| Zimbabwe
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| (1) | Although there was no formal or even informal arms embargo on Zimbabwe after August 1998, it is our understanding that there was a policy, not announced to Parliament, or apparently to exporters, of operating a more restrictive regime than hitherto towards arms exports to that country (paragraph 14).
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| (2) | We conclude that it was an error of judgement to have granted several Military List OIELs in late 1998 and early 1999 covering Zimbabwe, and that it would have been wiser to suggest to the exporters that they submit individual licence applications for these goods (paragraph 15).
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| (3) | It is our conclusion that the February 2000 decision to remove Zimbabwe from Military List and some other OIELs could and should have been taken in August 1998, or at the latest in June 1999 (paragraph 19).
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| (4) | We recommend that at the next annual review of the EU Code of Conduct the Government raise with our partners the issue of how best to deal with national embargoes in terms of denial notifications (paragraph 25).
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| (5) | For all the period during which Government examined the question of the Hawk spares licences, Hawk spares could have been freely delivered to Zimbabwe under Open Licences given in recent years to several companies. We recommend that the Government re-examine the system for inter-departmental scrutiny of applications for OIELs for sensitive destinations, to ensure that Ministers are fully aware of the significance of existing licences when examining applications for new licences (paragraph 28).
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| (6) | In August 1998 the armed forces of Zimbabwe intervened in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UK Government seems to have operated thereafter a tighter policy on licensing the export of arms which might be used in the conflict, but without the clarity of a formal embargo or even a public policy statement. After the breakdown of negotiations between the parties in mid-1999, the Government, together with the Dutch Government, took the initiative in sponsoring an EU Declaration calling for rigorous enforcement of the terms of the EU Code of Conduct. Following a newspaper leak of internal discussions on seven licence applications for Hawk spares, the Prime Minister announced in February 2000 a tighter regime on arms exports to Zimbabwe. Two weeks later seven licences were given for spares for Zimbabwe's Hawk aircraft. Described by the Minister of State in evidence to us as " a very isolated exception", this decision both undermined the force of the June 1999 EU Resolution which the UK had co-sponsored and seems to have constituted a breach of the UK's national criteria on arms exports. Three months later these and other licences were revoked as a result of the serious deterioration in Zimbabwe's internal situation, unconnected to the material to be supplied. We recognise the real dilemma faced by Ministers in balancing the contractual obligations of a company and the reputation of the UK as a supplier of defence material against its desire to ensure that UK arms are not used in "international aggression" or to "affect adversely regional stability in any significant way", as the UK's arms export criteria state. The episode reveals nonetheless a disturbing degree of muddle and confusion arising from these conflicting objectives (paragraph 29).
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| Pakistan |
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| (7) | We welcome the fact that decisions have at last been taken on many of the outstanding applications for licences for export of goods to Pakistan. We question whether it need have taken quite so many months to reach these decisions. We are also minded to believe that the interest we have shown in this issue may have had a stimulating effect. We can only speculate as to whether there may be other as yet unrevealed areas where similar scrutiny might have similarly beneficial effects (paragraph 36).
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| (8) | The refusals of licences [for Pakistan] announced on 5 July should be the subject of denial notifications to our EU partners under the terms of the EU Code of Conduct (paragraph 37).
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| (9) | A number of licence applications for dual-use goods, including safety equipment for personnel engaged in mine clearance, equipment for disposal of impaired explosive devices and firefighting equipment, have been awaiting clearance for many months. We conclude that the fact that they were held up for so long strongly implies that an informal and indiscriminate moratorium was indeed in force. Ministers have referred to the policy as one of strict examination on a case-by-case basis of applications for licences to export to Pakistan. The policy of strict examination on a case-by-case basis applies, or should apply, to all destinations. Ministers have rejected the description of the policy as an informal embargo, freeze or moratorium. The fact that a number of licences have now been granted or refused does not alter our conclusion that there has been in operation an informal moratorium on strategic export licences for Pakistan (paragraphs 38 and 39).
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| China |
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| (10) | While there is no suggestion that there has been any case of the export from the UK of lethal military equipment to China since the 1989 EU embargo, the details we procured of the Military List licences granted in 1998 do give some indicatation of the fine line that has to be drawn between lethal and non-lethal equipment in interpreting the scope of the EU embargo (paragraph 43).
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| (11) | We are concerned that differences of interpretation of the EU embargo on China may well lead to misunderstandings between Member States. The current embargo on the export of arms to China runs the risk of giving misleading messages to exporters and to the Chinese authorities. UK companies are marketing and selling non-lethal Military List goods for export to China, as they are quite entitled to do under present arrangements. Other EU Member States may be pursuing a different policy. In view of the varying opinions on the human rights situation in China and the risk of regional conflict, we recommend that the Government take active steps within the framework of the CFSP to reach a Common Position on the EU embargo on China, and that active consideration be given to introducing a stricter interpretation of the 1989 embargo than that currently operated by the UK (paragraphs 44 and 48).
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| Hong Kong SAR |
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| (12) | We welcome the Minister's reassurances that exports to Hong Kong are subject to follow-up checks to prevent diversion or re-exportation, and recommend that such checks are maintained. We recommend that similar precautions are taken with respect to Macao (paragraph 50).
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| Human Rights |
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| (13) | The responses highlight the extent to which different considerations are applied to different branches of a country's armed services and police forces. Licences for small arms may thus be granted to one element of a country's forces but not another. We shall return to this issue when we have seen the Government's legislative proposals (paragraphs 53 and 54).
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| Police Equipment |
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| (14) | We recommend that it should be normal practice for technical advice to be sought from the Home Office on the export of unusual equipment for police use (paragraph 55).
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| Appeals |
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| (15) | We are disturbed that this large sample of those companies with recent experience of appeals against refusals of a licence should have had such uniformly bad experiences of the operations of a Government department. Appeals against refusals are taking too long to settle. There is no reason why an improved appeals system cannot be introduced on a non-statutory basis prior to the passage of legislation. We recommend that the appeal procedure which it is proposed to bring on a statutory basis be introduced as soon as possible. Given the relatively small number of appeals against refusal, we also recommend that further consideration be given to ways of ensuring that an appellant company can participate in the appeal procedure, and be given a more detailed account of the reasons for the original refusal and for the eventual decision on an appeal (paragraph 58).
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| ECO |
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| (16) | We seek some reassurance that efforts are being made to enhance the performance of the Export Control Organisation and that the lessons are learned from the sorts of errors to which we have drawn attention (paragraph 60).
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| Brokering and trafficking |
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| (17) | We reiterate our conviction that a more stringent national policy and a clear statutory framework to control brokering and trafficking of arms would command general consent and act as a spur to international action (paragraph 64).
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| Licensed production overseas
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| (18) | We welcome the signs that the issue of licensed production overseas is being given the higher priority we sought and look forward to the production of legislative proposals at an early date (paragraph 67).
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| Government transfers |
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| (19) | We conclude that recent events bear out the importance of full, accurate and open reporting to Parliament of arms transfers by the Government and its agencies, whether or not judged by the Government to be "major". We shall return to this issue (paragraph 69).
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| EU Code of Conduct: applicant states
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| (20) | We welcome the Government's reminder that adoption of the acquis by applicant states includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and record our conclusion that that in turn covers the EU Code of Conduct (paragraph 70).
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| EU Code of Conduct: USA |
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| (21) | Harmonisation of the policies pursued by the USA and Europe on arms export controls should not present insuperable problems. A visibly coordinated approach between the USA and Europe would present a powerful message to those arms exporting nations not within a consensus. We remain of the opinion that there would be value in an internationally harmonised system of conventional arms export policies to be followed by the major arms exporters (paragraph 73).
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| Prior scrutiny |
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| (22) | In our view, the authority to export arms is of a different degree of sensitivity to the other types of Ministerial casework. There can be few decisions of greater potential impact on the conduct of foreign relations, and on the lives of many people overseas, than decisions as to whether to permit weapons made in this country to be put into the hands of overseas governments and their forces. The nation as a whole feels an exceptional degree of engagement with such decisions. There is understandable anger when it is found that British-made weapons have been used to oppress or terrorise people, or to endanger the lives of our service men and women or civilians (paragraph 80).
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| (23) | The case for some "real-time" prior scrutiny of licensing of arms exports is significantly reinforced by our examination of the Zimbabwe licences. If Government is to be judged on the exercise of its powers, this can best be done on a continuous basis rather than months or years after the event. We are convinced that accountability demands that Parliament is engaged in scrutiny of arms export licences before as well as after their grant. Prior scrutiny should be designed to ensure that Parliament has a voice in matters of such crucial importance before final decisions are taken. Issues of such importance warrant democratic involvement (paragraphs 27 and 81).
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| (24) | The four Select Committees that make up the Quadripartite Committee have concluded that strategic exports by their very nature justify the establishment of a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny, and that such a system should be put in place forthwith. We have made a detailed examination of the systems in place in the only two countries who, to our knowledge, currently operate them, Sweden and the USA. The prior scrutiny system we have proposed will, we believe, contain a much stronger element of prior scrutiny than the Swedish system and will be more comprehensive, more streamlined and more transparent than the US one. Our proposed system poses no threat to either the commercial confidentiality or the competitiveness of British companies. It would introduce no delay of any significance in the granting of export licences. It would not impede in any way the immediate granting of export licences when these are needed in times of crisis or to meet imperative national security requirements. Furthermore, it can be operated by the existing Select Committees making up the Quadripartite Committee, and can be brought into being without either Resolutions of the House or changes to the Standing Orders. We recommend acceptance of our proposals by the four Secretaries of State in time for the new system of parliamentary prior scrutiny of strategic exports set out in this Report to commence as from the beginning of the next Session of Parliament (paragraph 90).
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