Conclusion
29. OCCAR, with its grounding in the principles of
competition and the amelioration of the worst effects of juste
retour, is an idea whose time has come. Effective European
collaboration in procurement will be an essential component of
future European defence cooperation if the government's project
of a strengthened European defence capability is to be realised.
However, it is clear from our evidence that the UK defence manufacturing
industry views this latest venture with some scepticismit
is still regarded by them as something of a shot in the dark.
While we wholeheartedly endorse the principles which are embodied
in the Convention, which were expounded to us so enthusiastically
by the Chief of Defence Procurement, it is only by its works that
OCCAR will be justified. We expect, as we have made clear, to
see evidence of its achievements reported regularly to Parliament.
Under the terms of the Convention, for the three years following
its entry into force, the Board of Supervisors will have the power
to take action to restore the workshare balance if any member
state receives less than 66 per cent of its financial contribution
'concerning a programme, a certain phase or a certain sub-assembly
of a programme' or if a global imbalance of more than 4 per cent
is identified in relation to all programmes. At the end of the
three years, a decision will be taken on whether this procedure
can be repealed.[87]
We recommend that, when the balanced workshare provisions of
the Convection are reconsidered, the UK will press for the remnants
of juste retour to be permanently abandoned. We trust
that our successor committee will monitor these developments with
a view to ensuring that the treaty revisions will be in the UK's
best interests.
30. Like any treaty which has been voluntarily entered
into, the OCCAR Convention represents a sharing of national sovereignty
(in this case the ability to exercise untrammelled political control
over the design and supply of equipment and the ability to protect
national industry) in the pursuit of a trans-national objective
(a stronger European defence industry). But as with any such inter-governmental
deal, there is a strong element of enlightened self-interest at
work. In this case that self-interest is grounded in the belief
that through OCCAR our Armed Forces will obtain cheaper, better
and more useful equipment, and that our defence industry will
have access to more open markets on the basis of real competition.
In endorsing the ratification of this treaty, Parliament must
be confident both that national self-interest will be protected,
and that the wider aims can be realised. That confidence can only
be based on a conviction that all the necessary accountability
mechanisms are in place and will be effective. We regret that
to some extent we are being asked to take much on trust as regards
the methods of holding OCCAR to account. However, assurances have
been offered to us in this regard, and we intend to play our part
in ensuring that they are honoured. OCCAR must not be allowed
to decline into the condition of stalemate which has rendered
so many previous collaborative ventures impotent. On the basis
of those promises of effective and rigorous accountability, and
on the understanding that this treaty will lead to the ultimate
abolition of any remnant of juste retour, we recommend
that the OCCAR Convention should be ratified, and that the House
should give its approval to the Order in Council to give effect
to that ratification.
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