Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60
- 79)
WEDNESDAY 19 APRIL 2000
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON,
MP, AIR COMMODORE
GLEN TORPY
AND MR
SIMON WEBB
60. I understand that.
(Mr Hoon) I want to make this quite clear, because
we do look very carefully at those claims, because we are very
concerned about the fact that we might cause collateral damage,
we might cause unnecessary civilian deaths, and we check them
very carefully. For example, I can tell you that on at least 27
occasions when there have been claims by Baghdad of civilian casualties,
we were either not flying that day or we did not drop any bombs.
Now all I ask is that you therefore view with some great suspicion
the claims that are made, simply because if on 27 occasions we
either did not have aircraft in the sky or we did not drop any
bombs, it is pretty difficult to see how we could have harmed
anyone.
61. I accept that, and I do not want to belabour
the point, but there may be lessons to be learned from mistakes,
like there were in Kosovo, so I wonder whether perhaps at some
point some dossiers could come to the Committee looking at the
mistakes that we admit might well have taken place. Is that possible?
(Mr Hoon) We clearly do learn lessons. One of the
responsibilities that the RAF has, in fact, is to provide very
sophisticated photographic evidence. We analyse that evidence
very carefully, and it does allow us, in appropriate circumstances,
to rebut the kinds of claims that are made by Baghdad. One of
the claims that has been repeated is that we have damaged the
Christian monastery where St Matthew is said to have been buried.
We have been able to photograph that. Indeed, I thought you might
be interested in a copy of the photograph.
Mr Hancock
62. It is damaged, though, is it not?
(Mr Hoon) I am sorry?
63. It is damaged?
(Mr Hoon) No, it is not.
64. There are people who have been there who
have seen it.
(Mr Hoon) We have photographs which demonstrate that
the monastery is intact. It is not the newest monastery in the
world. It may have been damaged, but we were not responsible.
Mr Hancock: But it is damaged.
Mr Cohen
65. I have one last question on a different
point, and that is the co-ordination between the north and the
south and what is the command structure. Are you happy with the
command structure that ensures proper co-ordination between north
and south, in terms of targeting?
(Air Commodore Torpy) Yes. Certainly, as the Committee
is aware, the US Command divides the operation into two. We (the
UK) have a completely unified view of the whole operation. Operation
Northern Watch in the north is controlled by Headquarters EUCOM,
and Operation Southern Watch is controlled by US CENTCOM based
in Tampa, Florida. There is daily consultation between the two
unified commands to ensure that they are approaching the whole
region in exactly the same way, and there is also consultation
by the two in-theatre commanders, both the US and the UK commanders,
as well.
Mr Cohen: Thank you.
Mr Gapes
66. Can I ask you about the other countries
in the region, and particularly the attitudes within the host
countries? During our visit, we had a number of extensive discussions
with government officials and members of the Shura Council in
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and also with the Kuwaiti Parliament.
It is quite clear that there is a general concern in the region
about the plight of the Iraqi people. People raised this with
us not in a sense of being opposed to the sanctions, but concerned
at how long this has gone on and at the real suffering of the
Iraqi people under Saddam. We are aware of the new Security Council
Resolution, it has already been mentioned, but I would be interested
in your assessment of the impact, if any, that this growing concern
and sympathy amongst the people of the region for the Iraqis is
going to have for the future operation of our policy, particularly
in the no fly zones?
(Mr Hoon) I think you put the case fairly, although
the only slight qualification that I might make is that I wonder
whether this concern and sympathy is growing. I think there has
always been concern and sympathy for the Iraqi people. I do not
think that that has changed much. I do not think any of the people
in the areas surrounding Iraq have anything other than sympathy
for the Iraqi people, but I think they felt that right the way
through, I do not think it has necessarily changed. Frankly, it
is a sympathy and concern that we share. We have never had a quarrel
with the Iraqi people. We have a severe difference of opinion
with the Iraqi regime. We have also—to go back to 1284—set
out in that Resolution a mechanism by which, if he chose to do
so, Saddam Hussein could, I am tempted to say "immediately",
but certainly very quickly, alleviate the plight of his own people.
The fact that he is not prepared to accept 1284 must cast doubt
on his willingness to do so.
67. I have no doubt about that, and I fully
support the strategy set out in 1284. My concern is that if the
Iraqi Government maintain their implacable opposition to any movement,
people may well start saying, "Well, this suffering is still
going on, and yet despite this Resolution, nothing's moved there."
My question is, is there a plan B? Is there a way in which we
could have, if you like, more smart targeted sanctions against
the regime? Is there some mechanism which will continue to maintain
the public support which is there, but nevertheless people are
worried?
(Mr Hoon) Like you, I have also had the opportunity
of visiting the region, both in my present position and in my
previous one. The one thing I have learned in talking particularly
to the various leaders from the region is that we should not be
too impatient. I think there is a difference in, maybe I should
call it, cultural attitude between people in the Middle East and
people in the West. They regard us as being rather impatient.
They view us as wanting change to occur overnight, and they have
consistently said to me that we should just give the Resolution
some time. They point out, for example, that Saddam Hussein initially
opposed the oil for food programme and yet eventually came to
accept it. They believe—and I have had this confirmed to
me on more than one occasion—that Saddam Hussein will accept
Resolution 1284, and what is important is actually that we do
not over-react to the delay.
68. So at this moment you could not be optimistic
that we are likely to see the Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission in Iraq in the near future, but nevertheless the conditions
are all set out there for it to move quickly at such a point as
the Iraqis accept it?
(Mr Hoon) I could not be optimistic, but then neither
am I pessimistic. I believe that this is a realistic process that
the international community have set out, with, as you will be
aware, very considerable support from the region, from countries
who are neighbours to Saddam Hussein. We are pleased with the
appointment of Dr Blix. We are impressed by the work that he has
already set in hand. I do not think that he is actually quite
ready to go in and start an inspection, but he is not far short
of it. We think that when the time comes, this is something that
Saddam Hussein will look at perhaps rather more seriously than
some of his public utterances might indicate.
(Mr Webb) I think things have been going well with
the planning to get the Blix Commission up and running. As you
say, Secretary of State, it is ready to move forward, I think,
in good order when the Iraqis will accept it.
69. There is no question of its not going in
except on the basis of being able to inspect anywhere it wants
to go?
(Mr Webb) That is so.
70. It is going to be able to do its job properly,
as envisaged?
(Mr Webb) Yes.
(Mr Hoon) There are both outstanding matters as well
as current concerns, but certainly we would want to be confident
that they were able to move freely around to inspect what they
wanted to inspect.
(Mr Webb) I think they have learned from some of the
previous difficulties.
Mr Hancock
71. I have read with interest the report that
our Members have put together so far of the visit they made but
how important is it, do you think, to those host countries that
we are there and their contribution towards us being there, how
important is that to our continued presence there?
(Mr Hoon) Certainly I have had nothing but appreciation
for the efforts that we have made and in return I have been able
to thank the host nations specifically for their assistance, their
hospitality and their support for what we are doing. I think there
is little doubt that our willingness to commit forces to the region,
both in relatively recent history and currently, has enormously
strengthened our reputation in an area where, in any event, we
were well thought of for historic reasons.
72. There are three variations on the host country's
hospitality: one does everything, one does slightly less and one
does not do a great deal. What would happen if that was to significantly
change so that the two who are contributing quite enthusiastically
to their side of this, if they were to downgrade that considerably?
What effect would that have on the MoD's ability to maintain the
same level of service?
(Mr Hoon) I do not recognise your description. In
any event, you are inviting me to speculate from the rather insecure
basis of your question.
73. Maybe on this occasion this is the chance
for us to write to you with a letter.
(Mr Hoon) I disagree with your premise, Mike.
74. Okay, Geoff. I have read with interest what
our colleagues have written. What effect is the operation having
on relations vis a vis the UK in particular with the host
countries? What effect do their sensitivities to some of the issues
which they are having to live with as neighbour to neighbour in
your continuing role there have on their attitude to you and some
of the operations you may want to be involved in?
(Mr Hoon) We have a very constructive relationship,
it is very positive. Bearing in mind that we are there by invitation,
if there were the concerns which your question implies then clearly
host nations would have an appropriate remedy available to them
but they are pleased to have us present, we are pleased for their
hospitality and it is a mutually supporting relationship.
75. Have they raised anything with you in such
a way that they are very sensitive to certain issues that have
prevented some aspects of operational capability?
(Mr Hoon) I think you need to be a little more specific.
76. Have they said to you "please do not
do that" on any occasion? Do you have to consult with them
before an operation can take place?
(Mr Hoon) Again, I think you need to be more specific.
Is there something that you are—
77. I want to know whether or not at any stage
do the host nations have a power of veto over what you are trying
to do operationally? Do you have to tell them in advance what
you are going to do packing a punch from an airfield in their
homeland?
(Mr Hoon) Clearly in general terms we would indicate
to the host nation what it was that we were doing based in their
territory. There is full disclosure as to what our intentions
are. This is rather the same point that I was being asked about
earlier. It does not go as far as giving precise details. We have
a general permission to operate from a host nation territory subject
to an indication to those countries as to what it is that we are
doing there.
78. Do they ever veto?
(Mr Hoon) Over what?
79. Have they to date said no to something you
have told them vis a vis an operation?
(Mr Hoon) I think you need to be a bit more specific
as to what you are driving at.
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