Replies to further written answers submitted
to the Ministry of Defence concerning oral evidence given by CDP
and DCDS(EC) (20 June 2000)
Q1. What sort of "smart default points
are the MoD likely to use to manage progress with the BVRAAM programme,
once a contract is negotiated?
A1. A. There are four smart default milestones
for BVRAAM.
— Boost/sustain motor transition and
sustain motor operation at high angles of attack and side slip.
The transition from boost motor to sustain
motor and sustained motor operation will be demonstrated through
trials, including wind tunnel testing, culminating in ground launch
firings.
— The control of an asymmetric airframe.
The control of the airframe aerodynamics
will be demonstrated through a series of tests culminating in
ground launch firings.
— Aircraft/missile misalignment.
The effect of static and dynamic misalignment
of the missile and platform will be quantified through mathematical
modelling validated by air carriage trials.
— Electronic Protection Measures.
Performance of the missile against jamming
and other countermeasures will be demonstrated through simulation
in a synthetic environment leading to verification through live
firings.
Q2. What arguments are there for tying the
Eurofighter partners to their declared requirements for specific
aircraft numbers, and what are the financial consequences of any
country changing the numbers they will take (QQ 20, 21)?
A2. The Eurofighter Production Investment
(PI) and Production Memorandum of Understanding(MOU 6) signed
by Partner Nations in December 1997 committed the Partners to
a total of 620 aircraft, of which 232 are for the RAF, to the
procured in three tranches. In addition to the commitment in the
MOU, the Partner Nations are contractually committed to the production
of the first tranche of 148 aircraft, 55 of which are for the
RAF.
The MOU is specific in that the Participants
have entered into the arrangement with the firm intention of completing
the PI and Production phases. Therefore, before any changes are
made to the aircraft numbers are specified in the MOU, detailed
consultation amongst the Participants is required. The MOU requires
a minimum of six months for this process.
The provisions of the MOU require any Participant
reducing his offtake to compensate the other Participants if they
suffer an increase in their production costs as a result of the
reduction; the amount to be based upon the change in unit cost
of an aircraft. In addition, the Participant reducing the numbers
would still be required to meet its obligations for Production
Investment and the costs of any resultant change to workshare
arrangements arising from a change in aircraft numbers (production
workshare has been calculated on the basis of aircraft offtake).
The MOU limits the cost liability arising from any change to the
value of the Participant's contribution to the entire PI/Production
phase ie PI plus aircraft offtake declared at the time the MOU
was signed.
Any change affecting the aircraft in the first
tranche would also necessitate re-negotiation of the existing
contract.
Q3. Have any aircraft in the MoD's current
operational inventory suffered fatigue problems because of use
of their cannon?
All aircraft are subject to inspection after
a period of planned operation. Only two Jaguar aircraft, out of
a fleet of 78, have shown signs of damage in the gunbays which,
although unconfirmed, has been attributed to the firing of cannon.
No damage has been found in the gunbays of either Sea Harrier
FA2 or Tornado GR1/4 and F3, the other aircraft in the MoD's current
operational inventory that are equipped with cannon.
Q4. The committee would like a note
on the operational rationale for the MoD's decision not to fit
a canon on its second and subsequent batches of Eurofighter, and
whether the JSF and US F-22 are planned to have a cannon (QQ 34/35,
303)?
A4. We now assess that the operational value
of a gun on Eurofighter is very limited, particularly bearing
in mind the historical pattern of operations over the last decade
and the aircraft's improved short-range armament. The combat value
in retaining the gun on Eurofighter in any role is more than outweighed
by its support, fatigue and training cost implications.
Since the introduction of air-to-air missiles,
the gun has been used for very close range engagements where the
target was inside a short-range air-to-air missile's minimum range.
The improved minimum range capability and agility of the ASRAAM
missiles with which the aircraft will be armed greatly decrease
the likelihood of such engagements. ASRAAM, including a Helmet
Mounted Sight targetting system, offers the pilot a shot with
a very high probability of success in almost every conceivalbe
situation. And were these missiles to be exhausted, it is unlikely
that a cannon would be of use as the risk would remain that aircraft
could be engaged by missiles from well outside the gun's range.
Furthermore, in order to use the gun the pilot would have to point
the aircraft directly at the target, thereby making less effective
the aircraft's integrated Defensive Aids Sub-System (whose towed
decoys operate best when the aircraft is not head on to the threat)
for the small probability of a successful gun shot.
Additionally, firing "warning shots across
the bow" with a gun is not an effective means of coercion
in modern operations. The cockpit environment of modern aircraft
is such that the pilot is extremely unlikely to hear such warning
shots and would only see them if they were tracer rounds. The
value of such a display against a civilian aircraft is dubious
and may be misconstrued by a military aircraft. And in air-to-ground
combat it is difficult to justify the relatively indiscriminate
nature of gun firing in an age of precision-guided munitions,
with which Eurofighter will be armed.
This limited value cannot compensate for the disadvantages
of retaining the gun, including:
— the recoil shock effects on the electronics
(approximately 4 tons recoil shock 30 times a second);
— the corrosive effects of the exhaust
gas;
— airframe fatigue, where the weight
of 80kg of ammunition can add substantial loads at the wing roots
of the aircraft during high G-force manoeuvres;
— a range of training costs, including
the provision of new targets and the increased demands on the
Hawk aircraft towing the targets; and
— the environmental damage of additional
lead pollution in training on UK ground attack ranges or over
the sea.
It is not currently planned to fit an internal
gun to the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant
of JSF, although it will be able to carry an externally mounted
cannon which can be put on and removed from the aircraft for particular
missions. Other JSF variants are currently being designed with
the capability for an internal gun, although no firm decisions
have been taken on fitment. We understand that the F-22 is planned
to carry an internal gun.
Q5. What is the programme for the C-130J
aircraft being ready for operational use (Q 83)?
A5. the first C-130J for squadron use was
delivered to RAF Lyneham in November 1999. The RAFC-130J was cleared
for limited use in the strategic transport role on 26 January
2000 to enable crew training to commence. Full clearance to operate
in the strategic transport role, including the carriage of palletised
cargo, is planned to be achieved by September 2000, when the first
squadron crews complete their training on the aircraft. It is
planned that full clearance to operate in the tactical role, including
air dropping of personnel and stores, will be achieved in the
latter part of 2001. Aircraft deliveries and crew conversion training
will continue in parallel with the clearance programme, with the
full number of aircraft (except those being used on the clearance
programme) being delivered by late 2001. Following the necessary
work-up training in the tactical role, and subject to any aircraft
being in routine maintenance, it is expected that the full number
of 25 aircraft together with crews trained across the whole spectrum
of tactical operations will be available for tasking by early
2003.
Q6. What is the level of security on the
personal role radios being introduced for any units (Q 165)
A6. The Personal Role Radio (PRR) will not
provide electronic encryption, but will derive its security primarily
from its short range—typically 500m in open terrain whilst
being used tactically. The nature of information passed over the
PRR, which is for use at the lowest tactical levels, will be very
short term and localised: "go left", "I'm in position",
etc, rather than detailed orders for longer term operations.
Q7. What arrangements are the MoD putting
in place to ensure that the Type-45 destroyer is deigned in such
a way that land-attack missiles such as Tomahawk could be used,
and for which batch of Type-45's would it be possible for such
missiles to be carried (Q 247)
A7. The Type 45 Destroyer is being designed
from the outset to allow the fitting of a vertical launcher suitable
for a variety of weapons (including missiles such as Tomahawk)
to every ship in the class, should a funded requirement be raised
for this capability.
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