Further Memorandum from the Ministry of
Defence (19 April 2000)
BOWMAN
Bowman will provide a secure, robust data and
voice communications system in support of land operations, to
replace the Clansman combat radio and the HQ infrastructure element
of the Ptarmigan trunk system. It will also play a key role in
the MoD's Battlespace Digitization initiative. A risk reduction
programme is currently under way under a contract with Archer
Communications Systems Ltd. It is planned to seek approval to
place the first supply contract in 2000.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. Bowman is required to provide a secure
combat communications system for the Army and elements of the
other Services, in support of land and littoral operations. It
will serve as the primary means of voice and data communication
for tactical level operations, where operations are characterised
by mobility and are undertaken by many individual platforms and
by dismounted individuals. The system will, therefore, be based
on radio communications that can operate without relying on fixed
infrastructure. As well as man-portable versions, Bowman will
be an integral part of the communications fit of major equipments
such as the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank, the attack helicopter
and warships. In addition to radios, Bowman will also provide
a local area sub-system. That sub-system will distribute information
within key platforms and around deployed divisional, brigade and
unit level headquarters, as well as providing the inter-connection
between Bowman and other military and civil communications systems.
A management information system will enable operational deployment
of the system to be planned and managed.
2. The requirement for Bowman was first
endorsed in 1988 as a two-stage project: stage 1 to provide a
replacement for the Clansman capability with a simple vehicle
harness, and stage 2 to enhance this system to allow for increased
data and interoperability requirements. Approval was given to
enter a competitive Project Definition phase for stage 1, PD1,
and a simultaneous Feasibility Study phase for stage 2, FS2. The
latter concluded that the system demonstrated in PD1 would not
support the data demands of the number of information Systems
that would be in service with Bowman and which would be needed
to support the digitization programme. The requirement was therefore
revised to include additional capacity for data transmission and
the computing infrastructure to support new information systems.
These included the local area sub-system, an additional radio,
known as the High Capacity Data radio and computer terminals.
FS2 also demonstrated that it would be lower risk for the communications
harness for Bowman, known as the Vehicle Integrated Communications
Distribution System, to be provided by the Bowman prime contractor
rather than provided by the MoD as a separate project. This system
was, therefore, merged with the Bowman requirement in 1997.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Close liaison with the prime contractor
has led to agreement on a series of cost/capability/time trade-offs.
In particular, the delivery of capability will be staged; elements
of the system that are assessed to require prolonged development
to reduce risk will be delivered after the in-service date. Some
detailed reductions in functionality have also been agreed. Ruggedized
off-the-shelf, rather than bespoke, computer terminals will be
used. Where feasible, Bowman will be certified to less stringent
US Military Build Standards rather than to UK Defence Standards,
which increases the degree of commonality with the US systems
on which some elements of the system will be based. More limited
protection against jamming and interception of transmissions will
be accepted for some radio types.
NUMBERS
4. The number of combat radios required
depends primarily on the force structure and numbers of vehicles
and other platforms in service. The current assessment is that
about 55,000 man pack and vehicle mounted radios will be procured.
Bowman radios would be installed in some 23,000 vehicles, 43 major
ships and some 450 battlefield and support helicopters and transport
aircraft. These numbers are subject to review.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
5. The Strategic Defence Review highlighted
the importance of effective command control and communication
Systems and confirmed the requirement for Bowman. Force changes
arising from the SDR are likely, however, to have an impact on
the numbers of equipment required and the programme for converting
units.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. As the primary means of communication
at the tactical level for land operations, Bowman will be used
across the spectrum of conflict, for all missions and at all scales
of deployment. Bowman will be central to the command and control,
and therefore the effective deployment, of forces used for military
tasks ranging from disaster relief to regional conflicts.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE,
ISD
7. Bowman will replace the Clansman family
of combat radios, which has been in service since the 1970s. It
will also replace those elements of the Ptarmigan trunk communication
system within tactical headquarters, that is vehicle borne HQs
at divisional, brigade and unit, ie battlegroup level.
8. Bowman was originally endorsed against
an ISD of December 1995. In 1993 this was revised to June 1999
as a result of budgetary constraints and an increased understanding
of the technical complexity of the project gained from the Phase
1 Feasibility Studies. During the competitive PD1 phase, the ISD
was revised to April 2001 for budgetary reasons. Following the
completion of PD1, the ISD was slipped to March 2002 as a result
of the revised procurement strategy and the redefinition of the
ISD to reflect the delivery of a true operational capability.
In the light of an assessment of the technical risk remaining
in the programme, the ISD was further slipped in December 1999
to late 2003/early 2004, subject to a Main Gate approval. Since
August 1998 the ISD has been defined as the date when a brigade
HQ and two battle groups are equipped and capable of deploying
on operations other than war. The Clansman family of combat radios
and the relevant elements of Ptarmigan will be progressively removed
from service over the period 2003-2010, as Bowman is introduced.
9. It has been possible however, to plan
for the early delivery of a small but significant operational
capability that previously was tied to the delivery of the whole
system. Through the application of SMART Procurement principles,
in particular incremental procurement, the Personal Role Radio,
a short range, non-secure tactical radio for use at section level
will now be procured in advance of the delivery of the main BOWMAN
system with initial deliveries expected to start by the end of
2001.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
10. Development of the system was carried
out by two competing consortia: YEOMAN, led by Siemens Plessey
Systems, now BAE Systems and Racal; and CROSSBOW led by ITT UK
Ltd. Following international competition in 1993, contracts were
placed with these two consortia for both PD1 and FS2. The opportunities
for international collaboration at system level were also assessed
at that time, but the timing of the UK's requirement did not coincide
with that of any of our major NATO partners. However, it was decided
that the contractors providing other nations' new combat radio
Systems would be invited to bid for Bowman.
11. Following completion of PD1 in late
1996, the competing consortia announced their intention to form
a joint venture company, known as Archer Communications Systems
Ltd, ACSL, to bid jointly for the Bowman supply contract. This
resulted in a review of the procurement options open to the MoD,
namely continuing with either one of the consortia, continuing
with Archer or finding a new prime systems integrator. A revised,
single source, procurement strategy for Bowman and the remainder
of the risk reduction work was approved in March 1997, and a risk
reduction contract was placed with Archer in August 1997.
12. Work on defining the supply phase is
continuing linked to the incremental introduction of technology
and the staged delivery of capability. Before the first supply
contract is awarded, further risk reduction work, known as Package
0, is being undertaken to ensure the necessary confidence in performance,
time and cost of the programme for the Main Gate approval and
before contractual commitment. The contract for Package 0 was
placed with Archer in October 1998 at a value of £185 million.
13. In order to achieve best value for money
for sub-system solutions, Archer is required to hold competitions
wherever possible. Some 60% by value of sub-contracts will be
subject to competition. Where sub-contract competition is not
possible, the MOD applies NAPNOC, no acceptable price, no contract,
conditions.
***
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS
14. The options of upgrading Clansman or
procuring an austere off the shelf solution were examined at the
time of the review of procurement options in 1997 but were considered
to be less costs effective options for meeting the requirement.
However, Archer has not performed well on the programme to date,
and the way forward is under consideration. Archer remains the
preferred supplier but studies have been set in train with potential
alternative providers (Computing Devices Canada and Thomson CSF)
in order to protect the department's value for money position.
Collaboration was also considered, but not found to be viable,
see paragraph 10.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
15. There will be marketing opportunities
in those countries operating VHF and HF radios bought from the
selected Bowman suppliers, ITT and Racal, which might be upgraded
using elements of the Bowman system, or in those countries which
wish to improve their capability at Brigade level and below. The
sophistication and cost of Bowman will limit the market for the
total system but there will be scope for supplying parts in many
countries.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
16. Of the procurement options considered
in 1997, only Archer combined all aspects of design, manufacture,
assembly, systems integration and support in the UK and would
maintain a significant UK capability in all these areas. Archer
revised their Joint Venture agreement earlier this year, with
BAE Systems taking over the management role. Shareholdings were
not changed. The impact of the potential purchase of Racal by
Thomson is not yet clear.
SMART PROCUREMENT
17. The project is now following Smart Procurement
principles, including a "partnering" approach with Archer.
It will use technology and modules developed in Project Definition
and for other customers. A contract strategy of incremental acquisition
is proposed.
ACQUISITION PHASES
18. FS1, FS2 and PD1 have been completed.
The award of the package 0 contract in October 1998 enables Archer
to complete sub-system definition and subcontractor selection,
prepare for and commence system integration, and prove the platform
installation design process prior to full commitment to "Supply
and Support". It was planned to award the first of the production
contracts, in late 1999. However, following a submission from
industry in March 1999, an affordability review and some redefinition
of the project, was carried out. The principal area of risk leading
to this delay is the integration of sub-systems supplied by a
number of different sub-contractors. A further key risk to the
timescale for contracting for installation design certification
and conversion in over 200 platform types with complex existing
design rights. Progress has been made. Archer has selected ITT
to supply the VHF radios, which are the heart of the Bowman system.
Improvements have been made in the company's management arrangements
for the project. Further progress in reducing the risks will need
to be demonstrated. If we can agree with the prime contractor
an acceptable programme in terms of performance, time and cost
we intend to place a production contract at the end of the year.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
19. Key milestones now in prospect for this
project are:
| Approval for Package 1
| end 2000 |
| Placement of Package 1 | end 2000
|
Cost summary Approved stages as at 31 March 1999,
at 1999-00 prices.
|
| Breakdown of procurement costs | Development
| Production | Total
|
|
| Current estimate of costs | 341
| | 341 |
| Estimate of costs at MOD approval | 132
| | 132 |
| Difference | +209
| | +209 |
|
Reasons for difference: costs resulting from changes to the
scope of work undertaken, +£12M; accounting adjustment, +£1M;
slippage of PD1 work, +£5M. Extension of Risk Reduction phase
+£196M. Expenditure at 31 March 1999 was £185M. Reduction
in forward buy of GFE in advance of Main Gate submission -£5M.
***
The years of peak expenditure are likely to be 2002-03 and 2003-04
onwards.
The revised ISD for Bowman has resulted in additional costs
of £9M to run on Clansman longer than originally planned.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
20. There are two aspects to Bowman support: the provision
of initial spares and facilities to support operations, which
will be provided with the prime equipment and installations; and
on-going support that enables reprovisioning corrective action
and contractor support to ensure sustainability of the deployed
system. The planned single Supply and Support contract will encompass
both aspects. The level of support required is being determined
using integrated logistic support principles. The importance of
reliability and spares availability, and their impact on equipment
sustainability, is reflected in the draft contract. The use of
existing spares and equipment, where appropriate, has been mandated.
Training is being addressed under the tri-Service Training Needs
Analysis, which will identify the recommended training methodology,
including training media.
21. The Bowman conversion programme is a major task that
will be carried out over a period of eight years. Conversion will
be by operational grouping, principally brigade; there is therefore
a vital link between conversion planning and the Army's Formation
Readiness cycle. Units will be converted in their "other
tasks" year. The Bowman Fielding Plan addresses the requirement
to provide support to both the new system and that being replaced.
Dual Clansman and Bowman training will be needed at certain locations.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE AND
RESERVES
22. In accordance with the principles of whole fleet
management Bowman equipment not assigned to the front line will
in effect be held in reserve, although there will be no formal
war reserve. Spares to support Bowman will be held in storage,
under arrangements still to be decided.
INTEROPERABILITY
23. National interoperability for land operations will
be achieved, since all elements of the three Services that take
part in the land or littoral battle will be equipped with Bowman
International interoperability with other nations is more difficult.
The intention is that Bowman should meet currently agreed and
likely future NATO standards. Use of extant US national protocol
standards was considered, but was not judged to offer an acceptable
degree of protection for the lifetime of Bowman. A standard for
encryption has been agreed by certain countries, including the
US and UK, and will be adopted by Bowman. Standards developed
for Bowman could be made available for adoption for the next generation
of US tactical radio communications, or as future NATO standards.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
24. Defence Export Services will consider the most appropriate
disposal route, sale or scrap, for Clansman equipment that is
no longer required. Relevant parts of Ptarmigan will be retained
as spares to support the Ptarmigan elements remaining in service.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
25. Bowman is planned to be in service for at least 25
years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
26. Given the pace of change in information systems technology,
it is likely that there will be developments that require technology
insertion over the course of Bowman's service life, and the system
is being designed accordingly.
April 2000
FUTURE CARRIERS—CVF
The decision in the Strategic Defence Review to purchase
two large aircraft carriers, to replace the three Invincible-class
carriers from around 2012, is being taken forward and competitive
contracts for the CVF Assessment Phase were awarded in November
1999 to BAe Land and Sea Systems, now BAE Systems, and Thomson-CSF.
The first part of this phase, Analysis of Options, is examining
a wide range of carrier design options, to reflect the options
for the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA, see separate memorandum.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that the ability
to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force
projection operations, and that aircraft carriers can provide
valuable flexibility in a range of operational circumstances.
They can also offer a coercive presence, which may forestall the
need for war fighting. The SDR recognised that there is an increasing
likelihood of future operations being conducted by forces far
from their home bases. In such operations, host-nation support,
including access to suitable air bases, cannot be guaranteed,
particularly during an evolving regional crisis or the early stages
of a conflict. The SDR concluded that there is a continuing need
for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers.
Our three Invincible-class carriers were designed for Cold War
anti-submarine operations. The intention, announced in the SDR,
is to plan to replace these with a new class of larger and more
capable carriers, known as the CVF, Carrier Vessel Future, class.
2. In accordance with the Smart Procurement model, CVF
is following a two-stage approval process that involves an Initial
and Main Gate. Initial Gate approval, utilising the Smart Procurement
model, was given in December 1998 for an Assessment phase. Studies
being undertaken in Assessment will examine the User Requirement
Document and develop it, using cost/capability trade-offs to produce
an affordable and achievable Systems Requirements Document. The
objective is to build a replacement for the current carriers that
has an increased emphasis on offensive air operations and is capable
of operating the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest
possible range of roles.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Trade-offs between cost/capability and time/capability
are integral to the Assessment work.
NUMBERS
4. The original plan was to replace the three Invincible-class
carriers with three 20,000 tonne vessels. Operational analysis
demonstrated, however, that it would be more cost-effective to
procure two large carriers, each capable of carrying up to about
50 aircraft. The SDR also saw advantage in future carriers being
capable of carrying more fixed-wing aircraft than the current
vessels, in order to be able to contribute more effectively to
the support of operations on land and at sea.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
5. The SDR assessed the requirement for aircraft carriers
within the overall requirement for an offensive air capability.
It concluded that "there is ... a continuing need for Britain
to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers" and
the emphasis for replacement carriers should be on "increased
offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible
range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles"—The
Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, pages 6-6 to
6-8.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. The CVF will deploy offensive air power in support
of the full spectrum of future operations, including force projection
as a central component of the maritime contribution to joint operations.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
7. The planned out of services dates for HMS Invincible
Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal are 2010, 2012 and 2015 respectively.
The SDR introduced no changes to this programme of withdrawals
from service. The first CVF is scheduled to enter operational
service in 2012 and the second in 2015. The in-service date for
CVF is defined as the "Operational Date Materiel Assessment",
which is the date at which it will be accepted as fit for entry
into the operational fleet.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
8. The CVF procurement strategy is based on competition
and prime contractorship, with clear and unambiguous output requirement
specifications. Although we intend that the ships should be built
in the UK, prospective prime contractors are from the UK and France.
9. In accordance with the Smart Procurement model, the
project is following a two-stage approval process. Invitations
to tender for the Assessment phase were issued in January 1999
to six potential prime contractors—BAe Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, Marconi Electronic Systems, Raytheon, and Thomson-CSF.
Responses were received in May from two teams; the first led by
Thomson-CSF of France with BMT Defence Services Ltd and Raytheon
systems as major sub-contractors; the other by BAe Land and Sea
Systems with Marconi Electronics Systems as a sub-contractors.
Following tender evaluation and face-to-face meetings with industry
it was judged that the bids offered the basis for robust and effective
competition and contracts were awarded to both teams in November
1999. BAe and Marconi subsequently merged to form BAE Systems,
and in February 2000 Lockheed Martin joined the Thomson-CSF team.
10. The Assessment phase comprises two main stages. The
first, analysis of Options, involves the examination of carrier
design options and will help inform the decision, expected in
late 2000/early 2001, on the type of aircraft to meet the Future
Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA, requirement. Progress to the second
stage of Assessment will be subject to satisfactory completion
by BAE Systems and Thomson-CSF of stage one, based on a review
of their performance, and the timeliness and quality of their
deliverables. The second stage will involve detailed work to determine
the carriers' design parameters and to reduce technological risk,
informed by the choice of FCBA. It will culminate in the Main
Gate approval decision, planned for 2003, to down-select to one
preferred prime contractor to proceed to Demonstration and Manufacture
of two carriers. The Demonstration phase will begin with the design
of a virtual prototype by the selected prime contractor, using
computer-aided technology. The intention is to achieve, so far
as possible, a freeze on a mature design before construction begins.
11. A cost model is being developed to generate whole-life
cost estimates for CVF and this will be populated with data from
industry. In the event of competition collapsing, this model would
be used as the basis for No Acceptable Price, No Contract negotiations.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS
12. During Assessment, a wide range of carrier and aircraft
options, including conventional take-off and landing, short take
off and vertical landing, and short take off but arrested recovery
will be considered. As part of this work and following normal
practice, the cost of life-extending the three existing carriers,
by10 years, will be assessed to provide a baseline against which
all the options can be evaluated.
COLLABORATION
13. It is too early to be specific about the prospects
for collaboration. Some informal discussions have taken place
with the US, Spanish, French, and Italian navies to identify any
common ground in carrier replacement programmes or requirements.
At present, whole ship collaboration would appear unlikely to
be a viable option, but collaborative opportunities will be reviewed
during Assessment, especially for equipment and systems.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
14. It is unlikely that this project will lead directly
to whole-ship sales, although the commercial marketing of CVF
design skills and production technology could benefit UK industry.
Much of the ship's equipment could have export potential. Industrial
Participation proposals will be invited, as appropriate, for offshore
content of the proposed solution.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
15. In accordance with government policy for the construction
of warships, the CVF will be built in a UK shipyard. Industrial
factors will be taken into account in the selection of a contractor.
SMART PROCUREMENT
16. The CVF programme will adopt a range of Smart Procurement
techniques including a greater emphasis on identifying, evaluating
and implementing effective trade-offs between system performance,
whole-life costs and time; the adoption of incremental acquisition
for areas such as the combat systems; the use of off-the-shelf
equipment and commercial standards, where appropriate. An Integrated
Project Team, IPT, is managing the project under the leadership
of an industrialist recruited in an open competition. In accordance
with Smart Procurement, what would previously have been Feasibility
and Project Definition stages have been combined into a Single
Assessment phase, with increased investment at this stage to achieve
early risk reduction. The two consortia have been encouraged to
be innovative throughout the project.
ACQUISITION PHASES
17. A number of small-scale pre-feasibility studies were
completed prior to the award of the assessment contracts, described
at paragraph 9. A risk register will be maintained throughout
the life of the project as the core of an integrated risk management
system. It will contain both MoD and contractor inputs from the
Analysis of Options studies undertaken by industry and will be
the focus for work during the Risk Reduction phase. These will
help to provide confidence in the data to be assessed in the Combined
Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal that will support
the Main Gate submission to proceed with Demonstration and Manufacture.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
18. CVF milestones, as currently planned, are shown in
the table below.
| User Requirements Document endorsement and Initial Gate approval
| December 1998 |
| Issue ITT | January 1999
|
| Start Assessment | November 1999
|
| FCBA downselection | late 2000/early 2001
|
| Systems Requirement Document endorsement and Main Gate approval
| late 2003 |
| Order date | late 2004
|
| Contract acceptance date | 2011
|
| ISDs | 2012 and 2015
|
19. We envisage a total acquisition cost for the two
carriers of around £2 billion, including combat system and
initial support costs, but excluding the aircraft. The peak years
of expenditure are likely to be between 2008 and 2012. Costs incurred
so far, including pre-feasibility studies, total just over £5
million.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
20. We plan to investigate the let of a design/build/through-life
support/disposal contract as one package. Collaborative support
arrangements are unlikely.
21. Manning levels will be based on work by human factors
designers, to achieve a balance between automated and manual tasks,
and by training needs analysis, in accordance with the RN training
equipment strategy. The size of ship's complement is planned to
be about the same as for the Invincible class. Contractors will
be tasked to propose the most efficient manning strategies for
their designs, which will be examined during Assessment.
22. All logistic support associated with CVF will be
considered as a direct cost to the project, with an emphasis on
avoiding expenditure on new infrastructure. The maintenance management
system will be required to integrate with other MoD logistic systems
and to take account of emerging developments in IT. Innovative
support solutions will be examined, using Integrated Logistic
Support methodology to minimise costs throughout the ship's life.
23. Contractor Logistic Support CLS, will be examined
for some or all the maintenance and logistics. The benefits of
CLS include a strong focus on reliability for initial designs;
better standards of availability, reliability and maintenance;
and an incentive to the contractor to design and build systems
that minimise support costs. One option to be considered is the
adoption of best practice in supply chain techniques, to minimise
MoD ownership of spares, by contracting for agreed spares availability
from industry. CLS options for up to 30 years will be examined
during Assessment.
24. The upkeep cycle of the CVF will reflect the vessels'
modern design, and developments in upkeep practice such as "reliability
centred maintenance" rather than lengthy and expensive refits.
This will enable availability requirements to be met by only two
carriers.
FRONT LINE
NUMBERS
25. Both CVF will be assigned to the front line.
INTEROPERABILITY
26. The aim is to maximise the interoperability of the
CVF with the greatest possible range of UK and allied aircraft
and with other carriers, to the extent that this can be achieved
cost-effectively. Clearly, the type of aircraft chosen as FCBA
will be a major factor in determining the degree of interoperability
with other nations, especially within NATO. The issue will be
explored further during Assessment with due regard for the developing
FCBA business case.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
27. Prospects for the sale of the Invincible class to
other nations will be explored in due course.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
28. Each CVF is planned to have an in-service life of
30 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
29. The CVF programme is closely linked with the FCBA
and Future Organic Airborne Early Warning programmes.
EUROFIGHTER
Eurofighter is an agile fighter aircraft that will serve
as the cornerstone of the RAF's fighting capability from the early
years of this century. The 232 aircraft we plan to acquire will
replace the Tornado F3 and Jaguar in air defence and offensive
air support roles. Eurofighter is being developed in a collaborative
project with Germany, Italy and Spain. Contracts for the production
of the first tranche of 148 aircraft, of which 55 are for the
RAF, were signed in September 1998 and the UK expects first deliveries
in June 2002.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The original European Staff Target for the Eurofighter—then
European Fighter Aircraft, EFA—was signed in Rome on 11
October 1984, by France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The
nations' air forces agreed a requirement for a new fighter aircraft
to enter service in the 1990s. EFA was to be agile and designed
to fulfil air defence, including air superiority and interception,
and air to surface roles. France attached equal importance to
both roles; all other nations, while wishing to retain good air-to-surface
capability, recognised air-to-air as the conditioning role. EFA
was to be capable of intercepting, fighting in air combat, and
destroying a wide range of aerial targets including cruise missiles,
remotely piloted vehicles and drones at a threat level expected
in the mid 1990s and beyond, as well as attacking enemy airfields
and enemy surface forces. EPA was to be able to operate in the
electronic warfare environment of a late 1990s European scenario
by day and by night, in all weathers for air defence and in poor
visibility and low cloud-base for its air-to-surface role. The
numerical superiority of hostile air forces was to be compensated
for by EFA's superior quality and operational flexibility. Low
observability and survivability were key design goals, as were
reliability, maintainability and testability.
2. Following a 1984-85 feasibility study, the other four
nations found it impossible to reconcile all their requirements
with those of France, which wanted a lighter aircraft that would
not provide the overall operational capability required by the
others. France accordingly withdrew from the programme in August
1985. The key parameters agreed by the other nations—an
unstable, delta-winged aircraft, with canards, to have a "basic
mass empty" of 9.75 metric tonnes, a wing area of 50 square
metres and two engines each producing a static sea level thrust
of 90 kilonewtons—were incorporated in the European Staff
Requirement, ESR, and signed by the four Chiefs of Air Staffs
in December 1985.
3. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the re-unification
of Germany led to a "reorientation" of the programme.
The ESR needed to be updated to reflect the radically changed
political and military situation in Europe after 1989 and to address
the requirement for the year 2000 and beyond, taking account of
EFA development work. Amendments were embodied in the European
Staff Requirement for Development, ESR-D, of a European Fighter
2000—Eurofighter—signed on 21 January 1994. The ESR-D
acknowledges that specific threats are no longer predictable in
detail, but stipulates that a future European fighter aircraft
must be capable of operating effectively in a variety of roles
and theatres.
TRADE-OFFS
4. ***.
NUMBERS
5. The original requirement of the four partner nations
was for a total of 765 aircraft—250 for Germany, 165 for
Italy, 100 for Spain and 250 for the UK. The current requirement
is for 620 aircraft—180 for Germany, 121 for Italy, 87 for
Spain and 232 for the UK. Germany, Italy and Spain reduced their
numbers during the reorientation. The UK reduced its own requirement
following studies that concluded that the UK required 232 aircraft
to meet its operational commitments. The UK is now committed contractually
to the Tranche 1 production of 55 aircraft. Future production
contracts would commit the UK to 89 and 88 aircraft for Tranches
2 and 3 respectively.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
6. The SDR confirmed our commitment to acquiring 232
Eurofighter aircraft. The acquisition of Eurofighter will provide
a step change in the RAF's ability to achieve air superiority
and provide air defence. Its multi-role capability will also allow
it to fulfil the ground attack roles now performed by Jaguar.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
7. Eurofighter will bring a significant increase in our
air superiority capability as it replaces the Tornado F3. It will
also provide a true, adverse weather, multi-role capability. This
will allow it to be employed in the full spectrum of air operations
from air policing to peace support through to high intensity conflict.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
8. The Eurofighter will replace the Tornado F3 and Jaguar,
the out of service dates for which are 2010 and 2008 respectively.
The currently forecast in-service date for Eurofighter, defined
as the date of the delivery of the first aircraft to the RAF,
is June 2002. This represents a delay of 42 months against the
original ISD of December 1998. The slippage is attributable to
procurement delays caused by reorientation, delays in signature
of the Memoranda of Understanding for the Production and Support
phases, some 22 months slippage, and technical difficulties resulting
from the application of complex technologies required to enable
the equipment to meet the original Staff Requirement, some 20
months slippage. The definition of the ISD for Eurofighter relates
to procurement factors and was agreed internationally some years
ago.
***
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
9. Early work in each participating country by defence
contractors working to their national governments was co-ordinated
under Memoranda of Understanding between the partner nations.
Full collaborative development was launched in 1988. Collaborative
Production Investment and Production including Initial Support,
was launched by the partner nations at the end of 1997, following
signature of further MoUs, and contracts were signed in January
1998. Contracts for production of the first tranche of 148 aircraft,
including 55 for the RAF, were signed in September 1998.
10. Eurofighter development and production are undertaken
by two consortia. Eurofighter GmbH, and Eurojet GmbH. Eurofighter
comprises BAE Systems from the UK, DASA from Germany, Alenia from
Italy and CASA from Spain, and is responsible for developing and
producing the airframe, avionics and the other aircraft systems,
and for the integration of the EJ200 engine. The latter is being
developed and produced by Eurojet GmbH, comprising Rolls-Royce
from the UK, MTU from Germany, Fiat from Italy and ITP from Spain.
11. The purchasing arrangements are described in further
detail in the table at Annex.
COLLABORATION
12. Government oversight of the programme is exercised
through the Board of Directors of the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado
Development, Production and Logistics Management Agency, NETMA,
which carries out day to day management of the international contracts.
The Agency has some 300 staff and an annual budget of about 75
million DM. Funding for the agency is shared in accordance with
the respective participation of each nation in the Eurofighter
and Tornado programmes. The UK contribution is about 35%. The
UK national project office element of the programme is managed
by an Integrated Project Team (IPT), which co-ordinates UK input
to the programme and provides national oversight, currently comprises
some 111 staff. Its annual budget is about £5 million.
13. Development work and costs are shared on the basis
of nations' planned production off-takes, as declared in 1987,
giving the UK and Germany 33% shares each, Italy 21% and Spain
13%. Production Investment and Production work and cost share
are based on aircraft off-take declared at the start of these
phases in 1997, giving the UK some 37.5% share, Germany 29%, Italy
19.5% and Spain 14%.
14. Seven MoUs commit the four collaborative partners
to the various phases of the programme and its management.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
15. Eurofighter GmbH has identified several potential
customers for Eurofighter in Europe, the Middle East; the Pacific
Rim; and South America. In Europe, Greece has stated that it will
buy up to 90 Eurofighters subject to satisfactory negotiations,
and Norway is close to completing its evaluation of Eurofighter
and F16 bids. Export sales could run to several hundred aircraft
over many years but there will be competition from a variety of
American, French and Russian combat aircraft types.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
16. The Eurofighter project is fundamental to maintaining
an industrial capability within the UK for the design and build
of advanced military aircraft. As the only suitably qualified
UK firms to undertake the development manufacture of advanced
fast jet aircraft and engines, BAE Systems and Rolls Royce were
the natural choice as the major UK partners. Similar factors influenced
the selection of contractors by our collaborative partners.
SMART PROCUREMENT
17. The Eurofighter programme embraces several Smart
Procurement features. The UK has an integrated project team with
collocated operational requirements, procurement and logistics
staff. The design standard of delivered aircraft will follow an
incremental acquisition path, with the first aircraft being delivered
to an initial standard—to allow early training—with
full standard delivered later to meet the declaration of operational
capability. The prices negotiated with industry have taken account
of efficiency improvements by industry: arrangements have been
agreed to share further efficiency benefits beyond those already
included in the price. Elements of the production contracts include
firm, non-revisable prices for the five years and, for subsequent
years. Variation of Price formulae based on Producer Output Indices.
There is provision for liquidated damages and the right of termination.
Much effort is being put into developing a partnership with industry
to support the aircraft in service.
ACQUISITION PHASES
18. There are four distinct phases within the Eurofighter
programme: pre-development, development, production and support.
19. Pre-development comprised a number of activities.
Following early concept studies and various efforts to establish
a collaborative programme, two key demonstration activities were
completed by the UK before development: the Experimental Aircraft
Programme, an airframe programme primarily aimed at proving the
feasibility of unstable flight control concepts, and the XG40
engine demonstrator programme at Rolls Royce. The results of these
demonstrators and associated studies, and similar work by the
other nations, were harmonised in a definition, refinement and
risk reduction phase that ran from the end of 1985, when the four
nations signed the MoU covering this phase, to 1988.
20. The main development contracts were signed in November
1988 and amended in November 1995.
21. The Eurofighter production contract strategy is based
on an "umbrella contract" that secures maximum prices
for all production investment and the total order of 620 aircraft.
Commitments against this contract are made as a series of supplements
against fixed prices within the overall maximum price. The umbrella
contract and the first supplement covering production investment
were signed in January 1998. The second supplement, covering the
production of the first tranche of 148 aircraft, was signed in
September 1998.
22. Integrated logistic support procedures were embedded
in the programme from the outset, to ensure that adequate attention
was given to support issues throughout the development phase.
Concurrently with the umbrella contract, the first two support
procurement contracts were let, following agreement that industry
would ensure that support is available when the first aircraft
is delivered.
23. A reliability maintenance panel meets every three
months to monitor progress against the reliability plan. In-service
demonstration is also part of the programme.
24. The current assessment of risks associated with the
timely completion of the programme highlights the integration
of the avionics within the overall weapon system and the achievement
of incremental increases to avionic functionality. Risk management
processes in industry and the MoD, and contractual incentives
for industry, aim to ensure that these risks do not impact adversely
on delivery.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
25. The four nations signed the Full Development MoU
and consequent contracts in November 1988. MoUs for Production
Investment/Production and Support were signed in December 1997.
These were followed by signature of the Production Investment/Production
and Support overarching contracts in January 1998 and the first
tranche of production contracts in September 1998. The first aircraft
is scheduled to be delivered to the UK in mid-2002. Dates for
the two further production tranches have still to be determined.
26. Details of expenditure of 31 March 1999 and further
expenditure in prospect are provided in the table at Annex.[1]
27. In the event of late delivery, the production contracts
with Eurofighter GmbH and Eurojet GmbH both include provision
for liquidated damages up to a maximum of 3% of individual weapon
system value. All interim payments made prior to delivery are
subject to the achievement of technical milestones. If a milestone
is not achieved, payment is withheld.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
28. Support of Eurofighter is being managed collaboratively
to reduce life cycle costs. MoUs and International Framing Agreements
aim to ensure that all elements of the project are taken forward
on an agreed international basis. Costs are shared in proportion
to the aircraft off-take of each nation. This is the first major
international project to apply integrated logistic support, ILS,
procedures, thus enabling all aspects of logistic support to be
optimised. Emphasis is being placed on partnership with industry
to define the most cost-effective solution.
29. The Eurofighter IPT is maintaining close liaison
with all three RAF Commands throughout the planning process to
ensure that the end users contribute to the development of support
policy and have a clear understanding of the developing support
concepts. The IPT is also ensuring that, where it is cost effective,
maximum use is made of existing support capability; and also that,
where possible, any new generic support equipment being procured
is compatible with Eurofighter.
30. The most obvious potential bottleneck is the support
infrastructure at the Main Operating Bases, MOBs. As each MOB
converts, there will be a short period where both Tornado F3 and
Eurofighter will be required to operate together and, as each
maintenance facility is converted, the Tornado F3 would potentially
be left unsupported. This risk will be overcome by ensuring that
the MOBs provide mutual support during the conversion phase. Another
potential problem that has been identified is the maintenance
of minimum manning levels at the front line whilst training the
first tranche of Eurofighter tradesmen, and building up the Operational
Conversion Unit and the first squadrons. Such potential difficulties
are being addressed by a series of working groups. All are currently
considered to be manageable.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE, AND
RESERVES
31. The active RAF fleet of Eurofighter will be 137 aircraft,
covering the seven front-line squadrons, the Operational Conversion
Unit, OCU, and the Operational Evaluation Unit. Each squadron
will have one in use reserve and the OCU will have two in use
reserves giving a total of nine. The remaining aircraft allow
for assumptions of attrition and overall use of the aircraft over
the 25 year life of the aircraft, with the last aircraft being
scheduled for delivery in 2014. The fleet once in steady state
will be managed around engineering requirements, such as scheduled
servicing and modification programmes.
INTEROPERABILITY
32. Interoperability is fundamental to Eurofighter design.
The Eurofighter programme has adhered to Standard NATO Agreements
and protocols to ensure Eurofighter's compatibility with current
and future systems, both operational and logistic.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
33. The aircraft being replaced will be at the end of
their productive lives and will probably be scrapped.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
34. Eurofighter is planned to be in service for 25 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
35. Unlike previous programmes, where major enhancements
were incorporated via a major in-service upgrade, we shall, following
Smart Procurement principles, establish a programme for through-life
evolution of the RAF Eurofighter fleet. The aim is to acquire
and incorporate emerging technology, on an incremental basis,
to maintain the capability of the weapon system. Partnership between
the MoD and industry will provide the necessary expertise and
focus to enable us to identify, prioritise and pursue modifications
to Eurofighter that balance operational effectiveness, life cycle
costs and obsolescence issues.
36. Adapting Eurofighter for operations from aircraft
carriers, or "marinising", is one of the possible solutions
being considered to meet the requirement for the Future Carrier
Borne Aircraft. Various Eurofighter derivatives are also among
the options being considered to meet the requirement for Future
Offensive Aircraft Systems.
April 2000
1
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