Memorandum by London Transport (RT 27)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Under the London Regional Transport
Act of 1984 London Regional Transport has statutory duties to
provide or secure public transport services in London with due
regard for efficiency, economy and safety of operation. London
Transport procures bus services throughout London through tendered
contracts with private operators which specify route, frequencies
and fares and operates the Underground sub-surface and deep "tube"
trains through its subsidiary company, London Underground Ltd.
London Transport also runs Victoria Coach Station Limited and
licenses river services.
1.2 London Transport was responsible for
the planning, design, construction and initial operation of the
first three stages of the Docklands Light Railway in east London
and the planning of the fourth stage, the Lewisham Extension,
due to open shortly. London Transport is responsible for the Croydon
Tramlink project in south London which will also open shortly,
operated under a franchise agreement with a private consortium.
1.3 London Transport is currently developing
plans for five Intermediate Mode or Light Rapid Transit systems
in various parts of London. A range of bus based and rail based
schemes is being considered for these. An initial part of one
scheme, an electronically guided bus based system, known as Millennium
Transit, has been constructed to provide a shuttle service from
Charlton Railway Station to the Millennium Dome at North Greenwich.
2. LIGHT RAPID
TRANSIT
2.1 London Transport uses the term "Intermediate
Modes" for the range of public transport modes lying between
the conventional bus and the Underground or heavy rail systems.
In London Transport's view the term "Intermediate Modes"
is synonymous with the term "Light Rapid Transit" and
encompasses systems with the following general characteristics:
— Segregated alignments (surface, elevated
or tunnel) or running in the street with a high level of priority
over other traffic;
— Systems which have a greater flexibility
than conventional railways in terms of negotiating tight corners
and steep gradients, and which use lighter vehicles;
— Vehicles of modern design with high
levels of comfort and ambience;
— High capacity vehicles which are
fully accessible for disabled people and have stops with level
boarding (this also improves access for many other passengers);
— Environmentally friendly diesel,
gas or electrically powered vehicles;
— Well designed stops which are equipped
with shelters, real time information, CCTV etc;
— Construction timescales shorter,
and costs significantly lower, than conventional Underground or
heavy rail systems.
2.2 There are many examples in European
cities illustrating the above range of Light Rapid Transit system
attributes. These include:
— Guided Busway: Leeds (mechanically
guided), London Millennium Transit (electronically guided), Paris
Val-de-Marne (trials of various forms of guidance and vehicles);
— Light Rail/Trams—mainly street
running: Sheffield, Amsterdam, and Zurich;
— Light Rail/Trams—mainly segregated
running: Manchester, Birmingham, Croydon and Paris;
— Automatic Light Rail/Light Metro—fully
segregated: London Docklands, Lille, and Vancouver.
London Transport's knowledge and experience of
Light Rapid Transit systems outside the UK is summarised in Annex
1.
2.3 There are other "light" transport
systems such as those known as "People Movers" usually
with small vehicles running automatically on segregated guideways,
as found at Gatwick airport, and systems such as Monorails as
found, for example, in a number of Japanese cities. These more
specialist systems are not considered in this submission.
3. THE ROLE
OF LIGHT
RAPID TRANSIT
IN LONDON
3.1 London's public transport network with
its three principal systems—the National Rail network, the
Underground network and the Bus network, is one of the most extensive
in the world. Most Londoners are within 400 metres of a bus stop
and a majority are within 800 metres of an Underground or National
Rail station. Changes are continuously made to the network, most
frequently to the bus network and to a lesser extent on the rail
network, in response to changes in demand and passenger needs,
and to improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the services.
Whilst there is little doubt that the network needs to be improved
in terms of capacity, speed, reliability and quality of service,
the need to extend the network and possibly introduce new types
of systems may be less obvious.
3.2 Development of London's public transport
network is however necessary, for a number of reasons including:
— Responding to land use changes and
development proposals, for example the expansion of Heathrow Airport.
— Responding to specific proposals
such as the Millennium Dome.
— Supporting the regeneration of areas
such as Docklands and the Thames Gateway.
— Supporting a range of policy initiatives
such as encouraging further use of public transport, providing
an attractive alternative to the car, improving access to town
centres and reducing social exclusion.
— Increasing the capacity of the system
to reduce congestion on key routes or corridors and improve the
quality of travelling conditions.
3.3 In the majority of cases the appropriate
solution will be to improve or develop one of the existing modes
rather than introduce a new system. Circumstances where it may
be appropriate to consider an alternative such as a Light Rapid
Transit system are as follows:
— Where line capacity requirements
are relatively high (in the range 2,000-10,000 people per hour)
but not sufficiently high to justify a heavy rail or Underground.
— Where perhaps a higher quality service
is required, in terms of speed, reliability and comfort, in comparison
with the conventional bus.
More contentious arguments can be put forward
including:
— Where a service with a particular
image quality is required to meet a specific transport or development
objective.
— Where there are specific environmental
objectives eg for a service running through a pedestrianised area.
The Light Rapid Transit systems currently operating
or under development in London fall into one or more of these
categories.
3.4 Plans for the further development of
Light Rapid Transit in London need to be considered in the context
of the overall strategy for the development of public transport
and plans for the development of the individual modes.
Bus Services
In addition to the many changes to bus service
routes and frequencies each year, London Transport Buses has a
wide ranging programme of developments aimed at improving the
quality and efficiency of services. Current initiatives include:
— Completion of the 800 km London Bus
Priority Network in conjunction with the London boroughs, with
resources now concentrating on priorities on whole bus routes.
— Introduction of modern low-floor
wheelchair accessible buses through the tendering process.
— New interchanges, improved stops,
shelters and real time and static information.
— Extensions to the bus network, including
night buses and extra resources to improve reliability.
— Simplification of fares and fare
collection methods, including bus stop ticket machines.
— Introduction of low emission vehicles.
London Underground
The Underground investment plan includes many
projects to renew and modernise the network and stations. The
intention is that these will be undertaken by the private sector
under the PPP project to be implemented over the next 12-18 months.
Current plans to expand the network which will not be funded from
the PPP process include:
— Extension of the Piccadilly line
to Heathrow Terminal 5 if this goes ahead.
— CrossRail and the Chelsea-Hackney
lines to improve access and add extra capacity in the central
area—projects which are currently without funding but are
safeguarded.
National Rail Network
Railtrack's Network Management Statement identifies
a number of plans to develop London's rail network. These include:
— The Thameslink 2000 project to improve
the capacity and develop cross London services.
— The second stage of the Channel Tunnel
Rail Link from Kent to St. Pancras station.
— In conjunction with BAA plc, a number
of proposals to improve rail connections and services to Heathrow
Airport.
— In conjunction with London Underground,
proposals to extend the East London line and run through services
from the western region onto the Circle line.
3.5 In July 2000 transport in London and
the development of the network will become the responsibility
of the new Mayor. A new authority Transport for London will be
created to help develop and implement the Integrated Transport
Strategy for London which the Mayor will be required to produce.
This strategy will encompass bus, rail, Light Rapid Transit and
highway areas and will be the blueprint which determines transport
policies for the capital and the strategies and priorities for
development of the network, including Light Rapid Transit.
4. LONDON TRANSPORT'S
EXPERIENCE OF
DEVELOPING LIGHT
RAPID TRANSIT
4.1 London Transport has been involved in
the planning, development and implementation of Light Rapid Transit
systems in London for nearly 20 years. This work has focused on
five areas:
— The needs of the Docklands regeneration
area which led to the construction of the four stages of the Docklands
Light Railway.
— The potential wider role of light
rail in London which led to the construction of the Croydon Tramlink.
— The transport needs of the Millennium
Dome and the Millennium Village which has led to the construction
of the Millennium Transit guided busway.
— The potential role of Intermediate
Modes and transport needs in outer London which has led to the
development of a number of proposals.
— The transport needs of the central
area which has led to the development of the Cross River Transit
proposal in conjunction with the Cross River Partnership.
The following sections summarise work in each
of these five areas in turn.
4.2 Docklands Light Railway
Responsibility for the Docklands Light Railway
(DLR) lay with London Transport from its planning inception in
around 1980 until 1994 when Government decided responsibility
should be transferred to the London Docklands Development Corporation
(LDDC). In 1998 the LDDC was wound up and responsibility for the
DLR passed to the Department of the Environment, Transport and
the Regions (DETR). From next July the DLR will become the responsibility
of the Mayor and Transport for London.
4.3 The DLR was conceived as a lower cost
alternative to an extension of the Underground and more appropriate
to the emerging needs of the Docklands development area. A system
was required which met the then modest anticipated travel demands
for the area and could be built within a relatively short period
in order to meet the timescales for completion of significant
development. Light rail options were compared against conventional
buses running on a partially segregated busway and the conventional
cost-benefit evaluation showed that the busway would perform better
than the light rail system. In the event, the case was argued
that the light rail would have a better image and would encourage
more development. Government agreed that the light rail project
should proceed, justified by a combination of transport and regeneration
benefits.
4.4 The initial 11km DLR network connecting
Tower Gateway and Stratford to the Isle of Dogs opened in 1987
and soon exceeded its demand forecasts of 22,000 passengers a
day. The project was built on a design and construct basis, the
first time this had been used in modern times for a railway in
the UK. The initial railway was constructed on a combination of
former railway rights of way and new elevated viaducts across
the former docks. The use of light weight trains allowed the reuse
of old railway structures, some of which had not been used for
nearly 60 years. This would not have been possible with a heavy
rail system which would have been significantly more costly than
the £77 million for the DLR.
4.5 A decision was taken to fully automate
the DLR train operations. This was strongly influenced by the
LDDC who wanted to use the system to project a modern "high
tech" image for the area. Full driverless automation, as
used on the DLR, has the advantage that the train crew or "captain"
can undertake other duties such as checking fares and providing
passenger information but adds significantly to the cost and complexity
of the system and does not allow street operation.
4.6 Soon after the railway opened, development
of the Docklands area rapidly continued and changed in character,
notably with the arrival of the Canary Wharf development, which
took the employment forecasts way beyond the LDDC expectations.
A fourfold increase in the capacity of the DLR was required. New
signalling, train and platform lengthening and extensions to Bank
and to Beckton were implemented in an intense period of development
over a seven year period, although the latter extension failed
to immediately stimulate further office development as expected
by the LDDC. During this time the railway suffered greatly from
unreliability and periodic shutdown.
4.7 By the end of the 1980s it was realised
that the capacity constraints of the DLR would impose an unacceptable
constraint on the future development of the Docklands. Although
a strategic review suggested further extensions of the DLR—including
the extension under the river to Lewisham, due to open shortly—these
would not provide sufficient additional capacity and so planning
commenced on an extension of the Underground—the Jubilee
line extension.
4.8 Today the DLR is running at capacity
on the city branch and in total carries over 100,000 people a
day. As well as providing for the main commuter flow to and from
the Isle of Dogs, with is frequent services, close stop spacing
and fully accessible trains and stations the DLR fulfils a local
transport role for the area between that of the conventional bus
and the rail network. Annual surveys for the Isle of Dogs show
that public transport is now carrying around 45 per cent of all
daily journeys to and from the area in comparison with around
30 per cent when the line was first opened. When the Jubilee line
extension opens the DLR will provide the second tier of an excellent
hierarchy of public transport services in east London linking
and feeding key interchanges with the other networks at major
interchanges such as Bank, Stratford, Canning Town, Greenwich
and Lewisham.
4.9 DLR Ltd has advanced plans to provide
a link to the London City Airport. Plans are also in hand to explore
the possibility for extending the DLR under the river to Woolwich
Arsenal. Current studies by London Transport and DLR Ltd. are
comparing the costs and benefits of the light rail alternative
to the heavy rail alternative. The attached plan shows the DLR
network.
4.10 Croydon Tramlink
Following the approval of the first stage of
the DLR, interest grew in the possibility of further light rail
schemes in London. In conjunction with British Rail, London Transport
initiated a study of the possibilities and a report "Light
Rail for London?" was produced which set out the potential
role for such systems and made a number of recommendations for
further study. The study recommended that further consideration
be given to the development of a light rail network focused on
Croydon Town centre. Other recommended schemes relating to conversion
of the outer parts of the Central line and the East London line
have not been pursued.
4.11 London Transport initiated a number
of planning, engineering and evaluation studies for the Croydon
area. These showed that a light rail network would give a positive
benefit to cost ratio and was worth pursuing. Discussions with
the London borough of Croydon showed that the scheme would also
fit in with their aspirations for the environment and the economic
development of the town centre. Whilst Croydon had experienced
a boom in office development in the 1960s and 70s the construction
of the M25 and investment in neighbouring town centres had reduced
the attractiveness of the town centre. The light rail proposal
was seen by the Council as a means to "put Croydon back on
the map" and increase the transport capacity of routes to
the town centre without the need for increased car traffic and
possibly new road construction. The project would also connect
the residential estate of New Addington more closely and conveniently
to Croydon town centre, thereby helping this area of 25,000 people
with significant social and economic problems.
4.12 The Croydon Tramlink was therefore
jointly developed by London Transport and the Council through
the design and development stages and through the parliamentary
process, where the Bill was jointly promoted by both organisations.
The Bill was enacted in July 1994.
4.13 The project comprises 28 km of route
with 38 stops as shown on the plan. The three legs of the network
converge on a single track clockwise loop encompassing the town
centre and connecting to both east and west Croydon stations.
Twenty-four low floor articulated trams have been built and will
provide a service on three routes. Croydon Tramlink is planned
to open later this year.
4.14 Tramlink is being built by the private
sector (Tramtrack Croydon Ltd.) under a concession agreement with
London Transport. From an early stage Government indicated their
requirement for the private sector to be closely involved in the
project. In 1992, following a competitive process, a Project Development
Agreement was signed with a consortium involving an operator,
an equipment supplier and a construction company. This Project
Development Group assisted London Transport and the London borough
of Croydon in the development of the project and progression of
the Bill through parliament.
4.15 Following the granting of Royal Assent
for the Bill, Government indicated that, in principle, it would
be willing to contribute towards the capital costs of constructing
Tramlink. The project was taken forward under the Government's
Private Finance Initiative and London Transport held a competition
for a 99 year concession to design, build, finance, operate and
maintain the Tramlink systems. Bids were invited against a Performance
Specification produced by London Transport and the powers granted
by the Act of Parliament. During the course of the competition,
government confirmed the award of £125 million of grant towards
the total project cost of around £200 million. The proportion
of Government grant is one of the lowest for all the recent UK
light rail schemes.
4.16 London Transport awarded the Concession
to the private sector consortium TCL in November 1996. Under the
Concession Agreement TCL is awarded all the rights and given the
obligation to construct and operate Tramlink. The Concession Agreement
also sets out the division of risks between the parties. In essence
the risks transferred to TCL include:
— the design, construction and commissioning
of the system;
— operation and maintenance of the
completed system; and
— ridership and general business risk.
London Transport has taken the risk on the diversion
of statutory utilities equipment and the compulsory acquisition
of property.
4.17 Demand forecasts estimated that Tramlink
will attract some 25 million passengers per annum. It is anticipated
that the system will be used for a wide range of journeys, to
the town centres of Croydon and Wimbledon, for employment, shopping
and leisure purposes and via the connections with the National
Rail and Underground services to other destinations, particularly
central London. Changes to local bus services in the area are
planned to provide an integrated network of feeder and complementary
services. These will be adjusted in response to the actual changes
in demand following the opening of the system. The evaluation
of the project estimated that around 10 per cent of Tramlink users
would be people transferring from cars.
4.18 A number of "before and after"
surveys are in hand or planned to understand the effects of Tramlink
on travel patterns in the area and to improve our understanding
of how people respond to the service quality changes. Of particular
interest is the comparison people make between buses and trams
and how this affects travel behaviour, especially to what extent
the tram can provide an attractive alternative to use of the car.
The research is aimed to explore this topic in some depth to assist
the further consideration of such projects in London.
4.19 Plans for Intermediate Modes in Outer
London
Following the successful progression of the
Tramlink project to implementation stage a number of local authorities
approached London Transport requesting consideration of light
rail projects in their area. A decision was taken to explore the
potential for such schemes in outer London for the following reasons:
— there are many orbital journeys which
are difficult to make by rail as the network is less dense;
— the overall modal share by car is
typically much higher than in inner and central London at around
75 per cent;
— road congestion is growing; and
— there are several requirements, especially
in east London, to serve new developments.
4.20 In order to assess the transport needs
in a consistent manner London Transport invited the outer London
local authorities to come forward with suggestions of corridors
or links where, in their view, local transport services needed
to be improved. Some 65 ideas resulted which were consolidated
into around forty-five possible schemes. These were considered
by London Transport in a preliminary evaluation and reported in
the document: "New Ideas for Public Transport in Outer
London". The evaluation considered the likely benefits
of investing in improved public transport and other factors such
as the degree to which the scheme might meet wider borough planning
and environmental objectives. This led to a short list of nine
areas for further consideration where significant investment might
prove worthwhile. During 1997 these nine areas were subject to
a second stage of studies which was reported in the document "New
Ideas for Public Transport in Outer London—Development of
Case Studies". Following further discussion with the
boroughs involved it was agreed that four of these nine proposals
should be fully evaluated. The other five schemes are either being
progressed as improved bus corridors or may be considered for
Light Rapid Transit at a later stage. The four schemes in outer
London are shown on the plan and are:
— Barking, to provide north-south links
between the Thames-side development areas, existing developed
areas and the radial transport interchanges.
— Romford, similarly to provide north-south
links between the Thames-side development areas, existing developed
areas and the radial transport interchanges.
— Greenwich, to improve links between
Greenwich, Woolwich and Thamesmead and the main transport interchanges,
in particular North Greenwich on the Jubilee line.
— Uxbridge Road, to serve the town
centres of Uxbridge, Southall, and Ealing and Shepherd's Bush,
also filling a gap in the radial rail network.
4.21 In reaching agreement with the appropriate
London borough Councils to progress these schemes two important
principles were established. The first was that not just light
rail schemes were to be considered; rather the range of appropriate
Light Rapid Transit modes and "best-bus" alternatives.
The second was that where the schemes were to run on-street—as
to a large extent in all cases—they would need to be granted
a very high degree of priority over other traffic. London Transport
felt it particularly important that this second principle was
recognised at an early stage as without it the speed and reliability
of the new system would be insufficient to make the schemes attractive
to car users. The concept of a "virtuous circle" was
put forward whereby the introduction of a new service with a high
degree of priority over other traffic would introduce a step change
in the quality of public transport. This in turn would attract
people from their cars thereby reducing traffic levels and therefore
easing any problems associated with the introduction of the priority
measures in the first place.
4.22 These four schemes are currently undergoing
a comprehensive evaluation using transport modelling and a multi-criteria
assessment process. For two of the schemes (Uxbridge Road and
Waterfront) the preliminary demand work suggested that both tram
and bus based systems should be evaluated. For the other two (Barking
and Romford) the preliminary work showed lower demand levels so
only bus based schemes are being considered. In all cases the
options are compared to a base case of the "best bus"
alternative, with high but realistic on-street priority.
4.23 As well as indicating the financial
and normal cost-benefit the multi-criteria evaluation will also
assess the projects on a wider basis in line with the Government's
White Paper, under the five headings: integration, safety, economy,
environment and accessibility.
4.24 The evaluation of the four schemes
will be completed by the end of the year when London Transport
will decide the priorities for taking forward. Assuming a positive
result for either a tram or bus-based option from the evaluation
and agreement with the appropriate local authorities, the next
stage will involve public consultation and the seeking of initial
expressions of interest from the private sector. It is intended
that the result of this second stage will be completed in spring
2000 in time for a recommendation to be made to London's new Mayor
towards implementation.
4.25 Central Area Partnership—Cross
River Transit
The fifth area of London Transport's Light Rapid
Transit work concerns the proposal for a new transit link across
the heart of the capital. The Cross River Partnership is a consortium
of businesses and public authorities which has come together to
address, inter alia, issues relating to transport and planning
matters adjacent to the river in central London.
4.26 The scheme comprises a central core
running from Euston to Waterloo, using existing roads and crossing
the Thames on Waterloo Bridge with branches to Camden and Kings
Cross to the north and Peckham and Stockwell to the south, as
shown on the plan. A mixture of reserved transit lanes, traffic
management and signal priority seeks to ensure a high quality
service with minimum disruption from other traffic. Journey times
from Euston to Waterloo are expected to be similar to that for
the Northern line offering a degree of congestion relief on the
Underground. Traffic management and reallocation of space from
other traffic will allow for landscaping and increase in pedestrian
space, particularly in areas such as Aldwych.
4.27 Cross River Transit was conceived as
a way of improving links across the river, helping to improve
the economic performance of the south Bank and relieving the pressure
on areas such as Covent Garden. The scheme also aims to improve
access from some densely populated inner suburbs, such as Peckham
to the buoyant job market in the central area. At the same time
it will improve access to a number of main line and Underground
stations. Transit is seen as an attractive alternative to car
use and will allow the reallocation of space from private cars
to public transport and pedestrians. There is significant pressure
on road space in the central area, both from existing traffic
and from the desire of the authorities to improve the environment
and ambience such as in the World Squares initiative. Transit,
and similar levels of priority to public transport on other corridors,
is seen as potentially an important ingredient in the developing
strategy for central London.
4.28 The Cross River Transit project is
at the same stage of development as the four schemes in outer
London, with a full evaluation in hand. Both bus-based and trams
are being looked at. As with the other schemes, assuming a favourable
outcome from the evaluation and agreement with the appropriate
local authorities the next stage will involve public consultation
and the seeking of initial expressions of interest from the private
sector. This second stage will be completed in spring 2000, in
time for a recommendation to be made to the Mayor.
5. ISSUES
5.1 The work by London Transport on the
development of Light Rapid Transit systems in London raises a
number of issues on their planning, funding and implementation.
Those discussed here are: the role of Light Rapid Transit in the
light of current and emerging transport policies; issues relating
to funding and the involvement of the private sector and; issues
relating to the legislative framework.
5.2 ROLE
OF LIGHT
RAPID TRANSIT
The Government's White Paper on Transport firmly
sets the agenda to discourage the need to travel and encourage
use of the most environmentally friendly modes, particularly in
the urban areas where congestion and pollution from vehicles is
affecting the quality of life. In cities such as London, where
there is already a dense public transport network, major changes
to the transport network will be uncommon and because of the need
to respect the existing urban fabric, in most cases also very
costly to construct. New Underground or rail projects require
massive flows of people to utilise their capacity and unless there
is very heavy overcrowding of the existing network to relieve,
or there are substantial changes in land use or developments to
generate new demands, they are very difficult to justify. Whilst
there are examples of new heavy rail construction in London such
as the Heathrow Express, Jubilee line extension and Channel Tunnel
Rail Link, of these only the Jubilee line will provide an attractive
alternative to the car for a range of local journeys in London.
For such journeys, London's buses play a vital role in the network
and the continuing programme of changes and improvements to services
ensures these keep in tune with passenger demands.
5.3 However, whilst there are obvious differences
in performance and carrying capacity of buses and trains there
are also significant differences in the way the two modes are
perceived in such terms as quality, image and attractiveness.
This perception has an adverse effect on attempts to encourage
use of the bus as an alternative to the car. Continuing developments
in bus vehicles and stops will help to erode this quality gap
and improve the perception of buses. However a key difference
tends to be the level of on-street priority given to buses compared
to trams. So far there is little hard evidence that buses can
have a significant impact on car use in the way that conventional
rail and tram systems appear to, but whether this is based on
real differences in performance or image is not clear. Continuing
research is therefore essential to try to understand why this
is so and to understand if the light rapid transit systems such
as guided buses are perceived and used in a different way to the
conventional bus.
Similarly the impact of providing very high
level of on-street priority to conventional buses needs to be
better understood.
5.4 Based on the outline appraisal of a
wide range of schemes as outlined above, and given the current
state of knowledge, London Transport does not see the widespread
introduction of Light Rapid Transit systems in London. Understanding
the impact of the Croydon Tramlink, the Millennium Transit and,
assuming their introduction, the impact of one or more new bus
or rail based transit systems from the current programme will
be essential before further schemes are progressed. This impact
assessment needs to identify how well schemes have met their transport
and wider objectives, particularly their impact on travel patterns
and car use.
5.5 Funding and the Involement of the Private
Sector—Funding, for the improvement and development of those
parts of the network under London Transport's control, originates
from three main sources; fares, Government grant and private sector
investment. In all new schemes there is a requirement to seek
the involvement of the private sector in the design, construction
and operational stages and London Transport intends to do this
for any new Light Rapid Transit systems. As a result of the relatively
high fares in London, unlike most other cities of the world, many
bus services and the Underground generate an operating surplus
over day-to-day operating costs. The two light rail systems under
construction—Croydon Tramlink and the DLR Lewisham extension
are both anticipated to generate significant operating surpluses
which will provide revenue streams to service the private sector's
capital investment requirements. However in neither case is this
sufficient to cover the full costs of the schemes and Government
grant has been necessary to close the funding gap.
5.6 To invest in such systems the private
sector must take a view of the risks of the project and balance
these against the potential future returns. The risks associated
with Light Rapid Transit and other similar public transport projects
are not insignificant. First there is the risk associated with
the planning and approval stages. As discussed in the next section
the uncertainties associated with the Transport & Works Act
Order process are significant. Secondly there is the risk associated
with the revenue income. In a unregulated market as found outside
London the risks are those of uncertainty and aggressive competition,
particularly from privately operated bus companies. In London
where fares and services are regulated, fares income is largely
dictated by London wide agreements giving little opportunity for
flexibility by the individual operator but providing protection
from competition. Finally there are risks associated with construction,
which are significant for any Light Rapid Transit involving street
running and requiring the diversion of utility services from beneath
the road. In this respect the Statutory Utility companies are
in a unique position in being able to largely determine the scope,
timing and cost of relocation. As a result no private company
involved in the recent UK light rail schemes has been prepared
to take on this risk.
5.7 In Croydon, Tramtrack Croydon Limited's
(TCL) financing plan is a highly complex package, providing roughly
half the necessary project finance. It uses a mixture of funding
sources to provide the minimum overall cost of financing, combining
finance leases with senior, mezzanine and shareholder debt and
equity. There are complex inter-creditor issues involving a large
number of parties, creating 76 direct agreements within the TCL
family.
5.8 Traditionally, few UK companies have
been involved in both the construction and operation of public
transport systems. This has created a steep learning curve for
consortia involved in turnkey projects. Often the operator, who
will be responsible for the system and its success for many years
after construction has been completed, has had sufficient influence
over the design and specification of equipment. For the next generation
of LRT schemes London Transport is likely to seek expressions
of interest from operating companies in the first instance.
5.10 The Legislation Process
Until 1992 Light Rapid Transit schemes in the
UK generally required the authority of an Act of Parliament. This
is contrast to, say, highway schemes which require conventional
planning permission and associated orders for the compulsory purchase
of land. Furthermore, unlike conventional bus services all rail
and Light Rapid Transit systems (including Guided busways) have
to meet the requirements of Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate
(HMRI).
5.11 For the four stages of the Docklands
Light Railway and for Croydon Tramlink, London Transport promoted
private Bills. Although all these projects were of broadly similar
nature and complexity the time taken for the Bill to be enacted
varied considerably as shown in the table below. This created
uncertainty over the timing of the project and meant that it was
difficult to proceed with, for example, the tendering process,
until the parliamentary process was nearing completion.
|
| Project | Bill Deposited
| Royal Assent |
Period |
|
| DLR Initial Railway | November 1982
| April 1984 | 17 months
|
| DLR City Extension | November 1985
| December 1986 | 13 months
|
| DLR Beckton Extension | November 1986
| July 1989 | 32 months
|
| DLR Lewisham Extension | November 1990
| May 1993 | 30 months
|
| Croydon Tramlink | November 1991
| July 1994 | 32 months
|
|
5.12 From 1984 onwards there was a sharp increase in
the amount of parliamentary business taken up by contentious private
railway Bills generated by, amongst others, London Transport.
The system began to attract criticism from both houses of Parliament,
partly due to the increased time members of both Houses were required
to spend on Select Committees examining Bills and petitions deposited
against them and also the amount of parliamentary time being taken
up by debates on the floor of both Houses. Accordingly, the Joint
Committee on Private Bill Procedure was established by Parliament
in 1987 to look into the private bill procedure.
5.13 The Committee concluded that private bills were
no longer the appropriate mechanism for authorising proposals
that essentially involve works and the compulsory purchase of
land and rights. The Committee recommended that a system be established
outside Parliament requiring public local inquiries to be held
with power being conferred upon a Minister to make an Order which
would broadly have the same effect as an Act of Parliament.
5.14 Accordingly the legislative process for all such
projects was changed with the enactment of the Transport and Works
Act 1992 ("the 1992 Act"). The system of promoting rail
schemes by private Bill was replaced by a system of Ministerial
Orders, made following the successful completion by an applicant
of a number of procedural steps which may include the holding
of a public local inquiry into the application. The granting of
planning permission being dealt with as part of the overall process
leading to the making of an Order.
5.15 It had been hoped that the new procedure would shorten
the process and reduce uncertainty. Unfortunately it is not clear
that this has been the case. Although London Transport has yet
to promote a Light Rapid Transit scheme under the new process,
the experience of promoting the proposed extension of the East
London line to Dalston (in some ways a simpler project than the
light rail projects) and in dealing with applications promoted
by others suggests that the new procedure has a number of structural
weaknesses. These are set out in Annex 2. It is submitted that
a review of the current legislative framework should be undertaken
to identify those aspects of the new procedure which are perceived
to add unnecessary delay and uncertainty to the process but which
could be modified without reducing the level of public scrutiny
of a promoter's scheme.
5.16 The table below identifies the time-scale for the
promotion of the London Underground (East London Line Extension)
Order 1997.
|
| Project | Bill Deposited
| Order | Period
|
|
| East London Line Extension | November 1993
| February 1997 | 38 months |
|
| October 1999 | |
| |
| 
