Air-to-Air Refuelling
165 Operation Allied Force revealed that there was
insufficient NATO air-to-air refuelling capacity, compounded by
a lack of interoperability in this area between most air forces
(including the US Navy) and the US Air Force (which provided the
majority of aircraft to the operation).[402]
The UK deployed significant air-to-air refuelling assets to the
theatre and the MoD emphasised the fact that 85% of the fuel transferred
by RAF tankers went to non-UK aircraft. This suggests that the
UK provided more than most other NATO members.[403]
Air Vice Marshal Nichol reminded us that
... one tanker captain was
awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and that was specifically,
apart from his overall operational experience, for the support
he provided personally to two EA-6B Prowler American aircraft
electronic warfare operations.[404]
The real problem with air-to-air refuelling appears
to lie with our European Allies.
166 Despite this apparent disproportionate contribution
of the UK, the Chief of Joint Operations asserted that the UK
requires a greater air-to-air refuelling capability.[405]
The UK's existing capability, provided by an ageing fleet of 35
VC-10s and Tristars, is due for renewal as part of a public-private
partnershipthe 'Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft' programme.[406]
It will be essential that the lessons of Operation Allied Force
are incorporated in the specification of this PFI service contract,
expected to be let in 2002. These tanker aircraft are not only
valuable force multipliers but also enable operations that, without
them, would not be possible. We expect the response to this
report to set out how the MoD is going to ensure that the tanker
fleet is sufficient for likely future needs and that new tankers
become available soon enough to replace the present ageing fleet
before they are obsolete. There have been suggestions made of
establishing a European tanker fleetthis is clearly an
area where wholesale duplication by each of the Allies of this
capability is likely to be inefficient. It will be essential that
the UK's own requirement is addressed in the wider context of
the European-NATO shortfall in this capability.
Infantry Equipment
167 The participation of UK ground forces in KFOR's
entry into Kosovo also gave rise to leaked reports in the media
about the inadequacies of the SA80, in particular in its Light
Support Weapon form, and the lack of secure tactical communications.
We discussed the shortcomings of tactical secure communications
at length in a recent report.[407]
The concerns about the SA 80 are old, well-documented complaints
which pre-date Kosovo and which have concerned the Committee before.[408]
It is disappointing that it is taking so long to resolve them.
We know, though, that the MoD is acutely aware of these shortcomings
and has provided an update on the measures in hand in its Lessons
report.[409]
Ministers have recently announced a programme of remedial work
on the weapon.[410]
We shall monitor the results.
366 NAO, p 31 Back
367 Ev
p 266, para 101 Back
368 Cm
4724 Back
369 QQ
263, 265 Back
370 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 19 July 2000,
p 3 Back
371 Q
459 Back
372 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 19 July 2000,
p 3 Back
373 Q
1164? Back
374 QQ
1165-1167 Back
375 Cm
4724, para 7.26 Back
376 HC
Deb, 24 January 2000, c70w; 18 April 200, c429w Back
377 HC
(1999-2000) 613, op cit, p 100 Back
378 Ev
p 73, Q 443 Back
379 Ev
p 61 Back
380 Ev
p 245, para 27; Ev p 257, para 78; QQ 442 and 282 Back
381 Q
445 Back
382 Cm
4724, para 4.5 Back
383 Q
447 Back
384 Q
479 Back
385 Q
481 Back
386 Q
232 and Cm 4724 para 7.41 Back
387 QQ
520-1 Back
388 Second
Report, Session 1990-91, The Procurement of the Multiple Launch
Rocket System and the Phoenix Remotely Piloted Vehicle, HC
49 Back
389 Seventh
Report, Session 1994-95, Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Target Acquisition, HC 319 Back
390 Tenth
Report, Session 1999-2000, Major Procurement Projects,
HC 528, p 74 Back
391 HC
Deb, 19 June 2000, c32w Back
392 Ev
p265 Back
393 Q
517 Back
394 Q
519 Back
395 HC
Deb, 19 June 2000, c32w Back
396 Seventh
Report, Session 1994-95, op cit, paras 44-45 Back
397 Their
original cost was £164,000 plus VAT, when ordered in 1985
(HC Deb, 19 June 2000, c32w). But the NAO report Kosovo; The
Financial Lessons of Military Operations (1999-2000, HC 5300
notes that 12 lost unmanned reconnaissance aircraft were valued
at £3.5 million - or £290,000 each. Back
398 Q
517 Back
399 Q
528 Back
400 Its
original in-service date was 2003. Latest estimate is 2005, a
delay of 29 months (HC (1999-2000) 613, p 66) Back
401 Tenth
Report, Session 1999-2000, op cit, p 74 (para 7) Back
402 QQ282,
442, 446 and 554 and Cm 4724 para 7.45 Back
403 Q
446 and Cm 4724 para 7.41 Back
404 Q
446 Back
405 Q
282 Back
406 Cm
4724 para 7.41 Back
407 Tenth
Report, Session 1999-2000, op cit, paras 41-59 Back
408 Third
Report, Session 1992-93, The SA80 Rifle and Light Support Weapon,
HC 729 Back
409 Cm
4724, paras 5.31 and 5.32. Back
410 HC
Deb, 23 June 2000, cc 318-319w Back