Memorandum by the Health and Safety Commission
(FLU 15)
1. The Health and Safety Commission, and
its executive arm, the Health and Safety Executive, is responsible
for regulating the safety of the London Underground. Whilst HSC/E
has no direct influence on funding of the London Underground,
its activities in seeking to maintain and improve safety on the
Underground have cost implications. For this reason the Health
and Safety Commission believe that the Sub-Committee would wish
to know what view HSC/E has formed on the development of safety
arguments for PPP and to understand how the development of rail
safety policy, as a whole, following Ladbroke Grove, might impact
on the proposed Underground arrangements.
2. HSE has been in constant dialogue with
London Underground and the relevant Government Departments (namely
DETR and the former Government of London (GOL) Office) to promote
the interests of safety in the development of the London Underground
PPP and to ensure that the development of the safety arrangements
meet with HSE's approval.
3. In September 1999, HM Railway Inspectorate
of HSE (HMRI) accepted the LUL "shadow running" safety
case for PPP. In doing so, HMRI were satisfied that a safety justification
for the Underground was being appropriately transferred and maintained;
that there was clear allocation of individual responsibilities
within the proposed new structure of the Underground; and that
LUL were progressing adequate arrangements to take charge of any
operational emergency and in particular to ensure suitable co-operation
between parties (eg Infraco's and sub-contractors). Overall, HMRI
were satisfied, at that stage, that PPP was being implemented
in a way which would ensure that safety standards would be maintained
and in some areas improved. HSC has informed Ministers of this
judgement.
4. During the development of the shadow
running safety case, two important issues were raised and resolved.
Firstly, HMRI have made it very clear to London Underground that
HMRI regard LUL as the sole "infrastructure controller"
on the Underground network. This term has precise legal meaning,
attracting statutory duties within the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations
1994. LUL accept this point and have established this position
in their safety case and in Infraco tender request documentation.
LUL are also the only passenger train and station operator on
the network. Hence, there is no obligation, under the current
Railway (Safety Case) Regulations, for an Infraco to produce,
and have accepted, a statutory safety case, excepting in the case
of Transplant-JNP, which will operate trains to progress engineering
works and, as such, is a train operator; Opsco would currently
have to accept the Transplant-JNP safety case.
5. Secondly, HSC/E formed the view that
inadequate consultation between LUL and Union representatives
had taken place in the development of the safety case. Undertakings
were given by LUL to take corrective action and we are satisfied,
at this stage, that adequate consultation is now taking place.
6. As part of acceptance of the shadow running
safety case, HMRI agreed with London Underground that the safety
case would need significant development in a number of areas before
it would be judged acceptable for the full PPP operation. A programme
for development of the safety case was agreed and HMRI believe
that current progress, in this area, is promising. The next milestone
towards PPP is vesting of Infraco's on 1 April 2000. HSE is currently
assessing the revised safety case from LUL to assure itself that
suitable progress is being made against the commitments given
at the shadow running safety case stage and that LUL are ready
to make further changes without creating additional risk.
7. Prior to the Ladbroke Grove rail accident,
HSC had asked the Executive to review the current Railway (Safety
Case) Regulations. These regulations were introduced in 1994,
at the time that the main rail network was being privatised. The
review was intended to establish whether the regulations had bedded
down and whether they were delivering their objective, namely
a regulatory vehicle to ensure that the safety arrangements of
the newly fragmented rail industry were satisfactory. Following
Ladbroke Grove, HSE has reported to the Deputy Prime Minister
on its review of the Management of Safety by Railtrack [Reference
1] and the Department of Environment. Transport and the Regions
has reported to Ministers on its review of the Railtrack Safety
and Systems Directorate functions [Reference 2]. In consequence
Ministers have, in consultation with the Commission, announced
their wish to introduce significant changes to the regulatory
regime [Reference 3]. Whilst the focus of this development is
principally directed at Railtrack and train operating companies
using their infrastructure (and therefore outside the scope of
the underground PPP), HSC has agreed with Ministers that it will
consult on a significant change to the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations
whereby any train or station operator would require safety case
acceptance from HSE, rather than as now from the infrastructure
controller. The Commission plans to consult on revised regulations
this summer.
8. Since LUL will remain the sole infrastructure
controller, station and passenger train operator under the proposed
PPP, and hence can be regarded as a vertically integrated operator,
the current regulations already require their safety case to be
accepted by HSE. HSC's intended consultation proposals would not
affect this position. In the case of Transplant-JNP, the safety
case would need to be accepted by HSE rather than Opsco, through
Opsco would need to be satisfied with the safety case and would
need to make a formal recommendation on acceptance to HSE, as
an input to HSE's decision.
9. HSC also intends to consult on expanding
the scope of infrastructure controller, train and station operator
safety cases. This will have an impact on LUL, but no more than
it will on all other Railway (Safety Case) Regulation duty holders.
Specifically, on current plans, there will be no general requirement
for Infraco's to submit a statutory safety case although the safety
case for Opsco is based on the production of contractual safety
cases from the Infraco's.
10. The Committee will be aware that following
Ladbroke Grove, HSC has set up a Public Inquiry, to be led by
Lord Cullen. As part of a wide-ranging inquiry, Lord Cullen will
examine, in some detail, the current regulatory framework and
regime. Whilst Lord Cullen will not be examining in detail the
Underground arrangements, it is possible that any recommendation
that he may make could influence the statutory provisions that
currently apply to the underground. Until Lord Cullen concludes
his inquiry, we are not able to indicate what effect, if any,
this may have on the Underground.
REFERENCES
1. HSE: Management of Safety by Railtrack—Published
22 February 2000.
2. DETR: Railtrack's Safety and Standards
Directorate—Review of main functions and their location—Published
22 February 2000.
3. Deputy Prime Minister's statement on
rail policy delivered to the House of Commons 22 February 2000.
March 2000
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