Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Minutes of Evidence



Examination of witness (Questions 80 - 99)

WEDNESDAY 15 DECEMBER 1999

MR DENIS TUNNICLIFFE

  80. You are convinced that there are techniques, which presumably they think amount to constructive tension, which can save these incredible billions of pounds?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) What we have done is we have worked through the whole portfolio of work that is done and we have talked—I say "we" it has been done basically between Ove Arup, our engineering advisors, Price Waterhouse, our financial advisers and our own engineers—and they have worked through the things that have been done. From what they have seen as to how the private sector works in these circumstances, they have taken views of efficiencies that have emerged elsewhere under private pressures, and they have taken the view that yes there is significant improvement to be had.

  81. They have effectively established that a series of good practices, management techniques which are identifiable, are quantifiable, are understandable, are implementable by human beings add up to this package of savings?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) They take the view that on average the way the private sector behaves with private incentives as compared with the generality of how we have been able to behave with the constraints or whatever that we naturally find, will have a substantial difference in efficiency together with the monies that they will have which will allow that in general to be exploited by increased volumes. Therefore they will find it relatively easy to take advantage of these people.

  82. I have to challenge that last statement. Price Waterhouse did their sums on the basis of equal amounts of money being available in the public sector and in the private sector. Let us take that as a given, as it were, if these skills, these management techniques that can be so clearly identified and added up are there, why do you not implement them in your current structure in the public sector? If you have not got the people who understand these techniques well enough to implement them, why do you not hire them to people, which is perhaps back to Mr O'Brien's question, is the management of London Underground up to the job?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) If 18 months ago somebody had said "Well, we have looked at all these reports, Dennis, and we are not going to make any change", clearly we would have been struggling—not struggling that is the wrong term—we would have been seeking to do exactly what you suggest. We have not because we have been asked over the last 18 months to position ourselves as efficiently as possible with the most effective people and organisation into three companies which will be attractive to the private sector and the private sector will buy and then bring to the party pressures and techniques and efficiencies. It is not so much that there are a series of techniques that you can see out there and say "Look you can do that, that and that", what the conclusion has been, as these people have taught, as I say from Price Waterhouse, from Ove Arup, from our own engineers, some of whom have worked in the private sector, they have taken a view that given how much we tend to have to pay for something, and given how much the private sector has to pay for something, there is a substantial difference. Now, you have to remember the Deputy Prime Minister's position on this is that that case is sufficiently persuasive that it is proper to go into a competition and find out from the market place, not from a consultant's report or whatever but from the market place, whether businesses with real money behind them are willing to put in bids which will yield those efficiencies. We will only start to see that picture next spring when those bids come in.

  83. I am sure I will get the opportunity to ask the Deputy Prime Minister for his view but at the moment I would like your view. To follow from what you have just said, it seem that the viable alternative was for you, as a public company, to restructure your management in order to adopt these more professional and more efficient techniques and thereby achieve in the public sector the efficiencies which we are now going to try and achieve with a public private partnership. That follows from what you have just said, is that right? That would have been an option that the Deputy Prime Minister could have chosen to give to you and you would have been able to implement it or made a good fist of trying to implement it?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I could have tried to make the delivery more efficient but in a sense I have been trying to do it for eight years. We have had some successes. When we self-examined ourselves with these experts in producing advice to the Deputy Prime Minister we had to confess that we had not made the progress that we would expect the private sector to make. Now clearly if we had been asked to manage the railway in the public sector we would have carried on trying to improve, just as we would have carried on trying to persuade Government to produce the steady amount of money which is an important part of making that happen.

  84. The private sector has this magic, which Price Waterhouse called "constructive tension" which somehow makes it all possible for them to do it and you cannot. That is what I do not understand.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I suppose that the people looking at this look across the range of apparent improvements that have occurred over the last 15 years as parts of the private sector have taken over from the public sector in provision.

  85. It is an empirical assessment not a management assessment.
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) It was a series of judgments and, because the judgments were taken in a lot of places, they were added together saying "There would be a high probability of a substantial advantage in terms of improved efficiency coming from a private sector focus on the delivery of these projects". Certainly sufficient of a probability that it was a sensible road to go down and explore the market and see if indeed the market would behave as our advisers predict.

Mr Bennett

  86. How far was this £1.9 billion original estimate for the Jubilee Line extension really optimistic or was it geared as low as possible to convince the Government to give you the go ahead?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) It was actually in today's money, if you want to compare 3.5 with something, you need to compare it with 2.1 if I recall.

  87. That was not the question I asked you. Was it really set as low as possible to convince the Government they should give you the go ahead?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I did not think I was doing that at the time. Clearly I was trying to make the project look attractive and trying to make sure there was no fat in the project and indeed we did cut some things out. In other areas where we thought it was very valuable we put bits of money in so we have an all new train fleet, for instance. I have to confess, and you can look back and say "How could you get it so wrong" but at the time when I said to Government it was deliverable for that, I genuinely believed it.

  88. What have been the consequences? With the extra money what on the system has not had money spent on it that should have had money spent on it?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I could try and give you a written answer to that. The key issue is that—

  89. The Central Line could have been upgraded substantially, could it not?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) No, the problems with upgrading the Central Line have more or less all been the limitations of the technology and making it work and so on. It has not been a money problem. We will give you an answer but it will be things like track renewals and that sort of thing. The key thing is a lot of problems occurred before May 1997 and we did not get a very good hearing and we did have to pull back our core programmes quite significantly. Whilst we have sometimes wished this Government would respond to our concerns more rapidly, essentially as compared with the inherited budgets previously, new monies, as you know, of £365 million I think in March 2000 and a further approximately £500 million in July this year have come to us. We did have to pause in one or two of our programmes. Broadly speaking we have been able to maintain an average of around £400 million a year in the three years which we are in the middle of now.

  90. On the Jubilee Line are we ever going to get 36 trains an hour?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I hope so.

  91. Do we need them to move the sort of number of passengers?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) Certainly we do not need them for a number of years but the Jubilee Line, and in a sense here I do not make an apology, was in part an act of faith. It was a belief that the building of the line would stimulate development out of all proportion to what the simple planning models would say and that very much like the Victoria Line for different reasons before it, traffic would grow on it at an enormous rate and the revitalisation effect of the line both on the Isle of Dogs itself and on the corridors it serves would cause the thing to grow. I think within a decade, personally, we are going to be saying yes we need all the capacity we can get out of the line.

  92. You are then hoping to get 36 trains?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) That would seem to be the theoretical upper limit and certainly we want to set out a strategy that can lead us to that if the demand is there.

  93. In general can you tell us anything about the balance between getting extra numbers of passengers and fare increases?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) We know that broadly speaking fare increases have in them the elasticity of I think decimal 26.

  94. Can you explain that?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) As I was going to say, if we put up our fares say ten per cent—I do that because the arithmetic is easy—we would expect to lose 2.6 per cent of our traffic. It varies between a business elasticity of about 0.19 so with the worker driven traffic it is very elastic and I think it is 0.4 for our leisure traffic.

  95. A very trivial question, when I buy a carnet why can I not have one ticket which allows me to do ten journeys rather than waste an awful lot of paper with ten separate tickets?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) The technology is not currently up to it. We have a private finance initiative scheme to introduce gating, new ticket machines right across LT including the buses and that will move I think in about two years time to a contactless smart card medium, which is a touch and pass type medium. It is very probable we will be offering your carnet then on that electronic medium.

Chairman

  96. Mr Tunnicliffe, I do not want to keep you here forever but there are certain things I need to know and I need fairly brief answers. What about the conventional signalling system that you have gone back to on the Jubilee Line rather than the original sophisticated equipment idea. Why is that?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) Essentially because our contractor so far has not been able to make the sophisticated system work.

  97. Did you presumably give him the specification and ask him to do it in the first place and presumably you were then satisfied he could do it?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) We gave him an output based specification and yes—

  98. You were satisfied he was capable of doing it and he was not?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) That is correct; as yet.

  99. As yet. So what are the specific cost implications?
  (Mr Tunnicliffe) I simply do not recall at this moment.


 
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