Examination of witnesses (Questions 220
- 239)
WEDNESDAY 25 OCTOBER 2000
MR GURBUX
SINGH and MR
BOB PURKISS
220. 200,000. That is even worse, it is a mind-boggling
figure.
(Mr Singh) General Sir Charles Guthrie will speak
for himself, but when I spoke to him about this matter he was
hugely disappointed at the fact that this target, which he said
was originally very much achievable had not been achieved, particularly
in the context of an organisation which is a command organisation.
Put crudely, if you tell somebody to do it, it invariably gets
done. He was hugely disappointed by that. He still felt those
targets should be achievable and that it was up to the MoD and
the three Services to get their act together to begin to resolve
those sorts of problems. Those were the types of comments he conveyed
to me when I saw him a matter of six to eight weeks ago.
221. What about this, a quarter of a million
to the door and only 300 going through?
(Mr Singh) The point we are making on that is that
the organisation that the three Services have used to get people
to the door, that stage of it is working. Youngsters are being
identified, young people are being identified, who are walking
through the doors but then something fundamentally goes wrong
beyond that. We have been saying to the Services that what they
need to do is to make some sort of critical assessment as to what
goes wrong. We do not know what goes wrong. They need to conduct
an exercise which establishes the facts as to how these people
are there. There is obviously a level of interest but then that
completely falls off in a dramatic way at the point in which you
get to the application stage. There are some problems which we
ourselves have identified. There are problems of time scale between
initial entry and then to the application stage. You may engage
enthusiasm at the entry stage and then at the interview stage
there is a big gap and the enthusiasm wanes off. Then there is
an even bigger gap on many occasions between the interview stage
and the actual entry into the services, anywhere between 6 to
18 months. During that time a further lot of people could then
drop by the wayside. The important point we are making to your
Committee is that we believe that they need to carry out a rigorous
assessment as to what fundamentally goes wrong, to enable them
to put in place some corrective measures to sort that particular
problem out.
(Mr Purkiss) If I can come back to that. I think the
last time I came here we were open and frank, we have to be open
and frank so you get some real examples. The Chairman said, people
have come to the door and been brought to the door in different
ways. As part of our Partnership Agreement we have been working
at different levels. Some three or four years ago now we were
asked to go to the army recruitment officers meetings and we went
down and told them the attitude change that they needed to have.
Recruitment officers are people who have spent some time there,
so maybe their attitude to General Guthrie's response might not
be clearly understood. We went down and made the points and explained
very clearly what was needed. That was received quite well. The
next year we were asked back and because they had not achieved
targets, because they had not converted, because in our minds
the barriers were still there we went in with a very heavy message,
why are we wasting our time if something is not being done. That
was heavily criticised by them and we have not been asked back
again. The message is there.
222. Do you find that significant?
(Mr Purkiss) I do. I find it very significant. As
the Chairman said, as to their willingness to analyse what is
going wrong, there must be something there if 200,000 are coming
to the door and they cannot get them through. There is a difference
between the people who bring them to the door and then they are
left. There are also other factors.
223. It would be helpful if you were to write
to us and tell us how significant you feel it is that you have
not been invited back. I think the MoD need to answer that.
(Mr Purkiss) We have made the point on a regular basis.
Mr Hancock: They have to answer it through
us when they come to give evidence.
Chairman
224. You must have a fair idea from your contacts
with the Sikh community, who are, historically, amongst the best
soldiers the world has ever produced.
(Mr Singh) I suspect there are a whole range of reasons.
Take the Sikh community in Southall, the Midlands or wherever.
Whilst the Sikhs have been involved in martial activity for a
long, long time, only 10% to 13% of the Indian Army is Sikh, clearly
out of all proportion from what we are within the Sikh community
in India. There is a history of military interaction in the Sikh
community. As a minority community in this country what are parents
saying to young Sikhs leaving school? "Is it really the Armed
Forces that you want to go into? Hang on, what about the professions,
the medical profession and the accounting profession?" It
is not easy.
225. There is a shortage of doctors in the military
as well.
(Mr Singh) Exactly. One of the important things for
this Committee, I would have thought, is that the three Services
are still not being seen as equality friendly organisations. That
is a message that I would leave with you. Even if you take the
study that the RAF themselves conducted—and we welcome that
particular issue—that survey showed considerable discrimination
perceived by the people within the RAF, drawn from minority communities.
There was evidence of bullying and harassment identified through
that particular survey, and also a desire not to raise the issue
in any formal way, which relates to a subsequent recommendation
we want to make to this Committee. There are real issues within
the Services which then create the public image of those organisations
in very negative terms. That is one of the key reasons which deter
people from moving into that profession. As a Committee, you know
yourselves, if an organisation is seen to be hostile the general
tendency is that we avoid that organisation at an individual level.
If the organisation is perceived in positive terms, in welcoming
terms, then you are more likely to want to seek employment and
engage with that.
226. Do you have any problems within the Police
Forces or the Prison Service?
(Mr Singh) I think the same debate rages within the
Police Forces. The Home Secretary has set clear targets for all
of the 40 odd Police Forces in this country and the evidence,
at least last year's evidence, in relation to those targets was
equally depressing. Firstly, the targets had not been achieved
within the police, including the Met. Secondly, there had been
no real shift, the position had remained static. In a couple of
Police Forces the numbers had actually gone down as opposed to
gone up. There is a similar problem, if I may say so, within the
police. There is a desperate desire to try and recruit, there
are clear targets actually set. Organisationally they are still
perceived as being racist, still perceived as not being sympathetic
to the minority community and people are not seeing them as attractive
havens to secure employment.
(Mr Purkiss) There are a couple of areas, if you look
at the Signals Regiment as an example, where people want to go.
There is a significant number of black people who feel comfortable
in the Signals Regiment, because their ability is being used.
There is a significant number of sergeants and warrant officers
and officers within the Signals Regiment. The same message seems
to be going out now with regard to the Household Cavalry, that
because of what they have gone through you will be protected.
That is an organisation that dare not discriminate against you,
it is the message that goes out, in that sense.
227. It shows the Household Cavalry as a target
for a campaign. Has there been a case study written up so that
other Regiments and other Units are aware of what has been done
and what can be done?
(Mr Singh) That is one of our recommendations to you,
that the Services need to examine and need to assess what it was
that the Household Cavalry did and why was their strategy successful.
What were the steps they put in place to achieve the culture change
within and what are the lessons that can be transferred to other
parts of the Armed Services? That is a key recommendation from
ourselves to you. Perhaps that is not as clear as how I have expressed
it now. That is what we would like you to take away from the particular
evidence that we are giving to you.
(Mr Purkiss) You will recall, Chair, when the PPOs
came in front of you—this what I am referring to about the
different levels of understanding and interpretation—that
the current Second Sea Lord, after we pointed out to him some
of the ways that the Household Cavalry were successful, actually
met with the Household Cavalry. There is still this regimental
rivalry and also areas of competition—"Just because
they did it right maybe we will not follow the same line".
We think that best practice comes out of that.
Mr Brazier: I bored the Committee earlier
with my Grandmother. Her husband, my Grandfather, served in the
Indian Army for ten years and it seems to me a really disgraceful
example—we have mentioned young people coming in, in terms
of reaching back to tradition—was the marginalisation of
the Indian Army in the 1995 VJ Day Celebrations. It was the Indian
Army that broke the back of the Japanese offensive, and the Indian
veterans were put so far back on the parade—these are British
people, now living in the Britain who had themselves served and
fought in that campaign and provided most of the weight for that
campaign—the television cameras had switched off by the
time they reached the Cenotaph. We said a lot about the Sikh military
tradition. Quite rightly, however, reaching back to the traditions
of people who served the Crown in those wars should be a critical
part of putting them up there in their place.
Chairman
228. As to the co-operation between the Commission
and the Ministry of Defence, could you give us some idea of the
range of contacts, the regularity of meetings, the ethos of the
relationship? Then I shall ask you about the action plan that
I asked you about four years ago, when Mr Viggers was in the Chair,
and the partnership agreement. First of all, what about the general
structure and ethos?
(Mr Singh) The starting point was the action plan,
and then embarked on a partnership of compact. It is true to say
that we actually have a good working relationship with the MoD
and the three Services. In general terms that is an absolute truism.
We have a structure of a series of regular reports which come
from the three Services. We have three and six monthly regular
reports which are received on progress against the action plans.
Officers within the Commission and personnel from the Services
meet to discuss the content of those plans. Bob Purkiss who has
led, and will continue to lead on this matter has a regular relationship
with them. In general terms I believe that we have the structure
at the top and the infrastructure with officials within the Services
to enable our partnership to work. We have the processes in place.
It is not due to lack of process that we have achieved or we have
failed to achieve or the Services have failed to achieve, I think
it is due to other factors.
(Mr Purkiss) Just on the ethos, again it has been
down to the individuals and how we have worked with them. Some
come in and there is still what I would describe as the denial
and defence mode, others come in with acceptance and a positive
approach. Where we get that we work very closely with them and
where we can we attend various meetings and talk with officers
at Mess dinners. It is done in various different ways. It is very
much the regiment or the brigadier or the colonel, and whether
or not they have switched on to it, rather than a Directive which
everyone has picked up and said, "This is the best practice,
we want to implement". There has been some frustration, when
we met with PPOs where we tried to spread the best practice and
we spent the best part of two and a half years trying to get more
tri-service work amongst them. That is, at last, starting to pay
off. We now have Air Marshal Pledger, and he has taken on board
at that level General Guthrie's words and turned that into action.
It is that practical commitment. At varying levels we are getting
a bit better. Perhaps that leads into the answer to your question.
The action plan was very much more structural, as we explained.
There was a need for monitoring and for putting in place the structures
for ensuring that you had the various levels of understanding
of collecting and analysing materials and information on a regular
basis. The Partnership Agreement was much more of a cultural nature
as far as I saw it. How do you win the hearts and minds? How do
you put in place training elements that actually lead to a rise
in the level of awareness, which were educational? It is not just
a question of training people not to discriminate. It is really
educating people as to how and why. Your previous talk to the
EOC was about that attitudinal change, that is what partnership
is all about. One of the problems we have with the Partnership
Agreement—the action plan is structurally there and being
completed—is the fact that there still seems to be a long-term
attitude, that this will be righted in the long run, as people
blend more and more into our society. Chair, as I pointed out
to you last time, black people have been here since AD 256 as
black Roman soldiers, the Bladed Guards. How long do we have to
wait? If we look at what I call the new communities out of mixed
relationships, that is growing, people who are neither from a
Sikh community but are, as we will see in the new census, from
different communities. Things have to be done now. It is not a
question of saying in ten years' time, because the attitude, therefore,
by a number of the people is, "I do not really have to do
anything because I am only going to be here for the next two years".
That is a problem. It has to be now. We have to transfer that
action plan into a culture of developing something now. It has
to be monitored and people have to measured. There have to be
avenues of redress, which is something we also want to talk about.
You are never going to make complaints and problems go away, that
is the nature of the human relationships but what do you do about
it? Again, the Household Cavalry demonstrated that when there
were complaints of racial discrimination immediately something
was done about it and, unlike before where they tried to hush
it up, everyone knew what was done and what disciplinary measures
were taken.
229. That was the biggest defeat of the British
Army since Singapore. Did it leave any bad feeling between you?
You went in pretty bloody heavy over the Household Cavalry. It
was quite a humiliation.
(Mr Singh) Yes.
230. To threaten the Ministry of Defence with
what you did.
(Mr Singh) Yes.
231. Was there any residue of resentment at
that?
(Mr Singh) I have to say, if we are talking about
the wider army, yes, there was. There were a number of people
who because of the elitism, as they saw it, of the Household Cavalry—there
is nothing wrong with being elite if that means being good but
that is not the interpretation of the word elite that other people
put on it—there was a feeling, I think, "well they
have got their comeuppance". Then, when they turned it around
and start to now be at the top, there is now a different feeling
towards the Household Cavalry by some people and a resentment
that they have now made other people look at themselves.
232. Last question in this section, the Partnership
Agreement says that the CRE has the right to intervene if expected
rates of progress are not maintained. Have you reached a point,
Mr Singh or Mr Purkiss, where you need to fire a shot across the
bows of the military or even one service rather than another?
(Mr Singh) The reality is that the initial agreement
that we had, which followed on from the Household Cavalry—Just
to remind the Committee, we decided not to issue a non discrimination
notice against the Household Cavalry because we had got this agreement
to proceed. Clearly there is nothing we can do about that now,
what we will need to do is to reflect and come to a view as to
whether we believe that sufficient progress has actually been
made and as to whether we continue working in partnership and
whether that agreement is sustained, given that we have made very
little progress. I am going to hesitate to suggest that we pull
back from the agreement, because I think that at this stage would
be wrong. Most certainly we have to consider what our position
will be over time. We will have to consider, given that the rate
of progress is not terribly impressive, what we next do. Clearly
the CRE has considerably more enforcement powers. We have the
power to conduct formal investigations. We may need to consider
as part of our general deliberations what the next steps are.
We have not taken that decision.
233. You have not reached that point?
(Mr Singh) No, we have not reached that point. We
still believe that we need to act and work in partnership. We
believe there is considerable merit in trying to secure change
through that Partnership Agreement. There will come a moment in
time in the future when we will have to say "Well actually
is this working? Is this getting us anywhere?" The facts
speak for themselves, it is not terribly impressive at this moment
in time. We will come to a time when we will say "Well actually
what real progress have we made? Do we need to pursue a different
course of action?" We are not there yet.
(Mr Purkiss) When we have to draw up our progress
report, and you have indicated, Mr Viggers, that is when we will
have to make some very clear assessments of our position and,
of course, the amendment to the Race Relations Act that is coming
along will give a positive duty, we will have additional powers
under that to enforce that. That is when we will start to have
to make some severe assessments of what happens next.
Chairman: One of the motives for undertaking
this Inquiry into personnel issues was really as a lead in to
the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, of which I am quite
sure a number of the Members of this Committee will be Members,
including I hope Mr Viggers who will ask our next question.
Mr Viggers
234. What work have you done to identify the
hidden barriers to recruitment? Are you in a position to talk
about that at this stage or would you prefer to delay your comments?
(Mr Purkiss) The hidden barriers are not so much hidden
from us, I think they are hidden from the individual Services,
the example I gave you of the recruitment officers refusing to
recognise that something is wrong there. That is a barrier that
they have. There is definitely a barrier that is stopping people
going through. I think those hidden barriers are attitudinal ones
and cultural ones and can be dealt with to enable people to go
through. We have made some progress in breaking down the regimental
recruitment so that regiments recruit only from certain areas.
People are now going a little wider in terms of areas of recruitment.
It was said the Navy just recruited from Portsmouth and Plymouth
but actually when you go on board a ship and you talk to people
you find that they come from Macclesfield and other places, Crawley,
where there are not any ships, are there? I think it is getting
people to identify where those real barriers are and then getting
them exposed. They are not so much hidden from us, people themselves
hide the reasons because they feel uncomfortable.
(Mr Singh) Can I just add to that? Clearly given the
stark figures that we have given you about initial interest and
then the failure to capitalise on that initial interest, there
are things that are clearly going wrong. There are barriers clearly
which exist. Frankly we do not know what those barriers are, it
is only when and if there is a proper critical assessment made
of the blockages which may well be there that those involved will
be able to identify them. That is why we go back to our original
point, that there should be, by the services, a clear critical
assessment made of what is going wrong in the process. That critical
assessment I think will then throw up some of the hidden barriers
which I believe may well exist.
235. Are you confident that that study is being
carried out by the Ministry of Defence?
(Mr Purkiss) No.
Chairman
236. Have you done any statistical analyses
or studies of whether the Ministry of Defence is making even fewer
inroads into, say, the Bengali community rather than the Hindu
community? Across the whole breadth of what are called the ethnic
minorities, where is the MoD best recruiting, although it is pretty
bad overall?
(Mr Singh) Bob will come back to this but if I may
reply. I do not want to paint a picture which is all gloom and
doom, there has to be a balance. I made my point at the very start,
there is some progress. The three services have actually tried
to engage different communities through a whole series of localised
activity on the ground. Whether it is the Bengali community or
whether it is the Asian community in the West Midlands or whether
it is the Afro-Caribbean community in Tottenham, they have made
some effort to try and engage in a dialogue and discussion. How
effective that is is a separate point. I am not absolutely sure
as to whether the range of initiatives, whether they are coherent
or are they simply a series of ad hoc initiatives which appear
to be sensible and very sound but are not in any way coherent
and joined up. I have no idea whether in fact an assessment of
the impact of those initiatives has every been carried out. Going
to the local Mela in Birmingham, which was one of the things they
went to, what was the impact of that or was it just a nice occasion
where the services were seen, their physical presence was actually
seen or was there a direct outcome as a result of being there?
If there was a discourse—I use that word—with the
Bengali community, as I know there was, what has been the outcome
of that? That analysis has not been done. It is that systematic
analysis which we believe is critical to find a way forward.
Dr Lewis
237. I want to ask about the prospects of improving
recruitment. A few weeks ago, and not for the first time, an excellent
film was shown on television called The Tuskegee Airmen.
I do not know if you are familiar with that. It tells the story
of the American black fighter pilot unit and all the obstacles
they had to overcome in the Second World War. I am not suggesting
this as a recommended proposal but it did strike me, thinking
about that, that one of the things which kept those young men
going was the mutual support and comradeship from one to another
within the unit through all their vicissitudes. That may be an
argument. Do you think it would help if there were some units
within the Armed Forces where black and Asian recruits knew that
if they joined them they would be with a significant number of
other black and Asian recruits. This would give them similar mutual
support, on the one hand, and would also enable those units to
perform really well. It would show their capabilities and destroy
the prejudices that other units might have, thinking that they
were, perhaps, not as capable and as effective soldiers, sailors
and airmen as people from white communities?
(Mr Singh) That is an interesting point. Bob may not
necessarily agree on that one. I take the view and, yes, I accept
the principle that there is need for mutual support. If there
is evidence of discrimination or harassment or bullying then clearly
mutual support is of vital importance. I think there is some logic
around critical mass, the need to create an organisation, there
is a volume of people who will then make other people find that
organisation attractive. Whether you go to the extent of saying,
"Well actually we will create, as a deliberate policy, clusters
of people in particular arms of the service as a specific policy
initiative", I have some doubts about that, I have to say.
That could well lead to the notion of ghettoisation. You create
ghettos of people within certain sections, with all of the ramifications
that that would generate. I also have some reservation as to whether
that would be lawful itself. How would you pursue a process that
would enable that to happen? It is an interesting point. Bob may
have a different view.
(Mr Purkiss) It would be totally unlawful to do that.
I think with my legal-hat on would be chasing whoever did it in
the first place. A major point I take from what you said—we
have constantly made reference to the MoD—is that they should
look at the lessons that were learned by the American Armed Forces
in changing, and what they had to do. Secondly, in terms of numbers,
it is quite strange because—forgive me for going back to
the Household Cavalry—that was the very point that was made
to us by the Colonel of the Household Cavalry, who said he would
rather have twelve black people than one. When one turned up,
he was turned around. That led to us going in there. We had to
say that if one person was subject to discrimination you should
put your efforts into removing the discrimination so that people,
irrespective of colour, can go anywhere, in terms of what happens
inside. In 1994 the Black Police Association was established and
that had support groups. That does not mean that all black people
were put in different police stations, it does mean that they
have support groups when they need to share something with them,
they can go to that organisation. I am not saying that would be
the same within the Forces. I gave the example of the Signals
Regiment. People do feel there is support there, that there are
other black people they can talk to at different command levels.
Mr Hancock
238. I was just going to ask you about the Signals.
When your colleagues were in on the equality issue they were saying
that women found the Signals more acceptable and easier to work
in as soldiers and their skills were more appreciated. It is not
a question about the skills that people possess, it is about where
they are comfortable deploying those skills. If they are in a
unit like the Signals, people skills are the things that look
to be the most predominant factor, rather than whether they club
well together. It is interesting that both you and the previous
contribution both singled the Signals out as a good example of
where people can fit in together.
(Mr Purkiss) The assessment that officers have, in
particular what the warrant officer will make of an individual,
is based on their ability within those regiments. If I take the
other example of a black Sergeant I know in the Parachute Regiment,
he is a good boxer and an all-around athlete. Because he was a
good boxer and an athlete he was therefore accepted. You do not
get to be a Sergeant in the Parachute Regiment very easily, and
if you are black you have to be a little bit special. This guy
said, "I was accepted because I could show I was an equal
at that level, or superior." I understand the sentiments
you are stating. I think we have to overcome those in our society
nowadays. We have to say that you do not have to be twice as good
to get half as far. You really have to remove those barriers that
stop people being judged on their individual ability, whatever
that be, whether it is shooting, being able to march or being
able to operate technical equipment in the Signals Regiment.
Chairman
239. I would not go down the route of Dr Lewis's
provocative questions. The British Army is based on an ethnic
basis, there are the Gurkhas, the Welsh Regiment, the Scottish
Regiment and the Irish Regiment. You would probably have trouble
finding somebody in the Staffordshire regiment who was not from
Stoke. It seems to me the argument does have an element of difficulty
for those who would say, "No, you should not ghettoise because
the British Army has done that part of its underpinning.
(Mr Purkiss) There are many Irish, Scots and Welsh
who are black as well. I come from Hampshire, and there is a Hampshire
Regiment.
Chairman: You see the general point.
Mr Brazier: The London Regiment beat
the Coldstream Guards the last time they competed against each
other.
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