House of Commons - Defence - Thirteenth Report

Select Committee on Defence Thirteenth Report

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY 26 JULY 2000

Members present:

Mr Bruce George, in the Chair

Mr Julian Brazier Mr Jimmy Hood

Mr Harry Cohen Mr Stephen Hepburn

Mr Mike Gapes Mrs Laura Moffatt

Mr Mike Hancock Mr Peter Viggers

The Committee deliberated.

***

Draft Report (Iraqi No-Fly Zones), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Draft Report (Iraqi No Fly Zones), proposed by Mr Harry Cohen, brought up and read, as follows:

"Introduction

1. The patrolling of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq is one of the UK's major overseas defence commitments. About 1,000 UK personnel are stationed in the Gulf region at an estimated cost of £30 million in the last financial year.[178] As a Committee, we have set ourselves the task of examining, over the course of time, all the UK's defence commitments to ascertain the extent to which they continue to be necessary.

Moral and Humanitarian Justification

2. We should, however, begin by examining the nature of the mission. The Committee considers that the no-fly zone operations, in which UK military forces are a participant, cannot be justified either on moral or humanitarian grounds. The MoD have told us that—

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On the contrary, the action is, we believe, motivated principally by a supremacist ideology. The Strategic Defence Review set out the UK's interest in the Gulf region as follows—

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This indicates that the principal aim of the mission is not moral, since factors such as the control of world oil supplies and control of oil prices unduly influences the policy. These are described as 'of core strategic importance' and we believe represent the main reason for the continuing military intervention in the region. We see no reason why our oil interests cannot be maintained by free trade rather than a distortion of the market by resort to military means to enforce essentially economic measures.

Defence Sales and Military Assistance

3. An important element of defence relations is defence sales and there is undoubtedly a link between the commitment countries are prepared to make in offering military assistance to nations and their ability to sell defence equipment to those nations. The Secretary of State was reluctant to accept that there was a direct correlation between the two[181] but another reason why our participation in operations against Iraq is not moral is because western policy has as a priority for its intervention in the area the sale of armaments to several countries in the region. The Secretary of State has confirmed that—

182

4. Military assistance and training for the armed forces of overseas countries is one of the elements of the defence diplomacy mission set out in the Strategic Defence Review.[183] This role is fulfilled in different ways and on a varying scale in each of the countries of the Gulf region which we visited, but typically includes British personnel on secondment, assistance and advice on training, and joint exercises. It has even been suggested that the UK should charge at a lower cost for its military assistance and training in the region to maintain good relations and sell more arms; and that sales of UK equipment should be linked to military assistance to give advantage to the UK defence industry. Such defence contracts pale in moral importance in comparison to the plight of civilians and children in Iraq.

Sanctions

5. Sanctions were first imposed on Iraq in August 1990, following the invasion of Kuwait, under UN Security Resolution 661. This Resolution prohibited the sale or supply to Iraq (or Kuwait at that time) of all goods except 'supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs'.[184] After the Gulf War had ended, Resolution 687 of April 1991 specified that the prohibitions did not apply to foodstuffs or 'to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs'.[185] Further Security Council Resolutions later that year introduced the so-called 'oil-for-food programme' which permitted Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil every six months for the import of humanitarian supplies.[186]

6. During the time sanctions have been in place, the health and well-being of the Iraqi people have deteriorated. The sanctions have been a key factor in the high incidence of malnutrition amongst Iraqi people, especially children, and the lack of adequate medical care. Mr Hans von Sponeck, the UN humanitarian co-ordinator for Iraq, who resigned in March this year (as did Jutta Burghardt, the head of the World Food Programme for Iraq) said that the sanctions were causing huge suffering in Iraq without achieving their goal of reforming the regime. His predecessor, Mr Denis Halliday also resigned saying 'We are in the process of destroying an entire Society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral.' We were told by some of those whom we met during our visit to the region, particularly in Bahrain, that the present situation was a death sentence for the Iraqi people but was not hurting Saddam. Reservations were expressed about the UN view that there were medicines in Iraq which it was failing to distribute. Iraq's neighbours in the Gulf region do not want to see it destroyed. Many believe that sanctions have gone on for long enough and more progress is necessary than is represented by UNSCR 1284. The 'no-fly zone' policy is not humanitarian as it bolsters the economic sanctions policy (and previous military devastation) which has been in place against Iraq since 1990.

7. Iraq currently has amongst the highest maternal and child mortality rates in the world, and the economic sanctions and military no-fly zone policy is the equivalent of medical treatment in the Middle Ages. The physician deals with the patient's plight with a totally irrelevant bloodletting, and in Iraq's case it is even applied to the wrong patient; powerless civilians instead of the regime.

Legal basis for the no-fly zones

8. The legal basis for the no-fly zones is controversial. The MoD's view is that—

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The UK and the US governments have frequently said that the basis lies in UN Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1991 which—

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The Secretary of State told us—

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and he expanded on this—

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9. Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee recently examined the 'doctrine' of humanitarian necessity in their Report on Kosovo. They concluded—

... at the very least, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current international customary law...

Specifically in relation to NATO's intervention in Kosovo, that Committee decided that the action was 'of dubious legality in the current state of international law' but 'justified on moral grounds'.[191] In our view it is highly questionable whether the no-fly zone military action over Iraq is in accordance with international law. Certainly representatives of other countries, including the Russian Foreign Ministry, have declared it illegal. Whereas military intervention during the Gulf War was specifically authorised by UN Resolution 678, the no-fly zones are not backed by any specific UN resolution: Resolution 688, which the MoD claims justifies the action, makes no provision for the use of 'all necessary means' to enforce it.

Protection of Ethnic and Religious Minorities

10. The line being militarily patrolled is an arbitrary one and represents an incursion upon Iraq's territorial integrity affecting one-third of its land. This half-hearted occupation does not protect vulnerable people within the zones from ground operations or those just outside of the zones. If the western powers argue that these people are vulnerable then its no-fly zone policy amounts to letting them be slaughtered so long as it is not from the air within the zones. Even there, it is a scandal that the western powers do not protect the Kurds in the northern zone from murderous Turkish military incursions. The Secretary of State for Defence expressed to the Committee no interest in affording such protection to the Kurds.

11. The French, Russians and Chinese have also made clear that they consider the US and UK's ideologically-motivated pro-active containment package, which includes the economic sanctions and military no-fly zones, as being wholly disproportionate to the Iraqi threat. We agree. We do not believe that the threat that Iraq currently poses, or is likely to in the immediate or mid-term future, warrants this present assault upon its people. Mr Scott Ritter made the point recently that—

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It is significant that the no-fly zone operation does not have the support of France, Russia and China; and, apart from the use of their land for bases, none of the neighbouring countries in the region have contributed direct military support for the operation.

12. We are not convinced that there has been full and open disclosure about targeting errors arising from the no-fly zone operation. There were a number of such errors during the Kosovo conflict which resulted in damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure. That is war. With the volume of munitions dropped, there have bound to have been many such cases in Iraq too. Rather feebly, the Ministry of Defence denies all and then adds the mantra that it is all the fault of Saddam Hussein anyway. Also, the main control of targets is beyond UK forces, being subject to approval by US Centcom in Florida. Iraq has maintained that since December 1998 the UK-US bombing runs have killed 300 civilians and wounded another 800.[193]

13. The claim for the operation is that it protects ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq. This is plainly not so as it is only covers part of Iraq and is confined to the air. In the southern zone, where the UK forces have mainly operated, the options of the Shia Muslims if they are not to be part of Iraq is to seek an unsustainable independence or link-up with Iran. The UK and the US do not agree with this, but the no-fly zone policy risks giving them dangerously false aspirations. Neither is it UK or US policy to agree to an independent Kurdistan which would include northern Iraq, but upset Turkey.

14. Even at the end of the Gulf War, the Allies respected the overall territorial integrity of Iraq. If the eventual outcome is not to be a Kurdistan or link-up with Iran, then both the northern and southern territories must eventually be restored, without obstacle, to Iraq. At that time there could well be repression as the government in Baghdad (Saddam's or a successor's) reasserts its territorial control. Hopefully, the situation would then quickly settle down. This likely future repression, though, in the north and south of Iraq would be the fruits of the western intervention, including from the false aspirations now being sown by the no-fly zone policy.

Conclusions

15. There is no apparent endgame to the no-fly zone policy. It is a policy going nowhere and just extends the misery amongst the population of Iraq. As Jane's Defence Weekly reported—

Highlighting the lack of policy alternatives, William Perry, Clinton's Defence Secretary between 1994 and 1997 said 'In terms of strategy and tactics, we're stuck in a bad situation. But I'm hard pressed to come up with a better [strategy]'.

Harold Brown, US DoD chief during Gerald Ford's Republican administration agrees: 'This is not a good strategy, but I haven't thought of a better one,' he says. 'We're playing for time' echoes former Defence Secretary James Schlesinger. The shocking thing is that the UK goes along with this non (bad) strategy of the US, placing our own forces at risk for the political expediency of being a loyal ally to the US. This may be because it has earned the UK favourable treatment in the US, including in relation to arms contracts, but it is hardly a moral position when set against the plight of civilians and children in Iraq.

16. Our forces in the Gulf risk their lives every day and we pay tribute to them. But we believe that they are being put at risk unnecessarily and fruitlessly. It is miraculous, and a tribute to their professionalism, that there have been no casualties from the no-fly zone operation so far, but every day that passes increases the likelihood. This operation cost £30 million last year and £35 million the year before. In our opinion, other than the arms sales promotional aspect in the US, this is a waste of our precious defence resources.

17. The UK's policy for the Gulf region includes the promotion of self-sufficiency and internal stability. Iraq, ten years after the Gulf war and a decade of devastating sanctions, should not require direct western intervention on its territory. The matter should be left to the countries in the region. If the defences of some of those need bolstering, that should be done from within their territories, not from within Iraq. For overall stability, Iraq must be integrated into the region in a constructive and co-operative way, and it is preferable if that were done sooner rather than later.

18. Human rights and democracy are, in fact, almost as much strangers to some of the other countries in the region as they are to Iraq, but that has not provoked such direct intervention from the US and the UK. The UK should be much more pro-active in promoting democracy and human rights as the means to secure stability, rather than selling armaments and adopting a quasi-imperialist role in support of US goals which give this country a bad name. US goals include no settlement until Saddam is ousted. While we support that outcome, the punishing of the Iraqi people is not the way to achieve this. It has not worked for the past decade. In fact, Saddam's regime has been bolstered by being able to blame the western powers for his country's plight. The second US goal is the dual containment of both Iraq and Iran. There is a clear danger that this could involve the UK in a similar military threat to Iran in the future.

19. We believe that this current policy has an overall negative effect for the future stability of the Gulf. Plainly, any proper alternative strategy should include the continuation of an effective arms embargo against the regime of Saddam Hussein. But a settlement which should lead to the lifting of the economic sanctions (which most hurt the vulnerable in Iraq not the regime) should include the provision of normal inspection which, as indicated by Mr Scott Ritter, would be carried out by the IAEA. This would be better than the abnormal inspection regimes of the 1990s which, although they significantly downsized Iraq's military capacity, by their rude, hostile and intrusive nature eventually became counter-productive to the point of there being no inspection at all now. The no-fly zones could be withdrawn as an early stage move to a settlement which could include no significant repression in the north and south, normal unobtrusive inspection by the IAEA, and the lifting of economic sanctions.

20. The economic sanctions need to go for truly humanitarian reasons. As Mr Scott Ritter said in an interview on 12 July 1999—

There are two steps in the economic rehabilitation of Iraq and the Iraqi people. One is the lifting of sanctions and the second the reconstitution of the economy. The economy cannot be reconstituted from the outside, it has to be reconstituted from within.

United Nations resolution 1284, sponsored by the UK but currently left in abeyance, unless it is substantially modified by agreement, seems unlikely to represent a significant way forward. For these reasons, we believe that the no-fly zone policy in Iraq is fundamentally wrong."

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Chairman's draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "Chairman's draft Report" and insert the words "draft Report proposed by Mr Harry Cohen".-(Mr Harry Cohen.)

Ordered, That the Chairman's draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 2 to 6 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 7, read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 8 to 15 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 16 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 17 to 24 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 25 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 26 to 30 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 31 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 32 to 34 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 35 read, amended and agreed to.