POLICY ON INVESTIGATIONS
31. Given the very low proportion of reported injuries
investigated by the HSE, we were interested in how it determines
which accidents deserve to be investigated. The Director General
of the HSE told us that a decision to investigate was based on
a number of criteria relating to :
- the extent of the breach of the law;
- the severity of the harm done;
- the company's track record;
- whether an investigation would produce lessons
that could be applied elsewhere or would be a useful deterrent;
- the level of public concern; and
- where appropriate, the likelihood of a successful
prosecution.[48]
This was expanded upon in supplementary evidence
provided by the HSE.[49]
32. The HSE made it clear that it was not its intention
to investigate every accident, primarily due to "diminishing
returns"[50]
and because there were other, perhaps more effective, ways of
getting the message across.[51]
However, other witnesses did not agree with this policy. The Centre
for Corporate Accountability argued that injuries or deaths should
be treated with the same urgency and seriousness as other crimes
and should not be afforded greater leniency simply because they
occurred in a workplace.[52]
Or as Mr Dalton, a health and safety professional and author of
a number of books on the subject, put it, "why should being
killed by a brick be less of a crime inside the workplace than
out?"[53]
33. Witnesses pointed out that public concern about
the level of investigations of injuries was increasing. Partly
in response to this, the HSE has decided to look again at a large
sample of accidents which were reported but not selected for investigation.
The purpose of the exercise, the HSE told us, was to establish
whether the existing investigation criteria had been properly
applied and the extent of non-investigation in circumstances when
the Commission's and Executive's policies would require investigation
to take place. The results of the review are included in the HSE's
supplementary evidence.[54]
34. We welcome the HSE's review of investigation
criteria as we are concerned that there are potentially many injuries
which it should have investigated. We are pleased that the HSE
intends to re-open those cases where the original decision not
to investigate was judged to be wrong.
35. However, we continue to have some concerns
about how the criteria which determine which injuries will be
investigated, are applied by HSE inspectors. Decisions in the
past appear to have been unduly dictated by availability of resources.
While the HSE needs to operate within its resource limitations,
we believe that it should develop more detailed guidance for inspectors.
In particular, more thought should be given to a) how to 'weight'
the criteria, since some should surely have more influence than
others and b) whether some categories of very serious injuries
should automatically trigger an investigation in the same way
that fatalities do. Such a system would mean that decisions on
whether to investigate would be more rigorously based and more
transparent which would ultimately lead to a greater consistency
in application between inspectors. We urge the HSE to use its
review to address these issues.
36. We are also concerned about those cases where
the HSE fails to investigate an injury and an individual is subsequently
successful in bringing a civil case against an employer. We recommend
that the HSE provide a list of such cases in their annual report,
identifying the lessons learnt and the action taken, to ensure
that in the future such cases will be investigated. We recommend
that, unless there is evidence that the HSE is responding to this
concern, the Government consider taking action against the HSE.
POLICY ON PROSECUTIONS
37. Concerns were also voiced in relation to a number
of aspects of the HSE's policy on prosecuting employers. These
focussed on the low levels of companies prosecuted; the approach
to the prosecution process; and the final destination of revenues
generated by successful prosecutions (which is dealt with at paragraph
99).
38. We received evidence to show that prosecutions
are brought in only 10 per cent of major injury cases and 20 per
cent of cases where a death has occurred.[55]
In relation to fatalities, the Centre for Corporate Accountability
compared the number of companies prosecuted (five manslaugher
prosecutions) to the numbers killed at work (25,000) since 1965
and commented that this is "an infinitesimal follow-through".[56]
The prosecution rate was also criticised by the London Hazards
Centre[57]
and Mr Dalton who described the HSE's record in regard to prosecutions
as "dismally inadequate".[58]
39. However, increasing the number of companies prosecuted
for health and safety offences will not be easy. Bringing a prosecution
is a time consuming activity and it is, according to the HSE,
"becoming increasingly difficult to win cases".[59]
Some witnesses questioned whether in fact this represented an
efficient use of resources or inspectors' time. For example, Mr
Alesbury of the CBI said: "I am aware that taking someone
to court does involve them in a great deal of time and effort,
and with their limited resources that will detract from other
activities to promote and improve health and safety".[60]
Instead, one proposal we received was that the HSE should consider
using lawyers, rather than HSE inspectors, to prosecute cases
in magistrates courts.[61]
We considered this proposition, but do not believe that it
would be in the public interest to replace inspectors with lawyers
to prosecute cases in the lower courts, primarily due to the significant
resource implications. Instead, we welcome the HSE proposals to
have fewer, better qualified specialist prosecuting inspectors
in the lower courts.[62]
40. However, in addition, we believe that there
may be some merit in enhancing the legal support currently available
to HSE inspectors when prosecuting cases. We therefore recommend
that the HSE provide better access for inspectors to legal expertise,
whether this be in-house or external, to assist in the preparation
of cases for magistrates courts. This
may increase the chances of a successful prosecution and should
allow inspectors to spend more time in the field.
41. Another aspect relevant to this discussion, is
the success rate in prosecutions. Clearly there is little point
in urging the HSE to prosecute more companies if these prosecutions
fail. The Director General told us that the HSE prosecutes in
cases where they think there is at least a 50 per cent chance
of success.[63]
In 1998-99, it secured successful convictions in 83 per cent of
the cases it prosecuted.[64]
Overall we accept that this is a strong performance and the Director
General told us the HSE's record compared well with success rates
in criminal courts.[65]
However, the record for defended cases, ie where the defendant
pleads not guilty, is much poorer, with the HSE winning only 38
per cent of such cases.[66]
The Director General told us that this was because cases were
being defended by "more competent lawyers" due to an
increased stigma attached to health and safety offences.[67]
However since the HSE only proceeds in strong cases, we feel this
is a very poor rate and expect to see an increase.
32 These
are legally binding notices requiring employers to change or halt
a certain work practice. Back
33 HSE25,
para50 Back
34 See
HSE25a, para19 Back
35 HSE25a,
para19 Back
36 HSE25a,
para19 Back
37 HSE25,
para51 Back
38 There
were 274 fatal injuries to workers in 1997/98 (HSE25, para 17) Back
39 HSE25,
para51. Under RIDDOR 95 (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995), the following injuries
are classed as 'major non-fatal injuries': fractures, amputations,
dislocations, loss of sight, eye injuries, electrical shock or
burns and a number of categories of illness. (See HSC, Health
and Safety Statistics 1998-99, p70 for a comprehensive list). Back
40 HSC
HSC Annual Report, p97 - but also see Q236 Back
41 HSE03 Back
42 HSE18,
para 11 Back
43 HSE15 Back
44 HSE21 Back
45 Q377
Back
46 HSE25,
para51 and Q257 Back
47 HSE25,
para51 Back
48 QQs
256 & 266 Back
49 HSE25a Back
50 Q256-see
also HSE25a, para25 Back
51 Q258 Back
52 HSE20,
para 52 Back
53 HSE06 Back
54 HSE25a,
AnnexB Back
55 Q201 Back
56 Q241 Back
57 HSE15 Back
58 HSE06 Back
59 Q268 Back
60 Q33 Back
61 see
paragraphs 36 and 37 of HSE20 & QQs 211, 212 & 221 Back
62 Q382 Back
63 Q264 Back
64 HSE25a,
para31 Back
65 Q272 Back
66 HSE25a,
para31 Back
67 Q268 Back