Annex (continued)
TYPE 45 ANTI-AIR WARFARE DESTROYER AND ITS
PRINCIPAL ANTI-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM (PAAMS)
The Common New Generation Frigate, CNGF, a collaborative
programme with France and Italy, was planned to replace the UK's
Type 42 destroyers in the early part of the century. CNGF comprised
two distinct collaborative programmes: the Principal Anti Air
Missile System, PAAMS, and the ship with its other systems, Horizon.
Whilst the contract for the development and initial production
of PAAMS has been placed, the "Horizon" project did
not progress satisfactorily. The three nations agreed on 25 April
1999 that it would not be cost-effective to pursue a single prime
contract for the ship and that the tri-national Horizon programme
would end upon completion of its Project Definition and Initial
Design Phase (Phase1) at the end of October 1999. The UK is now
taking forward its ship programme, designated the Type 45 Anti-Air
Warfare Destroyer Programme, through a national prime contract,
building on the tri-national project work already carried out
and pursuing opportunities for co-operative procurement in equipping
the ships.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. PAAMS and Horizon both derived from the
single Tri-Partite Staff Requirement for CNGF. The requirement
was approved by the three participating nations, the UK, France
and Italy, in December 1992. The UK requirement was, and continues
to be in the national Type 45 programme, for a ship to provide
effective area air defence against aircraft and missiles, to replace
the Type 42 destroyers. At the start of Project Definition for
Horizon in 1995, the intention was that PAAMS would provide an
anti-war warfare capability sufficient to meet the most demanding
threat foreseen. It was subsequently agreed that the initial capability
sought should be sufficient to meet the most demanding threat
forecast at the then expected in-services date for CNGF (2004),
but that a growth path to provide the capability necessary to
address future predicted threats would also be identified as part
of this work. This remains the position for the Type 45, and we
have revalidated that PAAMS will be able to meet the most demanding
threat foreseen for 2007 when the Type 45 is due to enter service.
TRADE OFFS
2. The principal cost/capability trade-off
in the PAAMS programme has been the acceptance of a capability
sufficient to meet the threat at ISD, rather than beyond. Studies
into cost/capability and programme/capability trade-offs for Project
Horizon to achieve an affordable CNGF were undertaken as part
of Phase 1 of its programme which completed on 31 October 1999.
This work is being carried forward into the UK's national programme.
NUMBERS
3. The UK planning assumption is for the
acquisition of 12 Type 45s. (The Horizon Memorandum of Understanding
assumed French and Italian procurement of four and six ships respectively).
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
4. The requirement to replace the Type 42
destroyers was scrutinised in the Strategic Defence Review. No
changes were made to the operational case underpinning Project
Horizon, which will now be addressed by a national warship contract.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
5. Type 45 destroyers equipped with PAAMS
will provide area defence against aircraft and missiles, including
local area defence against modern anti-ship missiles, to protect
lightly armed or unarmed ships. In this role, the warships will
support maritime assets across the range, from RoRo vessels through
amphibious assault ships to aircraft carriers, in both UK national
and allied/coalition operations. In addition, the Type 45—in
common with all destroyers and frigates—will be a multi-role,
general-purpose platform capable of operations across the spectrum
of tasks, from peace support to high intensity warfare.
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
(ISD)
6. The warship and PAAMS are planned to
replace the capability currently provided in the Type 42 destroyer
with its GWS30 Sea Dart weapon system. The Type 42s are scheduled
to be withdrawn from service from the Type 45 first of class in
service date and then at intervals staged to match the in service
dates of incoming hulls, with the exception of HMS Birmingham,
which left service in 1999.
7. The ISD for CNGF was defined as the completion
of Part IV Trials, which indicate the ship is fit to enter service.
The original estimated ISD was December 2002. This slipped, largely
owing to the need to synchronise the warship and combat system
programmes, and the internationally agreed ISD for CNGF was amended
to June 2004. The latest offer from industry pointed to a UK first
of class CNGF being further delayed until 2007. We are confident
that the Type 45 first of class can be delivered within a similar
timescale and the 12 ship build programme is planned to complete
in 2014. ISD definition has since been revised to reflect the
availability of the Destroyer for operational tasking after sea
training. This will normally be two months after the completion
of Part IV Trials. There is no effect on the programme as a result
of this change.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
8. Marconi Electronic Systems, MES, was
appointed as the prime contractor for the Type 45 Programme on
23 November 1999 when it was also contracted to complete the Preparation
for Demonstration, PFD, phase of the programme. This responsibility
has passed to BAE Systems now that the merger of MES and British
Aerospace has taken place. Appointment of BAE Systems will ensure:
the minimum of delay to the overall programme; that maximum benefit
is carried forward into the UK national programme from the work
already done under the tri-national Horizon programme; and that
the prime contractor will own much of the risk associated with
that earlier work.
9. The MoD's concern is to maintain a competitive
base, not only for the Type 45 build programme but also for the
downstream Future Surface Combatant. With this in mind, Vosper
Thornycroft, VT, is also being involved in the Type 45 PFD contract.
Following successful completion of this phase, the next stage
will be a contract with the prime contractor for the demonstration
and first of class manufacture, DFM, phase ie including the build
of the first-of-class ship planned for award later this year.
The MOD and the company will then have higher confidence in a
programme that can meet the Royal Navy's requirement on time and
within budget. Subject to satisfactory progress, the DFM prime
contract will also involve VT and Marconi Marine (YSL) Ltd with
a view to allowing the efficient construction of Type 45 Destroyers
at both yards. The detailed contractual arrangements for the DFM
phase remain under consideration and it remains the MoD's intention
to oversee the competition for follow-on ships. In line with MoD
policy, there are no plans to extend competition for warship construction
to yards overseas.
10. Collaboration continues with France
and Italy on PAAMS, and, on 11 August 1999, France placed a contract
on behalf of the three nations for Full Scale Engineering Development
and Initial Production, FSED/IP, with the tri-national consortium
EUROPAAMS acting as prime contractor. Prime contractor members
were nominated by their governments and the UK member is UKAMS
which began as jointly owned subsidiary of Siemens Plessey, GEC
and BAe SEMA who were selected on their industrial capabilities
to provide the equipment required—see paragraph 17 below.
Following subsequent restructuring, UKAMS is now a wholly owned
subsidiary of Matra BAe Dynamics. FSED/IP sub-contracts have now
been let by the prime contractor to all the main equipment suppliers.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS
11. Before the 1996 MOU was signed, the
UK considered a number of procurement options, including life
extension of Type 42s and acquisition of off-the-shelf alternatives.
COLLABORATION
12. The PAAMS Programme MOU and its FSED/IP
Supplement were signed by France, Italy and the UK in March 1996.
The UK share of the costs of PAAMS FSED/IP will be higher than
those of France and Italy because of the costs of developing the
Sampson Radar used only in the UK variant, and because the UK
is making a contribution to the cost of the Franco-Italian technology
in the FSAF Programme, Family of Future Surface to Air Missile
Systems, being used for PAAMS.
13. The PAAMS Programme is managed by the
tri-national PAAMS Programme Office, PPO, in Paris which reports
to a tri-national Steering Committee. The aim is to delegate as
much programme management work as possible to the PPO although
co-ordination of UK policy on PAAMS remains the responsibility
of the Type 45 Integrated Project Team (IPT). A new charter that
sets out the arrangements for co-ordinating between PAAMS and
the national Type 45 ship-programme has been agreed with France
and Italy, in place of the previous PAAMS/Horizon charter, as
has a charter between PAAMS and the new Franco/Italian bi-lateral
Horizon programme.
14. At 1 February 2000, the PPO had 21 full
time staff: 10 UK, five Italian and six French; and four part
time staff, one Italian and three French. The UK also has one
member of staff located with the FSAF Project Office in Paris.
The tri-national JPO located in London disbanded on completion
of the Project Definition and Initial Design Phase of Project
Horizon on 31 October 1999. The Type 45 IPT has an annual running
costs budget of £4 million including salaries and expenses
of UK staff working in the PPO and FSAF Project Office.
15. The reasons for the failure of the tri-national
Horizon programme were the subject of analysis by the tri-national
Horizon Joint Project Office, JPO, and Horizon Steering Committee.
A short paper which synthesised their and others' views into a
single national "lessons learned" report which could
be used to inform the UK's approach to future potential collaborative
ventures has been compiled and a copy is attached at Annex A.
16. The potential for achieving economies
of scale by co-operation purchasing of common items in the Type45
and Franco-Italian Horizon programmes has been explored without
success to date. An opportunity exists later in the year to revisit
the question when Type 45 and Horizon equipment selections will
have been identified.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
17.
Export potential for the system as a whole is constrained
by its high technological specification and cost, but elements
of the system such as PAAMS—and in particular its associated
multi-function radar SAMPSON—may have considerable export
prospects to the value of several billion pounds over the next
fifteen years. There could be prospects in refit programmes as
well as in new build hulls.
INDUSTRIAL
FACTORS
18. For PAAMS, the Matra BAe Dynamics UKAMS
consortium was formed out of the companies possessing the technologies
crucial to the programme—notably the existing FSAF contractors
and the Sampson supplier Siemens Plessey Systems, now BAe Defence
Systems Ltd. PAAMS work share is constrained by existing FSAF
arrangements, but the aim is to achieve equitable work share throughout
the life of the programme as far as possible, subject to considerations
of cost-effectiveness and competition.
19. For the national warship programme MES,
as part of GEC, was part of the Horizon International Joint Venture
Company, IJVC, and was thus heavily involved with the work that
was undertaken by the IJVC during the Horizon Project Definition
and Initial Design Stage which completed at the end of October
1999. To avoid further delay to the programme to replace the Type
42 destroyers, it was essential that the chosen prime contractor
would be able to make maximum use of the outputs of the HORIZON
definition work, and demonstrate an ability to resource the programme
and the timelines in partnership with the IPT.
SMART PROCUREMENT
20. The Type 45 Programme is being undertaken
within the principles of the Smart Procurement Initiative, SPI.
The Type 45 IPT was formally established in September 1999 with
the single Prime Contractor Organisation, PCO, working with the
MOD project team at Bristol. A charter to set out the working
ethos between the DPA and PCO has been agreed. The MOD is confident
that the SPI approach to requirements management, through the
development of an initial operating capability, which could be
progressively enhanced through a programme of incremental upgrading,
will enable the first of class ship to be delivered on time and
to cost.
21. The principal lessons for the UK learned
from the outcome of the Horizon programme covering, procurement
strategy, risk reduction, communication with industry at an early
stage of the project and affordability, are already built into
the Smart Procurement Initiative.
ACQUISITION PHASES
22. The PAAMS FSED/IP Phase is now well
under way, following contract placement on 11 August 1999. This
includes the supply of the systems and associated equipments and
spares for the three nations' first of class ships. Systems for
follow-on ships will be covered by a second supplement to the
PAAMS programme MOU on which formal negotiations with France and
Italy have opened.
23. For the warship, the prime contractor
BAe Systems was contracted in November 1999 to complete the Preparation
for Demonstration, PFD, phase. Phase 1, Project Definition and
Initial Design, of the aborted tri-national Horizon programme
completed on 31 October 1999 and the prime contractor has indicated
that he will pull through some 70% of Horizon output into the
national Type 45 Programme.
24. The PFD contract is planned to complete
later this year, following which Main gate approval will be sought
for DFM, phase—see paragraph nine above.
MILESTONES
AND COSTS
25. Table 1 below shows the currently planned
milestones and approved budget for MPR99 price base.
Table 1
|
| Original
| Current |
|
| Approved Expenditure | £1,367 million
| £1,345 million |
| Start of PAAMS FSED/IP | September 1996
| August 1999 |
| Start of warship assessment phase | July 1999
| July 1999 |
| Completion of Horizon Phase 1 | July 1998
| October 1999 |
| Completion of warship assessment phase |
End 2000 | End 2000
|
|
26. Delays in the PAAMS programme were largely related
to slow progress in agreeing a procurement strategy with partners,
and then in negotiating a satisfactory contract.
27. Table 2 below shows expenditure to date, updated
to 1999 prices. Forward commitment amounts to £881 million.
For the PAAMS FSED/IP and national warship contracts, the total
cost is expected to be of the order of £6 billion including
£2.2 billion total acquisition costs for PAAMS. The years
of peak expenditure are expected to be 2005-06 to 2007-08.
Table 2
|
| Spend to Date
|
|
| Pre 1996-97 (see Note 1) | £103 million
|
| 1996-97—Start of Horizons Phase 1 |
£8 million |
| 1997-98 | £13 million
|
| 1998-99 | £17 million
|
| 1999-2000 (forecast) | £116 million
|
|
Note 1: Includes aborted NFR Programme costs, around £7
million.
28. Under the terms of the Horizon MOU, the UK carried
liabilities in respect of additional expenses associated with
winding up the Horizon Joint Project Office/International Joint
Venture Company, IJVC. Following completion of the contract, the
IJVC has been wound up without any claim on the MoD. The JPO was
closed on 31 October 1999, no additional expenses being incurred.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
29. A common support arrangement for spares and maintenance
was proposed for CNGF. Under the national programme, opportunities
for co-operative procurement will be pursued, including any opportunities
for shared support.
30. Ship staff training and spares storage are potential
bottlenecks. Increased use of experienced Type 42 crew would reduce
the load on pre-joining training, and thus the training bottleneck,
when the Type 42 replacement comes into service. Use of computer
based training will reduce disruption to operational programmes.
"Just In Time" stock management techniques will reduce
the volume of spares to be held, thus minimising the need for
new storage facilities during the transition period.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE AND
RESERVE
31. Assuming a class of 12 ships, 9 or 10 would on average
be available at any one time to the Commander in Chief Fleet for
tasking, while two or three would be undergoing maintenance, including
one or two in refit. It is not planned to hold any ships in storage
or as in-use reserves.
INTEROPERABILITY
32. Commonality of the majority of PAAMS systems and
sub-systems, including in particular the Aster missile, will ensure
a good level of interoperability with both France and Italy. In
a warship context, the requirement for interoperability will be
re-examined under the revised procurement strategy, but given
the primary Force Anti-Air Warfare role of the ship this will
remain a high priority.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
33. The sales potential of Type 42s is being considered.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
34. The Type 45 is planned to have an in-service life
of 25 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
35. The Type 45's systems and sub-systems will be updated
as appropriate throughout the life of the system to take account
of developments in the operational environment. It is likely that
the Future Surface Combatant and Future Carrier programmes, currently
in the early stages of concept development, will both draw on
major elements of the Type 45.
ADVANCED SHORT RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE—ASRAAM
ASRAAM, Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile, is a highly
agile missile which is due to be deployed on the Tornado F3 and
Harrier GR7 to replace the Sidewinder AIM-9L missile, and will
also be fitted to Eurofighter. Although ASRAAM was originally
conceived as a collaborative project, our partners withdrew when
the programme encountered difficulties. ASRAAM was re-endorsed
as a national programme in 1990. Contracts for Full Development
and Production were let in 1992.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The requirement for a highly agile missile with good
infra red counter measure resistance was driven by the need for
short-range air superiority in visual combat. Such a missile would
provide Eurofighter with a substantial advantage against the forecast
threat at the turn of the century, and would be complementary
to Skyflash and the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile, BVRAAM—see
separate memorandum.[5]
The missile would, additionally, be an important factor in the
overall capability of the Tornado F3 and the ability of offensive
air support aircraft, such as Harrier, to defend themselves effectively.
2. Initially, the UK sought to meet the national requirement
for a short-range air-to-air missile through participation in
a collaborative development for a family of weapons. In accordance
with a Memorandum of Understanding between the UK, the US and
Germany, signed in 1980, a tri-national Staff Requirement was
agreed in October 1984. Subsequent budgetary pressures, technical
and management problems, and changes to US requirements caused
our partners to withdraw from the project. The Staff Requirement
was re-endorsed as a UK national programme in 1990 without any
significant changes since the original approval.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Although the programme has encountered some technical
difficulties and slippage, the UK's Staff Requirement, as re-endorsed
in 1990, has not been altered.
NUMBERS
4. The original NATO stockpile requirement for *** missiles
as at December 1987, was ***, with options on a further *** in
September 1990, as a result of changes in the threat assessment
and in the Eurofighter programme. Following a review of the operational
and training usage of ASRAAM missiles, based on planning assumptions
for Eurofighter and Harrier GR7, a second tranche,*** missiles
was approved in January 1994. Of these *** missiles on order,
*** will be for full operational use and *** will be telemetery
missiles for trials firing.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
5. The Strategic Defence Review did not affect the requirement
or existing orders.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. ASRAAM will provide a significant contribution to
achieving and maintaining air superiority. It will be employed
in the full spectrum of air operations from air policing to peace
support through to high intensity conflict.
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
7. ASRAAM will replace Sidewinder AIM-9L on Tornado F3
and Harrier GR7 in a phased programme starting this year. Sidewinder
is currently due to remain in service until 2018 on the Tornado
GR4, but we are considering whether to integrate ASRAAM on to
all combat aircraft in order to rationalise air to air missile
stocks. Sidewinder could then be withdrawn from RAF service.
8. Details of the In-Service Date are given at Annex.[6]
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
9. Under the provisions of the 1980 MoU, the US was to
develop an advanced medium range air-to-air missile, and the UK
and Germany, along with Norway and Canada, who had subsequently
joined the programme, were to develop the short-range system.
The European programme was managed by a joint project office,
with Bodenseewerk Geratetechnik GmbH and British Aerospace Dynamics
Ltd as the principal contractors. The programme encountered difficulties
over the missile configuration, the establishment of effective
collaborative arrangements in industry, and the identification
of an affordable product. Germany withdrew from the programme
in 1989 and the US, Norway and Canada in 1990.
10. Once ASRAAM had been re-endorsed as a UK national
programme in 1990, an invitation to tender was issued on 1 May
1991. It called for a package deal, covering development, production
and associated logistic support of the missile and its associated
training variants. We also stipulated the minimum use of Government
Furnished Facilities and Equipment, and the earliest possible
ISD.
11. A number of candidate weapons were considered. British
Aerospace Defence Ltd, Raytheon, a consortium of GEC, Marconi
and Matra, Bodenseewerk Geratetechnik GmbH, BGT, and Loral Aeronutronic
all expressed an interest in the competition. In the event, Raytheon
and Loral did not respond to the ITT. The BAe bid of ASRAAM, the
GEC Marconi/Matra bid of MICAASRAAM and the BGT AIM9L IRIS were
considered as options in early 1992. Other weapons, including
a further BGT bid, the AIM 9LI, an improvement over the standard
AIM9L, and a number of US options either in service or in development
were also considered, but were not assessed as capable of meeting
the UK requirement.
12. The BAe bid met the Staff Requirement and offered
a number of advantages over the BGT and GEC Marconi/Matra bids.
BAe Defence Ltd, now Matra BAe Dynamics Ltd, was awarded a fixed
price contract on 31 March 1992.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
13. ASRAAM won its first export order in December 1998
when it was selected for the Royal Australian Air Force. There
is also interest from a number of other nations. This type of
missile has historically sold in the tens of thousands. Missiles
with similar capabilities are being built in the USA, Germany,
Russia and Israel.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
14. The decision on the main development and production
contracts took account of the employment implications for the
UK. Matra BAe Dynamics estimated that more than 80% of the work
in total would be in the UK, securing some 7,000 jobs. The GEC
Marconi/Matra bid offered only 50% of work in the UK, although
they estimated that this would rise to 70% if potential sales
were achieved.
SMART PROCUREMENT
15. Matra BAe Dynamics Ltd proposed in September 1998
a number of Smart Procurement "gain sharing" initiatives,
including the introduction of a more powerful processor into the
missile, and better alignment of missile production deliveries
with candidate aircraft platforms leading to a revised ISD of
***. A contract amendment was agreed in September 1999.
ACQUISITION PHASES
16. The acquisition phases are shown in the table below:
|
| Phase | Date |
Activity |
|
| Pre-feasibility | January 1981
| Endorsement of UK support to NATO operational objectives for ASRAAM & AMRAAM
|
| Feasibility | June 1982 |
Systems studies including IR detectors, transparent materials and sub-systems
|
| Project definition | December 1984
| Design of prototype missile and launcher sub-systems
|
Project Definition Amendment
—re-definition 1
| December 1987 | Confirmation of image processing algorithms; manufacture of inert safety and arming units and design of strap down software
|
Project Definition Amendment
—re-definition 2
| July 1988 | Study into detailed proposals for an integrated missile configuration and more efficient management structure
|
| Development & Production | March 1992
| Full development and production of ASRAAM starts
|
|
17. Completion of design and development of the seeker
software remains the most critical of the programme risks. Much
of this work is dependent on flying and firing trials, conducted
at the US Eglin range. The most recent trial, in September 1999,
met its primary objectives.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
18. Approvals for the development stage are listed above.
Details of expenditure to 31 March 1999, and of further expenditure
to which the MoD is committed, are given at Annex.
19. Delays to the programme reached a point where liquidated
damages became due and these will be collected in the form of
consideration payments totalling some £19 million the amended
contract, see paragraph 15, makes provision for further liquidated
damages, a maximum of 6% of the value of delivered items, against
delivery of the new processor missiles.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
20. ASRAAM is an industry-supported missile, with the
bulk of its maintenance to be undertaken by the prime contractor.
Although Eurofighter aircraft delivered to Germany, Spain and
Italy will be able to fire ASRAAM, these nations are not committed
to buying ASRAAM. At least initially, therefore, in-service support
costs will fall to the UK.
21. Most of the support equipment and handling procedures
for ASRAAM will be the same as for the current AIM-9L weapon.
However, there will be a substantial reduction in routine servicing
requirements at the front line, since all major servicing will
be undertaken by industry. Storage is a potential bottleneck,
as ASRAAM stocks are built up without equivalent reductions in
AIM-9L stocks. A Weapon Loading and Storage Study is addressing
these issues. Since the operational and training missiles both
have classified software, unlike the current air-to-air weapons,
of which only the operational weapons are classified, modified
handling procedures will be needed.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE AND
RESERVES NUMBERS
22. Current plans for operational missiles require ***
to be placed in storage and *** to be allocated to Main Operating
Bases. The remainder are telemetered rounds.
INTEROPERABILITY
23. ASRAAM has demonstrated its compatibility with earlier
AIM9L launch equipment and interfaces. It is capable of being
carried and fired, with minimum modification, by all UK and other
allied air forces' aircraft that can carry and employ AIM9L, including
Sea Harrier. The system is compatible with the new rail launchers
on Harrier GR7 and on Eurofighter. It is also designed to be employed
using multiple sensors, such as the infra red search and track
systems and helmet-mounted sights planned for Eurofighter, as
well as radar.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
24. Surplus Sidewinders may have potential for resale.
Missiles that cannot be sold will have no operational use and
will be scrapped.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
25. ASRAAM is planned to be in service for 25 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
26. It is intended to establish a programme of through-life
development, in conjunction with Australia. This will involve
the acquisition of emerging technology on an incremental basis.***
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