Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Minutes of Evidence



Examination of witness (Questions 40 - 59)

WEDNESDAY 15 DECEMBER 1999

MR DENIS TUNNICLIFFE

Mr Forsythe

  40. What risk will remain in the public sector once the PPP agreements are agreed?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) We did send you this document, and I think there is a section in there that sets it out. They will not carry on any revenue risks because our revenue is very much driven by the state of the London economy. There will be certain change of law risks that they will not carry. What we are trying to do with the contract is to try and not have a very clever contract as most PFIs used to start, where you try to beat down the supplier and you have a long war. We are trying to have it more proportional than that, and we have left the door open for bidders to talk about risks they may not want to take. The obvious ones are highly catastrophic risks where the potential is extremely small, and we know the risk because we have known the business for a long time, and we might end up taking that risk if the bidders put to us that it is more value for money for you to take that risk than for us to take that risk.

  41. Are the rail unions correct then when they say that the private sector will be assuming less risk than originally anticipated?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I think we have always said from the beginning that the risk transfer would be appropriate. You cannot push more risk on the private sector than it can manage and fund and sustain. That is the experience of all the PFIs and the risks you want the private sector to bear are not the—well, we will have that debate with them, but it is the risk of things going wrong not exactly on the day to day level but at equipment level of stuff they manage and control, problems of how the thing is fixed, how quickly the railway is handed back and so on. You want them managing the risk that they understand and they can manage and you want them very clearly incentivised to do that. That is why we have not shut our minds to debating with the private sector catastrophic risk because catastrophic risk is very big and is also something on which they may be able to bring very little to the party.

  42. It sounds a bit like the PPP will give poor value for money. Have you made any estimate of the continuing requirement for subsidy in the future?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) We are in the middle of doing some sums on that and we have not come to any conclusions yet. I think it would be fair to say that the most probably outcome is that there will be some requirement. I would like to be more specific than that but I will gently use the word "modest" if I may.

Mr Bennett

  43. You talk about catastrophic risk. Is it not really something much more grave than that? If you took something like the levels of water in the ground under the system, that can be partly global warming, it can be fairly minor rises in the water table. Is it not extremely difficult to separate out that risk from being something that you would say was major to something that was relatively minor?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) We do not believe so. We have not started this debate but we do not believe so. If we look at our own insurance profile, for instance, there are big gaps between the catastrophes and we think we will get the risk lying where it should be.

  44. So your insurance covers you for global warming?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) No.

Chairman

  45. Can I just be clear before you move on because we have a number of people wanting to question you: are you really saying that nay private company coming in would be able to say to you, "We will undertake the normal responsibility of day to day running, but if anything serious happens the taxpayer has to underwrite it"?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I think it is more accurate to say that bidders will come back to us and talk about the risk they can afford to take on, and there may be some very large risks which are very unlikely—

  46. Which the taxpayer will have to take?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) Which are very unlikely.

  47. No, no. Mr Tunnicliffe, let us not bandy words here. What you are saying is that they are prepared to come in when they can make a profit on the day to day running, but they are also going to ask that the taxpayer underwrite the possibility of any major problem?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) The taxpayer, you have got to remember, is owning this asset long term. The asset is not going out of the ownership of the taxpayer.

  48. So the division in your mind is not between a private company coming in to perform a service and making a profit. It is between the ownership of the assets and the employment of a service company, and you will decide at which level that risk is divided? Is that what you are telling us?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I realise that the moment I say yes you are going to leap on it.

  49. I never leap on you, Mr Tunnicliffe. I might like to, but I do not. I could get myself such a reputation that way.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) Certainly we look upon it, as I think the Deputy Prime Minister has explained many times, as not the transfer of the asset long term. It is the transfer of the asset to be maintained and presented for use for the eventual return to the public sector.

  50. You and I are in agreement.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) We look to the maximum sensible transfer of risk to the companies who are going to look after and maintain those assets.

  51. So I ask you again: the service companies are going to put to you a deal whereby they will take over the risk for the ordinary running day to day and the taxpayer will underwrite serious risks over and above very minimum ones?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) No, I see it very much the other way round. I see the companies taking on the vast majority of the real risk that is there and the taxpayer only coming in in the exceptionally unlikely areas.

Mr Donohoe

  52. How much do you estimate has been spent so far on consultancy fees looking at the PPP?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I would be very grateful if you did not press me on that and that is for a reason of the courtesies of this establishment. Ministers I understand have given assurances that they will regularly answer that question. I understand they intend to answer that question very shortly and I understand they would be grateful if you would allow that question to be answered through that medium.

  53. With great respect to you, it is you who is here as a witness and the Sub-Committee has previously guesstimated the figure and it was at the rate of some £65 million. Are we far away from that as a figure now? Have we gone beyond that?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) As I say, I believe that you will get a clear answer—

Chairman

  54. No, Mr Tunnicliffe. Let us get the rules of engagement clear. You are giving evidence to us. Ministers are also answerable to Parliament and they will in due course have to answer our own questions that we put to them and the report that this Committee produces, so I am afraid we are asking you.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I would prefer to send you a written response privately.

  55. Very well; we will accept that, but you will understand that you are going to have to discuss whether or not it is published.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) Yes. I know Ministers are very concerned that you do have the information.

  Chairman: I know Ministers want to keep us informed. We do want to be informed. that is why we are asking the person who is likely to be responsible.

Mr Donohoe

  56. If you cannot answer that, can you answer this? To what extent has the planning for the PPP by management diverted away resources from the day to day operating?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I think the change we have been through has diverted some management effort. It is difficult to quantify it but we have done two things at once. We have re-shaped the company. We have re-shaped the company in a way that our previous work was suggesting was sensible anyway. The biggest diversion was in that change, in other words we had an organisation which was managed on a line basis with maintenance and operations in the same line business unit. For the PPP and as a result of work we had previously done, we have changed that into a station based operation, a train based operation, a marketing based operation and so on.

  57. So because of that you will be able to tell us, will you, the revenue loss that has been accrued since the opening of the Heathrow Express?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) if you wanted that figure we could certainly give you an estimate of the revenue loss since the opening of the Heathrow Express.

  58. I would have thought that that would be something that you, as the Managing Director/Chief Executive, would have concentrated on because it is a fairly major factor. It is a new project which must be filtering off quite a substantial amount of revenue. I wondered whether or not you would also know what the estimated revenue would be for the new Jubilee Line link-up to the Dome.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I could certainly give you both those figures. I do not have them at hand. Could I say something that I think shows the difference that we have in the public sector compared with an equivalent private sector company, and that is that to us we are a complement to the Heathrow Express, not a competitor. The Heathrow Express has relieved some traffic from ourselves into London but that relief has allowed people who use the Piccadilly Line downstream of Heathrow, who really had a quite difficult journey before the opening of the Heathrow Express, to build up capacity. Our general remit is to improve public transport and if that means a competitor comes in and takes pressure off us and allows us then to offer a better service to the rest of our customer base, that for us is a good thing against our remit generally to improve public transport in London.

  59. Why is the GLE project being completed late and over budget?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) That is a very big question.


 
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