were used primarily
for this purpose. Over 50% of the bombs dropped by the RAF
were cluster bombs.
148 The BL755 has been in-service with the RAF since
1972. Even in 1991, the MoD acknowledged that experience in the
Gulf War had shown that the bomb was no longer credible against
modern main battle tanks.[338]
Despite modifications since then to improve its capabilities,
counter-measures[339]
have developed faster so that tanks are now four times as likely
to survive BL 755 bombing than in 1991.[340]
Its main limitations are that it works most effectively when deployed
by low flying aircraft (which also have to fly directly over the
target); it is not guided; and on average around 5% of its 147
bomblets fail to explode.[341]
However, there is evidence that the actual failure rate in Operation
Allied Force was higherpossibly between 8% and 12%.[342]
That means that the RAF left between 4,000 and 10,000 unexploded
bomblets on the ground in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force.
A report in Flight International, purportedly based on
MoD operational analysis, suggested that only 31% of cluster bombs
hit their targets and a further 29% cannot be accounted for.[343]
Human Rights Watch commented
There are seven confirmed
and five likely incidents involving civilian deaths from cluster
bomb use by the United States and Britain. Altogether, some ninety
to 150 civilians died from cluster bomb use ... After the technical
malfunction of a cluster bomb used in an attack on the urban Nis
airfield on May 7 ... the White House quietly issued a directive
to restrict cluster bomb used (at least by US forces) ... Nevertheless,
the British air force continued to drop cluster bombs ... indicating
the need for universal, not national, norms regarding cluster
bomb use.[344]
The Foreign Affairs Committee made a similar point.[345]
149 The weaknesses of the cluster bombs were highlighted
in the Kosovo air campaign, where allied aircraft were not permitted
to fly low, where, as we have rehearsed above, cloud caused many
sorties using such free-fall (and laser-guided) munitions to be
aborted, and where the avoidance of collateral damage and civilian
casualties were high priorities. The RAF need not have been so
handicapped, however. The MoD's Brimstone programme is intended
to provide a stand-off[346]
anti-tank guided missile with its own autonomous target-seeking
radar which will not require continuous guidance from its launching
aircraft. The MoD now expects it to enter service in October 2001,
but that will be 10 years later than planned when the programme
was launched in 1982.[347]
The project will have then taken more than twice as long as it
should have done,[348]
a delay largely caused by the MoD itself, as the missile's requirements
were re-evaluated and refined, including a delay of more than
5 years while the implications of the post Cold-War 'Options for
Change' defence review and the lessons of the Gulf War were addressed.[349]
The MoD has reported that its operational analysis has showed
that Brimstone would be 20 times as effective against main battle
tanks deploying modern countermeasures as the cluster bomb currently
in service[350]
an advantage unavailable in the Kosovo conflict.[351]
150 The Secretary of State put up a stout defence
of the use of cluster bombs, telling us
As far as cluster bombs are
concerned, I regret that munitions are not always as effective
as we would like ... We were aware that there was a small failure
rate, in the order of 5% ... but a judgment has to be made. These
are extremely effective weapons. They are the most effective weapons
against armoured and certain kinds of soft skinned vehicles and,
frankly, if we did not use the most effective weapons available
to us we would be putting our armed forces at risk.[352]
The Secretary of State's claim that cluster bombs
are 'the most effective weapons' for an anti-armour ground attack
task does not, we believe, apply to the circumstances of this
campaign. At the very least, their reputation as an indiscriminate
weapon risks international condemnation, undermining popular support
for an action. The UK needs a more discriminatory anti-armour
system in order to move to an early end to reliance upon recourse
to these weapons in inappropriate circumstances.
151 The MoD's Lessons from the Crisis[353]
recognises the requirement for more effective engagement against
tanks, other armoured vehicles and air defences.[354]
At the end of July 2000, the Secretary of State announced that
the UK would proceed with the integration of the Maverick anti-armour
system onto Harrier GR7s,[355]
and that missiles would be purchased in sufficient time to give
an operational capability by the end of 2000.[356]
The contract for the purchase of these missiles was subsequently
signed in September 2000.[357]
The Department sees Brimstone being complemented, rather than
replaced, by the US Maverick anti-armour missile. Each has its
different strengths. Indeed, when the MoD had chosen Brimstone
back in 1991 it had evaluated it against the Maverick system.
The MoD had noted that Brimstone would have been able to tackle
many mobile targets in a given area (such as a tank formation),
and that Tornado and Harrier aircraft could not have carried enough
of the heavier Maverick missiles to defeat massed armour.[358]
Brimstone's radar target-detection system makes the weapon considerably
more effective where the target is obscured by cloud, fog or heavy
rain than a weapon (like Maverick) which relies on electro-optical
or infra-red systems.[359]
In addition, while Brimstone would have an autonomous target detection
and recognition capability, the pilot would have to lock the Maverick
missile onto a particular target prior to launch, which in certain
conditions would increase aircraft vulnerability.[360]
But, crucially important in the Kosovo campaign and others like
it, this characteristic may give the Maverick missile a lower
risk of inflicting collateral damage,[361]
and the MoD now envisage Maverick filling a capability gap for
attacking solitary armoured targets in an environment with a high
risk of collateral damage and consequently restrictive rules of
engagement.[362]
152 The MoD has recently reduced its planned purchase
of Brimstone missiles,[363]
perhaps by 25%.[364]
We trust that this will be more than balanced by the purchase
of other precision munitions, such as Maverick missiles and GPS-based
systems, but caution is required in substituting (rather than
enhancing) such capabilities each type of munition is best
suited for different types of conflict. There is a case, as the
MoD itself says in its Lessons report, for having 'a range
of capabilities, to tailor the response to the target'.[365]
It is clear that for air-to-ground attack, and even for just
an anti-armour capability, a mix of weapons is required which
the UK does not currently possess.
274 Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis,
p.30; Ev p 240, para 1 Back
275 See
para 112 Back
276 NAO,
para 3.3 Back
277 DoD,
p 81 Back
278 Ev
p 191 Back
279 Q
110 Back
280 Q
116 Back
281 Q
110 Back
282 Q
79 Back
283 Ev
p 57 Back
284 QQ
122-4 Back
285 Q
84 Back
286 Q
245 Back
287 Q
246 Back
288 Ev
p 57 Back
289 Q
214 Back
290 Cm
4724, p 63 Back
291 Cm
4724 p 51 and Q 201 Back
292 NAO,
p 31 ff Back
293 Q
201 Back
294 Ev
p 256, para 69 Back
295 ibid Back
296 0.38
sorties per aircraft per day as compared with 0.47 for land-based
aircraft Back
297 Ev
p 241, paras 2 and 7; Q 247 and 248 Back
298 Q
197 Back
299 Q
218 Back
300 Q
196,197 Back
301
DoD, figures 13-15 Back
302 Q
215 Back
303 Q
199 Back
304 RUSI
Journal June 2000 p25 Back
305 Formerly
Joint Force 2000 Back
306 Cm
4724, para 9.3 Back
307 Q
107 and Ev p 240 Back
308 See
for example Cm 4724, p 5 Back
309 QQ
83 and 381 Back
310 Q
240 Back
311 Cm
4724 para 7.38 Back
312 Q
88 Back
313 Q
86 Back
314 Q
147 Back
315 QQ
84-6 and 236 Back
316 Ev
p 242, para 13; Q 88 Back
317 HC
Deb, 11 February 2000, c344w Back
318 Fifth
Report, 1993-94, HC 43, para 69 Back
319 ibid Back
320 Q
211 Back
321 Q
70 Back
322 HC
Deb, 11 February 2000, c342w Back
323 Major
Projects Report 1997, Report
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC (1997-98) 695, p 99 Back
324 HC
Deb, 11 February 2000, c343w Back
325 See
eg Human Rights Watch Report on Civilian Deaths in the NATO
Air Campaign, February 2000, p 7 Back
326 QQ
89, 148-9 and 229 Back
327 QQ
1, 107, 450, 459, 463 and Cm 4724 para 7.38. Back
328 Q
469 Back
329 'Kosovo
bombing misses the target, says MoD report', Flight International,
15-21 August 2000. Back
330 QQ
88, 143-4, 236-8, 254-8, 461 Back
331 See
eg Human Rights Watch, op cit, p 7 Back
332 Ev
p 243, para 19 Back
333 Q
84 Back
334 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 15/3/2000 Back
335 HC
Deb, 24 July 2000, c 778 Back
336 Ev
p 257, para 77; Cm 4724, Annex F, p.70 Back
337 Cm
4724, p 70 Back
338 Major
Projects Report 1999, Report
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC (1999-2000), para 3.7 Back
339 Such
as 'explosive reactive armour' and 'defensive aids suites' Back
340 HC
(1999-2000) 613, op cit, para 3.8 Back
341 ibid Back
342 Note
of meeting between the All-Party Parliamentary Landmine Eradication
Group and NATO officials, 24 July 2000 Back
343 'Kosovo
bombing misses the target, says MoD report', Flight International,
15-21 August 2000 Back
344 Human
Rights Watch, op cit, p 8 Back
345 Foreign
Affairs Committee, op cit, para 150 Back
346 Its
range is 8 km Back
347 HC
91999-2000) 613, op cit, pp 59-63 Back
348 ibid,
Figure 16 Back
349 ibid,
p 63 Back
350 Thirty-third
report of the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1999-2000,
Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1998, HC 247,
p19 Back
351 HC
(1999-2000) 613, op cit, para 3.8 Back
352 Q
1214 Back
353 Cm
4724 Back
354 Cm
4724, para 7.41 Back
355 ibid,
para 4.5 Back
356 HC
Deb, 24 July 2000, c 778 Back
357 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 20 September
2000 Back
358 Thirty-third
report of the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1999-2000, op
cit, p 19 Back
359 Q
466 and Ev p 255, para 77 Back
360 Thirty-third
report of the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1999-2000, op
cit, p 19 Back
361 Q
466 and Ev p 255, para 77 Back
362 Thirty-third
report of the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1999-2000, op
cit, p 19 Back
363 HC
Deb, 25 July 2000, c 544w Back
364 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 5 July 2000 Back
365 Cm
4724, para 7.41 Back