Select Committee on Defence Thirteenth Report

RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Strategic importance of the region to the United Kingdom

7. The MoD have told us that—

UK defence policy in the Gulf (endorsed by the Defence Council in May 1999) aims to encourage regional stability in the Gulf region as identified by the SDR [Strategic Defence Review] to be of core strategic importance to the UK. As part of this, we attach a high priority to demonstrating a long-term commitment to the security of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states, and encouraging self-sufficiency and internal stability in the region.[10]

The Strategic Defence Review set out the UK's interest in the Gulf region as follows—

We have particularly important national interests and close friendships in the Gulf. Oil supplies from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy. Confrontation in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and, since the region borders on NATO, in some circumstances crises could involve the Alliance directly ... Outside Europe, the greatest risks to our national economic and political interests—and probably to international stability—will remain in the Gulf.[11]

The Secretary of State recently reiterated the importance of the region—

Stability and security in the Gulf region is vital for economic prosperity there, in the UK and throughout the world.[12]

The MoD has set out the UK's formal relations with the Gulf Co-operation Council countries as follows—

Whilst we have agreements and Treaties of Friendship of various descriptions with all GCC countries, the only formal treaty obligation we have which explicitly commits us to the defence of a country is with the United Arab Emirates, in the form of a Defence Co-operation Accord signed in 1996 ... All of the GCC countries have an expectation that we would assist them in times of crisis, as we did in 1990, and as the continuing deployment of British troops in the region has shown we are prepared to do. Many of the GCC countries do not feel the need for an agreement because we have continually assured them of our commitment to the stability of the region, and a formal treaty could be construed as a limitation on the UK's preparedness to assist by setting out defined limits on when and where the UK would help out. Nevertheless, the UK should remain open to requests for such treaties from GCC states.[13]

8. The UK's commitment and that of many other countries, most notably the United States, to uphold the security of the region was demonstrated in the Gulf War. This determination to preserve stability and guarantee the West's oil supplies remains a key issue. Iraq has remained the main threat to regional stability since the Gulf War and the operations to enforce the no-fly zones are part of a policy aimed at containing Iraq. The Secretary of State has affirmed that—

We will continue to work with the states of the region to assist them in developing their defensive capabilities. And we will continue to be prepared, when necessary, to commit our own forces in the face of aggression.[14]

The Gulf War

9. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 in an attack involving 100,000 personnel. UN Security Council Resolution 660 was passed that day demanding 'that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990'.[15] Iraq's failure to comply with the Resolution led to a further Resolution, 661, on 6 August 1990, which called for the restoration of the 'sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait' and imposed wide-ranging economic sanctions against Iraq.[16] The US and the UK, in Operation Desert Shield, began deployments of troops to the region soon afterwards, with the initial aim of deterring further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia which was threatened by large numbers of Iraqi forces on its border.[17]

10. Over the following months, the UN failed to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which authorised Member States—

to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area

unless Iraq adhered to previous Resolutions demanding its withdrawal from Kuwait on or before 15 January 1991.[18] In defiance of this, Iraq continued to build its forces in Kuwait so that, by the 15 January deadline, it was estimated that it had 600,000 personnel, 4,500 tanks and 3,250 artillery pieces in the region.[19]

11. The failure of Iraq to meet the UN deadline led to military operations by multinational forces, involving about 1 million personnel from 30 countries.[20] The US contribution to the operation was 450,000 personnel; the UK had the second largest contingent of about 45,000 personnel.[21] The coalition war against Iraq, Operation Desert Storm,[22] began on 16 January 1991 with a massive air attack against strategic targets in Iraq and Kuwait and continued for five weeks. This was followed by a ground campaign beginning on 24 February which drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait by 28 February, when hostilities were suspended. An official ceasefire followed on 11 April. About 250 allied personnel were killed during the campaign, 47 of whom were British.

The United Nations and weapons inspection

12. In the aftermath of the Gulf War and in an attempt to prevent Iraq re-emerging from the war as a potent threat, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687 which required, amongst other things—

... that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components ... all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres ... Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General ... a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified .. and agree to urgent, on-site inspection ...[23]

The Resolution also set out the process for setting up a weapons inspection organisation, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), to 'carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities' and required 'the yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless ... of all items specified'. [24] UNSCOM was to work with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA).

13. Iraq accepted the Resolution on 6 April 1991 and UNSCOM began its first chemical weapons and missile inspections in June that year.[25] The relationship between UNSCOM and the government of Iraq from then on was characterised by periodical flare-ups arising from Iraq's lack of co-operation with the inspection process. Iraq frequently threatened to end co-operation with UNSCOM altogether, and some of these threats were followed through. For example, in January 1993, Iraq refused to allow UNSCOM aircraft to fly into Iraq and began incursions into the demilitarised zone on the border with Kuwait. Following warnings from the Security Council, France, the UK and the US conducted air raids on sites in southern Iraq and Iraq backed down.[26] Further UN Resolutions requiring Iraq to co-operate with weapons inspection were passed when Iraq's behaviour was particularly intransigent.[27]

14. There was a major escalation of tension in February 1998 when UNSCOM inspectors were once again refused access to sites believed to be linked to the manufacture or storage of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[28] This refusal related in particular to eight so-called 'presidential sites' which Iraq declared out of bounds to the inspectors. The US and the UK threatened Iraq with military action unless full co-operation with the UNSCOM inspectors was restored. They built up their military strength in the region and made it clear that force would be used if necessary.[29] This crisis was averted by the direct intervention of the UN Secretary General which resulted in Iraq signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which it confirmed its acceptance of all relevant Security Council resolutions.[30] The UN Security Council endorsed the MOU in Resolution 1154 of March 1998 and warned that any violation of the agreement would have the 'severest consequences for Iraq',[31] although it was not clear whether this gave authority for military action in the event of non-compliance.

15. Iraq's relations with UNSCOM deteriorated again in June and July 1998 when Iraq's declaration on its biological weapons programme was disputed by UNSCOM, particularly on the development of VX nerve agent.[32] In August, Iraq announced it was suspending all co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.[33] In September, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1194, condemning Iraq's lack of co-operation and suspending the six-monthly reviews of sanctions until co-operation was restored.[34] A comprehensive review of sanctions was offered to Iraq as an incentive but was rejected as it excluded the key issue of the oil embargo. In October, the UN Secretary General again held direct talks with Iraqi officials but failed to make progress and at the end of the month the Iraqi government declared an end to all co-operation with UNSCOM. In November, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1205 which condemned Iraq's action as 'a flagrant violation' of previous resolutions and demanded that 'Iraq provide immediate, complete and unconditional co-operation' with UNSCOM and the IAEA.[35] All UNSCOM personnel were withdrawn from Iraq on 11 November 1998.

16. On 12 November the US and the UK warned Iraq that it would face a substantial military strike if it did not return to full compliance with UN Resolutions. On 14 November the US and the UK authorised the launch of an initial wave of strike aircraft. At the same time the UN Secretary General's special representative attempted to provide Iraq with a face-saving formula. Two hours before the first air strikes were due to take place, Iraq indicated that it was willing to comply with UN demands although allied forces remained ready to act while the exact terms of Iraq's compliance were clarified. The UK and the US then suspended military action on the basis that Iraq had agreed to 'unconditional resumption of co-operation'. The Prime Minister said then 'If there is a next time, I shall have no hesitation in ordering the use of force'.[36] UNSCOM inspectors returned to Iraq on 17 November.

17. Renewed Iraqi co-operation was short-lived and on 15 December 1998 the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, wrote to the UN Secretary General to update him on Iraqi compliance since November. He reported some progress but concluded that during that period 'Iraq initiated new forms of restrictions upon the Commission's work' and that 'Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes'.[37] Iraq had therefore failed to honour the promise of full co-operation made in November, when military action was suspended.

Operation Desert Fox

18. Military action against Iraq was initiated by US and UK forces on 16 December 1998 in Operation Desert Fox on the basis of Iraq's non-compliance with UNSCOM and the growing concern that Iraq was continuing to develop its chemical and biological weapons capability. The objective of the operation was—

... to degrade the ability of Saddam Hussein to build and use weapons of mass destruction [WMD], including command and control and delivery, and to diminish the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbours by weakening his military capability.[38]

The operation ended on 19 December. UK forces participated in 32 sorties (15 per cent of the total missions)[39] involving Tornado GR1 fighter-bombers from RAF 12 Squadron based at Ali Al Salem in Kuwait. Targets were chosen on the basis of avoiding damage to civilians and civilian sites as far as possible and 'economic targets', such as power supplies and transport networks, were not attacked.[40] The then Secretary of State announced in January 1999 that 87 per cent of targets in Iraq were either damaged or destroyed[41] and that, as a result, Iraq's WMD programmes had been disrupted 'for several months at least'; its ballistic missile programme had been set back by one or two years; and its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle programme had been seriously damaged or destroyed.[42]

19. Operation Desert Fox had no effect on Iraq's intransigence on weapons inspection and there have been no UN weapons inspectors in Iraq since the withdrawal of UNSCOM personnel in November 1998. We discuss below the arrangements for a new inspectorate as set out in UNSCR 1284 (see paras 73 to 79). During the years of its operation, UNSCOM was able to make some progress in the disclosure and destruction of weapons. It destroyed more than 38,000 chemical weapons munitions, 690 tonnes of chemical weapons agents, 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, 48 Scud missiles and a biological weapons factory.[43]

Sanctions

20. Sanctions were first imposed on Iraq in August 1990, following the invasion of Kuwait, under UN Security Resolution 661. This Resolution prohibited the sale or supply to Iraq (or Kuwait at that time) of all goods except 'supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs'.[44] After the Gulf War had ended, Resolution 687 of April 1991 specified that the prohibitions did not apply to foodstuffs or 'to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs'.[45] Further Security Council Resolutions later that year introduced the so-called 'oil-for-food programme' which permitted Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil every six months for the import of humanitarian supplies.[46] Iraq did not agree to the terms of the oil-for-food programme until five years later and has not fully co-operated with its implementation since that time.[47]

21. During the time sanctions have been in place, the health and well-being of the Iraqi people have deteriorated. Iraq's failure to co-operate fully with the oil-for-food programme has been cited as a key factor in the high incidence of malnutrition amongst Iraqi people, especially children, and the lack of adequate medical care.[48] The UN Special Rapporteur observed—

... had the Government of Iraq not waited five years to decide to accept the 'oil-for-food' agreement proposed as early as 1991 ... millions of innocent people would have avoided serious and prolonged suffering.[49]

He also commented that 'the Government of Iraq has used some resources to enrich itself'[50] and the UK Government estimate that illegal exports of Iraqi oil were worth $250 million in 1999 and $170 million to date this year.[51] The Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme expressed concern in May 1999 that, of the $570 million worth of medical supplies which had reached Iraq, only 48 per cent had been distributed.[52]

22. A contrast is frequently drawn between the three northern governorates of Iraq, where the UN administers the oil-for-food programme on behalf of the Government of Iraq, and the 15 governorates in the southern and central regions, home to 85 per cent of the country's population, where the government of Iraq distributes food and medical supplies directly. In the latter, the under-five and infant mortality rates more than doubled from the 1984-89 assessment period to the 1994-99 assessment period. In the northern region both rates rose between 1984 and 1994 but have fallen since the UN took over responsibility for the programme.[53]

23. Our colleagues on the International Development Committee have recently examined the effect of sanctions on Iraq as part of a wider inquiry into the future of sanctions.[54] The view of that Committee is that 'the responsibility for the plight of the Iraqi people must ultimately lie with the Iraqi leadership' but that 'This does not ... entirely excuse the international community from a part in the suffering of Iraqis': Saddam Hussein's willingness to oppress his people and his contempt for humanitarian law were well-known before sanctions were imposed and the Committee concluded that 'A sanctions regime which relies on the good faith of Saddam Hussein is fundamentally flawed'.[55]

24. Some of those closest to the situation believe the UN sanctions are the direct cause of the suffering of the Iraqi people. Mr Hans von Sponeck, the UN humanitarian co-ordinator for Iraq, resigned in March this year and alleged that UN sanctions were causing huge suffering in Iraq without achieving their goal of reforming the regime.[56] The UN Secretary General acknowledged in March this year that the 'humanitarian situation in Iraq posed a serious moral dilemma for the United Nations' and that the UN was 'in danger of losing the argument, or the propaganda war—if that had not already been lost—about who was responsible for the situation in Iraq'.[57] UN Security Council Resolution 1284 of December 1999, which is discussed further below (see paras 73 to 79) was intended, amongst other things, to address some of the weaknesses in the present sanctions regime.

United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)

25. Under Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 a demilitarised zone on the Iraq/Kuwait border was established extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait.[58] Under a further Resolution a few days later, a Chief Military Observer was appointed and arrangements put in place for an observer mission to be established, which would monitor the zone, deter violations of the border and observe hostile acts by either country.[59] In 1993, UNIKOM's role was enhanced to allow the redress of violations of the zone and to monitor Iraqi installations,[60] including ship movements in and out of Umm Qasr, Iraq's main port, which is used for oil-for-food programme shipments.

26. We were able to visit the demilitarised zone and were briefed by the Force Commander and members of the British contingent in UNIKOM. The UK contribution to UNIKOM is currently 11 officers drawn from all three Services on six-month postings. 32 countries contribute personnel and the operation is unique for the UN in that it involves representatives from all five permanent members of the Security Council.[61] Violations of the zone do occur but serious incidents have been few and the mission is regarded by the United Nations as a success.[62]

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10  Ev p 31 Back

11  Strategic Defence Review, MoD, July 1998, Cm 3999, paras 40 and 54 Back

12  Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence to the Royal United Services Institute's conference on Gulf Security 2000, 17 May 2000 Back

13  Letter to the Second Clerk of the Committee from the Parliamentary Clerk, MoD, 25 July 2000, not printed. The Gulf Co-operation Council countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Back

14  Speech by the Secretary of State to the RUSI conference, op cit Back

15  UN Security Council Resolution 660 (1990), 2 August 1990, para 2 Back

16  UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), 6 August 1990 Back

17  See Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 28 June 1991, Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, GCB, ADC, FRAeS, CBIM, RAF, Joint Commander of Operation Granby, published with the Minutes of Evidence to the Tenth Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1990-91, HC 287, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby Back

18  UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), 29 November 1990, para 2 Back

19  See Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 28 June 1991, op cit Back

20  Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Gulf War Illnesses-Dealing with the Uncertainties, December 1997 Back

21  Tenth Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1990-91, HC 287, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para 15. The total number of UK personnel who served in the Gulf during the entire campaign was about 54,000 and the US figure was nearly 700,000: see Seventh Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1999-2000, HC 125, Gulf Veterans' Illnesses, para 3 Back

22  The UK's contribution was known as 'Operation Granby'. Back

23  UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, para 8 Back

24  ibid, para 9 Back

25  UNSCOM: Chronology of main events, UN website at www.un.org/Depts/unscom Back

26  ibid Back

27  UNSCR 699 of June 1991; UNSCR 715 of October 1991; UNSCR 1051 of March 1996; UNSCR 1060 of June 1996; UNSCR 1115 of June 1997; UNSCR 1134 of October 1997; UNSCR 1137 of November 1997 Back

28  See HC Deb., 24 February 1998, cc 173-176; See also UNSCOM: Chronology of main events, op cit and House of Commons Library Research Paper 99/13, Iraq: 'Desert Fox' and Policy Developments, 10 February 1999 Back

29  See HC Deb., 24 February 1998, c 173 Back

30  See HC Deb., 24 February 1998, c 174 and 3 March 1998, c 511w Back

31  UNSCR 1154 (1998), March 1998, para 3 Back

32  HC Deb., 16 July 1998, c 249w and 20 July 1998, c 766-767 Back

33  HC Deb., 16 November 1998, c 608 and UNSCOM: Main chronology of events, op cit Back

34  UNSCR 1194 (1998), September 1998 Back

35  UNSCR 1205 (1998), 5 November 1998 Back

36  HC Deb., 16 November 1998, c 610 Back

37  Letter from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 15 December 1998, S/1998/1172; see also HC Deb., 17 December 1998, c 1099 Back

38  Statement by the Prime Minister to the House, HC Deb., 17 December 1998, c 1097 Back

39  MoD aide memoire sent to all Members of Parliament, December 1998, See Ev pp 28-29 Back

40   Operation Desert Fox: Battle Damage Assessment, edited transcript of press briefing by Air Marshal John Day, 22 December 1998, available on FCO website at www.fco.gov.uk/news Back

41  HC Deb., 25 January 1999, c 1 Back

42  MoD aide memoire, op cit, December 1998, Ev p 28-29; see also transcript of press briefing by Air Marshal John Day, op cit Back

43  HC Deb., 16 November 1998, c 607; see also UNSCOM's Main Achievements, March 1998, on UN website at

www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Achievements/achievements.html Back

44  UNSCR 661 (1990), 6 August 1990, para 3(c) Back

45  UNSCR 687 (1991) 3 April 1991, para 20 Back

46  UNSCR 706 (1991) of 15 August 1991 and UNSCR 712 (1991) of 19 September 1991 Back

47  Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, reports by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, February 1999, E/CN.4/1999/37, paras 29-43 and October 1999, A/54/466, paras 30-37 Back

48  Reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, , op cit, February 1999 paras 41-42 and October 1999, para 31 Back

49  October 1999 Report, op cit, para 31 Back

50  October 1999 Report, op cit, para 33 Back

51  HC Deb, 22 May 2000, c 839 Back

52  October 1999 Report, op cit, para 36 Back

53  ibid, para 27. Back

54  Second Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000, The Future of Sanctions, HC 67 Back

55  ibid, paras 39-40 Back

56  Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 May 2000, p 21 Back

57  UNSCR Press Release SC/6833, 24 March 2000 Back

58  UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 3 April 1991, para 5 Back

59  UN Security Council Resolution 689 (1991), 9 April 1991; Ev p 27 Back

60  UN Security Council Resolution 806 (1993) of 5 February 1993 Back

61  Ev p 27 Back

62  See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (24 September 1999-30 March 2000) S/2000/269, 30 March 2000, paras 2 and 17  Back

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Prepared 2 August 2000