ANNEX
1. The Government is grateful to the House of Commons
Defence Committee for its report, European Security and Defence,
produced at the request of the European Scrutiny Committee. The
Committee has rightly pointed out that this issue is of fundamental
importance to the UK. We are strongly committed to developing
improved arrangements for European security and defence, and to
ensuring that European nations are better able to act on their
foreign and security policy objectives, whether through NATO or
through the European Union. Significant progress has been made
since the St Malo Declaration of December 1998 but, as the Committee
recognises, there are many challenges ahead. We therefore welcome
the Committee's recommendations, which will help to shape our
approach in the coming months. Our response to the Committee's
opinion follows.
EUROPEAN
SECURITY
AND
DEFENCE
(Paras 37-49)
2. The Committee rightly recognises that the European
security and defence arrangements currently under development
are for crisis management, not collective defence. The Committee
recommends that in public debate about European defence, this
distinction should be made clear. The Government agrees. We must
be clear that we are not building new structures to rival NATO;
indeed as the Committee acknowledges, the Government firmly believes
that strengthening European capability will strengthen the Alliance
as a whole. In the Alliance context, improved capabilities will
be available both for crisis management and for collective defence,
as required.
3. The Government also welcomes the Committee's acknowledgement
that there is a distinctive European need for a crisis management
capacity. The Committee suggests that this should be explicitly
recognised within the Alliance. At the Washington Summit, in April
1999, NATO leaders agreed to pursue common security objectives
through the Alliance wherever possible, but also welcomed developments
in the EU, recognising that the Union should be able to take decisions
and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not
engaged.
4. Finally, the Committee questions whether this
particular initiative will bring about genuine changes that will
allow European nations to act militarily in support of their own
perceived interests. The Government believes that this initiative
is on track to succeed. Significant progress has already been
made. We are convinced that this has been possible because the
debate has focused on capabilities rather than dwelling on institutional
questions. As the Committee recognises, a more potent European
security capability will be the true test of the success of this
initiative.
THE
HEADLINE
GOAL
(Paras 50-55)
5. The Committee welcomes DSACEUR's role in planning
and generating the forces to meet the Headline Goal. We agree
that the role of NATO defence planning systems in supporting the
delivery of the Headline Goal will be important.
6. The Committee is right to observe that the numerical
force generation element of the Headline Goal is a modest ambition,
and that achieving the back-up elements of the Headline Goal will
be the real test by which the initiative will stand or fall. There
are, as the Committee notes, significant numbers of personnel
in the armed forces in Europe. However, many of these are still
structured to face Cold War threats. They are not readily and
rapidly deployable. They do not have the support structures to
allow them to be sustained in a theatre of operations away from
their home base. It is precisely these deficiencies that the Headline
Goal is designed to address. Providing the troop numbers themselves
is not a significant challenge. The Government believes that providing
rapidly deployable and sustainable forces at this level, able
to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks, is a challenging,
but realistic target. This autumn, the EU nations will participate
in a Capability Commitment Conference. This conference will review
national contributions and agree measures to address shortfalls;
measures which will be fully consistent with NATO's own defence
planning and Defence Capabilities Initiative. We look forward
to reporting progress towards the achievement of the Headline
Goal.
THE
EU STRUCTURES
(Paras 56-68)
7. The Government welcomes the Committee's recognition
that military aspects of EU-led crisis management will be an important
complement to the EU's crisis management tools, and that the EU's
ability to deploy a wide range of instruments will allow it to
make a distinctive contribution to European security.
8. We agree that double-hatting of military representatives
to NATO and to the EU is desirable. The "toolbox paper"[8],
which the 15 Member States have agreed should be a basis for further
work, states that dual-hatting was the ideal, although this would
be a matter for national decision,. 13 of the 15 EU Member States'
Military Representatives or military Heads of Mission are currently
dual hatted to NATO and the EU. The Government agrees that DSACEUR's
attendance at the EU Military Committee will, in many cases, be
essential, not least to ensure transparency between the EU and
NATO. The toolbox paper reflects this view, in its statement that
DSACEUR should "normally participate as appropriate in the
EMC".
9. Many details concerning the future structures
have yet to be resolved. These include; questions of the relationship
between the EMC and other EU bodies; the precise means of selecting
the Chairman of the EMC; and the staffing of the EMS. This work
will be taken forward during France's Presidency of the EU. We
welcome, and broadly support, the Committee's recommendations
in these areas.
10. The Committee recognises that the EMS will have
a role in identifying the constituent parts of the European rapid
reaction forces and recommends that it should be tasked with maintaining
and improving interoperability not only across EU forces but across
the whole of NATO. Clearly, the EMS as a body of the European
Union, cannot co-ordinate actions taken to improve the forces
of Allies who are not EU Member States. However, the forces that
Member States commit to the Headline Goal will in most cases also
be forces that are assigned to NATO. The importance of interoperability
across the board is understood and accepted by all. Close co-operation
and understanding between the two organisations will be essential.
EU/NATO RELATIONS
(Paras 69-75)
11. We strongly agree that there must be appropriate
arrangements for the participation of the six non-EU European
Allies in new arrangements. Heads of State and Government at the
Feira European Council, 19-20 June, agreed a Portuguese Presidency
Report that set out the outline of arrangements for the consultation
and participation of these and other countries.
THE
RESIDUAL
WEU (Paras 76-80)
12. The Government agrees that it would be best to
ensure a clean break with the WEU, with as little institutional
residue as can be achieved. In practice however, with considerable
work still to be done and much detail yet to be decided, a residual
but reducing staff will be required for a time. What size it will
need to be and how long it will need to remain are as yet undetermined.
The future of the specific organisations mentioned by the Committee
- the WEAG, WEAO, and the Satellite Centre is still being considered.
ACCOUNTABILITY
(Paras 81-83)
13. We agree that the question of democratic scrutiny
of European defence arrangements needs to be tackled. As Member
States will remain individually responsible for decisions about
the deployment of their armed forces, the primary responsibility
for parliamentary scrutiny of European defence will rest with
national Parliaments. At the European level, we believe that it
is more important to get future parliamentary oversight right
than to rush through changes that might have treaty implications.
It will be better, therefore, to address this question once the
permanent arrangements are in place in the EU.
8 Military Bodies of the European Union and the Planning and Conduct
of EU-led Military Operations. Back
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