Select Committee on Defence Eleventh Report


V GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO COMMITTEES REPORT

Brokering and trafficking

  61. In our February Report we announced our support for "a more stringent national policy on brokering and trafficking", looking to the 1999 Annual Report to make some specific reference to the Government's view on this matter.[72] In March we received a further paper on the subject from Saferworld.[73] In May the Minister expressed support for as much control as possible on traffickers and brokers.[74] The Government's response confirmed the Government's commitment to "constructive participation in international discussions on trafficking and brokering".[75] In the course of our visit to Washington in May we were given a written note on the operation of the US regime of registration and licensing of those engaged in arms brokering, which was introduced in November 1996. We are aware that the Government is engaged in detailed consultation and discussion on the possibility of going beyond the limited proposals in the 1998 White Paper.

62. In the course of oral evidence from the Minister of State to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 May on developments in Sierra Leone, reference was made to allegations that arms had been supplied to the rebels in Sierra Leone from Ukraine, brokered by a Gibraltar based arms dealer and using a British-based airline, Foyle Air, who made the administrative arrangements for transporting the arms from Ukraine to Burkina Faso. There is no evidence that the company was involved in the subsequent transfer of the arms via Liberia to Sierra Leone. Recent press reports have also referred to the supply of arms from destinations in eastern Europe to various conflicts in Africa, brokered by others. These are merely the latest accounts of arms brokering which stokes such conflicts on an unacceptable scale.

63. Some of the reasons given in the 1998 White Paper for resisting a further extension of national controls do not stand up to close examination. It is no satisfaction to those seeking to control the menace of arms brokers operating from suspect regimes to know that those involved are required to comply with the laws of the exporting country; the countries concerned will have been selected by brokers at least in part based on an assessment of the ease with which arms can be exported, whatever the laws there stipulate. While there is no denying that enforcement will be difficult, it is reasonable to believe that the very existence of a statutory regime will have some effect on UK brokers who wish to remain on the right side of the law so that they can continue to operate from or reside in the UK.

64. The 1998 White Paper proposals could readily be extended in such a way as to extend to UK nationals engaged in the brokering of arms to and from third countries similar controls as are applied to export of arms from the UK. Such a move would send a clear message to our EU partners and to those countries applying to join the EU that European public opinion is no longer willing to tolerate the involvement of its citizens in uncontrolled arms brokering. There would, for example, no doubt be indignation were the current embargo on Zimbabwe to be circumvented by UK brokers operating abroad. At the moment that would not be difficult. It is unfair to the honest exporter to leave a gaping loophole simply because of doubts about how completely it can be blocked. We reiterate our conviction that a more stringent national policy and a clear statutory framework to control brokering and trafficking of arms would command general consent and act as a spur to international action.

End-use

  65. We devoted several paragraphs of our February Report to examining the Government's record in implementing its pledge to "strengthen monitoring of the end-use of defence exports to prevent diversion to third countries and to ensure that exported equipment is used only on the conditions under which the export licence has been granted." We set out the steps reported to us as having been taken to strengthen end-use monitoring. We concluded that "it remains to be demonstrated that the pledge to strengthen monitoring of end-use has been — or can be — fully implemented", and looked to the next Annual Report to address these concerns.[76]

66. In oral evidence to us on 4 May, the Minister emphasised that the risk of diversion was "very stringently" considered and that exports would be stopped if diverted to an unauthorised end-use; for example, if surveillance equipment used in counter-narcotics work were used for internal repression.[77] In its July response the Government gave the assurance that the 1999 Annual Report would describe developments in the Government's policy on minimising the risk of diversion of UK exports.[78]

Licensed production

  67. The issue of licensed production overseas was also raised in our February Report. We reported that

and called for the issue to "be given a far higher priority by the Government, if necessary by the passage of legislation".[79] In its response, the Government noted that, in response to the earlier recommendation by the Trade and Industry Committee in December 1998, it had as requested initiated a discussion on licensed production in the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1999.[80] It is also being considered in the context of the general review of the 1998 White Paper proposals, although not referred to therein.[81] We welcome the signs that the introduction of controls on licensed production overseas is being given the higher priority we sought, and look forward to the production of legislative proposals at an early date.

Government transfers

  68. In our February Report we recommended that future Annual Reports should contain details of sales and other temporary or permanent transfers by government and its agencies, and an explicit account of exemptions from the licensing regime.[82] The Government's response stated that details of "major" sales of surplus equipment and Government to Government agreements were already included.[83] Table 8 in the 1998 Annual Report had five entries for "major equipment transferred" in 1998: two for Brazil, one for India and two for Uruguay. A Written Answer of 12 July revealed that most of the entries were wrong. The two Jetstream aircraft for Uruguay were not transferred until January 1999. The two entries for Brazil should have been consolidated to show a total of four rather than three ships. The two Harrier trainer aircraft sent to India were not Government-to-Government transfers.[84]

69. It has recently been widely reported that some of the small arms apparently lent or leased to the Sierra Leone Government armed forces by the UK Government had fallen into the hands of minors. These transfers, whether temporary or permanent, probably do not require licensing, being conducted on a Government-to Government basis. A written answer of 29 June 2000 announced the pending transfer to the Government of Sierra Leone of 5 million rounds of 7.62mm rifle ammunition and 4000 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition from surplus stocks.[85] The Foreign Affairs Committee has been told that distribution of weapons and ammunition is under the supervision of British officers. We also discovered that the Land Rover Defenders which were to have been provided to the police in Zimbabwe under the auspices of DfID would not have required licensing.[86] We conclude that recent events bear out the importance of full, accurate and open reporting to Parliament of arms transfers by the Government and its agencies, whether or not judged by the Government to be "major". We shall return to this issue.

EU Code of Conduct: applicant states

  70. In our February Report we concluded that an applicant state's proven willingness to conform to the EU Code of Conduct and comply with its operative paragraphs should be regarded as a precondition for its accession to the EU and for membership of European defence organisations. In its response the Government noted that candidates for EU accession will have to demonstrate their ability to adopt the acquis, including in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy.[87] From the experience of those committees which have recently visited some of the applicant states, the proposition that they should align themselves with the EU Code of Conduct is considerably less forbidding than many of the other conditions of accession. We understand that the CFSP chapter has been provisionally closed in negotiations with all 12 candidate countries.[88] We welcome the Government's reminder that adoption of the acquis by applicant states includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and record our conclusion that that in turn covers the EU Code of Conduct.

EU Code of Conduct: USA

  71. In our February Report we recommended that the Government take every opportunity to press the USA to align itself with the principles of the Code, as Canada has done. In its response, the Government noted that it had indeed taken appropriate opportunities to do so and that it was looking forward to constructive participation in future discussions on development of an international code of conduct on arms transfers.[89]

72. In the course of our May visit to Washington, we raised this issue with some of our interlocutors. It is indeed evident that there is some suspicion of the EU Code in the US Administration. One way forward may be through bilateral understandings. The USA and the UK have recently agreed the text of a Declaration of Principles on defence industrial and equipment co-operation, which includes a commitment to harmonise export procedures and as far as possible conventional arms export policies. A high-level council is to be established to pursue these and related measures. Another way forward is through agreement in multilateral fora. It may be that the Wassenaar Arrangement offers a promising route for this and other initiatives, although its recent Plenary was in most respects disappointing in its outcome.

73. US conventional arms transfer policy does not appear to differ in any important way from the EU Code or the UK national criteria. In some respects, notably its addressing of the question of criteria for upgrade programmes, it is an improvement. Harmonisation of the policies pursued by the USA and Europe on arms export controls should not present insuperable problems. A visibly coordinated approach between the USA and Europe would present a powerful message to those arms exporting nations not within a consensus. We remain of the opinion that there would be value in an internationally harmonised system of conventional arms export policies to be followed by the major arms exporters.



72  HC 225, paras 44-6 Back

73  Ev, pp 30-32 Back

74  Qq 132ff Back

75  Cm 4799, Rec 13 Back

76  HC 225, paras 49-51 Back

77  Qq 111ff Back

78  Cm 4799, Rec 16 Back

79  HC 225, para 47 Back

80  Cm 4799, Rec 14 Back

81  Ibid Back

82  HC 225, para 76 Back

83  Cm 4799, Rec 36 Back

84  HC Deb, 12 July 2000, col 519w Back

85  HC Deb, 29 June 2000, col 597w Back

86  Ev, p 21, A 7 (a) Back

87  Cm 4799, Rec 21 Back

88  House of Commons Library Research Paper 00/62, June 2000, pp 38-39 Back

89  Cm 4799, Rec 20 Back


 
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