Examination of Witnesses (Questions 159
- 179)
WEDNESDAY 24 MAY 2000
SIR ROBERT
WALMSLEY AND
VICE-ADMIRAL
SIR JEREMY
BLACKHAM
Chairman
159. Thank you very much. This must be the quickest
return visit I can ever recall. Yesterday we were discussing fairly
easy subjects, now we are getting on to really contentious things
like Bowman. I know we did discuss it earlier in the year but
we have a number of additional questions to ask. Admiral, the
saga has dragged on for a long time and shows every signs of exercising
your mind and your successors' minds, and successive Committees'
minds before eventually Bowman is going to be deployed. As the
initial starting date was several years ago and has been delayed
further, the world will have changed since Bowman was originally
conceived. Is the requirement for Bowman still relevant to war
fighting in the year 2010 and beyond?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) Certainly. It has,
of course, changed since it was originally launched in 1987 or
thereabouts, but the two principle features of it, that is to
say the provision of secure communications to our forces—and,
indeed, not just to our land forces, but to the air and maritime
forces operating with them—and the ability to use that as
a basis for a digitised system, a system for exchanging combat
data digitally, will be absolutely vital. Indeed, they will be
more important in 2010 than they were when we first conceived
this system.
160. What about security? There are a lot of
smart people out there who can make a living, or even a hobby,
some are even as young as 16, of breaking into secret systems.
Are you reasonably satisfied that it is going to remain secure
right up until 2030? I know it is an impossible question to ask,
but it is the kind of question that needs to be asked because
the whole basis of this has to be secure communication. What efforts
are going into making sure that as far as is humanly, scientifically
and technically possible, this is going to remain secure?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) There you have
obviously touched on one of the most difficult issues, not least
in the communications world where generations of equipment change
within months, and that is one of the reasons why it is so complicated
to deliver the Bowman system. Having said that, I think it is
important to understand that there are different levels of security
which are relevant in different kinds of operations and different
kinds of use. For example, some tactical information in a street
battle may only be important for a very short period of time,
providing of course you do not compromise the system itself. In
other areas, strategic or operational level information, you may
want a much longer lasting security. We can look at different
levels of security for different elements of the system. I think
it would be difficult to give you a guarantee that the system
will be impenetrable for the next 20 or 30 years, but clearly
another of the difficulties will be to maintain the system and
up-grade it as different generations of equipment become available
to our potential enemies. One of the difficulties with the whole
of this business is that in the communication system it is very
difficult to pick an entry point, there is always something new
just round the corner, but you have to cut through them. What
you have to do is make sure that you have an incremental path
where you can take advantage of technology change as it becomes
available.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I do not think people under
16 or over 16 succeed in penetrating cryptographically protected
systems. That is the key difference. There is a complete distinction
between hacking into a computer system and getting into a cryptographically
protected communication stream of noughts and ones. Part of Bowman,
wherever we buy the radios, the cryptologic chips, as they are
called, are United Kingdom designed, approved in Cheltenham, and
we are absolutely confident that those chips will be up-gradable
during the life of Bowman. There is no question of people penetrating
something which has been protected cryptographically. It is a
separate world to hacking into computers where you can get in
on the telephone line.
161. Those words will be engraved on my mind,
Sir Robert, and I hope you are absolutely as confident as you
can be. If we have 55,000 and one gets stolen, what will the consequences
be if people have access to one of the kits? Will that compromise
the other 54,999?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) It should not necessarily
do so in principle. Obviously, with cryptographical material,
if people have access to key cards and so forth, systems can be
compromised, and that is something with which we are familiar
with dealing. What you do is change the system immediately and
change the key cards.
162. Advise people not to leave them in cars?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) It is indeed more
easy to leave a piece of crypto around than it is a laptop. The
key thing is the point that Robert has just made, this is not
just a happy afternoon's fiddling, it is a very seriously difficult
business.
163. The Defence Committee, a long time ago,
when you were in naval college, first commented on the deficiencies
of Clansman and how much old equipment was actually in the new
Clansman. Now we still live with the system. Apparently, from
the document that you submitted to us, we are going to be living
with a fairly open system for another decade or so. What are the
consequences of our armed forces operating a system which is hardly
impenetrable? How can anything be done to up-grade at no high
cost? What can be done to ensure that the kits that our guys and
women are operating are going to be of relevance and serviceable
until 2010 and even beyond?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) Neither I nor Sir
Robert would attempt to say that the position is satisfactory.
Clansman is an old system which we are struggling to maintain.
I am confident, and so are the army, that it can be maintained
in an operational way until Bowman starts coming in, but obviously
there will be an overlap period and the key parts of it will be
protected.
164. With respect, that is not an immensely
reassuring answer. I know it is the best that can be given in
the circumstances, but as we have seen the ISD has been put back
on several occasions, and we know that the whole project is hardly
moving along at a rapid pace and with perfect success, so I am
not even certain, and I do not think that you are even certain,
when Bowman is going to be introduced. In the meantime, not for
a year or two years or three years, but for a decade and beyond,
people are operating a system that is well past its really useful
date. We have numerous examples from conflicts that we have been
involved with that the system is not adequate, and yet it will
remain inadequate for a decade. Hoping things come right with
Bowman in time for the next war or the war after, can anything
be done, or is anything being done, in the short-term, ie, a decade
or more, to make the system more useful than apparently it is
at the moment or is even likely to be in the next decade?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) We have been able
to put in systems specifically for operations where that has been
necessary, and that happened in Kosovo. We can find ways of meeting
the needs of a particular operation, but as I said, I would not
pretend that the situation is wholly satisfactory. I think, in
a sense, you said it yourself earlier, the answer I have given
is the best I can in the circumstances. That is why we are putting
a great deal of effort into ensuring that Bowman will deliver
and why Sir Robert is spending a great deal of his time on that
subject.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I have two points, first of
all, we have set by sufficient resources to recognise the support
costs of Clansman. It is not something we are just sitting back
and saying, "These radios seem to break down quite a lot,
isn't that terrible?" We have set by sufficient money to
maintain Clansman. It is not rocket science. As you said yourself,
they are old-fashioned radios. That is the first point; maintain
Clansman and make sure it is okay. I checked this week whether
we had had any bad reports from Sierra Leone about the performance
of Clansman, and we have not. The second point is that it is absolutely
true that it is not a very robust system, and that is partly because
it is old-fashioned and heavy and if you drop it there are a lot
of forces inside the box. So we have a competition under way now
to provide 43,635 radios, which are called personal role radios,
to the infantry, and they will start delivery next year. That
competition is under way. We plan to place the contract later
this year. There is not any encryption on them. I am trying to
separate the Clansman point out into functionality and reliability.
These will be reliable, they are modern radios, and we will start
delivering them from the end of next year and we will complete
the programme over about a 12 month period.
165. The US Marine Corps hired a team of 30
Navaho Indians to fool the Japanese. Maybe the Welsh or Glaswegians
will serve the purpose in the short-term. Perhaps you can drop
us a note on that, because that seems quite useful?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) It is characterised as a low
probability of intercept radio, which in English means that it
is difficult to listen into it if you are not meant to.[1]
166. I am not surprised Sierra Leone did not
throw up too many problems, I am not aware of the fact that the
Sierra Leonian rebels are a high-tech military. What about Kosovo,
do you have any lessons on communications from Kosovo? The impression
we have is that the Serbs could listen into a great deal that
was passed along our communications system?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) We
have lessons from that and they do not only touch on this area,
they touch the secure areas of communications as well, on which
we have already done some work. The measure which Sir Robert has
just referred to is part of that. We are introducing effective
personal radios, but the provision of an entire modern encrypted
system depends on the delivery.
167. Is anything happening in the EAC on Bowman?
Are any key decisions being made or likely to be made that we
should be informed of?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) The wonderful thing about the
EAC, of which I am a member, is that it does not make decisions,
it just generates advice, and as you know, that remains confidential
between us and our ministers.
168. I do not want to know what the advice is,
but will advice be proffered in the fairly near future?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I think we have proffered advice
on Bowman several times over the last 12 months and I expect there
to be some more advice proffered in the very near future.
169. The answer is yes.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I do mean yes.
170. You are very frank on many things. At least
we can read your expressions. Thank you very much.
Mr Hancock
171. Sir Robert, could I ask a couple of points
on what you have just said about the 45,000 radios that you are
going to buy? Surely having to concede that you need to buy them
is indicative of the fact that Bowman is still so far off that
you cannot foresee a time when you are going to have them, and
also is indicative of the fact that Clansman is so unreliable
that you are having to buy an off-the-shelf radio to allow troops
to communicate better on the ground. I would like to know if that
is the right scenario and, secondly, how much is it going to cost
to buy these 45,000 radios? You said you have a budget set by
for it, I would be interested to know where that is and if this
is going to be an add-on to the total package that Bowman is costing
the nation?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) No, it will be instead of. I
think the Chairman opened this morning with; had the Bowman requirement
remained stable over the last 15 years or so? The answer is, of
course, that basic requirement for a voice and data system that
is cryptographically protected and cannot be intercepted has remained,
but in detail it has changed enormously. We are not suggesting
that these personal role radios should, as soon as Bowman appears,
be thrown in the dustbin. They have been able to help us reduce
the cost of the total Bowman system. It is a perfectly reasonable
solution to some aspects of the requirement. I think Admiral Blackham
mentioned street fighting. These are very short range radios,
designed to allow infantry soldiers to communicate with each other
while they are in combat. It makes far more sense to have that
sort of radio for that than a really highly sophisticated Bowman
set which you have to carry around on your back and might weigh
20 pounds with lots of batteries and computers et cetera, so this
is not a waste of time or money. As to the cost of the thing,
I would rather not get into that now. We are right in the middle
of a competition and if I quote you a cost—I will just say
a small number of scores of millions of pounds, that is about
as close as I would like to be.
Chairman
172. That is confusing. That is an encrypting
remark.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) You are getting too close for
my part. I have to speak in these opaque terms, because equally
I realise it would be very frustrating for the Committee not to
know whether I am talking about 10 or 100 or 1 billion. I am talking
about a small number of scores of millions of pounds for 43,635
radios, that is not a bad buy.
Mr Hancock
173. You talked about secure communication being
necessary. You, Admiral, talked about the speed of change in communication
technology. If that is the case then Bowman ought to be in the
Natural History Museum by now, because it has been by-passed by
so many others, yet we have recently required the system to be
reduced from its original specification and we are actually asking
now for the product to be less rugged, we are asking it to have
less protection against jamming and against intercryption. Who
is responsible for that and why?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I am responsible
for the capability, Mr Hancock. Just to go back, I think it is
a little unfair to say that Bowman should be in a museum. Bowman
has been running for a long time as a project. The equipment,
when it is purchased, will be state of the art equipment, so it
will not be a museum piece at all, it will be the latest—
174. I thought there was one at Bletchley Park?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I think that has
been broken into.
175. That is why I was worried.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The equipment has
yet to be purchased and will be state of the art equipment when
it is purchased. The requirement is constantly under review. The
world changes. Bowman was first envisaged during the Cold War.
It would not be surprising if we made a number of changes to the
requirement since then. We are constantly assessing the circumstances
in which we might have to operate and the balance of resources
that we want to put into different things. The Bowman requirement,
as it now stands, is the requirement that satisfies the army's
need.
176. Are you actually suggesting that the army
are now saying, through you, Admiral, to you, Sir Robert, "Go
out and buy us a piece of a kit that is now less robust than we
first wanted" and they are also saying, "Let's have
a piece of kit which is easier to break into than we first required
and is susceptible to more jamming than we first required"?
Have they down-graded their spec to such an extent that you can
be that specific that we are now looking for a bit of kit which
is so degraded that one wonders why it is costing so much and
taking so long?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I think it is probably not right
to characterise those things that result in equipment which is
less satisfactory to the army. It is very difficult to write a
specification for shock for a piece of equipment. What we do find
is that as we assemble these specifications people tend to be,
because they are experts on shock, extremely cautious and it costs
an enormous amount of money to make a piece of equipment resilient
to these very high levels of shock. What you then do is go to
the user, or you go to Admiral Blackham, and say, "Look,
if we are going to afford this piece of equipment, does it really
make sense to be making the Bowman able to withstand a shock which
the piece of equipment it is in, like the armoured fighting vehicle,
the Warrior, could not withstand itself?" So you could have
a Bowman radio working with the Warrior destroyed. This is just
a sensible systems engineering approach. Every down-grading of
a requirement is not an undesirable factor. I can remember very
clearly that every Bowman radio originally had a requirement to
be able to sustain top secret communications, but that is just
not sensible because TA soldiers are not clear to make top secret
communications, so that is a sensible thing to start to eliminate
from the requirement. Each one of these has been looked at very
carefully by the operators. If they were not happy, Admiral Blackham's
team would not have accepted it and we would not be procuring
it on that basis.
177. Presumably an awful lot of money has been
spent down-grading this all of this time. From your point of view,
it is fortunate that Bowman was not ready when it was first programmed,
is it not, because you would have bought this Rolls Royce when
really you could have settled for a Cortina? Are you suggesting
that we are now taking what is generally accepted as US standards
for this equipment? Are you suggesting that United Kingdom standards
within the MOD and our expectations and quality standards are
so high and that is why our costs are so high and the delays are
so long, and that the Bowman scenario has taught you a number
of lessons which you are now going to put into operation on other
procurement contracts so that we see for the future a down-grading
of expectation and a more realistic approach to what the equipment
is going to be used for, and the requirement and the original
spec is going to be driven more by the MOD's now more realistic
approach to this thing?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) It is certainly true that Bowman
has taught us a number of lessons. I am sure that we will come
on to our perception, my perception, of why there have been delays.
I would like to refute any suggestion that Bowman has in some
way been down-graded, which will be to the ultimate detriment
to the army. One of the great strengths of our new organisation
is that Admiral Blackham's staff now have a real responsibility
for the cost of the equipment they specify. A soon as you insert
that discipline into the process, people are no longer over specifying
where it does not make sense from a combat capability viewpoint.
There is no question of us saying that this is a US system with
US standards. We will buy some radios to US design, we will buy
other radios at different frequencies to a UK design, and the
standards will be coherent. We will not have half of it working,
for example, the high powered amplifier working when the aeriel
pre-amp is broken.
178. I have to go back to your own memorandum,
which states quite clearly that you are now seeking less protection
against jamming. How can that be right? How can you accept less
protection against jamming? Admiral Blackham talked about making
sure that this equipment does not unnecessarily put people's lives
at risk. If you are now accepting second best—and on your
own expectation you are now down-grading it so it can be interfered
with and can be jammed—surely you are now taking risks?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) There is a limit to every radio's
ability to operate in a jamming environment. Somebody has to judge
what is a sensible level at which to set its jamming resistance.
I do not accept that this has been set at a lower level than is
satisfactory. I do accept that it has been set at a lower level
than before, but that does not mean that before was right and
now it is wrong, rather the reverse.
179. Do you say that the MOD got it wrong in
the first place? Do you accept that they got it wrong and what
you were seeking could not be delivered?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) No. I think when you look at
a requirement as complex as Bowman you do try to modify it as
thinking develops during the generation of the equipment specification.
The interaction between my staff telling Admiral Blakham's staff
what it costs and their understanding—and it is for him
to speak on this—of the operational capability that is required,
has produced a sensible adjustment of the specification in a number
of areas. There is no question of supplying a radio which does
not adequately protect against jamming. But I promise you that
if you put it within 100 yards of a 100 kilowatt transmitter,
it will be jammed. We are not going to do that.
1 See p 94 Q6. Back
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