MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY MR ROBERT KEY
MP (5 MAY 2000)
INTRODUCTION
1. The MoD employs over 11,000 people in
my constituency. The number of uniformed personnel is about half
this figure—and growing. The scientific industrial and administrative
civil servants who comprise the remainder work at HQ UK Land Command,
Wilton, Royal Artillery Larkhill, Salisbury Plain Training Area,
Bulford, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Establishment
Winterbourne Gunner, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment
Porton Down as well as Boscombe Down. Just across my constituency
boundary are HQ Adjutant General, HQ Quarter Master General, Tidworth
Garrison and at the Army Air Corps Middle Wallop hundreds more
are employed. Over 1,000 people at Aircraft Testing and Evaluation
Establishment Boscombe Down are facing continuing uncertainty.
They welcome the opportunity for consultation—but the information
so far made available in the Consultation Document and in briefings
has been less than necessary to form meaningful judgements
CONCERNS OF
CIVILIAN STAFF
AT BOSCOMBE
DOWN
2. AT&E staff welcome the fact that
they will stay as a single unit and that they are not to be sold
off in an industry buy-out (a point emphasised by the Trade Unions
later).
3. There is concern that, like the military,
most civilian staff chose a public service career for positive
reasons and are unhappy that they will no longer be civil servants,
notwithstanding TUPE arrangements (which have yet to be clarified).
4. No case has yet been made for the business
future of Boscombe Down. During the protracted discussions leading
to the public announcement on 17 April, there were no investment
appraisals made and no cost-benefit analyses constructed for the
options of NewDERA or retained DERA.
5. Although a strategic site plan is now
in being, and urgent investment requirements have been identified,
they have not been related to the consequences of the NewDERA
arrangements.
6. Under the proposed future arrangements
not a single person will be assigned to Retained DERA. This is
contrary to proposals for most other DERA sites—as indicated
on the accompanying chart[6]
which was used in Sir John Chisholm's briefing on Monday 17 April.
This is hard to understand in view of concerns about future relations
with other governments, with the Ministry of Defence and with
private contractors.
7. Of prime concern is our future with the
US Government. Continuing access to US personnel and assets is
paramount. The entire PPP project will not only fail but be against
the UK national interest if this is lost. Apart from intelligence
and technology links there is real concern about the future of
the Empire Test Pilots School (ETPS). The Big Four military schools
enjoy close working relations. In addition to ETPS, the others
are at Edwards Air Force Base, the USN School at Patuxent River,
Maryland and the French EPNER. They all exchange staff and flying
experience (eg P3 from US, Tornado to US from UK). At Boscombe
Down 25 Test Pilots are trained each year—nine UK military
(five fixed-wing and four rotary), and the remaining 16 come from
foreign governments. If Boscombe Down is a totally profit-driven,
private enterprise, how can it retain its military ethos and continue
to enjoy favoured-nation status with US (sharing cockpit secrets
etc)? The case has not been made.
8. Lessons should be learned from the fate
of the Mohave Test Pilot School, a civil neighbour of Edwards
AFB, which runs a civilian test pilot operation and is not recognised
by the Big Four.
9. What will be the status of the 180 military
staff now employed at AT&E, including US military?
10. No appraisal has been made of the consequences
of moving military combat aircraft to the private sector, which
may be treaty-limited under the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty. Furthermore, last year AT&E acquired Alpha Jets from
the German Government on a military-to-military basis. Has the
German Government been consulted on the change of status of AT&E?
11. Continuing military support will be
essential to the future of the AT&E, in personnel equipment
and of course sales which may depend on overt operational approval
by the RAF.
12. Britain's defence procurement programme
processes must not be jeopardised. For example, there are currently
AT&E test pilots working with both the Boeing and Lockheed
Martin teams on the Joint Strike Fighter programme. Can the Government
guarantee that participation will continue?
13. AT&E must continue to have access
to contractor trials, to people, data and sites in the private
sector. Will these continue if AT&E is seen to be a private
sector competitor?
14. The charging regimes currently imposed
on AT&E by the MOD are inappropriate for a competitive privatised
body. There has been no discussion of these regimes, and it is
hard to see how a new regime could be in place in time for the
proposed floatation. Accommodation costs, which include site costs,
are substantial. Training costs include a massive premium through
the aircrew amortized training charge. For fast jets this runs
at £10,000 per flying hour—and amounts to about £250,000
a year per pilot. If this system remains unchanged it will represent
a massive disincentive to successful floatation.
15. Boscombe Down always regretted the loss
of its old engineering-apprenticeship scheme. The comparatively
recent MOD apprentice training scheme now takes over 40 students.
What will be its future with NewDERA?
16. The first question HMG should ask—and
answer—is whether MOD needs an in-house capability for AT&E
in peace and war, or not. This has been ducked.
17. In summary, decisions must be reached
on all the questions raised above, and the timescale is clearly
incompatible with the proposed date of floatation.
MILITARY CONCERNS
18. The UK has never had a formalised policy
on aircraft testing and evaluation. MOD has always reacted to
perceived need. In contrast, US testing and evaluation policy
is embedded in a regulatory framework. Federal acquisition regulations
include input from a systems command and a material command. The
UK has no parallel system. The nearest we get to it is in Joint
Services Publication 318B, which offers some measure of regulatory
requirements. There was a round-table attempt to address this
gaping hole in January 1998—but nothing has come of it.
19. Under Smart Procurement rules, Integrated
Project Team Leaders are driven to look for least cost options.
They demand a clear understanding of what exactly Boscombe Down
will do and at what price. There is new evidence that some IPT
leaders ask Boscombe Down if a project is "safe", while
others decide to leave that to a foreign manufacturer.
20. If AT&E is moving to a plc, the
military must somehow be embedded in it. The main customers, Defence
Procurement Agency and Defence Logistics Organisation are clear
that they need the product but don't mind how it is delivered.
This really should not be fudged any longer.
21. Access to investment is crucial. The
previous Reliance model produced access to private money and a
special purpose vehicle for delivery. The Retained DERA model
offers little. New DERA appears to offer a stronger investment
basis—which could however be a mirage because of regulatory
problems. These must be resolved. The most serious concerns access
to US Data as discussed in 7 above.
22. Yet to be addressed is the question
of airfield regulation. If Boscombe Down ceases to be a government-owned
airfield it will be closed down on day one. Under the Air Navigation
Orders, Boscombe Down is in the ownership and occupation of a
government department. Special dispensations apply, covering Air
Traffic Control, arrestor wires (at Wharton they are buried),
lower lighting standards and runway designs which are unacceptable
to the CAA. It would cost at least £20 million to upgrade
Boscombe Down to civil standards. An option would be for the airfield
to stay in government ownership and operation—but how would
this be treated in the balance sheet?
23. The military and civilian mix at Boscombe
Down is unique. The project will fail if this cannot be maintained.
24. Legal liability issues remain unresolved.
Military standards include expected risks and dangers. How will
these be treated in NewDERA?
25. Private airfields which test military
aircraft such as Wharton and Yeovil operate under civilian regulations.
At Boscombe Down the entire operation is directed by and for the
military by the Director of Flying. This system cannot operate
under private NewDERA conditions. Does this mean the MOD will
have no regulatory structure to flight test its aircraft?
26. US military exchange remains crucial.
In the US there is no single flight test centre. Each service
regards testing as a military function. The nearest US equivalents
of Boscombe Down are Edwards Air Force Base, Patuxent River US
Navy base in Maryland and Elgin Air Force Base in Florida (for
weapons development). Boscombe Down shares information with all
these—and this must not be sacrificed.
27. The bottom line is the Secretary of
State's duty of care to the men and women of the Royal Air Force.
TRADE UNION
CONCERNS
28. Whatever may be decided at a government
or management level, the Boscombe Down Trade Unions have to operate
the system on a day-to-day, practical basis. At present, Boscombe
Down is not seen as a commercial rival by private industry. This
will change. The Trade Unions fear that, for example, BAe Systems
would stop sharing information and expertise on both Nimrod and
EF2000. They also point out that in every bit of kit coming from
the US to Boscombe Down for the C130J trials a notice states,
"for use of UK government". The Trade Unions said that
on occasions when Boscombe Down has tried to use private contractors
for specific purposes, contractors employees were refused entry
to Lockheed Martin projects by the US government.
29. Similarly there are concerns about Nimrods
and the US and Israeli Governments, about JSF, Harriers and particularly
Apache.
30. The Trade Unions are also concerned
about working relations with Elgin USAF Base (see 26) and Wright
Patterson AFB at Dayton, Ohio, which is the location of the System
Project Office for technical evaluation.
31. The Unions are unconvinced that Sir
John Chisholm's use of the term "rebalancing" does not
mean redundancies. They believe 3,000 jobs are at risk across
DERA. They are also anxious about their pension provisions.
32. The Trade Unions message to MOD is,
don't forget the "E" in DERA.
CONCLUSION
33. The Government's scientific and military
establishments in South Wiltshire have been under almost continuous
review for 20 years. They have never failed to respond positively
to the priorities and perceived needs of successive governments.
Indeed, their evolution from creatures of government to internationally
acclaimed vehicles of scientific excellence has been remarkable.
34. In October 1997 DERA Porton Down founded
the Porton Down Science Park to be a centre for knowledge-based
businesses whose foci relate to the civil application of DERA's
expertise including environmental engineering and modelling, biotechnology,
health care, analysis and detection systems, instrument development,
materials technology and testing, colloid science, drug evaluation
and vaccine development and so on. The partners in the enterprise
are DERA's two establishments at Porton Down and Boscombe Down,
the Department of Health's Centre for Applied Microbiology and
Research (also at Porton Down), the South West Regional Development
Agency, Wiltshire County Council and Salisbury District Council.
This is now known as the Salisbury Research Triangle. The Department
of Trade and Industry has awarded substantial start-up funds to
a biotechnology scheme. This is all fully in line with current
Government policy. What thought has the Ministry of Defence given
to the impact of its proposals to retain Porton Down but not Boscombe
Down, on this important project?
35. At a constituency level it is quite
clear that the broad-brush approach of Ministers and senior officials
has failed to address, let alone answer, the practical day-to-day
realities which face the people at Boscombe Down and Porton Down.
Those complex, detailed issues must be resolved before the separation
of the institutions and before floatation. So far, the MOD has
given no indication that it intends to do this.
36. The Government should not proceed before
it has addressed and answered unambiguously the three over-arching
questions of policy referred to above, namely:
(a) Does the MOD require an in-house capability
for AT&E in peace and war, or not?
(b) Does the Government intend to introduce
a national policy on AT&E, or not?
(c) Is the Secretary of State for Defence
satisfied that under his proposals he could continue to discharge
properly his duty of care to the men and women of HM Forces?
6 Not printed. Back
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