Memorandum by the Bristol and South Gloucestershire
Rapid Transit Scheme (RT 24)
INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Bob Fowler is a Transportation Planner
with over 20 years experience in both private and public sectors.
I am the Project Executive employed by the joint promoters of
Line 1 of the Bristol and South Gloucestershire Rapid Transit
Project.
2. Following Local Government Reorganisation
in 1996 two of the new Unitary Authorities, Bristol City and South
Gloucestershire Councils reviewed the transport and land-use strategies
of the former County of Avon and concluded:
(a) that the forecast (by previous, exhaustive
studies), identified and fundamental role that rapid transit would
play in the achievement of the Councils' policies remained and;
(b) that, in order to procure the optimum
network in a phased, efficient and cost-effective manner, the
Councils should adopt a Joint Venture approach involving the private
sector at an early stage, prior to application for Transport &
Works Act (T&WA) powers and based on the principles of risk
and cost sharing and the priority joint production of a commercially-validated
and robust Outline Business Case.
3. What has been achieved as a result, to
date, is:
— The selection of the Citylink consortium
as preferred bidder, through a competitive process, to develop
the Joint Venture. Citylink consist of Pell Frischmann, Norwest
Holst, AEA Technology Rail and FirstGroup with associate partners,
Railtrack.
— Submission of the Outline Business
Case for Line 1 as a bid for PFI funding.
— Preparation for the application for
a T&WA Order.
EVIDENCE
4. The Sub-Committee has sought evidence
on four areas of investigation. The last of these, as listed,
poses the question firstly whether it is appropriate to assist
the growth of Rapid Transit in the UK.
5. Clearly, from the above, this project
is proof that, in appropriate circumstances, rapid transit can
be demonstrated:
(a) to form an exclusively fundamental part
of an integrated strategy to achieve local and national policy
objectives;
(b) to attract very significant private-sector
investment in developing, implementing and subsequently operating
proposed systems.
That this is the belief of both the public and
private sectors involved in the project is manifest in the Provisional
Local Transport Plans produced by the two Councils and in the
joint Outline Business Case. The promoters of the project would
submit that, in such circumstances, assistance should be given
to achieving rapid transit schemes.
6. If this is accepted, then the second
element of the question posed by the Sub-Committee seeks advice
on the nature of that assistance. Significant are the following.
7. Rapid Transit is not, in itself, the
universal panacea—it is part of an integrated strategy.
Government must recognise that the ability to deliver, financially
and legally, other, complimentary, elements of the strategy is
crucial. Examples might include:
— Putting in place Legislationwhere
this is necessary;
— Demonstrating commitment to a strategy
eg in LTP Settlement statements;
— Developing and implementing policy
and legislative change identified in "Daughter" Papers
to the White Paper.
8. Given the long and expensive lead-in
time for rapid transit projects it is important to minimise the
potential for abortive expenditure. Clarity and consistency of
definitive guidance, advice and statements are paramount, as is
the speed of the decision-making process. It is important, too,
that general statements, for example on broad policy or the likely
availability of funds, are not confused with what might be different,
project-specific advice.
9. Government must ensure that it has a
realistic appreciation and threfore expectation of the views of
the private sector in investing in, developing and implementing
rapid transit schemes. In particular the way in which the risks
of achieving T&WA powers and the commitment of public sector
funding will influence the timing, extent and basis for the involvement
of the private sector and the nature of the partnerships or contracts
established.
10. The timing of this Inquiry is interesting
in relation to that of significant decisions which will potentially
influence many of the issues raised above. I refer, of course,
to the link forst drawn in the White Paper between the delivery
of rapid transit schemes and hypothecated revenue. Such is the
enormity of the consequences of the realisation and timing of
road user and workplace parking charges and the influence it will
exert that I would urge that, as soon as appropriate a dialogue
is established between Government, Local Government and the private
sector to discuss the financial and legal implications of this
issue.
R W Fowler
Project Executive
October 1999
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