UN Security Council Resolution
1284
73. At the end of January 1999, following UNSCOM's
departure from Iraq and Operation Desert Fox, the UN Security
Council began to reassess the way forward in relations with Iraq.
In December 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284,
which was co-sponsored by the UK and which, according to the Minister
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Hain), the UK
'drove through the Security Council in seven to eight months of
painstaking negotiation'.[154]
74. The Resolution created a new arms inspection
body, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), to replace UNSCOM.[155]
The new executive chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr Hans Blix, took
up his post on 1 March 2000.[156]
He is a former Swedish foreign minister, and was director-general
of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 to 1997. On
10 March, the UN announced the appointment of 16 commissioners
to UNMOVIC, to provide professional advice and guidance to its
executive chairman.[157]
Indications are that UNMOVIC will be ready to begin its work by
mid to late August 2000, should Iraq agree to the terms of the
Resolution by then.
75. In an attempt to address some of the humanitarian
concerns about the condition of the Iraqi people, Resolution 1284
has lifted the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports to increase the revenue
available for foodstuffs and other essential items, without the
precondition of Iraq's acceptance of the terms of the Resolution.
The FCO estimates this will make $10 billion available for goods
permitted under the oil-for-food programme.[158]
The Resolution allows for the suspension of sanctions against
Iraq when certain conditions are fulfilled: when UNMOVIC and the
IAEA are able to report that Iraq has been co-operating with their
monitoring system for a period of 120 days, sanctions will be
suspended for a period of 120 days, renewable by the Security
Council.[159]
Measures have also been put in place to improve the efficiency
and speed of the Sanctions Committee[160]
and contracts worth $1 billion have since been processed through
the accelerated procedure.[161]
76. Resolution 1284 also attempts to make progress
on the issue of the 605 Kuwaiti and third country nationals taken
prisoner by Iraq during the Gulf War, the whereabouts or fate
of whom the Iraqis have refused to disclose, despite great diplomatic
efforts at all levels by the Kuwaiti government.[162]
While we were in Kuwait, we visited the office of the National
Committee for the Missing and Prisoners of War. We were moved
by what we learned about the missing people and impressed by the
support offered to their families (who are convinced their relatives
are still alive) by the Kuwaiti government. On 14 February, the
UN Secretary General appointed Yuli Vorontsov of the Russian Federation
to act as his high-level Co-ordinator on the Kuwaiti detainees
and Mr Vorontsov has since begun his work.[163]
It is important that the international community, including the
UK, continues to exert pressure on Iraq to disclose the whereabouts
or fate of these 605 individuals and that the UN remains active
in this endeavour.
77. In March, the UN Secretary General drew attention
to the 'massive decline in the condition, effectiveness and efficiency
of the oil infrastructure' in Iraq and the consequences of this
for the quantity of oil which Iraq could produce. He urged the
Security Council to approve measures substantially to increase
the amount Iraq was permitted to spend on spare parts and equipment
for the oil industry. Resolution 1293 followed, allowing Iraq
to spend up to $600 million on the necessary equipment, more than
doubling the previous ceiling and without any concessions being
required from Iraq.[164]
78. The Secretary of State summed up what Resolution
1284 offered to Iraq—
... it does seem to me that
1284 is a very sensible, pragmatic view by the international community
of a way out for Saddam Hussein. ... We have ... set out in that
Resolution a mechanism by which, if he choses to do so, Saddam
Hussein could ... alleviate the plight of his own people ... 1284
does create a new inspection system that we believe Saddam Hussein
should accept as a means of ultimately restoring Iraq to the international
community.[165]
Iraq has so far refused to accept the Resolution.
Sa'id Hasan al-Musawi, Iraq's representative to the United Nations,
reiterated in January the views expressed by the Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, the day after the Resolution was agreed—
... we do not deal with this
resolution because it ignores Iraq's legitimate demands for lifting
the sanctions and disregards the aggression to which Iraq is being
subjected daily through the enforcement of the no-fly zones ...[166]
79. The Secretary of State's view on the prospects
for Iraq's acceptance of the Resolution's provisions was that—
I could not be optimistic,
but then neither am I pessimistic. I believe that this is a realistic
process that the international community have set out ...[167]
He believed that it was necessary to be patient and
to follow the lead of Iraq's neighbours in this respect—
The one thing I have learned
in talking particularly to the various leaders from the region
is that we should not be too impatient ... They regard us as being
rather impatient. They view us as wanting change to occur overnight,
and they have consistently said to me that we should just give
the Resolution some time. They point out, for example, that Saddam
Hussein initially opposed the oil for food programme and yet eventually
came to accept it. They believe—and I have had this confirmed
to me on more than one occasion—that Saddam Hussein will
accept Resolution 1284, and what is important is actually that
we do not over-react to the delay.[168]
Other commentators believe it is highly unlikely
that UNMOVIC will be allowed to begin its work while sanctions
and the no-fly zones remain in place.[169]
The UK's continuing commitment
80. Iraq's intentions towards its neighbours do not
appear to have changed since the Gulf War: it maintains a territorial
claim against Kuwait and in a speech in January 1999 Saddam Hussein
encouraged the people of the region to rise up and overthrow their
governments.[170]
The Secretary of State told us that—
... our presence does give
a degree of confidence and security to Iraq's immediate neighbours
in the region. Undoubtedly, they are still concerned about the
threat that Saddam Hussein's regime poses to them.[171]
and that —
... I have had nothing but
appreciation for the efforts that we have made and in return I
have been able to thank the host nations specifically for their
assistance, their hospitality and their support for what we are
doing. I think there is little doubt that our willingness to commit
forces to the region, both in relatively recent history and currently,
has enormously strengthened our reputation in an area where, in
any event, we were well thought of for historic reasons.[172]
During our visit representatives of the host governments
expressed to us the positive view which the Gulf states have of
the UK's continued commitment of forces.
81. The MoD is confident that, while the need for
the no-fly zone operations continues, the UK will be able to continue
its contribution for the foreseeable future. The Director of Air
Operations told us—
... I can reassure the Committee
that we can sustain the force that we have, both the GR1 force
and also the F3 force, for as long as the no fly zone operation
is likely to continue.[173]
When we asked him about the likely duration of the
no-fly zones operations, the Secretary of State told us—
We will be there for as long
as is necessary and is supported by international law and the
international community.[174]
MoD estimates the cost of military operations in
the Gulf in financial year 1999-2000 at £30 million.[175]
The Secretary of State's view was that—
... in terms of inhibiting
Saddam Hussein's ability to threaten his own people, inhibiting
his ability in the region as well as restricting his ability to
threaten internationally, I think it has been a remarkably useful
exercise and money very well spent.[176]
We agree. We have expressed in this Report some
reservations about the equipment available to our Forces but our
overwhelming impression is that UK forces are fulfilling a very
important role. Although the numbers of personnel and aircraft
which we are able to contribute are small in comparison with the
United States, our contribution is nevertheless important, in
both operational and diplomatic terms.
145 Q 25 Back
146 Q
25 Back
147 Q
49 Back
148 Report
of Emergency Session of the United Nations Special Commission,
24 November 1997, S/1997/922; see UNSCOM website at www.un.org/Depts/unscom/.
For an assessment of UNSCOM's concerns about Iraq's chemical
and biological capabilities in 1998, see Parliamentary Office
of Science and Technology briefing, Chemical and Biological
Weapons, February 1998 Back
149 HC
Deb., 18 July 2000, c 102w Back
150 Reports
by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the President of the Security
Council, 25 January 1999, S/1999/94 Back
151 Q
31 Back
152 Jane's
Strategic Weapon Systems,
Issue 31, September 1999 Back
153 See,
for example, Independent and Independent Herald Tribune,
3 July 2000 Back
154 HC
Deb., 29 June 2000, c 293WH. See also Ev p 27-28 Back
155 United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999), 17 December 1999 Back
156 UN
Press Release SG/A/721, 27 January 2000 Back
157 UN
Press Release SG/A/724, 10 March 2000 Back
158 HC
Deb., 29 June 2000, c 293WH Back
159 United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999), para 33 Back
160 ibid,
paras 15-25 Back
161 HC
Deb., 29 June 2000, c 293WH Back
162 UN
Security Council Resolution 1284, para 14 Back
163 Report
of the UN Secretary General, 26 April 2000, S/2000/347, paras
2 and 13-16 Back
164 UN
Security Council Resolution 1293 (2000), March 2000 Back
165 QQ
32, 42 and 66 Back
166 See,
for example, reports from Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic, 26 January
2000, and Voice of the Arabs, Cairo, 28 January 2000, via BBC
Monitoring Online Back
167 Q
68 Back
168 Q
67 Back
169 See
article in the Independent, 28 June 2000, 'US seeking arms
clash with Iraq, says ex-Inspector' for the views of Mr Scott
Ritter, a former UNSCOM inspector. Back
170 Q
28; see also Saddam Hussein's Iraq, US Department of State,
September 1999 Back
171 Q
6 Back
172 Q
71 Back
173 Q
95 Back
174 Q
131 Back
175 HC
Deb., 2 November 1999 c 99w and 20 March 2000, c 422w Back
176 Q
43 Back
