Integration with other modes
of transport
35. As well as being integrated with land-use planning
and traffic management policies, new LRT services must be integrated
with other forms of transport. Ensuring that an LRT system forms
the core of an integrated transport system is essential if its
full benefits are to be enjoyed. The PTE Group thought that this
should include the ability to provide feeder bus services, interchanges
with heavy rail services, park-and-ride and cycling facilities.
Moreover, once investment in a new LRT project has been made,
competition between modes should be circumscribed so that the
unnecessary duplication of services along the corridor can be
avoided. Co-ordination, according to the Institute of Logistics
and Transport, is an important factor in the success of fixed
track systems in mainland Europe and their relative failure in
the United Kingdom. In its opinion, while bus services remain
deregulated outside Greater London, "any serious form of
integration is impossible".[111]
36. Our witnesses thought that several light rail
systems have suffered to some extent because of competition from
bus services. Patronage on the South Yorkshire Supertram is thought
to have been particularly hard hit by bus operators who chose
to compete with the tram both in terms of fares and frequency
of service.[112]
Conversely, the regulation of buses in Greater London means that
Croydon Tramlink will not have to face competition from buses:
London Transport instead plans to restructure bus services in
order to complement the new system and provide some dedicated
feeder routes.[113]
Where competition from bus services occurs, however, the implications
for passenger and revenue forecasts might encourage a promoter
to increase the cost of an LRT project to take account of the
perceived increased risk to the success of the scheme.[114]
Disruption during construction
37. It is inevitable that the construction of a major
LRT scheme, particularly a light rail project with a high proportion
of on-street running, will result in some disruption. Both homes
and businesses along the line of the route will be affected as
will road users diverted around the works. Despite efforts to
minimise the effects of the work and to consult with those who
would be affected, the construction of the South Yorkshire Supertram
attracted negative reports in the local media.[115]
There were particular concerns at the effects the disruption had
on existing bus services.[116]
The problems caused by construction may tarnish the image of a
LRT project and weaken local support. Concern about the effects
of the disruption both during and after construction may encourage
those who would be affected to resist any proposal for an LRT
scheme strongly.[117]
80 See RT 31 (paras 6-13) for details of the cost of
recent United Kingdom schemes and how they have been funded. Back
81
RT 27, para 5.5. Back
82
See RT 30A for an account of the appraisal process. Back
83
Over the past 15 years, each light rail project has been developed
individually with almost each scheme having different funding
arrangements and forms of contract (RT34A, annex 3, para 2.1). Back
84
RT 19. In the course of taking forward proposals for the Leeds
Supertram, the relevant authorities and the private sector spent
more than £6m in trying to meet the changing criteria and
funding frameworks set by the Government (RT 1). Back
85
RT 19. Back
86
See HC Deb, 29 October 1998, col 263w. Back
87
RT 19. Back
88
Q 181. This change was expected to add £5million to the cost
of the proposed Manchester Metrolink extensions (Q184). Back
89
R T31A. Back
90
Q 387. Back
91
RT 30. This view was shared by others including Greater Manchester
PTA and PTE (RT 36, para 13) and the Institution of Highways and
Transportation (RT 18, para 3.9). Satisfaction was also expressed
with the workings of the Act. The Docklands Light Railway, for
example, thought that it was "a pretty good process"
(Q 252). Back
92
See RT 25 paras 1.4 and 7.2 and RT 34A, annex 1. Back
93
As expressed by the PTE Group (Q 153). Back
94
Q 252. Back
95
Promoting New Transport Projects,
Chartered Institute of Transport in the UK, 1998. Back
96
RT 17 and see also Better Public Transport for Cities,
Chartered Institute of Transport in the UK, 1996. The development
of LRT systems in Singapore illustrates the close relationship
that can exist between transport and land-use planning polices
(see Annex B, para 8). Back
97
It was originally expected that Supertram would be used for more
than 20 million passengers within three years of becoming fully
operational. Only 6 million passenger journeys were made during
the first year, however, and it became apparent that the patronage
targets would not be achieved (RT 22, para A2.3). Back
98
RT 22, para A2.3. See also RT 17. Back
99
RT 34, para 5.1. Back
100
RT 32. Back
101
Q 46. Back
102
RT 30. Back
103
The Institute of Logistics and Transport thought that traffic
restraint measures, such as road pricing, would have to be implemented
alongside public transport improvements if people were to be discouraged
from using their cars in large urban areas. Without such improvements,
however, motorists would simply use facilities outside town centres,
where restraint measures did not apply (Q 3). Back
104 Financial,
Operational and Demand Comparison of Light Rail, Guided Bus, Busways
and Bus Lanes, executive
summary. Back
105
RT 22, para A2.3. Back
106
Annex B, para 21. Back
107
RT 19. Back
108
Financial, Operational and Demand Comparison of Light Rail,
Guided Bus, Busways and Bus Lanes, executive summary. The
Institute of Logistics and Transport thought that few light rail
projects had been implemented as part of a truly co-ordinated
strategy which included measures to manage or limit private car
use; to integrate public transport services fully; and to integrate
transport and land-use policies. It thought that the success
of new schemes, particularly in the UK, had been reduced as a
consequence of this (RT 17). Back
109
RT 17. The Institute of Logistics and Transport noted that if
the Manchester Metrolink had been introduced with a road pricing
scheme, 25 per cent more passengers would have been attracted
and its subsidy requirement would have been reduced by 16 per
cent (Q 21). Back
110
Financial, Operational and Demand Comparison of Light Rail, Guided
Bus, Busways and Bus Lanes,
executive summary. Back
111
RT 17. Back
112
RT 22, para A2.3. Back
113
Annex A, para 12. The DLR benefited similarly from bus services
being regulated. It thought that there would be advantages in
franchising bus routes that would act as feeder services to future
LRT schemes (Annex A, para 35). Back
114
RT 3, para 3.4. Back
115
RT 22, paras A2.1 and A2.2. Croydon Tramlink was thought to have
benefited from the experience of earlier systems with improvements
being made in the approach taken to traffic management and the
phasing of work during its construction. This is thought to have
reduced the number of complaints made (RT 19). Back
116
RT 9, para 8. Back
117
The opposition of retailers along the line of the proposed extension
to Sydney's light rail line contributed to the project being delayed
and may lead to an alternative route being proposed (see Annex
B, para 23). Back
