Annex 2
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING AND AFTER CONSTRUCTION
A2.1 During construction public consultation
took place on a widespread scale through public meetings, press
briefings and direct contact with frontagers affected. However,
because a substantial part of the system was built in the existing
highway it was inevitable that there was disruption. This disruption
took a number of forms:
(a) To frontagers—This affected access
to both business and residential premises who claimed problems
of noise and dirt, loss of business. Some claims of this nature
have continued post completion of the system. Some of the disruption
was quite prolonged because of the necessity to divert utilities
services before the track slab for the tramway was constructed.
Tramways built on former rail alignment have not had problems
to the same extent, which was the South Yorkshire experience on
the Meadowhall section which uses some former rail alignment;
(b) To road users—This affected all
highway users as it lead to a considerable number of diversions
sometimes onto roads less suitable for heavy peak hour traffic
and this lead to congestion, extended journey times for car and
bus users, and difficulties for pedestrians crossing the road
where it was a construction site.
A.2.2 During this period the local media
particularly the press ran a very negative campaign.
A2.3 After construction the problems
were as follows:
(i) Patronage shortfalls. Although a technical
success, one year after full operation of the system it was clear
that passenger levels on the system were well below the original
forecasts. It was expected that patronage would build up to in
excess of 20 million passengers journeys per annum within three
years of the full system being opened at the time of the DoT approval.
In the event after the first full year of operation patronage
was some 6 million passenger journeys and it was clear that 20
million passengers were unlikely to be attained. The consequence
of this low patronage was poor financial performance with Supertram
operating at a loss;
(ii) Operating environment. Supertram has
to operate in an environment where buses are deregulated. From
the outset the bus operators competed with the tram both in terms
of fares and frequency. An example of this is in the Hillsborough
to City centre corridor where there are some 38 buses per hour
directly competing with the 12 trams per hour leading to over-capacity.
It was in this corridor that the first low floor buses were also
introduced to Sheffield despite the trams being fully accessible.
In addition the tram initially did not have traffic signal priority
or traffic management measures to encourage car users to use parallel
routes to the tram. Thus journey times were extended and the punctuality
was poor. Eventually in the case of Hillsborough measures were
taken to rectify these early shortcomings such that it was possible
to "save" one tram and improve frequencies and punctuality.
(iii) External factors. Patronage has also
been affected by land use changes along the route and changes
to the local economy. Examples of land use changes are where high
density residential apartments in council ownership have been
demolished and then replaced by lower density development such
as the Kelvin Park flats or the current regeneration of the Norfolk
Park area. Sheffield City centre has lost jobs to out of town
developments as employment has become more dispersed.
(iv) There have also been some problems for
other road users particularly car, with initially a higher rate
of "loss of control" incidents in wet conditions than
would be expected on similar roads without tram tracks. Following
extensive investigation by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
and research by Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) remedial action
was taken to replace the elastomer surrounding the tracks with
a material with higher friction characteristics and road markings
to encourage car drivers to position vehicles so that the wheels
do not run along the tracks. This action has resulted in a significant
reduction in such incidents.
A2.4 All the above factors gave rise to
a re-appraisal of the original forecasts by the transport consultants
MVA as clearly this was affecting the original funding arrangements
between SYPTE and the Government. The re-appraisal sought to explain
the reasons for the shortfall and produced some revised forecasts
of 9 million-12 million passengers as the potential annual patronage
dependent on a number of measures being taken.
SUPERTRAM—RESOLVING THE FUNDING AND
PRIVATISATION
A2.5 Based on the original forecasts the
concept was that the proceeds from privatisation of the operating
concession would fund some one third of the capital costs. However
with the system producing an operating loss due to the lower than
forecast patronage it was clear that the concept would not be
fulfilled. To resolve the ongoing debt problem the DETR agreed
to convert the original trading credit approvals into non-trading
approvals with final confirmation in August 1998.
A2.6 During 1996-97 privatisation of the
operating concession was pursued with the issue of a full prospectus
inviting expressions of interest. After a second round of bids
preferred bidder status was given to Stagecoach and the operating
concession was transferred to them in December 1997 when Stagecoach
entered into a service level agreement with SYPTE.
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