Memorandum submitted by John Bygate, Esq
(RT 15)
LIGHT RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
A Light Rapid Transit System (LRTS) will only
succeed in transport terms and commercial terms if it is planned
and operated as a part of a public transport network.
An LRTs is a sensible option for a route demanding
a passenger capacity of 2,000 to 8,000 passengers/hour in each
direction for on street services or up to 12,000/hour for off-street
services.
In London an LRTS would be a sensible choice
for a distribution system like DLR or the planned cross-river
tramway.
Elsewhere in the UK an LRTS would be a core
route carrier in a city or conurbation public transport network.
It would link with and distribute from the National Network. It
would link with and collect from local feeder services.
The fundamental problems are:
— outside London transport planning
is based on "the through journey"; not network interchanging;
— the public by and large do not even
consider network travel; the car serves door to door;
— transport legislation favours a mass
of competing through services and renders network implementation
difficult;
— public funding management has concentrated
on construction cost rather than operational life cost, with the
result that the functionality of the system and the passenger
appeal of the system have suffered.
If the LRTS is to have a future in the UK, Cities
must adopt Network public transport with frequent core
route services, supported by frequent feeder route services,
that have priority over all other transport.
EXAMPLE
|
| Home to Office or Shops |
|
|
| By Car | |
| 20 miles at 15 m.p.h.
| 80 mins |
| 20 miles at 35p / mile
| £7 |
| Car Park
| £4 |
| By LRTS Network | |
| Walk to Bus Stop
| 5 mins |
| Wait (ave.)
| 2½ mins |
| Bus 2½ miles at 15 m.p.h.
| 10 mins |
| Interchange (ave)
| 5 mins |
| Tram 17½ miles at 25 m.p.h.
| 42 mins |
| Walk to Office
| 5 mins |
|
| 69½ mins |
| 20 miles Ticket
| £3 |
| Return trip x 5 days / week |
|
| Car =
| 800 mins at £90 |
| LRTS =
| 695 mins at £30 |
|
The Bury to Manchester Tramlink might approach this level
of performance for some Bury residents. The service is successful.
The Hillsborough to Sheffield Supertram was designed to provide
this quality of performance but was not allowed to do so following
deregulation.
In short, if an LRTS is to be successful, the time conscious
potential passenger must "know the bus/tram is coming"
without worrying about a timetable, and the journey time must
be quicker and cheaper than the car.
(a) Examples
Nantes—France
Core routes from the outskirts to the city centre with major
bus interchanges on the outskirts.
Strasbourg—France
Similar to Nantes—so successful the fleet size is being
doubled after about 4 years in operation.
Sheffield—UK
On street like Nantes—no priority; no through ticketing;
no feeder services; competing through services running parallel.
Performs like a competing bus serving a walk-in-catchment.
Manchester—UK
Off street core route system, changing to on street in the
city centre. Popular—being extended. Relationships with
buses not all it might be!
Croydon—London
Opening soon will be a much needed east—west link between
urban centres and north south main line railways. Will succeed
because it is a priority distribution route in a network.
Nottingham—UK
Approved, announced, partner companies identified, staff
on site—planned to be a core feeder to keep Motorway traffic
out of the city.
Leeds—UK
A vibrant expanding city wants to keep Motorway traffic out
of the City with an LRTS but cannot secure approval.
Liverpool—UK
Designated priority regeneration area. Just had a public
authority LRTS turned down after four years planning! Has a private
LRTS proposal on the table but isn't quite sure how to progress
to credibility and funding.
(b) Problems
The ET & RA Committee Brief refers to construction and
operation. It is assumed Construction includes Planning. In fact
Planning must define Construction.
Recent systems in UK have been required to involve construction
contractors at the pre-approval stage. Contractors are "do-ers"
and are very good at saying "how to do things". They
are not land use planners, nor transport planners, nor transport
operators. The LRTS should be planned with the Passenger in mind
by the Operator and Transport Planners together with the Land
Use in mind by the Land Use Planners. Once they have decided the
Network and the LRTS that is needed, contractors should be told
what to build, but invited to say how it should be built, as a
part of their bid.
Financial planning must be a part of the Network plan. Appropriate
financial planners must be a part of the team planning the network.
The extent to which private sector participants might be reasonably
expected to take risk should be identified and the relevant project
criteria be identified and be made to occur.
Sheffield supertram was to be a fully integrated system when
it was approved;—but it never happened and the financial
results show the consequence.
Planning a Network with an LRTS as a core route carrier involves
transport planning, traffic management planning and particularly
adoption of network journeys with appropriate restrictions on
competitive through journeys. Such thinking is beneficial to the
environment and the overall public journey making. It is perhaps
a political minefield especially for the local council. Deregulation
may have promoted competition but has not improved city transport
networks nor city centre environments!
Network travelling requires feeder bus services to core LRTS
systems at high fequency. Of themselves such services will probably
be uneconomic and must be seen as part of a viable network if
they are to attract operators and passengers. The public and indeed
transport industry prejudice for the through journey bus competing
with the network must be countered.
LRTS Core routes should remain core routes and not branch out
into several infrequent services in the suburbs. Hong Kong MTR
runs 2 minute frequency services with no junction working but
cross platform interchange. This enhances reliability; the passenger
knows a train "is coming", and knows the next train
is "his train". DLR have now terminated Stratford trams
at Canary Wharf thus improving reliability and frequency on both
the City—Island Garden route and the Stratford route. Sheffield
Supertram has five terminae and four junctions none of which can
have a maximum frequency service. On London Underground District
Line, Wimbledon trains travel across London. If they terminated
at Earls Court and allowed interchange, both the District Line
and the Wimbledon Line frequency/regularity would be perceived
to improve.
Public Transport is notoriously unprofitable if capital cost
is included. In many cases even operating costs are not covered
by revenue.
Sheffield Supertram is a much publicised prime example at
a capital cost of £240 million, an annual operating cost
of about £8 million and an annual revenue of about £7
million.
Against this supposed background it is not surprising that
the private sector are slow to promote LRT systems.
However these numbers are very misleading.
The costs refer to a system of very high technical quality
in difficult topography designed to be a core route operation
in an integrated network. The revenue refers to actual operation
of a stand alone bus equivalent competing for walk-in catchment
in an almost totally unintegrated and deregulated environment.
A fundamental problem is that LRTS capital cost includes
many items which are associated with creating the new route. These
are not included when comparing the cost of providing a flock
of ordinary inferior bus services along existing routes.
If environmentally friendly integrated network public transport
is to be made available a complete review of how costing and funding
is considered is necessary. Also it must address full integrated
system costs and not just the stand alone LRTS as do the Sheffield
figures above.
Two more of the facets of the Planning stage must be addressed.
The legislation involved in obtaining approval for an LRT
System on its own is complex, expensive and lengthy. To achieve
approval for an integrated Network will certainly be more complex,
more expensive and at least as lengthy but must be pursued. To
pursue the core route and anticipate the remainder will fall into
place, ignores the short term expedient thinking of many local
political organisations. A procedure is required which:
— expedites in principle political approval;
— removes approved projects from the political arena;
— expedites detail approvals, consultations etc;
— is staged so that fundamental or major problems
are identified and addressed early, and are not allowed to fester
until all the time and expense of dealing with the minutiae of
the detail design is complete.
Secondly the planning of a Network system must involve all
the parties who are affected. It is not good enough for one official
department to work in isolation and expect everyone else to fall
in line. (no examples quoted but.....!) A major project requires
a team spirit, and each member of the team must generate some
ownership. The team should contain representatives of all who
will be seriously affected by the network project.
— The Council Officer Rep.
This will be further addressed under item (d).
Moving on to problems identified from the construction stage.
Once a project is defined and a programme agreed with the
contracts in place it is too late to introduce variations. The
project management structure must ensure this does not happen.
Unexpected problems will arise and these must be resolved expeditiously
with appropriate advice, at Board level. To often have projects
in this country omitted the Operator from crucial decisions during
construction. To often also, have projects been changed or delayed
by local political whim or indecision, or by tortuous time consuming
process. It is appropriate to draw attention to the take over
of management of Railtrack Projects by American Consultants!
LRTS projects have invariably required construction contracts
to be separate from ongoing maintenance contracts, usually at
the bankers insistence. This reduces construction costs, but ensures
lucrative maintenance contracts, and is not by any means the best
way of ensuring a minimum whole life cost. The Lewisham Extension
of DLR has attacked this problem by leasing the infrastructure
from the contractor. Some contractors are beginning to develop
maintenance areas which is a good sign for the future, but contracts
must combine construction with ongoing maintenance in one contract
if the Contractor is to be persuaded to "think whole life
cost".
LRTS projects have usually involved trams, built to specific
project requirements in a limited edition. In consequence they
have been expensive £1.5 million—£2.0 million
per vehicle. Vehicle costs must be reduced. The Tram currently
proposed privately in Liverpool would cost no more than £1.0
million for an 80 seat 200 capacity version.
LRTS projects must go on street in city centres. Some like
Sheffield, and the Liverpool proposal, run on street from the
suburbs. To be effective the LRTS must have absolute priority
at junctions etc. over other road traffic. In Europe this is understood
and is made to happen. In UK the appropriate restrictions on other
traffic are controversial and objected to by business groups and
residents groups. The local politicians must have the will to
rule in favour of the LRTS for the common good. They have not
always had that will.
LRTS projects involving trams have to lay slab railway track
in the street. This is bound to be disruptive but little effort
has been made to reduce the disruption. Motorway construction
thinking produces slip form paving over half mile sections. This
takes weeks and the effect on business or residential neghbourhood
is awful. An alternative shallow depth rail in a shallow trough
which can be laid one rail at a time in 100 yard lengths is being
considered for Liverpool. This will be little more disruptive
than laying a new kerb stone and will cost only half as much as
slab track.
LRTS slabs for rail track, or guideways for buses demand
a significant number of utility diversions. The shallow slab,
shallow rail track referred to above minimises the need for utility
diversions and reduces disruption and cost substantially.
Utility companies insist on diverting their own utilities
individually thus increasing the period of disruption in the street.
An arrangement is required whereby all utility diversions at any
location are done at once, by one contractor, and in a common
trench as far as possible to reduce the period of disruption.
Accommodation works for any LRTS will be needed. However
these should be necessary works. Some recent projects have been
compelled to include "highly desirable" accommodation
works which were not strictly necessary but could not otherwise
have been afforded. Perhaps they should be done—but not
at LRTS cost.
Testing and Commissioning is a crucial period at the end
of construction; it takes time; it costs money; it must be built
into the project. The Operator takes over responsibility for the
system at this time as well. It is essential that the Operator
is part of the project planning unit to ensure that this is adequately
catered for. Some UK schemes have failed to involve the Operator
adequately and have got it wrong.
Railtrack liaison can be difficult, expensive and subject
to significant variation. Safety is crucial and must be ensured;
that is not in question. Railtrack's overall co-operation with
complementary public transport systems which will benefit Railtrack's
own passengers through interchange and is thus to their benefit,
is less than might be expected. If LRTS systems and networks are
to be promoted then the relationship with Railtrack should be
explored at DETR level as many systems will run close to, or actually
on railway property. Indeed a number of redundant or little used
railways might be beneficially converted to LRTS use, as at Manchester
and Croydon, at less cost than adopting an in street route.
Major Bus Companies have shown a willingness to liaise with
LRT Systems but current competitive legislation discourages such
liaison (No more can be said as a legal case is outstanding in
Manchester).
Through ticketing with other modes is a huge advantage in
London for DLR and Croydon Tramlink. It is clearly imperative
for Network travel. While it is allowed in the deregulated non-London
UK, it is easily undercut by independent through service operators
running parallel services. This was blatantly the case in Sheffield
and the PTE were unable to do anything about it. The Supertram
Operator being subsidised could not indulge in a price war. Through
ticketing was ineffective.
The absence of the Operator at the planning design and construction
stages has resulted in a number of passenger unfriendly features
in LRTS schemes in UK. Typically, at Sheffield CCTV coverage of
stops was deleted from the project. This resulted in widespread
vandalism, destruction of ticket machines, assaults on passengers
and a bill for £½ million in the first 12 months of
operation. Less spectacular but thoroughly unfriendly to the customer
is the location of shelters on stops. Geometrically sited at the
centre of the platform they are not where the tram doors stop
at the ends of the platform. If it's raining the passenger gets
wet. The blind passenger follows the tactile tiles which lead
to the door and never finds the shelter so he has to stand in
the rain for 10 minutes till the tram comes!
The LRTS and a network, depend on frequency and regularity
for customer appeal. The old story of "no bus for half an
hour, then three came, together" must be consigned to history.
In Sheffield in excess of 75 per centdelays to Supertram are caused
by events outside the control of the Supertram operator. The obvious
solution of running off street on old railway or old tramway formations
is adopted where possible. This manifestly helps on Bury—Manchester,
Meadowhall—Sheffield and will do so on Wimbledon—Croydon.
But to be customer friendly the LRT must go where the people are
and so must go on the road in city centres etc. Not having continental
style priority at all road junctions is the first problem. Being
held up with all the other traffic in tail backs is the next.
A radical traffic management solution must accompany an LRTS if
it is to succeed. The Political Will must be strong. Public objection
will be substantial; but so it is against pedestrianised shopping
areas as well and yet no-one would go back on these after they
are introduced! A major marketing exercise is called for to sell
the overall benefits of such systems and reach a position where
city residents complain if their city hasn't got an LRTS based
network, as loudly as they currently call for a by-pass.
A difficult problem of passenger security exists on all public
transport. The perceived insecurity problem is even greater. The
best deterrent is a conductor on the vehicle. Supertram was obliged
to introduce conductors because the on stop ticketing machines
were wrecked. The public response was positive and immediate and
not just from ladies. In addition revenue rose 7½ per cent
immediately indicating that fare avoidance was double the estimates.
On tram vandalism became very small because the conductor was
present thus saving on operating costs. Similarly, the one piece
of integration affected in Sheffield was Car Parks at several
stops. The Car Parks were fenced, CCTV monitored, and staffed.
Cars were safe when left; car owners were safe walking alone;
car parks were used.
(c) Successes
Strasbourg
Integrated, priority service, orders placed to double the
tram fleet after some 4 years service.
Docklands Light Railway
After a bad start it is now reliable, frequent and integrated.
It carries about 100,000 passengers/day. The roads in the area
could not handle another—say—20,000 cars/day.
Manchester
The Bury line service is reliable, frequent integrated, and
quicker than the parallel road. The system is crowded despite
relatively high fares. The system is being extended as Manchester
has now realised LRTS is the way forward.
Sheffield Supertram is improving following privatisation
as there is now some through ticketing. It is reliable technically
but does not have the frequency or priority or feeder services
required to be a success. Also it is an on street system with
rival competing buses running parallel to the city centre. In
short Sheffield is not yet making best use of an excellent asset
which could reduce city centre congestion and pollution largely
caused by buses.
Cities across Europe retained trams, have renewed the systems,
have given them priority against the car, have provided feeder
services and integration facilities and have thus made best use
of the network and core route facility.
Docklands Light Railway is a core distributor, in an integrated
network. A well used asset.
Sheffield is a bus equivalent in an unintegrated system and
is not a well used asset.
The technical ability of an LRTS is not in doubt. To succeed
however it must be:
— properly located at the core
— properly supported by feeders
— properly used by being given priority
(d) Growth of LRTS in the UK
Many cities in the UK require to reduce traffic congestion
and attract more people to their city centres.
Most cities have out of date public transport systems based
on through journey buses all of which go as near to the city centre
as possible.
Each city must determine to concentrate on public transport
and downgrade car access in principle.
A public transport network plan must be developed with priority
core routes using old railway routes, existing railway routes,
and main roads.
The road based core routes can be buses except that when
patronage demand reaches 2000/hr the LRTS becomes a candidate.
The network plan must give public transport priority, allow
journey times to be 20+ mph, and reduce other traffic to facilitate
the public transport.
A major feature will be cost which will include:
— the buses, interchanges, and traffic management
to create the network;
— the cost of terminating some existing unwanted
through routes.
Fares must cover the cost of operating the LRTS and the feeders
and the leasing of vehicles for both.
Fares should cover the cost of leasing the track or guideway,
the power supply, the stops and interchanges and the depots. This
may well require funding support initially until patronage and
revenue build up.
Revenue is unlikely to cover the capital cost of land acquisition,
structures, utility diversions, railtrack accommodation works,
traffic management measures, accommodation works and public security
measures. In the case of Sheffield Supertram this was about half
of the infrastructure capital cost ie about £90 million.
For a fully integrated network it would have been more. Many cities
like Sheffield and Liverpool can attract substantial grants which
should contribute substantially to these costs which essentially
"create the route", which becomes a public asset.
The second major feature having established the network concept
is to determine an organisation.
In Hong Kong the Government created the Mass Transit Railway
Corporation as a "fully independent wholly owned" company
"working to prudent commercial principles".
In the special circumstances of Docklands the DLR now holds
the rights to the system but leases the new infrastructure and
the operation.
Neither arrangements suits a city in UK but do give a lead.
An outline network plan must be prepared by the PTE with
the Council together.
They should then create a joint Project Enabling Group (PEG)
to be their interface with their second creation the Integrated
Network Company Ltd (INC).
This is not dissimilar in format to the Nottingham City Council
proposal for their tramway but is proposed much earlier in the
process and the PEG will be much more involved.
The INC would:
— be a commercial company;
— have a private sector dominated Board but include
Council and PTE ex-officio members;
— prepare detail plans for the Network;
— project manage implementation;
— let contracts for vehicle and infrastructure construction
and maintenance with payment on whole life lease;
— operate the system or contract operation;
— arrange commercial finance where appropriate;
— agree grant finance with PEG;
— issue equity to PEG to cover early eg planning
costs;
— issue equity to contractors in return for loans.
The PEG would:
— be a professional public body;
— liaise and co-ordinate with Council/PTE;
— ensure the INC detail plan conformed with the
Council/PTE outline;
— run working groups for:
— land acquisition;
— transport integration;
— traffic management;
— utility diversions;
— safety and security;
— secure and manage available grant finance.
The above description is ultra superficial and simplistic
but is intended to provoke thought, on an organisational structure
to handle a major project, with major political ramifications,
major cost implications and requires as much private finance as
possible.
— The structure worked in Hong Kong;
— INC will have clout in the commercial world;
— PEG will have clout in the official world;
— INC and PEG will depend on each other and will
generate project orientated team spirit to the benefit of the
customer, and all the partners.
It is suggested three or four cities are studied and consulted
quickly to assess the overall problem.
It must be on the basis of "how would you create a public
transport network to substantially reduce congestion and pollution
in your city."
Cities might be
| Leeds | — a busy expanding city who want trams.
|
| Liverpool | — a city in need of regeneration.
|
| Edinburgh | — a busy city who want trams.
|
| Cardiff | — a busy city who want trams.
|
| October 1999 |
|
| 
