THE CLIMATE CHANGE LEVY
62.During the course of our inquiry, it was announced
that the Climate Change Levy would be introduced in April 2001
on the business use of energy, broadly in line with the recommendations
made by Lord Marshall. Following on from the initial announcement
about the Levy in March 1999, the Government consulted on the
details of the scheme and made significant modifications in the
pre-Budget report in November 1999. The Committee took evidence
after the initial proposals were published and then again in January
2000, after the changes made in the pre-Budget Report.
63.Although the Climate Change Levy is an instrument
which will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases without a major
impact upon the UK's competitiveness, it cannot be described as
a good policy. As the BG Group noted, "This [the pre-Budget
Report] in turn will considerably increase the scope of negotiated
agreements and arbitrary tax levels/allowances - the antithesis
of market-based economic instruments. In short a badly designed
economic instrument is made worse."[157]
In July 1997, the Government issued its 'Statement of Intent on
Environmental Taxation' which laid out its plans for shifting
taxation away from employment and onto pollution. Within this
document, it is stated that "environmental taxation must
meet the general tests of good taxation. It must be well designed,
to meet objectives without undesirable sideeffects; it must
keep deadweight compliance costs to a minimum; distributional
impact must be acceptable; and care must be had to implications
for international competitiveness."[158]
We do not believe that the Climate Change Levy meets the tests
of good taxation. The system of exemptions, negotiated agreements
and reduced rates has produced an extremely complex and cumbersome
market instrument which will result in a relatively modest emissions
reduction.
64.The Energy Intensive Users Group told us that
the original proposals for the levy would, if implemented without
exemptions, hit their members' industries very hard[159]
and we accept that an unmodified levy would indeed have been excessively
harsh for this sector. However, the Government announced in the
pre-Budget report that energy-intensive sectors would receive
a rebate of 80% if they entered into negotiated agreements to
improve their energy efficiency. Although the use of negotiated
agreements raises a number of concerns (examined in a separate
section below), witnesses mostly accepted that the 80% rebate
would limit the impact upon their competitiveness.[160]
We welcome the protection which the system of Climate Change
Levy rebates and negotiated agreements will offer to energy-intensive
industries.
65.However, the Government is currently offering
negotiated agreements and rebates only to those industries which
are covered by the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
(IPPC) legislation. In general, IPPC applies to those industries
with the greatest potential to pollute and tends to focus upon
larger sites. The Government argues that it is using IPPC as the
criterion because the legislation requires firms to operate in
an energy-efficient manner and also offers legal certainty in
defining those firms which are eligible to enter into a negotiated
agreement and receive rebates from the levy.[161]
Clearly, legal certainty is important but much of the evidence
we heard in January of this year argued that IPPC was a very poor
proxy for energy-intensity and that using IPPC was "arbitrary
and artificial", "illogical" and "inequitable."[162]
Perhaps the best example of the anomalies provided to us was by
Water UK: the water industry is the third most energy-intensive
industry but is not covered by IPPC legislation. Other witnesses
provided examples of specific energy-intensive processes which
were not covered by IPPC and many suggested that there were a
number of simple alternative criteria which could be used to define
energy-intensive industries.[163]
We concur with the Trade and Industry Select Committee that
the use of Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control to define
which industries are eligible to enter into negotiated agreements
and receive rebates from the Climate Change Levy is "likely
to create anomalies and inequities which will serve only to discredit
the levy."[164]
We urge the Government to adopt a simple, rigorous and equitable
approach to define energy-intensive industries eligible for agreements
and rebates.
66. A recurring point made about the levy was that
it impacted unfairly on manufacturing industry, particularly smaller
firms.[165] Although
the levy will be revenue neutral across all of industry, it was
suggested to us that it resulted in money being transferred from
manufacturing industry and passed to the service industry sector
through the reduction in National Insurance employer contributions.
This is essentially because the manufacturing sector tends to
employ fewer people than service sector firms. However, the Financial
Secretary to the Treasury, Stephen Timms, told us that:
"The levy package
will be broadly neutral for manufacturing as a whole and there
will not be a net transfer of resources out of manufacturing and
that is a feature of the proposals that were announced in November."[166]
although he went on to acknowledge that this assertion
involved "making some rather broad brush assumptions."[167]
Although we recognise that the system of negotiated agreements
and levy rebates may indeed mean that the overall impact upon
the manufacturing sector as a whole is 'broadly neutral', it does
seem likely that larger manufacturing firms will do rather better
out of the levy than smaller manufacturing firms. In general,
small firms will be unable to enter into negotiated agreements,
will receive no rebate of the levy and still have numerous barriers
to increasing their energy-efficiency. We are concerned that
the Climate Change Levy will have a negative impact upon small
and medium-sized businesses and urge the Government to pursue
schemes which alleviate this problem by targeting information
and resources at these businesses.
67.We heard from some witnesses that the effectiveness
of the levy would be less because it was essentially a downstream
energy tax, rather than an upstream carbon tax.[168]
One of the principal reasons for the Government opting for a downstream
tax was the need to protect domestic electricity users from the
levy.[169] This is
practically much easier to achieve by imposing the levy at the
point of use (where the 'business' user can be identified) rather
than point of generation, where the final user is usually unknown.
However, by introducing an energy levy there is no incentive to
encourage electricity generators to switch to less carbon-intensive
fuels. The exemptions for renewable sources and Combined Heat
and Power (announced in the Pre-Budget Report) will help to address
this situation. Nevertheless, witnesses suggested that the levy
in its existing format could still be 'carbon tuned' with the
levy rates adjusted to reflect the carbon content of different
fuels.[170] Given that
the primary purpose of the levy is to reduce emissions of carbon
dioxide, this would seem to be a sensible approach. We believe
an upstream carbon tax would have been simpler than the proposed
Climate Change Levy but we are concerned about the implications
this would have for fuel poverty. We also believe that there remains
an opportunity for the rates of the levy to better reflect the
different carbon content of fuels and urge the Government to bring
forward proposals to do this.
68.Given that the original structure of the proposed
levy offered no advantage to low-carbon means of generation, it
was widely argued that exemptions should be granted for renewables.
This argument was accepted by the Government and exemptions for
renewable sources were announced in the Pre-Budget Report. We
welcome the Government's decision to exempt renewable sources
from the Climate Change Levy. Similarly, the Combined Heat
and Power Association argued that combined heat and power should
also be made exempt from the levy.[171]
Although the case is a much less clear-cut one than for renewables
(since the emissions advantages of combined heat and power over
conventional sources of generation are much smaller), we welcome
the Government's decision to exempt 'good quality' combined heat
and power from the Climate Change Levy. However, it is worth
reiterating that an upstream carbon tax would be simpler to implement
since there would be much less need for the various exemptions
and cases for special treatment that we have discussed above.
69.Although the levy will not be introduced until
April 2001, we note the comments of Lord Marshall on future rates
of the tax: "a clear signal should be given of the long-term
direction of policy, with changes in the rate of tax made in a
gradual and predictable way."[172]
Some witnesses suggested that various policies, including the
climate change levy, be "ratcheted up"[173]
and that the proposed level of levy was too small to have much
impact.[174] In the
same way that the fuel duty escalator gave a clear signal to car
users about their behaviour, progressive increases in energy taxation
would give a plain message to industry about its need to reduce
energy use. With such a policy, firms can invest in energy-efficiency
measures with confidence.
70.The Government is committed to making the levy
revenue-neutral by recycling all the revenues back to businesses
and currently proposes that out of a total revenue of £1
billion, £850 million is put to reducing employer's National
Insurance Contributions with £150 million put towards a fund
for energy-efficiency measures. Although this £150 million
is up from £50 million in the original proposal, many witnesses
still argued that there was an opportunity being missed by not
recycling a much larger proportion of the revenues towards energy-efficiency
measures. Lord Marshall discussed the need for levy revenues to
be used to fund greater efforts to help small and medium-sized
enterprises.[175] The
need to find funding for energy-efficiency initiatives is a pressing
one, particularly for small and medium-sized businesses and should
not be passed over in favour of reducing employment taxation.
We welcome the Government's plans to put £150 million
from the total Climate Change Levy revenue towards energy-efficiency
measures. However, we recommend that this amount be increased
substantially in future years, with a sizeable fraction put towards
helping small and medium-sized businesses overcome the various
barriers to improving their efficiency.
CLIMATE CHANGE LEVY: NEGOTIATED
AGREEMENTS
71.Negotiated agreements between industries and Government
are an important part of the Climate Change Levy system. For those
industries eligible, a negotiated agreement to improve energy-efficiency
results in an 80% rebate of the levy. Much of the evidence we
took in January of this year focused on the details of these negotiated
agreements. Heads of Agreement were due to be reached with the
original ten sectors by 20 December 1999 and another thirty-one
were due to be completed by the end of February 2000. However,
there appears to be little detail in the agreements signed in
December 1999 which contained only 'indicative targets' and will
need to be finalised. Indeed, the timescale allotted for reaching
agreements caused some concern to the Chemical Industries Association:
"Frankly, we do not
think it is realistic because DETR are lacking in resources. The
people we are working with are working day and night and they
are showing real signs of strain ... That is dealing just with
us and really the initial wave of ten associations. Each deal
is quite complex, there are a lot of issues to be resolved."[176]
Other witnesses expressed various concerns about
the use of negotiated agreements, including the ambition of the
agreements signed, the methods of enforcement and the penalties
for not reaching the agreements. There are questions about how
an agreement can be shared out, or ultimately enforced, by trade
associations to their individual firms and how it can be ensured
that a given company cannot 'free ride' on the actions of the
others. While all of these concerns are important, we believe
that there is one issue which, if tackled, would help resolve
these worries: Friends of the Earth noted that the agreements
were not open to public consultation.[177]
The Confederation of British Industry expressed some support for
agreements to be in the public domain once they were agreed and
this will, effectively, be the case. However, if draft agreements,
their conditions and penalties were opened up to public scrutiny,
representations could be made by environmental groups and other
interested parties about all the issues noted above before the
agreement was finalised. We are concerned that the negotiated
agreements are not open to public scrutiny and recommend that
the details of draft negotiated agreements between Government
and energy-intensive industries be made publicly available.
EMISSIONS TRADING
72.Some witnesses were particularly keen on the potential
of emissions trading as a cost-effective method of reducing emissions.[178]
BP Amoco told us of the success of their own internal trading
scheme and their belief that a UK scheme should be set up as soon
as possible.[179] Indeed,
Lord Marshall's report concluded that trading could be an effective
tool to reduce emissions and the consultation document talks of
introducing such a scheme. However, there was division amongst
other industrial witnesses as to the merits or otherwise of a
trading scheme,[180]
even amongst those from the same industry.[181]
We believe that a domestic trading scheme should be pursued and
set up as soon as is practicable and support the work of the CBI/ACBE
Emissions Trading Group in developing such a scheme. The details
of the scheme will inevitably be very complex and there are also
problems with the interaction between any emissions trading scheme
and the Climate Change Levy which need to be resolved. An early
start to a national trading scheme would undoubtedly benefit the
UK once the international scheme starts in 2008. Although we support
the early introduction of emissions trading in the UK, we do believe
that caps should be placed on the contribution that trading, and
the other 'flexible mechanisms' under the Kyoto Protocol can make
to meeting a nation's emissions targets. Only in this way can
it be ensured that the flexible mechanisms are largely 'supplemental'
to domestic policies, as the Protocol requires. We believe that
any scheme of emissions trading should be designed so as not to
provide an opportunity for those trading in emissions credits
to make excessive profits. The primary purpose of emissions trading
must be to reduce emissions.
149 Q113 Back
150
Q175 Back
151
Q312 Back
152
Consultation Paper, paragraph 101 Back
153
Ev p99; Q234 Back
154
Q474 Back
155
Economic Instruments and the Business Use of Energy, paragraph
33, a Report by Lord Marshall, November 1998 Back
156
Q1251 Back
157
CC36A Back
158
HM Treasury, "Environmental Taxation - Statement of Intent",
2 July 1997 Back
159
Q456 Back
160
CC25A, paragraph 2, CC69, paragraph 2.3 Back
161
Q1361 and CC56A, paragraph 13 Back
162
CC80 and CC69 Back
163
Q1079, Q1271 Back
164
Ninth Report, 1998-1999 Session, Paragraph 41 Back
165
CC42B, CC65 and CC67 Back
166
Q1366 Back
167
Q1367 Back
168
Ev p44, p78, p89, p101 Back
169
Q1035 Back
170
Q1153 Back
171
Q329 Back
172
Economic Instruments and the Business Use of Energy, paragraph
101, a Report by Lord Marshall, November 1998 Back
173
Ev p18; Q111 Back
174
Q572 Back
175
Economic Instruments and the Business Use of Energy, paragraphs
153-155, a Report by Lord Marshall, November 1998 Back
176
Q1199 Back
177
CC07A Back
178
Ev p88 Back
179
Q625 Back
180
Ev p3; Q470 Back
181
Q626, Q627 Back