Memorandum by Merseytravel (RT 25)
1. GENERAL
1.1 Merseytravel is the operating name of
the Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority and Executive. Merseytravel
is responsible for securing the provision of a range of transport
services which are not being provided by the commercial market.
These include:
— socially necessary bus services to
treat transport requirements which are judged to be necessary
by the Authority and which are not provided for commercially under
the Transport Act 1985;
— a network of local rail services
provided by franchises under the Railways Act 1993;
— passenger information services;
— infrastructure for bus services (stops,
shelters, bus stations);
— public transport services for the
mobility impaired;
— concessionary travel facilities for
the elderly, mobility impaired and young persons;
— investment in the provision, development
and expansion of the public transport infrastructure;
— provision of a comprehensive family
of pre-paid tickets;
— the Mersey Ferry service; and
— operation of the two Mersey Tunnels.
1.2 Merseytravel is a member of the Passenger
Transport Executive Group (PTEG). PTEG is making its own submission
to the Select Committee, based on the combined experience of the
six PTE areas in England, the PTE in Scotland and London.
1.3 In a number of respects Merseyside is
not typical of the PTE areas, and conclusions drawn from elsewhere
are not always fully applicable to the area.
1.4 Last year, Merseytravel submitted an
application under the Transport and Works Act (TWA) for powers
to construct and operate Line 1 of the proposed Merseyside Rapid
Transit System (MRT). Following a public inquiry the Inspector
recommended that the scheme should not proceed. The Inspector's
report, and the Secretary of State's decision letter endorsing
the inspector's recommendation, gave a number of reasons for that
decision. Some of the reasons related to local circumstances in
Merseyside and along the MRT route. Others were of a wider nature,
and could have significant repercussions for rapid transit systems
elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
1.5 This document draws on Merseytravel's
experience of developing and promoting the MRT rapid transit system.
It outlines the particular economic and transport circumstances
of Merseyside, discusses the assessment of the public transport
needs of the Merseyside conurbation, the development of the Merseyside
Rapid Transit proposals to best meet those needs, and comments
on the statutory and other processes, including funding issues,
that need to be followed in order to implement rapid transit schemes.
Conclusions and recommendations are given, with particular reference
to aspects which would assist in the growth of rapid transit systems
throughout the United Kingdom.
2. MERSEYSIDE:
BACKGROUND ISSUES
2.1 Between the period 1961 to 1991, the
population of Merseyside experienced a decline from 1.72 to 1.45
million; a fall of 15.8 per cent in 30 years. The most pronounced
decline has been within the Liverpool district where the population
has fallen by over 250,000 (35 per cent) over the same period.
2.2 Liverpool was once the UK's largest
port, however the region has experienced endemic economic problems
since the end of the second world war, when the decline of the
port and associated industries deprived the area of one of the
UK main generators of economic wealth and activity. In other parts
of Merseyside there has also been a steady decline in traditional
local sources of employment.
2.3 The scale of the problems faced are
reflected in unemployment and other economic statistics. For the
last 20 years, Merseyside, and in particular Liverpool, has consistently
had one of the highest rates of unemployment in the country. Furthermore,
there has been a trend away from full-time employment towards
part-time employment, with many of the newly created jobs being
in telephone based call-services centres.
2.4 Between 1989 and 1993 Merseyside received
165 million ECU from the European Union (EU) through objective
two funding; however during this period, the economy of Merseyside
continued to decline. The seriousness of the situation was highlighted
in 1993 when Merseyside was designated an Objective One region
by the EU—to qualify for this status, a region must have
a GDP per head of population that is 75 per cent or less of the
EU average of a three year period.
2.5 The initial Objective One period ran
from 1994 to 1999, Merseyside has recently had its status reaffirmed
for a further five years as it remains to revive its economic
performance.
2.6 Within Merseyside, there exists sharp
disparities; in the worst affected areas jobless rates are in
excess of 40 per cent and there are very high instances of long-term
youth and adult male unemployment. Such areas have been designated
"pathways" areas, and are subject to particular attention
by the Objective One programme. This initiative is held in particularly
high regard by the EU.
2.7 The economy problems experienced in
the region have resulted in a low level of car ownership. There
is, therefore, a greater reliance on the public transport system
than in other regions. Together with the decline in population,
this means that traffic congestion is not widespread but instead
occurs on a localised and time-specific basis. However, it is
the opinion of Merseytravel and it's partners, that unless a high
quality public transport alternative is provided, and road space
reallocated in its favour, then an increase in private car use
would not be discouraged.
2.8 Private sector demand for redevelopment
of older sites had been low, with resultant large areas of derelict
industrial land; estimates put this at 1,700 hectares, which is
10 times the national average. However, as a result of recent
initiatives such as Lord Roger's Urban Renaissance and the resulting
Liverpool Vision Pilot Company, public and private partnerships
are aiming to encourage economic growth. Such growth creates an
increasing demand for jobs through sustainable developments and
positive investment; the aim is to encourage those additional
journeys to be undertaken on the public transport network.
2.9 Liverpool is a prominent tourist location
with over 5 million visitors per annum to the Waterfront alone.
Together with the various new tourist initiatives, again, additional
transport demands should be provided by the public transport system.
2.10 Merseyside is fortunate to have an
extensive local rail network, a vital part of which is the underground
"loop" linking four major stations with all the key
city centre destinations. Whilst a large scale programme of improvements
and investments are taking place on the network, sections of the
conurbation are not served by this fixed, fast network.
3. ASSESSMENT
OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORT NEEDS
ON MERSEYSIDE
3.1 In 1992, the key partners developed,
in conjunction with specialist consultants, a Merseyside Integrated
Transport Study (MERITS). The key findings and objectives of which
were reaffirmed by an independent consultant in 1999. These then
formed the basis of subsequent package bids, and the recent Provisional
Local Transport Plan:
— to reverse the decline of bus use
on Merseyside;
— to provide attractive efficient transport
for all sections of the community;
— to provide access to jobs, employment
and training;
— to promote economic regeneration.
3.2 These objectives readily complement
those of the recent White Paper on Integrated Transport:
and which have been adapted to Merseyside to
include:
4. MRT
4.1 Following the development of the MERITS
strategy, a number of studies were carried out to identify the
best options for improving public transport in non-rail served
corridors. It was concluded that bus priority measures, although
low in cost, would give relatively low benefits. Light rail based
options gave much higher benefits, at correspondingly higher cost,
but would not meet the financial and economic objectives. Intermediate
modes were found to give the best overall return. The optimum
corridor was an east-west route running from the waterfront (Albert
Dock—tourist/office/residential) via the city centre, Universities,
Wavertree Technology Park to Old Swan then along the A57 to Page
Moss, with a possible extension to Prescot.
4.2 The Merseyside Rapid Transit (MRT) proposal
was for an intermediate modern system designed to LRT standards
(the "tram down" category described in the Annex to
this evidence). The system was to be segregated from general traffic
for some 70 per cent of the route length, although parts of this
were to be shared with limited classes of other traffic. The route
was to be guided throughout, although the use of an electronic
guidance system meant that there was no resulting interference
with other road users or pedestrians. The system was to be electrically
powered throughout from overhead lines. High quality stops were
proposed with level boarding. The MRT vehicle, although based
on a standard articulated bus chassis, was to have a distinctive
shape and livery, and be provided with multiple entry and exit
doors. Tickets would be obtained from ticket machines located
on platforms, with roving revenue protection teams for enforcement.
The driver would not be involved in issuing or checking tickets.
These features all helped to minimise dwell time at stops. The
stop spacing would be greater than for conventional bus stops
which, together with the segregation and priority measures at
junctions, would give faster inter-stop journey times.
4.3 In Liverpool City Centre MRT was routed
along the principal pedestrianised shopping street, in order to
best serve the retail quarter, as well as providing good access
to parts of the business district and interchange with the two
city centre bus stations and the city centre underground rail
lines. City centre accessibility was to be further improved with
the planned second and third lines of MRT.
4.4 Collectively these measures would replicate
many of the features of successful light rail systems, but with
a significantly lower cost.
4.5 The preferred scheme appeared to meet
the requirements for ERDF funding under the Objective 1 programme
and the UK Section 56 funding. Fifteen million pounds of Objective
1 funding was provisionally allocated to the project.
4.6 Following a review of procurement strategies
adopted elsewhere, and discussions with the Department of Transport,
it was decided to involve the private sector at an early stage
in the process, to gain their input into the detailed development
of the proposals. In spring 1996 the project was advertised in
the Official Journal of the European Communities and tenders invited.
Tenderers were provided with outline drawings of schemes using
kerb guided bus, guided light transit (GLT) (a proprietary intermediate
mode utilising a single centre rail laid flush with the road surface
to provide guidance), and conventional light rail, and invited
to submit proposals for at least two of these technologies.
4.7 It was clear from the submissions received
that the tenderers also believed that intermediate modes were
the best option. Following an evaluation, the Transform Group
was selected as Merseytravel's private sector partner. Transform
(consisting of Cegelec, providers of wire-guidance technology
and Arriva North West, one of Merseyside's bus operators) proposed
the use of articulated buses, dual diesel and electrically powered
(from overhead lines) and guided by means of an electronic guidance
system , in which a small computer in each vehicle controls the
vehicle steering system to follow a pair of wires laid in the
road surface. This system was already in operation in the service
tunnel of the Channel Tunnel, and had been successfully demonstrated
on a bus in trials carried out in Newcastle. In other respects
the Transform proposals broadly followed the GLT option provided
in the tender invitation.
4.8 The MRT proposals were developed through
1997 to optimise the alignment, to improve operational performance,
reduce property acquisition and to develop detailed scheme costs,
patronage and revenue forecasts and the financial and economic
case for the scheme, from both the public and private sector perspectives.
4.9 A public consultation exercise was carried
out in October and November 1997, and this showed strong support
for the proposals.
4.10 Changes made to the proposals during
1997 included the following:
— The addition of a park and ride site
on vacant land close to the end of the M62 motorway. This was
to be connected to the main MRT route by a branch utilising a
disused railway alignment. Although this corridor has been converted
to a footpath/cycleway it was possible to develop proposals which
retained this facility to the satisfaction of Sustrans;
— The depot, originally remote from
the route, adjacent to an existing bus depot and accessed using
the diesel power capability of the duobuses, was relocated to
a disused site alongside the main route. Although designated for
retail use the site had been unoccupied for a number of years.
The existing building on the site was in poor condition, but was
found to be suitable for conversion to the main workshop/office/control
room building for the MRT system;
— The extension to Prescot was developed
in some detail as a non-electrified section of the route. This
section was subsequently dropped and a decision made to electrify
the whole route including the park and ride branch, and to utilise
electric-only powered vehicles.
4.11 Throughout this period close contact
was maintained between Merseytravel, DETR and the Government Office
for Merseyside/the NorthWest. Government support for the project
was strong, as shown subsequently by the unprecedented overt support
of the award of £1.5 million of Supplementary Credit Approval
(through the Merseyside Package Bid 1999-2000) for the project
in December 1998, conditional upon the outcome of the TWA process.
4.12 Following the rejection of the MRT
proposals by the public inquiry inspector and the Secretary of
State, Merseytravel is carrying out a review of the MRT project.
This review will look both at the routes to be served and the
choice of technology/mode. Whilst it is too early to predict the
outcome of this review, it is likely that intermediate mode solutions
will rank highly in the options considered, albeit with some changes
to address specific concerns raised in response to the previous
proposals.
5. STATUTORY
AND OTHER
PROCESSES
5.1 The TWA Order application and associated
documentation were submitted to DETR on 7 April 1998. One hundred
and forty-eight objections were received to the scheme and a public
inquiry announced.
5.2 The public inquiry was held at John
Moores University, Liverpool, from 18 November to 11 December
1998, before the inspector Mr Ronald Holley. Evidence was given
by Merseytravel and several objectors. A number of objections
were resolved outside the inquiry itself, while other issues were
formally set out before the inspector. It was Merseytravel's view
that by the end of the inquiry the majority of issues raised by
objectors had been satisfactorily resolved. In the case of a few
issues the alternative views were quite finely balanced, but in
no case did any issue appear to have been concluded wholly or
mainly in favour of an objector. It was therefore with some considerable
surprise and disappointment that Merseytravel viewed the Inspector's
report and recommendations, which were endorsed by the Secretary
of State.
5.3 The principal issues raised in the inspector's
report and the decision letter, and which could have implications
not only for MRT but for other rapid transit projects are discussed
below.
— No recognition appears to have been
given as to the practicality of integrating the MRT project with
the UDPs, given their respective timescales. Merseytravel require
clarification on the relationship between a proposal such as MRT,
UDPs, Package Bids and their replacement, Local Transport Plans.
— No account appeared to have been
taken of the statutory statements of views provided by both local
authorities in Merseyside as part of the TWA process.
— Merseytravel were criticised for
the "late" introduction of the P&R site within the
scheme. Clarification is required on the matter of the timing
of private sector involvement, as Merseytravel had been led to
believe that all contributions—financial and non-financial—were
valuable and welcomed. Furthermore, the Inspector commented that
"the proposal originated with Transform and not a local authority".
There is a need for clarification of the relative benefits of
involving private sector partners and their contribution to such
schemes.
— The relative roles and remit of the
Inspector and other government agencies requires confirmation.
The Inspector took decisions on matters such as safety and environment,
which Merseytravel had understood to be the responsibility of
HMRI and English Heritage—neither of whom objected or expressed
concern.
— The Inspector commented, which was
subsequently endorsed by the Secretary of State, that the use
of the former railway line required the provision of exchange
land. Merseytravel is concerned that this statement differs from
its understanding as to the covenants agreed upon the grant to
Sustrans by the British Railways Board of rights over disused
railway land, obliging Sustrans to make provision for railway
reinstatement projects.
— The Inspector criticised the full
and restricted cost benefit analysis on the basis that "what
does not appear in the financial calculations is any debit for
the loss of business to existing bus services, and possibly jobs
as well". Merseytravel understands that the transfer of cash
revenue from one operator to another is a transfer payment and
therefore is not an issue for an economic assessment.
— The Inspector commented that he was
concerned about the adoption of an untried guidance system in
relation to passenger transport. It was explained that these issues
were the subject of discussions with HMRI and the DETR Vehicle
Inspectorate. Merseytravel requires clarification on the merits
of pursuing, an innovative, cost effective means of meeting objectives,
as encouraged by the Government.
6. FUNDING
6.1 The MRT proposal was at an estimated
capital cost of £52 million; with contributions from the
private sector, EU and Section 56 grants. As a result of the TWA
decision, £10 million of private investment and £15
million EU monies have been lost to Liverpool.
6.2 The full cost benefit appraisal showed
MRT would have had a surplus of benefits over costs of £162.07
million PV and a benefit to cost ratio of 2.9:1 which represents
a robust economic case for a scheme of that type.
7. CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 On the basis of Merseytravel's experience
with the MRT project, and in view of the other rapid transit proposals
being pursued in the UK, the following conclusions and recommendations
are drawn.
That the Sub-Committee should consider:
(a) The respective roles of promoters, local
authorities DETR/Government offices and the private sector at
the various stages of a rapid transit project's evolution.
— project development, design, and
consultation;
— application for powers;
— procurement and funding.
(b) The development of MRT took seven years
and cost over £5 million. During this period changes to government,
policy advice (package Bids/LTPs/White Paper) and funding (private
sector involvement, PFI, etc) was the cause of much additional
work for the promoter. There is a clear need for this process
to be examined.
(c) The Transport and Works Order procedure
is considered to be time consuming and expensive. The experience
with MRT suggests the need for a closer dialogue between the promoter
and DETR (policy issues, Government Office role, TWA Unit etc.)
and a more closely defined scope for the inquiry Process. In the
case of MRT it is Merseytravel's view that the Statement of Matters
specified by the Secretary of State were exceeded by the Inspector.
(d) The views expressed by Inspectors at
the various TWA inquiries does not appear to be consistent. Given
the cost of promoting TWA applications this may be an area for
attention.
(e) In the case of MRT, the promoter followed
best guidance at the time regarding the need for private sector
involvement. Again, this process was expensive and time consuming,
but it resulted in a commitment to a contribution of £10
million towards the project costs (approximately 20 per cent).
Each rapid transit project that has promoted has featured a different
technology/funding mix. The scope for standardising these elements
needs to be considered.
(f) The MRT project sought funding from
three sources—the private sector, UK Government and the
EU. Each source is based on different criteria—commercial
objectives, restricted non-user benefits and wider full social
cost: benefit/regeneration objectives respectively.These often
conflicting requirements should be examined in the context of
the government's current agenda which advocates integration between
transport; environment, regeneration, social inclusion and health.
In particular, the narrow Section 56 grant criteria should be
updated to fit with the emerging NATA methodology/approach.
(g) In the case of Merseyside there is a
clear focus on regeneration (Objective 1) with a strong emphasis
on Liverpool City Centre (Liverpool Vision). This envisages a
way forward that includes city centre living, improved (regional)
retail facilities and a greater focus on cultural, tourist and
leisure uses. The role that rapid transit can play in providing
high quality and sustainable accessibility to a "civilised
city" needs to be examined and incorporated within the wider
(NATA-based) approach to scheme evaluation in the future.
7.2 A number of issues arise from MRT which
have implications for the wider implementation of rapid transit
systems. For some issues, a clarification of existing Government
policy is required. Other aspects may need addressing on a wider
basis.
Issues requiring clarification are:
— The relationships between Unitary
Development Plans, revised on a ten yearly basis, and Local Transport
Plans which will have a five year horizon.
— Policy in relation to the re-use
of former rail corridors as transport corridors, particularly
where formal or informal public access and/or recreational uses
have arisen since the railway was closed.
Issues which require wider consideration include:
— When to involve the private sector.
The private sector is unlikely to take the risks of the TWA
process. If they are involved at this stage it is necessary for
the public sector to underwrite some of their costs. This may
conflict with `value for money' requirements. If the private sector
involvement arises at a later stage, the opportunity for them
to shape the project to optimise the funding case is lost.
— Changes to schemes introduced
by the private sector. Significant changes introduced by the
private sector will arise relatively late in a project's development,
and may therefore not be consistent with local planning policies,
or the scheme as put to public consultation. The way in which
such changes are handled should be addressed.
— The TWA process is lengthy and
costly for promoters of rapid transit projects. Whilst it
is entirely appropriate that such schemes should be subject to
public scrutiny, the timing, and extent of the process could usefully
be reviewed. The terms of reference of the public inquiry process
could be reviewed, so that it is clear to promoters, objectors
and inspectors which matters are properly within the scope of
the inquiry and which are not.
— A scheme which is promoted by a public
authority will have been subject to public scrutiny and democratic
control on a number of occasions before a TWA application is submitted.
This position is quite different from a scheme promoted by a private
body, for which a TWA application could be submitted with very
little prior public or local authority involvement. Consideration
should be given to modifying the TWA process so that an approval
in principle can be granted to schemes which already have public
and local authority backing, before the higher costs of the public
inquiry process are incurred.
October 1999
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