Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum by the Health and Safety Commission (FLU 15)

  1.  The Health and Safety Commission, and its executive arm, the Health and Safety Executive, is responsible for regulating the safety of the London Underground. Whilst HSC/E has no direct influence on funding of the London Underground, its activities in seeking to maintain and improve safety on the Underground have cost implications. For this reason the Health and Safety Commission believe that the Sub-Committee would wish to know what view HSC/E has formed on the development of safety arguments for PPP and to understand how the development of rail safety policy, as a whole, following Ladbroke Grove, might impact on the proposed Underground arrangements.

  2.  HSE has been in constant dialogue with London Underground and the relevant Government Departments (namely DETR and the former Government of London (GOL) Office) to promote the interests of safety in the development of the London Underground PPP and to ensure that the development of the safety arrangements meet with HSE's approval.

  3.  In September 1999, HM Railway Inspectorate of HSE (HMRI) accepted the LUL "shadow running" safety case for PPP. In doing so, HMRI were satisfied that a safety justification for the Underground was being appropriately transferred and maintained; that there was clear allocation of individual responsibilities within the proposed new structure of the Underground; and that LUL were progressing adequate arrangements to take charge of any operational emergency and in particular to ensure suitable co-operation between parties (eg Infraco's and sub-contractors). Overall, HMRI were satisfied, at that stage, that PPP was being implemented in a way which would ensure that safety standards would be maintained and in some areas improved. HSC has informed Ministers of this judgement.

  4.  During the development of the shadow running safety case, two important issues were raised and resolved. Firstly, HMRI have made it very clear to London Underground that HMRI regard LUL as the sole "infrastructure controller" on the Underground network. This term has precise legal meaning, attracting statutory duties within the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 1994. LUL accept this point and have established this position in their safety case and in Infraco tender request documentation. LUL are also the only passenger train and station operator on the network. Hence, there is no obligation, under the current Railway (Safety Case) Regulations, for an Infraco to produce, and have accepted, a statutory safety case, excepting in the case of Transplant-JNP, which will operate trains to progress engineering works and, as such, is a train operator; Opsco would currently have to accept the Transplant-JNP safety case.

  5.  Secondly, HSC/E formed the view that inadequate consultation between LUL and Union representatives had taken place in the development of the safety case. Undertakings were given by LUL to take corrective action and we are satisfied, at this stage, that adequate consultation is now taking place.

  6.  As part of acceptance of the shadow running safety case, HMRI agreed with London Underground that the safety case would need significant development in a number of areas before it would be judged acceptable for the full PPP operation. A programme for development of the safety case was agreed and HMRI believe that current progress, in this area, is promising. The next milestone towards PPP is vesting of Infraco's on 1 April 2000. HSE is currently assessing the revised safety case from LUL to assure itself that suitable progress is being made against the commitments given at the shadow running safety case stage and that LUL are ready to make further changes without creating additional risk.

  7.  Prior to the Ladbroke Grove rail accident, HSC had asked the Executive to review the current Railway (Safety Case) Regulations. These regulations were introduced in 1994, at the time that the main rail network was being privatised. The review was intended to establish whether the regulations had bedded down and whether they were delivering their objective, namely a regulatory vehicle to ensure that the safety arrangements of the newly fragmented rail industry were satisfactory. Following Ladbroke Grove, HSE has reported to the Deputy Prime Minister on its review of the Management of Safety by Railtrack [Reference 1] and the Department of Environment. Transport and the Regions has reported to Ministers on its review of the Railtrack Safety and Systems Directorate functions [Reference 2]. In consequence Ministers have, in consultation with the Commission, announced their wish to introduce significant changes to the regulatory regime [Reference 3]. Whilst the focus of this development is principally directed at Railtrack and train operating companies using their infrastructure (and therefore outside the scope of the underground PPP), HSC has agreed with Ministers that it will consult on a significant change to the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations whereby any train or station operator would require safety case acceptance from HSE, rather than as now from the infrastructure controller. The Commission plans to consult on revised regulations this summer.

  8.  Since LUL will remain the sole infrastructure controller, station and passenger train operator under the proposed PPP, and hence can be regarded as a vertically integrated operator, the current regulations already require their safety case to be accepted by HSE. HSC's intended consultation proposals would not affect this position. In the case of Transplant-JNP, the safety case would need to be accepted by HSE rather than Opsco, through Opsco would need to be satisfied with the safety case and would need to make a formal recommendation on acceptance to HSE, as an input to HSE's decision.

  9.  HSC also intends to consult on expanding the scope of infrastructure controller, train and station operator safety cases. This will have an impact on LUL, but no more than it will on all other Railway (Safety Case) Regulation duty holders. Specifically, on current plans, there will be no general requirement for Infraco's to submit a statutory safety case although the safety case for Opsco is based on the production of contractual safety cases from the Infraco's.

  10.  The Committee will be aware that following Ladbroke Grove, HSC has set up a Public Inquiry, to be led by Lord Cullen. As part of a wide-ranging inquiry, Lord Cullen will examine, in some detail, the current regulatory framework and regime. Whilst Lord Cullen will not be examining in detail the Underground arrangements, it is possible that any recommendation that he may make could influence the statutory provisions that currently apply to the underground. Until Lord Cullen concludes his inquiry, we are not able to indicate what effect, if any, this may have on the Underground.

REFERENCES

  1.  HSE: Management of Safety by Railtrack—Published 22 February 2000.

  2.  DETR: Railtrack's Safety and Standards Directorate—Review of main functions and their location—Published 22 February 2000.

  3.  Deputy Prime Minister's statement on rail policy delivered to the House of Commons 22 February 2000.

March 2000


 
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