SINGLE EUROPEAN SKY
(20813)
13735/99
COM(99) 614
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Commission Communication on the creation of the single European sky.
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| Legal base: |
— |
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| Document originated:
| 1 December 1999 |
| Forwarded to the Council:
| 6 December 1999 |
| Deposited in Parliament:
| 6 January 2000 |
| Department: |
Environment, Transport and the Regions
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| Basis of consideration:
| EM of 18 January 2000 |
| Previous Committee Report:
| None |
| To be discussed in Council:
| June 2000 |
| Committee's assessment:
| Legally and politically important
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| Committee's decision:
| Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
2.1 In Europe today, one flight in three
is not on time — the average delay is 20 minutes, but can
be much higher at peak periods. About half the delays are due
to saturation of available airspace, having regard to the need
to ensure flight safety. The economic cost of delays because of
congested air space in Europe has been estimated at 5 billion
euro a year. Despite counter-measures already planned, it is likely
to worsen over the next few years.
2.2 The Chicago Convention, agreed at the
end of the Second World War, created the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO). In 1955, the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC) was established by European civil aviation authorities,
on the initiative of the Council of Europe and ICAO, to discuss
and co-ordinate civil aviation policies and air traffic management
(ATM). All EU Member States belong to ECAC. Under the Chicago
Convention, national governments retain sovereignty over their
air space for both civil and military purposes, subject to any
delegations agreed under that treaty.
2.3 EUROCONTROL (the European Organisation
for the Safety of Air Navigation) was established in 1960 and
is the international organisation responsible for technical collaboration
of air traffic control (ATC) in Europe. Currently twenty-nine
countries are members. EUROCONTROL also manages air traffic control
in the upper airspace over parts of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.
2.4 In 1996, the Commission published a
White Paper on air traffic management, 'Freeing Europe's Airspace'.
Our predecessors reported on that document on 24 April 1996[23]
and again on 10 July 1996[24].
The White Paper said that there was a strong case "for concentrating
efforts on improving the present procedures for strategic policy
making by creating a single regulatory authority (for ATM), whilst
leaving the existing mechanism for service provision largely unchanged".
Its favoured option for bringing this about was to reinvent EUROCONTROL
so as to give it greater political legitimacy and invest it with
appropriate powers and support mechanisms, with the Community
itself becoming a Member. The House of Lords European Communities
Committee published a report on the Commission's White Paper[25].
Neither the House of Lords Committee nor the then Government favoured
the Community joining EUROCONTROL, or any unified air traffic
management body that might be established in its place.
2.5 After the UK election in 1997, the Council
agreed unanimously that the Community should join EUROCONTROL
and a negotiating mandate was agreed in 1998. In the negotiating
mandate for Community accession the broad purpose was seen as
to bring about a single and efficient body for ATM policy making
in Europe. In the document on which we now report the Commission
says that accession could take place early in 2000.
2.6 In 1997, a new convention was signed
which was designed to strengthen the decision-making capacity
of EUROCONTROL. Ratification of the convention by EU Member States
is linked to Community accession to EUROCONTROL.
2.7 In 1998, the Council also agreed a negotiating
mandate for establishing a draft Treaty for a European Aviation
Safety Authority (EASA). Negotiations were to be held with other
full members (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Monaco) of the
Joint Aviation Authority (an associated body of ECAC). It was
envisaged that EASA would be responsible for drawing up and ensuring
effective application of rules for aviation safety in aircraft
design, operation and maintenance and that its powers might be
extended to cover safety rules relating to ATM and to airports.
2.8 In January 1999, the then Minister of
Transport (The Rt. Hon. Dr John Reid) told us that "no negotiations
have yet taken place under either mandate, but I confirm my intention
to keep the Scrutiny Committee informed when there are any key
developments". We have received no communication from the
Government since then.
The document
2.9 Concern about rising air transport delays
led the June 1999 Transport Council to request the Commission
to report on what was being done to minimise delays and to assess
what further initiatives are needed. This document is the Commission's
response.
2.10 The Communication examines ATM in Europe
and provides the Commission's views on where it believes there
are shortcomings. The Communication includes seven annexes which
examine in detail and propose action on: the current European
delay situation; the Community's air transport policy; the European
air traffic management system; how Europe's airspace is managed;
the need for collective commitment by all stakeholders; the requirement
for a new approach to system design; and the need for cost efficiency
and the separation of service provision from regulation.
2.11 The Communication develops arguments
originally put forward in the Commission's 1996 White Paper. It
contains no legislative proposal, but suggests a number of actions
the Commission believes are required. The Commission say that
these are to be developed further by a High-Level Group under
the Transport Commissioner, which is due to report to the June
2000 Transport Council when this document will be considered.
The Commission says that it will also open up discussions with
the two sides of industry. The document indicates that the Commission
intends to put forward proposals for reform of EUROCONTROL and
its working methods. Accession of the Community to EUROCONTROL,
if agreed by the Council, would lead to a collective Community
commitment to implement EUROCONTROL decisions where the Community
had a competence.
2.12 Underpinning the Commission's specific
proposals for discussion is an assertion that "the Community
must assume its responsibilities by bringing its management of
the airways in line with its economic and political integration
.... Europe cannot keep the frontiers in the sky that it has managed
to eliminate on the ground". The Commission sees such developments
as part of completion of the internal market and liberalisation
of the aviation business as a whole. One of the actions the Commission
says it will undertake is to examine "whether the way air
traffic services are currently provided is compatible with Treaty
provisions on competition and freedom to provide services".
It says it will take legal action where necessary to rectify any
infringement.
2.13 The Communication refers to the measures
that are currently in hand or planned, particularly by EUROCONTROL,
but it expresses doubt as to whether they will be adequate without
wider structural changes in ATM and ATC (as a subset of ATM) and
political commitment to make those changes effective. It argues
that:
"— Sectors
must be subdivided and routes established regardless of frontiers.
This will enable the use of airspace to be organised along the
lines of efficiency;
"— The division of airspace between
civil and military uses must take account of the new geopolitical
realities and form part of a consistent and efficient framework.
The way co-operation between the military and the civil sectors
is currently organised does not tie in with the smooth running
of airspace. Nor does the subdivision of zones reserved for military
use take account of the collective interest of the Community.
The European Union has already shown that it can manage the relation
between civil and military use of technology and this experience
may be of use in this next context".
2.14 It also argues that:
"The quest for efficiency
in the respective workings of the regulator and the service provider
means separating these two activities both within the Member States
and within EUROCONTROL".
2.15 The document suggests that the Commission
has alternative actions in mind if its proposals are rejected
or delayed:
"However, it cannot
be ruled out that the Member States of EUROCONTROL and non-members
of the Community might not wish to be party to this. Similarly,
delays in the entry into force of the revised [EUROCONTROL] convention
and Community accession thereto may hamper the implementation
of Community objectives within EUROCONTROL. Should that be the
case, the Community will have to assume its responsibilities and
the Commission will make suitable proposals for meeting the objectives
of the Treaty by other means".
The Government's view
2.16 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 18
January 2000, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Mr Mullin) says:
"There is little doubt
that there are shortcomings in Europe's ATM system. A fundamental
problem is its inability to respond quickly enough to the growing
demands for air traffic which regularly exceed forecast growth
figures. In spite of technical advances and the efforts of States
and EUROCONTROL to improve integration and the harmonization of
the European ATM system, air transport delays continue to mount.
This is because individual States/service providers, mostly in
western Europe where air traffic density is the greatest, are
unable to increase their ATM sector capabilities to meet all the
demands which users place on the system. The cause of this imbalance
is often attributed to a lack of coherent political commitment
among the States rather than to specific technical failings.
"The Commission identifies a number of failings
in current institutional arrangements for European ATM and proposes
further reforms in EUROCONTROL to help overcome these. These proposals
come before those already agreed under the 1997 revised EUROCONTROL
Convention have been fully implemented. The UK is nevertheless
sympathetic to the most fundamental of these proposals which is
the separation of the regulation of air traffic control services
from the provision of these services. There is a move towards
EUROCONTROL carrying out regulatory activities, and since it is
already a service provider, there could be a conflict of interest
within the organisation. The UK is already pursuing a policy of
this type. In particular, the Government is seeking the further
separation of UK regulation from service provision in its proposals
for a Public Private Partnership for National Air Traffic Services.
Similarly, the Commission's assertion that commercial sector methods
and expertise should be employed in air traffic service provision,
and for it to be regulated robustly, is fully in keeping with
current UK thinking.
"The Communication also introduces the concepts
of centralised airspace policy making and regulation in order
to secure political commitment and concerted action in response
to collective decisions. These proposals, which are not elaborated
in detail, need further study and they could have implications
for UK sovereignty or impinge on defence and security policies.
Consequently, it will be essential that the UK remains involved
in the High-Level Group's development work. Full participation
should help ensure these proposals are developed in ways which
enhance and support UK policies and interests.
"The airline industry has been kept informed
of developments through the Department's regular newsletter on
EC aviation. Further to this, the Department is in the process
of asking the aviation industry and other interested organisations
for their comments on the Commission's proposals.
"As there is no formal proposal, there are no
costs arising at this stage. However, the Commission's ideas to
create a fund for financing common projects with low financial
return but of benefit for the whole of the European network might
require the UK to provide additional funding. It is not possible
to quantify the size of this additional funding requirement until
the precise nature of the fund becomes clear. The Commission's
proposal to develop incentives based on reward or penalty could
also have financial implications. Such arrangements could benefit
National Air Traffic Services, UK aviation, and the UK generally.
"As the Communication contains no specific legislative
proposals, it does not raise any legal or procedural issues at
this stage. Subsequent legislation could, however, be brought
forward under Article 80(2) (ex Article 84(2)) of the Treaty on
European Union. Some form of collective airspace management policy
making is likely to be proposed which may in turn raise issues
of subsidiarity".
Conclusion
2.17 In the Background section
of this Report we have tried to put this document in its wider
context. Our predecessors saw the issues addressed in the 1996
White Paper as of major political importance which would, at the
appropriate time, justify a debate. The current document raises
similar issues which we also regard as having substantial legal
and political significance. It is self-evident that the effective
and efficient use of European air space requires collective agreements
and actions between states both inside and outside the Community.
The best means to achieve desired ends require careful evaluation.
Due account has to be taken of the Community and the commitment
to a common transport policy and to completion of the internal
market. But legitimate national interests, both civil and military,
need also to be considered, whether or not in conflict with Community
interests. There has been no debate on these issues in the House
so far. We believe such a debate should be held, but do not recommend
it at this stage. It may be that the right time will be before
the June 2000 Transport Council when this document and the outcome
of the High-Level Working Group and the Commission's discussion
with both sides of industry should be known. However, it is possible
that an earlier debate would be appropriate if a proposal for
a Decision for the Community to accede to EUROCONTROL comes forward
before then.
2.18 In any event, we ask the Minister
to respond to us on the following questions:
- can he say when a proposal may come forward
for scrutiny regarding the accession of the Community to EUROCONTROL?
- what, if any, effect on the national competence
of Member States in ATC will such accession have?
- what might be the implications for ECAC of
a strengthened rôle for EUROCONTROL? Can their respective
rôles be satisfactorily separated?
- what, if any, progress has been made in negotiations
regarding a European Aviation Safety Authority?
- how do any such negotiations mesh with the
proposals on ATC put forward in the document on which we now report?
- what specifically has he in mind in saying
that the Commission's proposals could have implications for UK
sovereignty, or that they could impinge on UK defence and security
policies?
- whether the Government considers that, if
progress with these proposals is blocked, there would be any basis
for any legal proceedings against Member States under the Treaty
— as suggested in the document?
2.19 We recognise that the Minister may
wish to defer a full answer on some of these questions until the
Commission's proposals have been examined and developed in more
detail. However, we are very concerned that there should be sufficient
time for debate on these proposals and related matters before
any decisions are taken about the Community's accession to EUROCONTROL
and before the June Transport Council, whichever may be sooner.
2.20 Meanwhile, we do not clear the document.
23 (17077) 5803/96; See HC 51-xvii (1995-96), paragraph
5 (24 April 1996). Back
24 (17077)
5803/96; See HC 51-xxv (1995-96), paragraph 8 10 July 1996). Back
25 Air
Traffic Management: Fifteenth
Report (1995-96), HL Paper 105. Back
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