ANNEX
1. The Government is grateful to the House of
Commons Defence Committee for its report The Adaptation of
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Committee
has rightly pointed out that this issue is of fundamental importance
to the UK and our allies. The Government agrees with the Committee's
main conclusion that the Adaptation Agreement should be ratified
by the UK, but its timing is all-important. The UK, along with
its Allies, continues to press the Russian government to meet
its treaty obligations and the commitments made at the Istanbul
summit. Some progress has been made in respect of compliance,
but there are challenges ahead. Our response to the Committee's
opinion follows.
2. The Government shares the Committee's view
that the original CFE Treaty made a significant contribution to
European stability and provided an invaluable mechanism for controlling
and monitoring the threat to peace in Europe that had been posed
by the large numbers of conventional forces ranged either side
of the Iron Curtain. The key to the Treaty's success was the binding
limits imposed on defined equipment types in zones across its
area of application making it practically impossible to launch
a surprise offensive. It also resulted in the destruction of nearly
50,000 pieces of equipment by the end of 1995, together with more
than 2,300 verification inspections during that period. The Government
is convinced that while the original CFE Treaty met and continues
to meet an important purpose, it needed to be adapted to take
account of the new European security architecture. We note the
Committee's agreement with this need.
The 1996 Flank Agreement (Paras 10-12)
3. At the time of the first CFE Review Conference
in 1996, four countries were exceeding their equipment ceilings—Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Belarus and Russia in the flank zone. The Conference
noted Russia's particular difficulties in the Caucasus and agreed
adjustments to the flank limits and boundaries. The Government
view, with which the Committee agreed, was that the negotiation
of revised figures for "Flank" equipments, which came
into effect in May 1999, was a necessary measure to preserve Russia's
confidence in the CFE Treaty.
4. Clarification is needed of the statement in
Paragraph 12 concerning oblasts. The Report states that "the
legally binding 'Flank Agreement' made changes to the boundaries
of some oblasts within the Russian and Ukrainian
parts of the Flank zone". However, the agreement did not
change the boundaries of the oblasts; it removed certain oblasts
from counting towards the Flank area and its limits. The words
of some oblasts should therefore be deleted.
5. The Report at Paragraph 12 states that "the
Flank agreement also placed specific limits on the levels of equipment
held in each oblast on the flanks". However, the Flank Agreement
did not establish individual oblast equipment limits beyond the
'Armoured Combat Vehicle cap' in the oblasts removed. The Flank
limits apply to the zone as a whole, not individual parts of it.
It is more accurate to say that "The Flank Agreement also
placed specific limits on the numbers of Armoured Combat Vehicles
which could be held in those oblasts which had been removed from
the Russian parts of the flank zone".
Compliance With The CFE Treaty (Paras 13-24)
6. The Government shares the Committee's concern
about the difficulties experienced by inspection teams when trying
to verify the exact number of Treaty Limited Equipments (TLE)
declared by the Russians. Russia has exploited certain specific
provisions of the Treaty to remove vehicles from accountability
by miss-classifying them as 'decommissioned', 'awaiting export',
as ambulances or (in the case of their large fleet of MTL-BU personnel
carriers) by regarding their inclusion in the Treaty as "an
error". Neither the Government nor its Allies are complacent
about this issue and continue to raise it with Russia on a regular
basis.
7. The Government agrees with the Committee's
recommendation that parties to the Treaty must impress on Russia
the importance they attach to Russia's good faith and compliance,
without which the foundation of the Adaptation Treaty may also
be undermined. For its part the Government will continue to make
this important point to Russia on a regular basis.
8. The Committee will recall that the completion
of the destruction to agreed levels by Russia of equipment withdrawn
East of the Urals had been estimated by MOD at Paragraph 14 to
be likely to be completed by March 2000. However, in the event
Russia did not in fact complete its East of Urals reduction by
March but claimed completion on 26 September 2000, with written
confirmatory notification to follow.
Chechnya (Paras 25-27)
9. Russia is currently in breach of its equipment
ceilings in the flank area, both for the original treaty and the
new limits of the Adaptation Agreement. Russian equipment figures
declared in July 2000 were couched so as to indicate that, apart
from equipment introduced 'temporarily' to operate in the North
Caucasus, Russia was generally in compliance with its Treaty obligations
both for the original and adapted Treaty limits. Detailed analysis
both of the data exchange and additional information provided
by the Russians indicates that the original Treaty limits are
exceeded by nearly 600 items of equipment, with the situation
in the adapted area being considerably worse, at around 1000 items.
These excesses have been masked through accounting methods of
questionable applicability. As recommended by the Committee, the
Government continues to press the Russians through diplomatic
channels to observe its Treaty obligations.
The Adaptation Agreement (Paras 28-47)
10. Verification. The Committee noted
that the Russians had sometimes cancelled inspections by claiming
force majeure as a result of 'security concerns', for example,
or 'weather conditions'. The Treaty places a general obligation
on all signatories to accept inspections. The Government has always
taken a robust line in the face of refusal of inspections. It
will continue to protest over all refusals to accept legitimate
inspections, as they risk undermining the good faith needed for
the Treaty to remain effective.
11. National Ceilings. The Government
continues to believe that NATO needs to retain flexibility within
its Allies' national ceilings in order to meet its military needs.
It welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the need to apply exemptions
to mandated peacekeeping operations and to retain flexibility
to transfer equipment ceilings.
12. Ratification. The Government agrees
with the Committee that the timing of ratification of the Adapted
Agreement is important. The Foreign Secretary said in his statement
at the Istanbul Summit: "We would hope to ratify it early,
but the time at which we do so will depend on the levels of all
Parties' compliance with the limits that have been agreed."
The Government has continued to take this line and welcomes the
Committee's endorsement of it. In support of this line, the Government,
along with its Allies, already implements the Committee's recommendation
to press Russia to reduce its equipment and forces in Chechnya
to agreed levels, and to meet its commitments in Moldova and Georgia.
Conclusions (Paras 48-57)
13. The statement in Paragraph 53 concerning
raised "equipment ceilings in Russia's southern flank"
is misleading. There is no such defined location as 'the southern
flank' to which equipment limits apply. The equipment limits apply
equally across the whole flank zone. The term 'southern flank'
is purely shorthand to distinguish the North Caucasus flank areas
from those in Leningrad. It has no legal standing. It is therefore
inaccurate and misleading to refer to two separate 'flanks' on
Russian territory this way. The word 'southern' should be disregarded
in Line One of Paragraph 53.
9 October 2000
Ministry of Defence
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