Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120 - 131)

MR NICK MABEY, DR PAUL JEFFERISS AND MR PETER HARDSTAFF

MR DUNCAN MCLAREN, MR TIM RICE AND MR BARRY COATES

  120. Do you think it is more a scoping exercise, as the previous witnesses said?
  (Mr McLaren) Yes, as the previous witnesses said, and one thing I would like to add on all of these three things which is something that is generally missing from such appraisal mechanisms is that they are about appraisal rather than about audit afterwards, and if we take a view of something that has been assessed in advance and we have got some predictions about what effects it would have, then the rational thing to do is to audit it afterwards to find out whether they were true and that would help us make better appraisals in the future. However, they are saying that the EU is still strongly opposed to doing any such review of the Uruguay Round which would actually be one of the best ways of improving its appraisal and assessment of any future rounds.

  121. What would you like the WTO to do at the centre to ensure that (a) adequate work is done, and that (b) the results are actually taken into account in the negotiations?
  (Mr McLaren) On which particular issues?

  122. When they are looking at sustainable impact studies and the work that is being carried out in Canada, what do you want them to do at the centre beforehand so that the work is adequately done?
  (Mr Coates) Obviously we have talked about capacity building as the major priority, and the WTO does not itself have the capacity to do the capacity building, but it has a role in ensuring that it happens. A second issue is decent research and, as was referred to, research that uses modelling in order to derive predicted outcomes does not actually address the degree to which the model may not be working. If you look at the framework for the WTO study on trade and the environment and also the sustainable impact assessment being undertaken for the EU, both of them are essentially using modelling exercises to predict what the outcome would be given different trade policies. The NGOs are saying is that that is a flawed model itself because it is not looking at the assumptions behind it, so, for example, it often assumes that markets work in converting trade policy into impacts on the ground. By contrast, in most countries market failures are more common than efficient market successes and in fact what we have to look at—

  123. When is a market successful? Are there any examples or models of good practice we could point to?
  (Mr Coates) Traditionally we are looking at relationships between small producers and small groups of consumers and you have an opportunity for ensuring that they have similar information and similar levels of bargaining power, but as soon as you introduce some of the reality into the situation where supply chains are often dominated by a few companies, where producers have relatively little bargaining power and very little knowledge about what relative prices are internationally, et cetera, et cetera, you start to understand that these assumptions do not apply similarly with regard to the environmental impact.

Mr Robertson

  124. You mentioned companies objecting to, for example, the so-called climate change levy on the grounds of commercial advantage and I think really the objection is the same that the motorist would have in the sense that there are no alternatives. Now, surely only countries which are wealthy develop alternatives and the Third World countries, because they are poor, will not develop alternatives and will not develop clean alternatives because the development of those clean alternatives requires countries basically to be wealthy. Do you accept that premise?
  (Mr McLaren) That is one of the arguments that underlies the idea that the WTO have used quite dominantly in their Report that as you get richer, then people take more concern for the environment and will invest more in environmental protection and so forth, and they put a lot of weight behind that despite the analysis saying, "Well, in fact it works in some places and it does not work in others". I think it is fair to say that there is a need for investment in alternatives, but that does not mean that all countries need to go through the damaging processes that we have undertaken in terms of the over-exploitation of resources and of people to get to those alternatives. China does not need to go through a heavy investment in fossil fuel power to exploit modern technology in photovoltaics, and this is an issue of, if you like, getting technology transfer going in the right direction in the interests of developing countries, yet at the moment the way that the trade and intellectual property rights agreement works is to attempt to protect those intellectual advances overwhelmingly in the interests of the companies developing them to the extent that poorer countries have less opportunity to adopt appropriate technology, so I am not sure that simply saying that there is no alternative in the way that companies and countries are objecting necessarily leads us down the right path.
  (Mr Coates) I think the question is also to what degree are those impacts avoidable and to what degree are those impacts themselves causing a loss of economic growth, so if you look at the studies in developing countries about issues like deforestation, soil degradation and pollution, there is an actual economic costs to those activities which has a detrimental effect on their economic growth. It is not that they are sacrificing some of the environment in order to achieve economic growth, but actually economic growth is reduced because of the scale of the environmental impacts and I think that that underlines these arguments because many of these issues can be addressed by more sensible policies.

Joan Walley

  125. I think you were each here for our earlier session and I would really like just to turn to the issue of the mechanics and the modalities of how we can get the proper input and the proper account being taken of the input that both NGOs and perhaps parliamentarians would want to see. First of all, could I just ask Mr Coates a direct question because it is my view that in view of the importance of the Performance and Innovation Unit in the Cabinet Office your organisation should be involved in that. Have you had any invitation to be involved in it?
  (Mr Coates) Yes, we have. We had a meeting with them last week and the Unit is in relatively early stages of preparation. We made a number of comments on their terms of reference and basically thought that the terms of reference were too narrow insofar as they did not look at many of the international issues, particularly the effect on developing countries, and they did not give adequate weighting to some of the social effects of trade policies.

  126. I am delighted to hear that and I shall be interested to see whether or not there is any progress on that agenda and I hope that we will be able to explore that through the Committee here. Can I then turn on to a different aspect of how we get Trade and Environment Ministers both in the UK and at the European Union level having a kind of common agenda as far as sustainability is concerned. In terms of the evidence that has been provided by Friends of the Earth, can I ask how you see the strength or the weight that the large transnational companies have and the membership that they have in advisory committees and how that either does or does not impact upon the ability of Trade and Environment Ministers to be able to combine the joint agenda in your view?
  (Mr McLaren) I think as a very brief comment, you have highlighted a serious problem, the influence of corporations and in particular transnational corporations and in particular on trade ministries, although I would not say that environment ministries were immune to that pressure—

  127. Can I just stop you there and ask you, therefore, in terms of the DG trade department at the EU having the competence and the Trade Ministers here having the competence for all but the investment part of this, is that a matter of concern for you?
  (Mr McLaren) It is indeed. I do not think it is a satisfactory situation given the lack of effective integration measures, despite your admirable efforts on the Greening Government in the UK and the beginnings of a similar process in the EU with the integration reports, and, as you heard earlier, the trade and competition functions have not yet been subjected to any such integration analysis. I think that in the light of what we were saying earlier about the lack of capacity in developing countries, the fact that we clearly do not yet have the capacity in the developed countries to deal with how one would get a trade round to promote sustainable development means that there is a long learning curve to go up.

  128. Can I just ask a sort of related, but separate question which is that everyone is talking about the need for transparency and it is something which Dr Iddon raised at our last session, but in terms of getting the sort of joined-up green ministerial thinking integrated both at EU level and at UK level and our concerns about full parliamentary scrutiny over what happens, have you any comments to make as far as a future role for this Committee is concerned because I think sometimes we feel a little bit that maybe we might well be informed and we might well have comments to make, but it is a question of how we can have some significant input? Do you think there is any need for any new framework about the role of the parliamentary committees, such as this, at the institutional level of the WTO?
  (Mr McLaren) I think it would be a topic that merits exploration and we do not have a sort of, "Here's our proposal". Mike Moore is very keen to emphasise the accountability of the WTO to national parliaments and I am not sure that Members of this Committee might feel that Mike Moore is accountable to them. I think there may be a case in the UK and in similar governments for some sort of standing oversight committee for WTO matters, freeing yourselves up perhaps to look at, "Okay, let's audit the impacts of what that trade agreement did", as perhaps was more foreseen in your establishment.

  Chairman: Quite a few questions we did ask your predecessors and they are not really relevant in your particular position on the WTO Round, so we can skip over those and I would like to move on to questions of transparency and openness.

Dr Iddon

  129. Looking at it from an NGO's point of view, has there been enough openness and transparency in the preparations leading up to Seattle both at the European and world levels?
  (Mr Coates) We welcome the increased levels of consultation meetings with the Government. However, I would add to the previous session that expressed concern about the degree to which those consultations had led to any kind of change in policy or even any sense that the NGOs were being listened to, and I particularly think that is relevant with regard to the issue of investment and the degree to which the recommendations from this Committee on investment and the overwhelming numbers of NGOs and civil society who are involved in the MAI coalition have been reflected in any change in government policy, and particularly there are a number of recommendations from the Committee's Report that I believe have not been acted upon. We see in the investment proposals by the Government still the objectives of investment liberalisation and protection for foreign investors as being too dominant objectives. This does not provide for the kind of balance of rights and obligations that this Committee called for and that the MAI coalition and members of civil society have called for. Further, it seems to us that it calls into question the rationale for the agreement and this is where we have challenged the Government actually to provide, through these consultations, some degree of research that backs up their position on many of these issues. For example, liberalisation of investment is not perhaps the most important issue given the fact that 94 per cent of the investment changes last year were in the direction of liberalisation already. Furthermore, there is, according to UNCTAD, no relationship that they could ascertain between increased investment liberalisation and increased levels of investment. Furthermore, the case for investment protection has not been made and already foreign investors tend to receive government incentives, such as tax holidays, derogation from labour or environmental standards, so I think the case for protection of foreign investors also has not been made. This is used to illustrate a concern of ours that the consultations have been held at a level of the Government wishing to pursue a certain agenda for certain reasons and NGOs trying to get the conversation into what are the substantive issues behind the Government's proposals. We have found it very difficult to do so.

  130. And particularly if we look back at the unsatisfactory way in which the OECD MAI negotiations were carried out, do you think the WTO has learnt anything from that and is it setting up its own negotiating machinery to listen to NGOs? If not, what would you like to see happening?
  (Mr McLaren) In a sense I think the lessons of the MAI in these very sort of procedural terms have not fully been learnt. In particular, there is still a widespread assumption that the public misunderstood what the MAI was intending to do and we hear that again now in and around the trade liberalisation talks, that the public just do not understand the benefits and they simply have to be educated about the benefits of further trade liberalisation. There is a sense in those meetings which we do get, and there is more openness to NGO input, that "the door is open, but nobody is home" and nobody is actually listening to what we are saying, that they are there and sort of paying no attention. We appreciate that it is not necessarily going to be the case that our inputs are going to change things, and governments have the job of balancing different interests, but we see predominantly other interests, notably those of business, as was mentioned earlier, reflected in government positions. As to what could be done further, it is difficult to say in mechanistic terms because the problem is the commitment of that side of the process to a dialogue where both sides are listening and learning from the process. I think there is also some proof yet to be demonstrated regarding the openness of the WTO itself in how it conducts negotiations in Seattle with regard to the presence of developing country negotiators at key negotiations or the amount of information that is provided about the ongoing debate.

  131. So in future if you could leave us with a key message, what would it be?
  (Mr Coates) My key message is that the British Government should try to persuade its EU partners, which I believe it would be able to do, to drop the proposal to put new issues on the agenda at Seattle, particularly the proposals for investment, competition policy and procurement. Secondly, we believe that international rules in those areas are very much required, but they need to be balanced international rules and they need to be rules that will essentially operate in a forum whereby they can involve in a meaningful way all the participants. For us, we would like to see agreements on investment and competition policy in particular in an international forum that is not the WTO because the WTO has a mandate for deregulation of government influence, not regulation in the public interest, which is what we believe is required in order for essentially these kind of issues to meet a challenge of sustainable development and equity.
  (Mr McLaren) The message that I would leave is that the pursuit of sustainable development, which this Government has expressed its commitment to, will not be furthered by an unbalanced pursuit of the economic objectives of trade liberalisation when there are failings of that process on all counts as far as sustainable development is concerned. It has environmental costs in terms of resource consumption, it has social costs in terms of inequalities and it has economic costs in terms of monopolies and instabilities which are encouraged through that process because it is an unbalanced process and there is a very clear need to invest time and effort and resources in bringing the process back into balance.

  Chairman: Well, thank you very much indeed. I think that was a very satisfactory conclusion, so thank you for all you have said and thank you for coming here this morning.





 
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