APPENDIX 13
Memorandum submitted by Saferworld
THE NEED TO CONTROL ARMS BROKERING AND SHIPPING
AGENTS
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide
information to members of the Quadripartite Select Committee on
the:
— Nature of the problem of arms brokering
and shipping:
— Response of the United Kingdom Government;
— Developments at the EU and international level;
In doing so, we outline the reasons why the
UK government White Paper proposals of 1998 would not be sufficient
to tackle the problem. Members of the Quadripartite Select Committee
will have a particular interest in this matter and may wish to
make representations to their ministerial colleagues on the need
for effective United Kingdom legislation.
SCOPE OF
THE PROBLEM
There is growing evidence that significant quantities
of arms entering the worst affected regions of conflict and human-rights
crisis zones are transferred there by UK arms brokering and shipping
agents. These individuals and companies organise the transfer
of arms from outside the European Union—often from former
Warsaw Pact countries, with vast surplus stocks of arms and weak
export controls. Some such deals are brokered by individuals or
companies located in the UK; others are arranged by UK residents
or UK passport holders operating further afield. Crucially, because
the weapons do not touch UK soil, a licence for export is not
required from the UK Government. Between 150-300 arms brokers
are estimated to be operating from the South-East of England alone.
There are a number of disturbing examples of
arms brokers and transport agents organising shipments for which
they would not have received a licence if the weapons had been
exported directly from the United Kingdom. Between April and July
1994, for instance, Mil Tec, a company registered in the Isle
of Man, was centrally involved in supplying arms to the perpetrators
of the genocide in Rwanda using aircraft provided by another UK
company. In 1998, JMT Charlesworth, a London-based company trading
as Global Services Ltd, arranged a deal for the supply of tons
of military equipment, including replacement engines for 80 battle
tanks, to Eritrea. In November 1999, a UK carrier transported
42 tons of small arms from Bulgaria to Zimbabwe; it is alleged
that these arms were then transhipped to the Democratic Republic
of Congo for use by Kabila's forces.
THE UK GOVERNMENT'S
CURRENT POSITION
At present, the only controls over UK arms brokers
and traffickers are those applied under the UN Act of 1946, which
prohibits arms transfers to UN embargoed destinations. In its
1998 White Paper on Strategic Export Controls, the UK Government
proposes to extend controls on the trafficking and brokering of
arms to destinations subject to EU, OSCE and national embargoes
observed by the UK, and on that of torture equipment and long-range
missiles.
It is argued in the White Paper that controls
on trafficking and brokering should be more limited than controls
on arms directly exported from the UK since those involve in arms
brokering and shipping will also be required to simply with the
export control laws of the exporting country. However, these arguments
fail to take into account the following facts:
— Brokering and shipping agents often
target their arms buying efforts on countries with inadequate
or poorly enforced export controls, or on countries where a level
of corruption exist;
— Embargoes are often imposed too late
to prevent arms reaching the protagonists in a conflict while
there are numerous countries which are not embargoed but would
not receive arms exports directly from the UK;
— Even where arms embargoes are in
place, brokers have shown themselves capable of circumventing
controls by shipping the arms via non-embargoed neighbouring countries.
OTHER GOVERNMENTS'
RESPONSES TO
THE PROBLEM
GERMAN
CONTROLS
German controls the activities of arms brokers
when they are on German soil. Before an individual can buy or
sell military equipment or act as a mediator in a transaction
involving lethal military equipment he/she must apply for a licence
from the German government.
There are no extra-territorial provisions included
within German laws on arms brokering. Thus they can be evaded
by individuals who leave the country, however briefly, to conduct
their transaction.
Swedish Controls
In Sweden all arms brokers require a permit
in order to engage in arms brokering activities. Arms brokers
must also apply to the Swedish authorities for a licence for each
transaction. Controls apply to all arms brokering agents domiciled
in Sweden, irrespective of where they conduct their operations.
Leaving Swedish territory would thus not exempt a Swedish resident
from laws regulating arms brokering.
United States
The United States adopted in 1996 a comprehensive
system of controls over arms brokering and shipping agents regardless
of where they or their companies are based. Any US passport holder,
wherever located, and any foreign person located in the USA or
subject to US jurisdiction, who engages in brokering activities
involving military goods or services, must first register with
the US Department of State. Each transaction must then be given
prior written approval by the State Department.
Firearms Protocol Proposals.
A UN Agreement, currently under discussion,
is likely to include regulation of arms brokering and shipping
agents. If such provisions are agreed then the UK will be bound
to adopt them. The current draft contains provisions which require
arms brokering agents to register and to apply for a licence.[4]
GERMAN INITIATIVE
ON ARMS
BROKERING
In the first half of 1999, during its Presidency
of the EU, the German government tabled proposals for common controls
on arms brokering agents to be adopted by EU Member States. This
would require all EU arms brokers who mediate in arms deals or
who buy and sell arms, to apply to their national authorities
for a licence for each transaction. The proposed controls would
cover transactions involving goods listed under the seven categories
of major conventional weapons as detailed in the UN Register of
Conventional Arms Transfers, plus those items listed under the
EU Joint Action on small arms. Whilst these proposals do not go
as far as the Swedish or US systems, they nevertheless go significantly
further than the current position ofthe UK.
THE ENFORCEMENT
OF CONTROLS
It is argued by the government that a comprehensive
licensing system would be difficult or very costly to enforce.
However, the experience of countries such as Germany and the US
suggests that their controls are enforceable and are not disproportionately
costly.
In the US, since the US law was passed by Congress
in 1996, 137 individuals and companies have registered as lawfully
being able to conduct arms brokerage for transfers outside the
USA and dozens have been refused such registration. Since then,
about 200 licences have been granted to conduct deals, with about
10% refused.
In Germany 10 applications for export licences
are made per year, with 2 or 3 of these requiring investigation.
CONCLUSION
Unless the United Kingdom government adopts
comprehensive and effective measures to tackle the problem of
arms brokering and shipping agents, reports will continue to emerge
of United Kingdom involvement in arms brokering scandals. Extending
controls to EU, OSCE and nationally embargoed destinations would
not prevent United Kingdom companies and individuals from continuing
to participate in the transfer of arms to countries in conflict
and human rights crisis zones.
The most effective approach would be to adopt
a version of the US law on arms brokers with full extraterritorial
application. As a first step, the United Kingdom could seek to
adopt the Swedish system which would require all arms brokers
resident in the United Kingdom to register with the authorities
and apply for a licence for each transaction. At a minimum, the
United Kingdom government should support the 1999 German proposals.
20 March 2000
4 The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
of the UN Economic and Social Council is currently developing
a "Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials" (commonly
referred to as the Firearms Protocol). This is intended to be
supplementary to the UN Convention on Transnational Organised
Crime. Back
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