FOURTH REPORT
The European Scrutiny Committee has made further
progress in the matter referred to it and has agreed to the following
Report:—
COMMON STRATEGY ON UKRAINE
(20727)
—
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Unofficial Presidency text of a Common Strategy on Ukraine.
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| Legal base: |
Article 13 EU; unanimity |
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| Department: |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration:
| EM and Minister's letter of 30 November 1999
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| Previous Committee Report:
| None |
| Discussed in Council:
| Submitted to the 6 December General Affairs Council and subsequently to the Helsinki European Council where it was adopted
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| Committee's assessment:
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision:
| For debate in European Standing Committee B
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Introduction
1.1 The legal basis of the relationship
between the EU, the Member States and Ukraine is the Agreement
on Partnership and Co-operation (PCA), which entered into force
on 1 March 1998.[19]
It has been planned for some time that a Common Strategy should
be drawn up, but the draft only recently came close to its final
form, and a text which could be submitted for scrutiny was not
issued by the Presidency until 29 November. A revised text of
3 December has since been made available and the FCO has undertaken
to provide us with a copy of the final text. This was not expected
to differ substantially from the 3 December text.
Objectives of the Common Strategy
1.2 The Common Strategy on Ukraine sets
out the objectives for the European Union's relations with Ukraine
for the next four years, and identifies the means to be used to
pursue them. By setting clear objectives and identifying specific
initiatives to be taken forward, it is hoped that the Strategy
will bring consistency and coherence to the range of relations
with, and programmes on, Ukraine. In a letter dated 30 November,
the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr
Vaz) notes the main aims as being:
"— to strengthen
the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the EU;
"— to encourage the democratic reform process in
Ukraine;
"— to encourage economic reform;
"— to increase co-operation with Ukraine in the
fields of justice and home affairs; and
"— to promote co-operation with Ukraine on areas
of common concern such as environmental and nuclear safety questions".
1.3 Part I of the document sets out
the "Vision of the EU for its partnership with Ukraine".
It comments that the strategic partnership, based on shared values
and common interests, is a vital factor for enhancing peace, stability
and prosperity in Europe. It says:
"The freedom, independence
and stability of Ukraine rank among the greatest achievements
in the new Europe rid of old dividing lines. Geography as well
as size, the resources of its population as well as its location
along the axes North-South and East-West give Ukraine a unique
position in Europe and make it a determinant regional actor".
1.4 It continues:
"Ukraine enjoys today
excellent relations with all its neighbours and has taken important
steps in nation-building and towards consolidating its democracy.
The fact that Ukraine has since independence been a source of
regional stability, despite its domestic difficulties and diversities,
is a laudable achievement".
1.5 The EU then welcomes Ukraine's commitment
to nuclear disarmament and its co-operation in maintaining European
and international peace and security, through the OSCE[20]
and the United Nations. It acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations
and welcomes Ukraine's "pro-European choice". It undertakes
to work with Ukraine:
"... in order to support
a successful political and economic transformation in Ukraine,
which will facilitate Ukraine's further rapprochement with
the EU. The Union and its Member States offer to share with Ukraine
their various experiences in building modern political, economic,
social and administrative structures, fully recognising that the
main responsibility for Ukraine's future lies with Ukraine itself".
1.6 Part II addresses the "Principal
Objectives" and notes that the EU and Ukraine "have
a common interest in accelerating the democratic and economic
transition process in Ukraine". The EU then welcomes Ukraine's
achievements in laying the foundations of a democratic system
and in maintaining its unity despite the country's diverse make-up.
Support is given to Ukraine "in all its efforts aiming at
the consolidation of democracy and good governance, human rights
and the rule of law". The paper goes on to stress the importance
of a properly functioning independent judiciary, a professional
police-force and the development of a meritocratic, well-trained
public administration and of a free media.
1.7 Strongly encouraging Ukraine to intensify
its efforts in building a functioning market economy, the
paper calls for an acceleration of the pace of reforms. Attracting
and protecting domestic and foreign investment plays a key rôle
in Ukraine's development, it says, and adds:
"In this context, the
EU notes that allegations of corruption and poor governance are
damaging to Ukraine's economic reputation. The Union will support
Ukraine in developing and adopting the economic policies needed
to increase domestic and foreign investment and to meet the requirements
of international lenders".
1.8 The EU also undertakes to support Ukraine
in progressively approximating its legislation with that
of the EU, especially in such areas as competition policy, standards
and certification, intellectual property rights, data protection,
customs procedures and the environment.
1.9 Further sections of Part II cover the
EU's wish to deepen co-operation to ensure stability and security
"on the European continent". The Common Strategy calls
for strengthened mechanisms for consultation and the intensification
of practical co-operation in crisis management through the implementation
of the action plan recently drawn up between the Western European
Union (WEU) and Ukraine. Reference is made to co-operation on
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Ukraine is
encouraged to fulfil its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention and to support the goals of the Convention on Anti-Personnel
Mines.
1.10 In a sub-section on co-operation on
environment, energy and nuclear safety, the EU undertakes
to promote the efficient and environmentally responsible use of
energy in Ukraine and the strengthening of new energy institutions
and authorities and their policy-making capacity. The paper notes
that nuclear safety and the decommissioning of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant are a priority in EU/Ukraine relations. It urges the
closure of Chernobyl and says that, in return, the EU will support
Ukraine in financing replacement energy-generating capacity.
1.11 With enlargement in mind, the
paper notes that some future Member States will share an external
border with Ukraine and that this will promote the economic dynamism
and political stability of the region. Ukraine is encouraged to
participate in regional, European and world structures. The document
particularly calls for co-operation with the EU on justice and
home affairs.
1.12 Ukraine is urged to redouble its efforts
to meet the requirements for World Trade Organisation membership
and the Union undertakes to examine the circumstances which might
allow for the future establishment of an EU/Ukraine Free Trade
Area, as foreseen in the PCA.
1.13 In Part III, the Strategy commits
the EU to rather more specific ways in which it will support Ukraine,
or co-operate with it, to fulfil the objectives set out earlier
in the paper. Much of this section is couched in language such
as "the EU will consider means to assist..." and "...will
explore the possibilities for closer co-operation on..."
The Government's view
1.14 The Minister says that:
"The Government fully
supports the adoption of this Common Strategy as a valuable development
of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. It
should make the policies and programmes of the Member States and
the Community vis à vis Ukraine more effective."
1.15 He adds that measures to implement
the Common Strategy will be submitted separately for scrutiny
as they are brought forward.
Council of Europe view
1.16 A delegation from the Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly observed the first round of voting in the
Ukrainian presidential election and issued a press release from
Kiev on 1 November. A summary, issued with a six-point statement,
concluded:
"A questionable campaign,
orderly and apparently free voting - no reason to doubt the Ukrainian
people's commitment to democracy."
1.17 The statement noted that Ukraine's
economy is in decline and social hardship increasing. The election
campaign was severely criticised. The delegation regarded parties'
access to the media as inadequate and the coverage as biassed,
so that it was almost impossible for a voter to rely on any one
source of information to gain an objective view of the campaign.
Forged newspapers were distributed and there were serious incidents
of violence, including an attack on a presidential candidate.
However, according to the delegation, the Central Election Commission
made "commendable efforts" to improve the level of transparency
of the process and the procedures on election day were carried
out in an orderly manner.
Conclusion
1.18 The Council of Europe report highlights
the distance Ukraine still has to go to establish a fully democratic
society.
1.19 No mention is made in this Common
Strategy of Ukraine eventually seeking to apply for membership
of the EU, but the document notes Ukraine's "pro-European
choice" and lays emphasis on Ukraine and the EU meeting common
challenges on the European continent. This appears to be as far
as the Member States are prepared to go in encouraging any wish
Ukraine might have to join the Union.
1.20 The contrast between the optimistic
tone of the Common Strategy and the events reported by the Council
of Europe delegation is striking. However laudable the EU's motives
in using encouragement rather than attempting coercion, the fact
is that the situation in Ukraine raises real concerns. We therefore
consider that this document should be debated.
1.21 Members may wish to raise the following
issues with the Minister:
- the Minister makes no reference in his EM
to the findings of the International Election Observation Mission
of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR), or of the report by the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Observers on the Ukrainian presidential campaign, which contradict
references in the Common Strategy to the degree of the democracy
enjoyed in Ukraine. The Council of Europe delegation were told
that the death penalty had been secretly reinstated and that there
was reason to believe that political prisoners had been executed.
Why has the Government been prepared to endorse the Common Strategy's
optimistic language and not made any comment on the situation
there in its EM?
- is it the intention of the Member States to
encourage Ukraine to apply to join the Union in due course? If
not, why does the Common Strategy specifically offer support to
Ukraine in approximating its legislation with important areas
of the acquis communautaire?
- does the Government believe that it is appropriate
to use the prospect of closer relations with the Union, if not
eventual membership, to promote the establishment of a secure
democracy and the rule of law in a country which is not an applicant?
If so, to which other non-applicant countries might such an inducement
be offered; and what will this mean for the nature and frontiers
of the EU?
- does the Common Strategy take adequately into
account Ukraine's economic problems and future economic prospects?
- does the Government believe that sufficient
funds can be made available to support Ukraine in closing Chernobyl
and providing for other sources of energy? If so, from where will
they be drawn?
19 (18886) 6109/98; see HC 155-xxi (1997-98), paragraph
13 (11 March 1998). Back
20 Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Back
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